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Foreword
Something I have learnt from my teachers is that the hallmark of intellectual virtue is the 
ability to pose interesting questions, A lesson I have come to understand on my own, however, 
is that this ability is something we develop over time and with practice. ir ever.
As a typical student of political philosophy I began rather inaccurately by taking an unlimited 
interest in the social world in its infinity, and then, in how it manages to hang together and to 
survive the immense dangers that beset, and after that, what prospects there are for hope. Still, 
as such a student, I realized that in order to  get some clues to  satisfy my curiosity, in order to 
find my way, I should enter into another world, a world o f  sophisticated representations o f  
that infinity. Somewhere on the way I figured out that the immense world that was the object 
of my interest and the sophisticated representations that somehow tried to measure it were not 
entirely set apart from each other.
Next, an apparently interesting question arose: if, as I was ready to believe, the social world is 
a world o f representations, as people act and react according to the way they re-present the 
situation in which they themselves happen to be, to what extent are the sophisticated 
representations (our social philosophy and theories) sensitive and responsive to this 'fact'?
This was my background question and its motivation. Shortly after they were established I 
went on to select my 'cases' and my 'targets'.
I then decided to  concentrate on the so-called individualist tradition, aware, however, of the 
conceptual difficulty in identifying a clear-cut definition of'individualism1 as Steven Lukes had 
pointed out in his book Individualism. I dealt with this problem by taking the word of the 
authors as authoritative of their 'individualisms' and trying to make explicit the kind o f  
individualism they claimed to follow. I felt that the individualist assumption of the precedence 
of individuals in relation to the social dimension as far as a representation o f the social world is 
concerned was a good starting point just because, as far as I could see, it seemed to be more 
provocative and challenging a premise than the converse presupposition o f  an already existing
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social dimension. Striving to prove their case individualist theses may display what a non* 
individualist cannot, or it seemed to me, namely, what a representation in terms o f individuals 
is able to achieve and what it is not able to achieve at all, both in terms o f explanatory findings 
and normative horizons for our social world. Of course, the result is a variegated lot of 
’individualist' arguments.
So, in its form, the thesis is an arranged collection of interpretative exercises whose initial task 
is to discern distinct images o f the social world amidst contemporary social thought, as these 
present the social order in terms of the interaction o f individuals. Accordingly, it identifies and 
subsequently comments on three major varieties o f idealized representations o f the social 
order, in recent developments of the so-called individualist tradition. The unifying thread is 
that these varieties of individualism are reconstructed so as to spell out the kind of 
idealization undertaken, as well as the extent to which, on the way to the ideal, the social 
dimension is reduced to the individual one.
Let me introduce the three varieties by explaining the title. (Note, however, that the order of 
the exposition is slightly different from the order in the title mainly for rhetoric reasons as 
explained in the Introductory Chapter.)
Thus, the 'one' world ('autonomy' or 'beyond self-interest'), is designed so as to include pieces 
of contemporary thinking, such as Rawls's theory o f justice and Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism, 
that share the assumption that the social order conceived in terms of individuals may achieve 
some ideal of well-orderliness. To this end, an assumption o f the individuals as also moral 
persons is adopted. As individuals are conceived as moral persons, one individual is sufficient 
to reason to an ideal society ; the reduction of the social dimension into the individual one is 
therefore maximum in this approach.
Conversely, the 'two' world ('self-interest and beyond'), is organized around the distinct vision 
that the social order may be thought o f  exclusively in terms of the self-interest of the 
individuals. The ideal social order is either conceived as coordination of people's plans or also
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efficient cooperation among them. The premise regarding the possibility o f reduction is tha t 
there is some reality in thinking of at least two distinct rationalities or thought processes, no t 
easily reducible to one other, and that this not only matters but there is some sense in trying to  
model this situation as strategic thinking.
The third framework, the 'many' or 'interacting individuals' world, is built upon the Hayekian 
alternative picture that the relationship between the individuals and the social order, at a  
conceptual level, is complex, the individuals being somehow incomplete in their capacities as  
sources of order unless they are envisioned as interacting- or rule-guided- individuals. This is  
not to say that the 'social' is prior to  the individual dimension, let alone that it can b e  
accounted for wholly in terms of individuals* conscious actions, as intersubjective rules tha t 
are not always consciously followed can account for the complex result which is a society. A  
more complex view is proposed where the social order surfaces from the interaction of th e  
ineducibly many. The ideal here is that some (progressive) order come into existence.
As a final target-related word, my interpretation o f this set o f theories stresses the fact that 
reductionism and idealization are in each approach related to its distinctive knowledge 
assumptions. In connection with my initial question as to the theories' sensitivity to our social 
world being a world of representations, I became convinced that the 'many1 outlook is the  
more sensitive one in that it takes up a less naturalistic stand regarding our knowledge 
possibilities both as social actors and theoreticians.
Neither the collection of cases nor the way it is arranged, it goes without saying, is intended to  
be exhaustive. Besides, though arranged in accordance with some common concerns which 
may suffice to  characterize and, to a certain extent, contrast the three accounts here, I have 
tried to  remain sensitive to the internal characteristics o f each one, in terms o f  some of the 
debates within them and the way these related to my unifying question o f how the arguments 
by the authors examined configure an individualist image o f  social order, as well as the degree 
of idealization and reductionism involved. O f course, much o f my personal view is revealed by  
the way I have undertaken to present the distinct perspectives, as sometimes critique appears
x
much more in its connotation as criticism than as analysis, on one occasion it even amounts to 
the reconstruction ab ovo o f a vision from a certain tradition (Part III). In particular, the 
treatment in Part II is quite conventional as far as Rawls and Harsanyi's theories are 
concerned, in Part I it is quite unconventional, whereas in Part III I try to rescue the social 
philosophy of Hayek and reconcile it with non-conservative premises, so that my own 'God’s- 
finger’ is much more perceivable.
In between the extreme demands of a thorough collection and those of an idiosyncratic choice, 
I have worked out an effort o f systematization in the Introductory Chapter, where a taxonomy 
is tried out and the sequence o f the chapters is justified.
xi
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INTRODUCTORY PART
Introductory Chapter
PICTURES
One may think o f social order with the assistance o f a number of images, as when one portrays 
it as somehow resulting from the interaction of its individual members,1 or else as somehow 
being the prior background condition for individuals to exist and flourish.1 2
In the individualist literature, the social order is often seen as the outcome of a  peculiar choice 
made by rational individuals. In this version, I submit, two kinds of purposes may be supposed 
of the individuals, as well as two types o f rationality. Thus, the ends of the individuals 
(dimension E below) may be regarded, roughly, as public or non-public, in the sense that th e  
social order may be depicted as the result o f individuals' efforts either to  achieve it o r  
something else (e,g., their private aims). Similarly, rationality (dimension R below) may b e  
seen as param etric or strategic (to follow Elster's (1979) suggestion), according to whether 
or not, on the way to furthering their ends, individuals supposedly frame their choice decision 
in terms of some suitable parameters, external to their deliberation.
We can characterize individuals' coordination with a simple 2x2 matrix, and it takes little tim e 
to figure out a number of theories that might illustrate its four cells,3 providing four different 
pictures. Provisionally, the following examples chosen from economic, social, and political 
theories, are suggested:
1 Kukathas and Pettit (1990) suggest the distinction between two varieties of individualism, namely, a  
'metaphysical' and a 'moral' individualism. A deep and forceful conceptual discussion of 'individualism' is found in  
Lukes' (1973) seminal work. Since this is not my main topic o f interest here I let the authors speak for themselves 
about their self-proclaimed 'individualism'.
2
On some varieties of this image, see Turner (1994).
3 1 disregard, a t th is point, whether these theories are explanatory or normative.
3MATRIX 1
R\E non-public public
parametric a )
standard economic theory and 
conventional welfare economics
(II)
social choice theory; Rawls & 
Harsanyi's normative theories
strategic (HI)
standard game theory
(IV)
public goods & collective action 
literature
To a certain extent, each cell displays a model of the coordination of individuals' actions, 
combining rationality and purpose as variously defined. Economic coordination, to take one 
example, may conceivably result either from parametric or strategic choices over non-public 
outcomes (where the individuals are not directly interested in their overall coordination), cells 
I and III respectively, according to whether it is portrayed by the model o f a representative 
individual (who takes the whole as a parameter) or by that of game theory4 *(where the 
individual relates to some other individual(s) at a local level). In the same way, more general 
images of social coordination might be evoked as illustrations o f cells I and III, such as those 
depicted in the tradition of eighteenth century Scottish thinkers,3 or else, that which has 
followed the von Neumann-Morgenstem's game theoretical vision of social interdependence.6 
On the public side of the matrix, social coordination may be said to emerge from parametric 
choices o f rational individuals aiming at the very constitution of the social order, as in 
normative theories where a well-ordered society is the result of a morally constrained 
individual’s rational choice among social states. It may also be said to result from the strategic 
reasoning o f maximizing agents willing to produce it for their own sake, as in versions of
4
See Kirman (1992) for a discussion of the use of the assumption of the representative individual in economics. 
See also Kirman (1995) for an alternative ev olutionary and game-theoretic approach of economic coordination.
3 See Hirschman, 1977.
6 See Leonard, 1995. See also chapter 3.
4public-goods literature.
Prima fa c ie , a natural contrast emerges here with respect to the usual explanatory one­
dimensional classification o f views o f  social order in terms of causal or intentional 
explanations, where individuals are thought of either as simple agents to that order or also as 
effective designers of it. In the latter case, the agent strives for the order and it arises as a  
result, whereas in the former the agent does not intend the order in his actions though it 
emerges all the same. This classification seems to coincide with the non-public/public 
distinction in the matrix above.
On the way to  delving into the traditional taxonomy, one might make the rather trivial point 
that an action always follows an intention (or may be understood in its terms) or else that 
intentions have an imporiant causal aspect to  the extent that they determine the result. In order 
to avoid a conceptual confusion at this point, it would be useful to somehow restate the  
distinction between causal and intentional explanations. To this end, I suggest that in a  
strictly causal explanation, we the theoreticians, are not supposed to be able to  trace all the  
way from the effects back to the originating causes, as we are not able to predict the course o f  
events from a knowledge of their causes, whereas in an intentional explanation we are 
supposed to be able to do so in either ways.
Having restated the causal-intentional distinction in the above way, we are now in a position to  
entertain the rather non nonsensical idea that a cause, in a purely causal explanation, may 
accommodate an intention on the part o f  the individual agent, only that this intention is to be 
systematically falsified7 after all the causes have realized their effects. Conversely, in a strictly 
intentional explanation the intention is to  be corroborated when effects are computed. This 
perception has the merit of highlighting the role of social actors' conjectures and expectations 
in the social intercourse, however conceived, as crucial intermediaries between intentions and 
actions. The assumption is that this epistemic material of our actions has an impact over both
7
Falsified here does not mean 'contradicted' but indicates that there arc other things to coordination than individuals’ 
intentions alone, that intentions are 'surpassed' o r transcended' somehow.
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5explanatory and normative reach of our theories.
The idea of qualifying causal and intentional models in terms o f falsification’ or 
‘corroboration’, in epistemic terms, that is, acquires more significance in the light of models 
where social actors are variously thought of in their capacities as both 'consumers' and 
'producers' of knowledge during social intercourse. This aspect may, to a certain extent at 
least, be captured through the parametric-strategic distinction. In a typically parametric 
approach, the decision-makers are only consumers o f knowledge, since they gather 
information about an external and fixed environment. In a strategic-like approach, however, 
they are also producers of knowledge as they are conceived as capable o f affecting, through 
their reciprocal conjectures, one another's decision-set, rendering the environment more 
internal and liable to change. Hence, this qualification has been advanced with the purpose of 
outlining the epistemic assumptions that dwell in the models I consider here and, in 
accordance, proposing a more complex notion of rationality.
In this way we can make sense of the rather intriguing cases where the agent wants to design 
the result (as if in the intentional model) and fails altogether (as if in the causal model) for two 
rather distinct epistemic considerations (in the one case because the actor sees his 
environment as external and fixed, in the other because he sees it as endogenous and mutable. 
These are the paradoxical worlds in cells II (e.g., social choice theory) and IV (public-goods 
literature). We may then take an interest in following the ways-out conceived by proponents of 
these images. In particular, I would suggest here that models in cell II (parametric-public) tend 
to design a moral conception o f individuals on the way to a solution (I am thinking o f Rawls 
and Harsanyi's normative theories), whereas models in cell IV (strategic-public) tend to fail in 
the absence of this moral premise (eg ., public-goods literature).
More generally, models in the bottom half o f the matrix, cells HI (strategic-non-public) and IV 
(strategic-public), tend to find more stable deductive solutions in their parametric 
counterparts, cells I and n. For example, standard game theory tends to develop much in the
6same line as a general equilibrium framework on the way to solution concepts/ and standard 
public goods literature has often found a way out in its implicit injection of some cooperative 
willingness (a moral premise) on behalf of its rational agents,8 9 which is better worked out in 
normative approaches (in cell II). Apparently, then, the parametric field exerts an irresistible 
magnetic attraction on its strategic counterpart, while the distinction between the aspects o f  
consumption and production o f knowledge is somehow impoverished:
A
I
I
l
I
(I) (ii)
( in ) (IV)
Recall that these four cells represent different nuances o f the same basic idea that the social 
order results from the rational choices o f individuals, the nuances having to do with the scope 
of the ends pursued and the description of the environment as more or less ‘rationality- 
friendly’ in terms o f the knowledge available. The expected result is that rational individuals 
can coordinate their efforts relying on rationality alone; it is also claimed that this coordination 
is efficient and just or *well ordered'. Cells III and IV will be discussed in chapters 3 (on game 
theory) and 2 (on the public-goods literature), in Part I. Cell n ,  meanwhile, will be the subject 
of Part II (on Arrow’s social choice theorem and normative theories). Taken together, cells 
IV, III and II stand respectively for the efficiency, equilibrium and justice 'normative* attributes 
of a conception o f  social order and peculiar knowledge assumptions.
Now, a non-reductionist although to  a certain extent still individualist thinking depicts
8 See Kirman, 1992. See also chapter 3.
9 See chapter 2.
7individuals as incomplete choosers who must have their incomplete rationality supplemented 
by evolving and irreducibly intersubjective multi-level rules on their way to building up the 
social world. In this case, the gap between intentions and actions is somehow filled by social 
forms of knowledge that cannot be fully articulated at the level of the individual consciousness 
and that are nonetheless acquired individually; indeed, even intentions are somehow 
conditioned by these individually acquired social forms. Let us call this view an evolutionary 
notion o f rationality that may be illustrated by Hayek's social philosophy and is the subject of 
Part QI. This account adopts a complex vision of the role o f  knowledge in our conception of 
the social world which emphasizes both its social and subjective aspects (as individuals are 
seen as producers o f knowledge by the very act of consuming it). It also points to the limits of 
normative reasoning due to that complex picture. The incorporation o f this new outlook 
expands my former matrix into the following:
MATRIX 2
R\E non-public public
parametric
Part II
(Arrow's social choice theory; 
Rawls & Harsanyi's normative 
theories)
strategic
P a rti
(Game Theory)
Part I
(Public Goods & Collective Action 
Literature)
evolutionary
Part i n
(Hayek's Social Philosophy)
With the addition o f this evolutionary perspective, I will assume that this field exerts an even 
stronger magnetic attraction on the strategic field than the parametric (though this can be only
8partially illustrated here with the cases in cell II), and that it may also provide a better stand fo r 
the parametric field.10
( I ) ( i n
( i n ) ( I V)
(V )
Having thus characterized the landscape, the thesis discusses four cases out of the five 
depicted in matrix 2 (cells II, III, IV, and V) with a view to  outlining their vision o f the social 
world and, in particular, the degrees of reductionism and normativity involved in their 
'individualisms'.11 In this latter regard, I assume that in spite o f current understanding the four 
cases I examine in the thesis are nonetheless normative to a certain crucial extent, and that this 
normativity is related to the way in which these theories deal with the knowledge issue.
One way o f structuring the material is to  move from the more reductionist and more idealized 
views to the lesser, or from the simpler to the more complex, in other words, from the ’one* to  
the 'many*. Another way involves the dramatization o f the sequence where we may think of the 
Parts as addressing each other's weaknesses. This latter option is undertaken here mainly for 
rhetoric reasons, as I am not claiming that particular issues unanswered by a framework are 
settled by another, let alone that one approach succeeds in settling its predecessor in the  
sequence. What has interested me most is collecting, interpreting, and discussing well- 
accomplished arguments, within the general typology proposed in my modified matrix, 
regarding the rather hot' issues that dwell in the individualist tradition and which constitute the 
basic foundations of its view of social order: the normative and the epistemological. My 
ultimate purpose is to see the extent to which what these arguments achieve is affected by
10 Note that the numbers in the m atrix still refer to the cells and not to the Parts of the thesis.
11 Terms such as 'indniduaJs,>param etric\ 'strategic1, and 'evolutionary* rationality, and ‘public1 and 'non-public' 
purposes are to be given conceptual density as long as the authors whose ideas we are discussing provide the 
necessary elements to this end *
inumipi
9their epistemological stand.
To this end, the sequence adopted seems quite natural. So, I begin in chapter 1 by proposing a 
discussion of self-interest from the perspective of an eighteenth century European tradition, as 
the starting point o f the set o f theoretical and philosophical propositions that are examined in 
the thesis. It is an interpretation that downplays the explanatory and normative abilities of the 
behavioral assumption of self-interest. I proceed, in Part I, by discussing two theories that 
disregard the advice implicit in the tradition and assume the possibility o f self-transcendence 
from a self-interest viewpoint ("Self-Interest and Beyond"). Self-interest can account for the 
public good of order in chapter 2 (on order as a public good) and can provide a basis for 
mutual coordination in chapter 3 (on order as strategic interaction). However, we find that a 
moral assumption is actually rather out o f place in chapter 2, to the effect that the public good 
of order can only be provided if cooperative behavior is assumed on the part of the individuals 
which is at odds with the theories' starting point. Part II then follows in a natural way as it 
takes up moral arguments and assumes that the (well-ordered) social order has to rely not only 
on self-interest but also on a moral motivation of the individuals' ("Autonomy: Beyond Self- 
Interest"). In the same way, insofar as we have an epistemic issue in chapter 3 that nonetheless 
received only a rather light treatment, where the equilibrium condition depends on a postulated 
convergence of beliefs, Part III is proposed as an in depth approach to the knowledge 
conditions and their hopefully coordinating role in a conception of the social order Finally, the 
epistemological discussion in Part III also addresses normative arguments raised in Part II as a 
certain view of knowledge, of which the argument in Part III is critical, is in fact crucial to the 
normative outlook taken up therein. The epistemological starting point in Part III also has 
effects on ethical arguments since it outlines the limited ability o f reason to articulate our sense 
o f justice. However, it is then argued that space for conscious and active intervention cannot 
be ruled out solely on epistemological grounds. The result is that the 'interacting individuals' 
version of the social world displayed in Part III proposes a non-reductionist understanding of 
it that still arguably encompasses horizons for hope. Moreover, this vision is more in line with 
chapter 1 where it is claimed that self-interest, or individual rationality for that matter, needs a 
context in order for it to mean anything.
^ K jà T h ììi7ì?i»*»iyà
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A simplified scheme may depict the links between ideas very briefly:
* Part III
Chapter 7
Of course, I realize that to advance this scheme as a thorough integration proposal would 
require a different treatment from the one I have undertaken here. My main aim is to propose 
an in terpreta tion  of a set o f theories in terms o f the particular ways in which they view th e  
social order as resulting from the interaction between its individual members, keeping an  
interest in the reductionism and normative purposes involved. Having spelled out their 
’individualisms’ as well as the epistemological and normative presuppositions, an effort o f  
theoretical integration might then follow as subject for future research.
Introductory Part
Chapter 1
P arti
Chapter 2; Chapter 3
Part II
Chapters 4, 5& 6
Chapter 1
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF SELF-INTEREST?
H'hat proposition is there respecting human nature which is absolutely and universally true?
Ife know ofonly one: and that is not only true but identical: that men always act from  self-interest.
(...) Butin fact, when explained, it means only that men. i f  they can, will do as they choose. (...) But 
we gain nothing by knowing this (...) In fact, this principle is just as recondite, and ju st as 
important, as the great truth, that whatever is, is. (...) [l]t is (...) idle to attribute any importance 
to a proposition, which, when interpreted, means only that a man had rather do what he had rather 
do.1
1. Introduction
In approaching self-interest one is easily led to seek its roots in the history o f ideas. One reason 
for this is that it seems unhelpful to begin with an analytical scrutiny of the concept in order to 
find what self-interest should be. Another reason is that taking the concept at face value, and 
accepting its 'realistic* appeal, does not explain its many puzzling aspects. In order to avoid 
engaging directly in the deciphering o f these conundrums, we shall pursue a somewhat crooked 
path, and follow the development of this notion in political arguments of the XVIIth and XVIllth 
centuries in connection with some benefits it was expected to bring to social and political 
interactions at the time, if not to social and political order tout court.
Accordingly, it seems to be well established that the notion of self-interest came to attract a 
considerable attention as an important piece of political argument around the mid-seventeenth 
century. It is also generally considered that the concept reached its heyday in the eighteenth 
century, in that not only was it widely used to explain phenomena but its possibly virtuous by­
products were also appreciated and even hailed.
Less remarked in its subsequent use, however, a third element besides the above explanatory and 
normative aspects has surfaced in my reading. This is that, though an increasingly powerful 
category, self-interest was forcefully taken as a negative or residue idea - a defensive claim for 
the existence o f something (or someone) else beside the State or the love o f God that should be 
taken into account as a new element within political arrangements and arguments. The ’self s-eye 
view' appeared as a rather non-place, a space open to political dispute.
1 Macaulay,1978:124/125.
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O f course this latter aspect very much qualified what could be expected merely on the basis o f  t h e  
two other claims, namely, the explanatory and the normative claims, in that the ex pec ted  
explanatory and normative virtues o f  the category 'self-interest' were somewhat constrained b y  
its negative trait, and for good reasons. We may anticipate tw o o f these reasons: that self-interest 
emerged as a mere cogito - the epoch attempts to build up a new standpoint from the disagreeable 
alternatives; and, that whenever taken too seriously it would reveal symptoms o f  endogenous 
decay.
This chapter is divided into two additional sections and a brief final comment. In section 2, it i s  
argued that the category self-interest was taken up, in the XVIIth and XVUIth centuries in t h e  
context o f the debate concerning the content o f the public interest. In particular, it was th e n  
suggested that the public interest should be somehow compounded of the many interests o f t h e  
people, but also that the plurality o f the interests should be somehow constrained by what w a s  
acceptable for all . In subsection 2 .1 ,1 outline the politically unstable state of the world that f i r s t  
gave rise to  conjectures concerning the political benefits that might result from the inclusion o f  
the interests o f the many subjects. Subsection 2.2 presents a number of diagnoses at the time th a t  
identified factionalism as the source o f political instability. In subsections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 self-­
interest is discussed with respect to its ability to overcome political instability, while subsection 
2.6 presents an argument against altruism.
In section 3 , 1 introduce a number o f the ways of integrating private and public interests w hich 
were brought about in the eighteenth century. From the arguments given in the preceding section, 
follows the idea that the public interest should express a compatibility of the many private 
interests; a question then arises as to  what forms this compatibility took in eighteenth century 
arguments. I have suggested that three modeb of compatibility emerged: that conflicting interests 
were seen in some pieces of literature as the efficient causes o f  public compatibility; that though  
conflicting, the many interests were still expected to  be compatible; and the somewhat hybrid 
belief that though the public interest is materially caused by the competition o f the many interests, 
there still remains some undesirable effects from this form o f  association, the many interests 
causing both common goods and common bads'. (It is argued in subsection 3.5 that th e  
undesirable effects of a society moved by the self-interest o f  its members might be overcome b y
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the Lockean idea that the General Good should somehow enter into the very constitution of the 
ends of the individuals, shaping their ends as citizens. But this is another, non self-interest based, 
story.)
2. The State of the World, The Causes, and The Solution
2.1. 'Masteriess world'
There is some literary evidence that Europe in the seventeenth century was seen by many at the 
time as a 'masterless world* which had come to that state of affairs due to a peculiar constitution 
of the public space, as an arena, that is, o f the power of the privileged.2 The public sphere thus 
depicted was regarded by many as unacceptably unstable. A revision of the extension o f the polity 
was in order, or, at least, since the established model was collapsing, there was room for such a 
claim to revision.
Gunn (1969) reports on this interesting public debate which took place in England in the mid­
seventeenth century on the meaning of'public interest'. Much of the rationale o f supporters of the 
Parliament was that this latter would better represent genuine public interest to the extent that it 
opposed the King's interest with a variety of interests of the many subjects of which it was 
compounded. The common condition o f  subjection and the multiplicity o f interests (not easily 
reduced to one head o f private interest) would prevent any privileged view from prevailing.
Public interest was interpreted, in this version, as being (loosely) compatible with the many 
interests of the subjects, and, as it were, as opposed to the one held by the King. To be sure, these 
many interests had different interpretations according to the various political principles maintained 
by their leveller, radical, or democrat supporters. However, they all had in common an eagerness 
to question the identity between the public interest and the interest o f the King or, as it used to 
be paraphrased at the time, the King's duty to his people.
Much of this opposition, Gunn argues, was linked with a conviction that one should look 
elsewhere for the grounds to justify a political order beyond law and historical precedent. One
2 See Gunn (1969), Mansbridge (1990) and Hirschman (1977).
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such justification was provided by the doctrine of the natural right and its peculiar identification 
of reason with self-preservation.
The path from historical precedent or religious authority to  the doctrine o f natural rights thus 
interpreted can be easily followed through the literature that has looked into the different forms 
taken by the doctrines of social contract, as in Gough (1957). In particular, Mansbridge (1990) 
makes the rather sharp point that social contract doctrines before Hobbes used to describe the so- 
called state o f  nature as a state of war o f some against others, among different factions, but not 
as a generalized state of nearly open conflict, of all against all. After Hobbes, however, opinions 
changed.
The political problem within the terms envisaged by the traditional way o f thinking, with their 
stress on partisan struggle, seemed to have reached a dead-end. We may conjecture, then, that 
alternative arguments were initially motivated by the need for a novel description o f the political 
problem. In particular, distinct descriptions were welcome which would hopefully discredit the 
belief that factionalism was a na tu ra l ground for a political order, since by natural was meant 
'doubtless' or 'self-evident', hence, outside the reach o f  critical scrutiny.
We may be tempted to conclude that the instability and subsequent suspicion surrounding the 
naturalism o f prevalent notions o f public-interest appear to have inspired a re-description o f the 
political problem as a somewhat non-natural one. In particular, suitable reasoning, it was 
sometimes suggested, might help us to  decompose factions into smaller units, and, by breaking 
their bonds, other links could be substituted which would be more congenial to a stable political 
order.
One such argument, as is well known, describes the political problem as that o f overcoming a 
'natural' state o f  equality among individuals, a state o f universal conflict calling for an overruling 
authority. Or, to  put it differently, a vision where (overall) conflict not hierarchy is ’natural'. The 
roots o f this 'naturalness', though, are to  be found in the demands, logical or otherwise, imposed 
by this thought experiment.
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2.2, Factions and Trump: even if 'th e  way be broad enough'
Again, why should one postulate that individuals, not parties or factions, are the units of the 
'commonwealth'?
In his essay "Of Parties in General", Hume argues that a faction displays a sense of cohesion that 
competes with that of nation, a cohesion which surfaces from engendering a difference, practically 
an 'animosity', among equals:
the influence of faction is directly contrary to that o f  laws. Factions subvert 
government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men 
of the same nation, who ought to  give mutual assistance and protection to each 
other. (Hume, 1994:34)
Hume identifies three kinds o f factions, originating from interest, affection (an 'imaginary* 
interest), or principle. Of these, the worst is that stemming from principle because it is the least 
accountable in reasonable terms and, accordingly, potentially more disruptive in its political 
effects. The rather shocking characteristic o f this latter is that it may engender a conflict where 
there is no scarcity, thus revealing a disturbing and basic aspect o f human nature:
Two men, travelling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass 
each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite 
principles o f religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking; though one should 
think, that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might 
proceed, without interruption, in his own course. But such is the nature of the 
human mind, that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches it; and as it 
is wonderfully fortified by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it shocked and 
disturbed by any contrariety. (ibidem:36/37)
This contention by Hume suggests the basic, though no less problematic role of'opinion' in social 
interaction, as he considers opinion to govern people's actions. When principles held by people 
have an expression in different forms of actions, he argues, the relation is straightforward and we 
may understand the ensuing conflict. But when different principles do not have a necessary 
extension in conflicting practices, referring rather (as in Hume's time) to theological dogma or a 
proposition concerning the divine character o f royalty, it reveals something else about human 
nature. It indicates that we are looking to  convince others o f  our ideas, to take hold on their 
minds. Thus, the connection between opinion and action becomes importantly enough
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problematic We might foster conflict where there need be none. Furthermore, it is hard to s e e  
how a legislator could overcome this tendency.
A dangerous potential was also ascribed to opinions by Hobbes, as is well known The confusion 
caused by opinion, according to Hobbes, has its expression in speech itself, the faculty of nam ing 
things and creatures:
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, 
because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all 
times, are in the common discourses o f men, o f inconstant signification. For 
seeing all names imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but 
conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid 
different naming of them. For though the nature o f that we conceive, be the same, 
yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions o f body, 
and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture o f our different passions. 
(Hobbes,1968:109/110)
Language is contaminated by opinions and these, as it were, are coloured red by passions. W here 
are we to find the 'true grounds for ratiocination', for in ratiocinating we merely resort to w o rd s  
and their consequences?
Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmétique is a 
certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason o f  any one 
number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well 
cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, 
as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, 
set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to  whose 
sentence they will both stand, or their controversies must either come to blowes, 
or be undecided, for want o f a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also on 
all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than 
all others, clamor and demand right Reason forjudge; yet seek no more, but that 
things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as 
intolerable in the society o f men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to  use for 
trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they 
do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in 
them, to  be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying 
their want o f right Reason, by the claim they lay to  it. (ibidem: 111/112)
And afterwards, he concludes that:
■*!*!■ !!!!!??!! nr
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The light o f humane mind is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first 
snuffed, and purged from ambiguity, Reason is the pace, Encrease o f Science, the 
way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end And, on the contrary, Metaphors, and 
senselesse and ambiguous words are like ignes fa tu i, and reasoning upon them is 
wandering amongst innumerable absurdities, and their end, contention, and 
sedition, or contempt, (ibidem: 116/117)
Hume and Hobbes both assume that opinion is the problematic source of conflict, and at the same 
time Hobbes suggests that it is the material we should try to improve. We should erect the right 
Reason in the person of an arbitrator that must not advance one particular opinion as the 
yardstick. And it is clear that this viewpoint is to be artificially constructed. The meaning of 
politics as an art surfaces here, and one is tempted to compare this sense of art, pace Hobbes, with 
the Greek techne, which is a kind of knowledge that deals with material that contains contrary 
forces, as opinions might be potentially disaggregating or aggregative (whether or not properly 
shaped by political argument).
As a side point, Hobbes* belief in the arbitrary origin o f  civil laws is usually taken to mean that 
according to him, any law is better than none. But it is also possible to interpret this latter 
contention, in view of the preceding reasoning, as meaning that no specific law is demonstrably 
better than any other, though one may have preferences among the possible range o f laws, and 
Hobbes himself seemed to have spelled out his own preference for a specific form o f government. 
In my judgement, though, his emphasis is rather on the logical necessity of an artificial procedure, 
a system of references by which the conflict of opinions might be reasonably reduced, a procedure 
he deems to be quite demonstrable, whereas a reasonable defense o f a specific set o f laws would 
require us to face the question of'trump'.
2.3. Self-preservation
It is quite clear that to construct the arbitrator's viewpoint, or the place o f the public interest, 
Hobbes would need to clarify its bearing on people's interests, for although it cannot stem from 
one 'mans Reason', nor from 'one group o f mans Reason', not even from a great many men's 
approval, it must have a hold in people's interests. We should look for something universal, so to 
speak, above the parts, that can be figured out by anyone. The natural law which obliges everyone
jL J U a
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to look after their own preservation might yield a proper understanding o f a situation of extrem e 
conflict as well as a possible way out, Hobbes argues.
One’s interest, therefore, could be safely constructed so as to envisage in some sense both civ il 
peace and self-preservation. In this way, civil laws were thought necessary to convey a reasonably 
acceptable meaning to self-preservation, this latter as somehow committed to peace. Conversely, 
self-preservation would impose a considerable restraint on the laws themselves, where pub lic  
interest was understood as the commitment to preserve people's lives.
In support o f  this view it is worth recalling some o f Hobbes anthropology . Hobbes populates th e  
state o f nature with people whose private concerns lead to  overall conflict. What is implied in  
these concerns? Their exact content initially deserved a rather extended taxonomic treatment b y  
Hobbes, as when he came to list the passions in the 'Leviathan*. Thus, he seems to suggest, w e  
should identify our irrational impulses and some o f their clearer consequences before we co m e 
to define our interests. So, the first step is to get a map of the selva oscura. Then, he goes on t o  
investigate our natural duties to  ourselves, the so-called natural laws. But, then, we are still in a  
somewhat muddled territory, for our interests seem to shift from the natural and to some ex ten t 
harmless drive for self-preservation to the drive for power over others. This uncertainty is  
sufficient to  instill a broader instability for even the internal boundaries o f self-preservation, h e  
seems to suggest, may be not so clearly demarcated. Self-interest has a potentially dangerous 
strategic component which may make the death of one's neighbor the safest way to  attend to on e 's  
natural duties to oneself. The suggestion, which we are hardly compelled to resist, is that w e  
should somehow create the circumstances where self-preservation is compatible with peace, th a t 
is, with a common understanding o f  what self-preservation is.
Hence, the message o f (the laws of) nature is not so straightforwardly comprehensible; we need  
a translation in terms of civil laws. These, in turn, would constrain the content o f  self-interest, 
through clear obligations, thus complementing the lack o f  information with respect to our rea l
interests.
mwwF
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We may then see that to a certain extent the definition o f the public interest enters into the 
definition o f self-interest in that the former raises barriers to the latter's extension Besides, these 
barriers appear to be somewhat constitutive of the meaning o f self-interest as well, as when we 
talk about 'real' interests. That is, again, this view 'constructs' the self-interest as that portion of 
human motivation which is congenial to civil peace.
In support of this view, it is interesting to refer, again, to Gunn's report of English public debate 
at the time. During the mid-seventeenth century debate there were some who maintained that the 
public interest was not the King's version o f it but the common interests o f the rich, or their 
property interests, for as proprietors they were deemed to be more concerned with the nation's 
affairs. Subsequently, during the debate, property rights took the rather expanded form of private 
rights, and the common interests were thus interpreted as private rights. These rights, in turn, 
were defended as at least compatible with peace and order, in a typical manoeuvre to  minimize 
'the amount of tension between particular interests and the general interest’.3
In the same spirit, the demand for private rights was interpreted by some as a demand for the 
expansion o f the realm of individual liberty. Concerning the definition of public interest Gunn
writes:
Gradually there was a shift in emphasis from recounting a king's duties to his 
people to defending people's right to look to their own interests, (Gunn, 1969:16)
This quest for a degree of privacy in the understanding of the public was expressed in the fact that 
political arguments, according to Gunn, were moving 'from grounds o f law and historical 
precedent to grounds o f reason and natural right':
Some of the earliest Parliamentmen had chosen to plead from the laws o f necessity 
and nature, and especially that o f self-preservation, (ibidem: 17)
A sort of unanimity arose with regard to one meaning o f  private interest that should be rejected 
altogether: that no man should be judge o f his own case. Here we cannot help recalling Hobbes' 
'trump' and Locke's concerns on the matter. Still, following Gunn, this claim was taken over by
3 Cf. Gunn. op. cit.
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the Parliamentmen to the effect that Parliament should be either an impartial arbiter between th e  
King and the people, or whenever it could not possibly claim impartiality, it should decide the case  
not in its own interests but in those o f  the people.4
Although there seemed to be unanimous rejection o f  partiality in the above sense, an unanimous 
positive standpoint was still missing. Actually, the concern with self-preservation, as Gunn points 
out, only moved the debate one step further, for the meaning o f self-preservation, and what is  
required to strive for it, was far from clear. People had fought precisely for different meanings o f  
it. Some maintained that self-preservation meant property rights, others like the democrats o f th e  
time disagreed. It was claimed, for instance, that 'taking away a man's property was the effective 
equivalent o f  taking away his life’.5 And, although the general Leveller viewpoint attempted to  
emphasize that 'in order to give the public interest some content' we should care for particular 
interests, some objected that these interests interpreted as property rights were but a measure o f  
official oppression, or, as John Warr, a seventeenth century democrat, believed
The people's good had always been the professed of government... The people had 
to be given an opportunity to  express their interest, a good as understood by 
themselves, (ibidem: 29)
And here, Gunn argues, we unravel a concern with the enlargement of the area of private freedom 
which was far more demanding than the claims for the preservation of the rights o f private men, 
as these had been previously understood (and, thereby, the commonwealth).
The interests o f  the many, we may conjecture, could be either the common interests they have, 
as in their expression under the property rights movement, or as potentially more conflictual with 
greater diversity, as implicit in the democrats' claims for a more complex (and less aggregative) 
concept of the public.
Like later democrats, those o f  the seventeenth century tended to move from the 
position that common men best knew their own interests to the position that they 
might then understand the public interest. They were not concerned with all o f a *3
4 Cf. Gunn, op. cit., p.18.
3 Cf. Gunn, op.cit., p.20.
man's private interests, just those that most closely impinged upon public policy. 
Nor were they very explicit about the interests of single individuals, preferring to 
ascribe rationality to the public However, they were obviously implying certain 
things about individual men. It happened that the individual interests of concern 
were rights valuable to all, and, indeed, insecure unless all shared them Securing 
life and property was the sine qua non o f further individual fulfillment. The 
connection between the public interest and those pressing particular interests that 
could be satisfied by political means was extremely close. (Gunn, 1969:30/31)
We come to see that, in this debate, a somewhat bewildered identity of interests with public and 
private, was being worked out. The rejection of a trump or a partisan perspective was carefully 
made explicit, as well as a loose interpretation of the public as somehow assuring the sine qua non 
of individual fulfillment however it was to be understood.
One particular instance of an unacceptable view of conflict is given by a change in the connotation 
of the word 'party' in the mid-seventeenth century and the relation of that change with a similar 
modification in the idea of conflict itself:
In the mid-seventeenth century, Parliament, which had almost all its decisions by 
consensus, began making most decisions by majority vote.(...) Political parties 
began to develop into ongoing organizations that remained in conflict from one 
election to another, and the word party began to lose its unsavory connotation o f 
a faction opposed to the common good. (Mansbridge,1990:6)
The demand for cohesiveness began to fade from the immediate agenda and to move to a farther 
and more permanent (however imprecise) background.
Thus, within a sound political environment, parties, and conflict between them, were no longer 
viewed with reproach. Parties, in the old sense of the term, were to give up their blind (and 
lexicographical, so to speak) allegiance to some revealed conception of the common good.
In conclusion, having resisted the received meaning o f public interest, the epoch has come to 
make a case for self-interest and to rehabilitate it from its pre-modem exile. At the time self- 
interest must have appeared a somewhat refreshing idea, once it had been purged o f all partisan 
connotations.
2.4. 'Read Thy S e lf: Self-interest as a Cogito
At this point, I venture, two related but different thoughts spring from the image of a ’masterless 
world'. The first is a sort o f anti-naturalistic outlook concerning the political realm, to the extent 
that the prevailing political order appeared unstable. The question arises, What is 'natural' in the 
political domain? Certainly not the traditional way of doing nor the traditional way of justifying 
what has been done.6
Images of the political body as an artificial construct abounded from the seventeenth century on, 
the most famous was Hobbes' which somehow echoed and radicalized an earlier Machiavellian 
insight into statecraft. Much of the idea behind social contract theories, according to Gough, is 
that any political society had to be understood in terms of a kind o f arrangem ent between 
individuals.
The other thought, which follows the preceding, refers to a reflection on the subject who is 
criticizing the received view on the foundations of political order, a subject that is bom as a sort 
o f critic. The idea is that self-interest is built up as the motivation o f this new political subject 
(albeit a residue of other motivations) and as a sort of cogito of the political experiment. We may 
be suspicious about the trustworthiness of all our motivations, yet the doubt is there. Is this doubt 
grounds enough to support a reliable political space? What could possibly be a 'Self s-eye view’, 
in contrast to (or in the abstraction of) God- and King’s- eye views? These are questions, I 
presume, that were on the XMIth and XVTIIth century agenda.
Thus, recall the Hobbesian Head thy self, which is meant to
teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions o f one man, to the 
thoughts and Passions o f another, whosoever looketh into himself, and 
considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, and fear &c, 
and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, 
and Passions o f all men, upon like occasions. (Hobbes,1968:83)
22
6 This anti-naturalistic outlook that seems to have emerged in the seventeenth century could arguably be taken as an act 
o f’self-consciousness’, following the facts pointed out both by Mansbridge (of religious authority faltering in the face 
of actual conflict) and Gunn (of historical precedent failing to provide argument enough to prevent resistance).
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Hobbes invites his reader to engage in critical inquiry, which involves introspection and 
comparison. In his suggestion, such a reading of ourselves might enable us to define a common 
path. An important part of this inquiry is then turned into a concern with the driving forces that 
motivate individuals, and the corollary question of how is it possible that anyone can effect a 
genuine detour from his particular experience to the more general grounds involved in mankind0 
This is especially important given that he who is to govern a whole Nation 'must read in himself, 
not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind'.7
There is certainly something abstract in this critical scrutiny, in the mode of work which is set in 
motion typically in political philosophical reasoning. In political philosophy, says Rawls,1 the work 
of abstraction is set in motion by deep political conflicts. The deeper the conflicts the higher one 
has to elevate one's thoughts in order to achieve a somewhat reasonable common ground among 
the contending parties.
My suggestion of self-interest as a political cogito, encompasses some of Rawls' insight regarding 
the conflictual nature of the subject, and also the necessity of finding a more abstract perspective, 
but concludes with a persisting (though enlightened) doubt. In the 'career' o f self-interest, 
somewhat artificially traced here, I identify a search for a more definite content whose conclusion 
is still a doubt.
Moreover, in this sense, the notion of self-interest cannot claim precedence in the search for a 
meaningful sense o f  public interest. I shall take the view that the category self-interest emerged 
(or re-emerged in its modem clothes) from a critical inquiry into the meaning o f public interest 
and became so intertwined with the definition of public interest that it gave rise to the ensuing 
confusion, that still persists concerning the normative character or optimal qualities of selfishness, 
and which has nearly nothing to do with its canonical Smithian (let alone Hobbesian and Humean) 
form. *
7 Cf. Hobbes, op.cit., p.83.
* Rawls, 1993(a), p.44.
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2.5. A pproaching the meaning of self-interest: a limited claim for universality
Some meanings o f interest in the seventeenth century, Gunn reports, were 'concernment* and 
’importance’ to  oneself There was also the meaning of interest as the nature or the normal 
function o f a thing.
People occasionally referred to the interest of the inanimate objects. It was one 
way o f naturalizing the term, by equating it with that law of nature commonly 
thought to be reflected in the activities and nature o f all things. [Charles] Herle 
showed his acceptance of this usage when he described interest as *the center of 
everything's safety* and noted that one might then speak o f a stone's interest in 
obeying gravity and staying on the ground. (ibidem:43)
Less physically (or in a more moral fashion), interest, according to Hirschman (1977), was 
worked out in arguments concerning the possibility o f a political order of the early seventeenth 
century, as an alternative to the disagreeable options of passions and reason. Passions were 
viewed as destructive and reason as ineffectual. Interest, in turn, was claimed to gather the 
benefits of both motivations, namely, the element o f reflection contained in reason as well as the 
strength normally associated with the passions.
This rather normative character of the notion o f interest soon gained an illegitimate heir, when 
arguments advanced at the end of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century exalted 
the explanatory qualities of the category, as in Helvetius's famous physical analogy o f the laws o f  
motion in the physical world and laws o f interest in the moral universe.
The distinction between uses and abuses o f the notion o f interest is better felt through the contrast 
between the following two maxims: the early-seventeenth century dictum that 'Interest will not 
lie', and thus was hoped to constitute a more reliable basis for a political order than traditional 
sources, and Interest Governs the world’, a late seventeenth century maxim and a comparatively 
explanatory claim that supersedes the artificial, normative, character o f the category, as 
Hirschman notes.
In any case, predictability and constancy, Hirschman goes on to remark, were nicely neutral 
qualities usually expected from self-interested action in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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In the same vein, Holmes (1990) contends that self-interest appeared attractive when compared 
to the disagreeable alternatives, examples of which abound in the writings o f Hume, Smith, and 
others, such as self- and socially- destructive behavior, and that its attractiveness was to be found 
not so much in its explanatory reach as in its expected normative qualities. It was understood as 
a set of comparatively less noxious forces that drive human action, thus compatible with social 
interaction.
Holmes invokes, for that matter, the Humean distinction between self-interest and factionalism. 
This latter was claimed by Hume to be more basic, as a sort of inborn tendency to identify 
emotionally with an exclusive group for the deeper reason o f an even more basic human feature, 
namely insecurity. Shared opinions hold groups together, but may lead individuals astray (and 
society as well). Interests and all human affairs are, in the end, governed by opinions, as a 
consequence, people often fail to grasp their real private advantage or to act upon it when they 
do grasp it. (We may wonder whether this is why Smith preferred to substitute trade for 
persuasion, when he elaborated what he felt to be a basic human inclination, namely, the 
’commerce' of ideas.)
Again, the suggestion of a fluctuating content of self-interest implies that this might be supported 
by deeper-rooted opinions, as those stemming from proper political argument. In particular, we 
may conjecture, in a somewhat Humean spirit, that whenever people follow well-established 
conventions they are acting from well-grounded opinions.
In any case, Holmes maintains, a fundamental reason for the intellectual success o f the category 
of self-interest lies in its potentially egalitarian and democratic connotation, against the backdrop 
of the alternatives. Thus, universal self-interest makes people discover conflicts o f interests 
everywhere, particularly between the interests of citizens and those of the wielders of power. 
From this postulate, people are entitled to a certain scepticism with respect to  any self-proclaimed 
manifestation o f 'public interest'. Smith, Holmes goes on to  argue, used the postulate of self- 
interest to criticize the idea that harmony was a natural product o f hierarchy and subordination, 
and supposed that harmony could be the (imperfect) result o f conflict, instead.
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In any case, Holmes and Hirschman stress, self-interest, in the good tradition o f Hume, is b u t a  
prudential maxim, something one predicates of one another, as a vicarious presumption, we m ig h t 
still say, that may be made to support a stable political arrangement.
We come up then, after Hirschman and Holmes's remarks, with a stress on the normative co n ten t 
of self-interest, and normative in the rather weak sense of a category that is shaped as a restriction 
to other comparatively more deleterious motives to human action. Thus, in a somewhat surprising 
conclusion, 'self-interest' appears to have been bom as a constraint!
Another course, taken by Hirschman (1986), clarifies a little further what it is that is restrictive 
about self-interest.
He further pursues the roots of the interest category in discourses related to statecraft as well a s  
individual behavior, only to find Machiavelli and Mandeville at the beginning o f  everything a n d  
he performs a second turn on the self-interest screw. This time, we learn that the category in fa c t  
evolved from euphemism, in its sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forms, to tautology, in i t s  
eighteenth century and later expressions.
So, according to Hirschman, the concept of interest has evolved with time from euphemism t o  
tautology. As a euphemism it used to hide, and in this sense to  restrain, the real forces or driving 
mechanism behind either the sovereign's acts (as in Machiavelli) or individuals’ behavior (as in  
Mandeville), making them work for the public. Interest, in Hirschman's view, was, in Machiavelli^ 
discourse, an euphemism for cruelty, mendacity and treason, much in the same way as avarice a n d  
love o f lucre, in Mandeville's writings.
It was fundamentally the aspect o f rational calculation attached to interest, in its euphemistic 
function, Hirschman argues, which was given emphasis under its early expression in the X V Ith  
and XVUth centuries. Interest-propelled action meant the action that had undergone a calculation 
of costs and benefits, and this would mean a prior restriction on the range o f possible actions.
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The widespread use of the category was followed, according to Hirschman, by a feeling of 
mistrust toward activities that were aimed at achieving the public interest directly, as in Adam 
Smith. Smith declared, for that matter, that he 'had never known much good done by those who 
affected to trade for the public good'.9
In this connection, it is worth noting, again, that the normative sense involved here is quite 
negative, that is, it refers to expected widespread benefits from private actions or interests 
stemming from restrictions interest would impose on the range of possible actions rather than 
from a straightforward identity between the private and the public spheres. As a corollary, it also 
refers to the negative judgement attached to a non-mediate connection between the private and 
the public standpoints.
However, a thorough 'Invisible Hand Doctrine' was worked out, encompassing a measure of 
'realism' in the consideration of human affairs as well as 'an attempt to prove that it is possible to 
achieve a workable and progressive social order with these highly imperfect subjects, and, as it 
were, behind their backs1.10 This doctrine of identity of the interests of a part with those of the 
whole, with its seemingly forceful elements of'realism' and 'alchemy', took the fairly vulnerable 
form o f a paradox, argues Hirschman.
As Hirschman points out, although the 'Invisible Hand Doctrine' became highly fashionable in 
eighteenth century arguments, as the paramount form of the doctrine of the identity o f interests, 
it also began to be attacked by those who felt there were other springs for action, such as 
sympathy, generosity and so on, and those who began to lament 'the world we have lost'
On the other hand, it is worth recalling that a substantial support to the doctrine o f self-interest 
was given by utilitarianism. In particular, utilitarianism laid down a strong defense against the 
objections to the doctrine of interests raised by those who lamented its failure in expressing the 
multiplicity of human motivation. This defense greatly contributed to the form of tautology self-
9 Cited in Hirschman, op.cit., p.40.
10 Cf. Hirschman, op.cit., p.45. *
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interest has taken since the XVTIIth century onwards. This is the second element o f  a doctrine o f  
self-interest Hirschman addresses.
As a tautology, interest was taken to cover any area o f human aspiration and deed, and in this 
sense it would not impose any constraint on choices or motives as the difference between a 
passion of whatever kind and an interest had virtually disappeared:
In the end, interest stood behind anything people do or wish to do, and to explain 
human action by interest thus did turn into the vacuous tautology denounced by 
Macaulay. (Hirschman, 1986:50)
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the fact reported by Holmes (1990) that Mill had thought of the 
difference between self- and public- interest as one o f  degree, rather than o f  kind. An argument, 
it goes without saying, that leaves room for the aggregative conception o f  the public interest 
typically entertained in utilitarian arguments.
On closer inspection, the shift from euphemism to tautology in interest-based arguments 
represented a difference in emphasis in the two elements that Hirschman identifies as constitutive 
of the notion o f  self-interest, namely, rational calculation and self-centeredness. The implicit 
contention by Hirschman is that in as much as self-centeredness gains prominence in matters o f  
'self-interest', as in the utilitarian argument, a real restriction on behavior is missing and, as a 
consequence, any account o f someone's actions in its terms will be but a truism.
As a matter o f  fact, the aspect o f self-centeredness and the related problems had already received 
extended attention by Macaulay in his famous critique of Mill's Essay on Government. In his 
essay, Mill translated self-interest into the calculated search for a net balance between pleasures 
and pains. Macaulay then spelled out a warning against the idea o f reducing every motivation to 
self-interest thus interpreted:
What proposition is there respecting human nature which is absolutely and 
universally true? We know of only one: and that is not only true but identical; that 
men always act from self-interest. This truism the Utilitarians proclaim with as 
much pride as if it were new, and as much zeal as if  it were important. But in fact, 
when explained, it means only that men, if they can, will do as they choose. When 
we see the actions of a man, we know with certainty what he thinks his interest to
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be. But it is impossible to reason with certainty from what we take to be his 
interests to his actions: one man goes without a dinner, that he may add a shilling 
to a hundred thousand pounds: another runs in debt to give balls and masquerades. 
One man cuts his father's throat to get possession o f his old clothes, another 
hazards his own life to save that of an enemy. One man volunteers on a forlorn 
hope: another is drummed out o f a regiment for cowardice. Each of these men 
has, no doubt, acted from self-interest. But we gain nothing by knowing this ( ..) 
In fact, this principle is just as recondite, and just as important, as the great truth, 
that whatever is, is (...) [I]t is (...) idle to attribute any importance to a 
proposition, which, when interpreted, means only that a man had rather do what 
he had rather do, (Macaulay, 1978:124/125)
What does self-interest (deductively) impose? Macaulay responds that we are unable to  determine 
this.
But, what if the meaning of self-interest be somehow restricted?
Then, Macaulay replies, the 'doctrine that men always act from self-interest', though ceasing to 
be identical, ceases also to be true."
I presume that by this statement he meant, in modem terminology, that the doctrine could be 
falsified, and, in this sense, could lose its deductive pretence. In particular, Macaulay believed that 
another motivation, the desire to be loved, should be put on a par with self-interest, in that it 
conceivably might also raise regulative barriers to human action.
As a conclusion, it seems that against the logic of parties or factions, or passions or ineffectual 
Reason, self-interest intimates a logic of universality, be it in the form of predictability and 
constancy, or egalitarian and democratic potential. This logic nevertheless proves hard to translate 
into a precise calculus (the elements o f which are a bit cloudy) and therefore seems to  give rise 
to an explanatory account of human action. The element o f self-centeredness is not a very reliable 
basis and should not be exaggerated lest tautological reasoning become widespread. The element 
o f rational calculation, in turn, seems to be more promising (but only vaguely so), insofar as it 1
11 Cf. Macaulay, op.cit, p.125.
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stands for an ingredient of concern with one's future (and thereby, hopefully, a concern with o th e r  
people) that is deemed to be present in a self-interested action.
2.6. Self-interest and altruism
Why the stress on 'self?
I quote Hirschman (1986), for a natural reason:
when action is supposed to be informed only by careful estimation o f costs and 
benefits, with most weight necessarily given to those that are better known and 
more quantifiable, it tends to become self-referential by virtue o f the simple fact 
that each person is best informed about his or her own desires, satisfactions, 
disappointments, and sufferings. (Hirschman, 1986:36)
But, even this ’inner thing' might be informed by some kind o f 'otherness' as conjectured b y  
Pizzomo (1986), in situations, that is, when the identity o f the sel£ and hence, its aims an d  
sources o f satisfaction, are given by its identification within a collective entity and without th is  
reference, that particular self vanishes as such and becomes a different one. So then, one is invited 
to think of the self as anything but a natural entity. Thus, to take the self as a natural entity is n o t, 
arguably, a good way to address its priority. He seems to ask, in quite a broad sense, 'what is th e  
meaning of 'self without any broader references?'
Another reason might emerge from the contrast between self-interest and altruism. One might 
wonder why this other-regarding motivation was not given the same attention as self-interest. In  
this respect w e quote Elster (1990):
There is a sense... in which self-interest is more fundamental than altruism. The 
state o f  nature, although a thought experiment, is a logically coherent situation. 
But w e cannot coherently imagine a world in which everyone had exclusively 
altruistic motivations. The goal o f  the altruist is to provide others with an occasion 
for selfish pleasures - the pleasure o f reading a book or drinking a bottle o f wine 
one has received as a gift. I f  nobody had first-order, selfish pleasures, nobody 
could have higher-order, altruistic motives either... The point is just a logical one. 
I f  some are to be altruistic, others must be selfish, at least some of the time, but 
everybody could be selfish all the time. But we cannot conclude, neither in general 
nor on any given occasion, that selfishness is the more widespread motivation. 
(Elster, 1990:45)
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Thus, according to Elster, a principle o f parsimony (rather than realism) could be invoked as a 
defense o f the 'methodological priority1 o f self-interest. The logical issue is sound enough and, 
perhaps, provides a reason for the success of social-theoretical explanations relying on self- 
interest. If  we had to choose just one motivation and the candidates were (a well-established 
definition of both) self-interest and altruism, self-interest is conceivably a more basic motivation 
in terms o f a coherent thought experiment. Short o f a well specified experiment, we may still 
dispute the priority o f the 'self.
Still, another reason for the relatively scant success o f altruistic motivation as compared to self- 
interest is provided by Larmore (1987), and it refers to the more demanding requirement that 
altruism would fail to pass the Kantian 'universalizability' test. Except under the very unlikely 
conditions, the argument goes, o f unanimity of opinions or coincidence of interests, the scenario 
of generalized benevolence would fail to deviate from the Humean circumstances o f justice, for 
conflict would be a more plausible result o f individuals' striving for the public interest. These 
efforts, Larmore contends, would translate into different and irreducibly conflicting conceptions 
o f the 'good life'. This is actually one o f the objections Kant raised against the principles of 
happiness, that they might allow for a variety of judgements as to what universal happiness 
imposes.
But, on reflection, is self-interest more likely to pass the test? O f course the answer depends, 
again, on how one defines self-interest. Thus, if we think o f  self-interest as vaguely as the 
demands self-preservation would impose in a lawless world, the universalizability test would be 
far from proved. But, again, Kant discusses the case where self-love (or private happiness, as he 
calls it) might be elevated into an objective (that is, universal) practical law. And this might make 
the 'happiness of others' rely only upon the universality of self-love and not on an 'additional 
external spring', such as a sympathetic disposition towards others:
let the matter [of the maxim] be my own happiness. This (rule), if I attribute it to 
everyone (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every finite being), can become an 
objective practical law only if I include the happiness of others. Therefore, the law 
that we should promote the happiness of others does not arise from the 
assumption that this is an object o f everyone's choice, but merely this, that the
form of universality which reason requires as the condition o f giving to a maxim 
of self-love the objective validity o f  a law is the principle that determines the will.
(Kant, 1978:304)
Nevertheless, practical contradictions are expected to arise, and, according to Kant, to indicate 
an independent origin of our moral judgements. For example, we would not take the services o f  
anyone as a steward who, we were told, had taken his duty to his private happiness to the point 
of stealing. However, it is arguable that this restriction would be important only in an ideal 
community. Hence, self-interest might limitedly survive (with some normative loss) the 
universalizability test, under, that is, a somewhat restricted range of possible meanings, one o f  
which could even harbor a weak form o f  'altruism without inclination* (as universal private 
happiness).
And what about altruism? Under Larmore's interpretation altruism has the sense o f action 
motivated by one’s conception of the good life, that is to say, by one's idea o f what is or would 
be better for everyone. Does altruism necessarily require that much? One may think of many cases 
where concern for the happiness o f another might straightforwardly translate into attending to his 
uttered needs. To be sure, we may easily think o f cases where we doubt he gives true voice to his 
interests, and still, feeling concern for that person, we may engage in a conjecture on what his true 
interests are. We may then achieve some principles that might guide our altruistic endeavors 
towards that person. Subsequently, we may feel that these principles conflict with the presumed 
one guiding the explicit utterances o f the individual, and, the next step left to us would be to  
further pursue a criterion that would reduce the conflict, and so on. Let us suppose this conflict 
to persist. Our determination to promote the other person's happiness might eventually establish 
the kind of'conflict without scarcity* Hume feared so m uch.
But is it still a matter o f altruism? This altruist looks more like Ivan Karamazov and his general 
concern with humankind and absolute contempt for the man next to him. Let us take the less 
caricaturable case where the altruist's duty is something in between attending one's voiced needs 
and the search for a consistent action stemming from a fully articulated conception o f the 'good 
life*. This altruism would be something that calls for construction in terms o f as well as within a 
political argument. Under this form, altruistic motivation is less easily dismissed.
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A subsequent question we would have to address relates to  the 'autonomy' of altruism, an 
expression taken from Elster, and we might ask: What is the meaning of'having an interest in 
other’s happiness*? Is this reducible to self-interest? As for the latter question, the answer may be 
in the negative. One might think, for example, that Macaulay's claim for an equal priority to the 
desire to be loved to that already conceded to self-interest, stemmed from a belief of his that this 
desire is derivative o f a more basic love for others, and therefore not reducible to a primarily 
selfish motivation. Hence, the fact that some of my desires are fulfilled by other would be a 
derivative o f my overriding desire to  so please the others as to let them please me, rather than as 
rooted in 'self-interest'. And a possible reply to the effect that this is but a form o f the selfish desire 
to be accepted by others would only stress the point we have been making concerning the artificial 
(for that matter, arbitrary) character of the issue, for a question would naturally arise why these 
others are so important to us. This would but engender an infinite regress, as it now seems clear
So, we may justifiably ask, is this question interesting enough to dwell on? It may well be that all 
we need is a category that sufficiently separates the 'self and the 'others'. The problem with 
altruism, in this sense, is that to postulate it is already to assume what we would want to know: 
can we have a concern with others? How ‘many* others? Is this foundation enough for the 'public' 
interest?
It is thus arguable that to postulate a difference between the 'others' and the 'seifs’ standpoints 
would constitute the first step in a critical inquiry into the meaning of the 'public', that is, the 
interests of all. So, the rather minimalist view shall be taken that self-interest perhaps carries the 
advantage, at least in the interpretation presented here, o f uncovering the two distinct elements 
in this inquest, namely the 'self and the 'others'. As a category, it does not take for granted that 
a concern with others overlaps with the public space (it is actually an open attack on this idea) and 
requires for that matter that a distinction be spelled out. It also makes no claims about the real 
motivation behind people's action. It claims rather to be a locus o f  critical reflection, at least in 
the proposed interpretation of it as a political cogito.
34
It may well be that we do not know the real motivation behind our actions; then the next-best is 
to have a place from where to assess candidate motivations. Besides, altruism may not be a strong 
enough defense against the risk o f  factionalism.
3. Self- and  public-interest intertw ined
3.1. The 'identity  of interests' issue
It has by now become quite clear that research surrounding the meaning of self-interest involves 
a reciprocal limitation: on the one hand, assigning a place for self-interest in political arguments 
indicates a desired limitation of the content o f  public interest; on the other hand, finding the limits 
o f public interest helps to shape more finely the contours o f self-interest (in that civil peace 
constrains the acceptable meanings o f self-interest, to say the least).
Two such different thoughts regarding the regulatory principles supporting the civil laws are 
provided by what we call a theory o f the hedges', of laws, that is, that in the words o f Locke, 
'hedges us in only from bogs and precipices', and Locke's theory of'Laws of Justice’.
The easiest parallel here is that with negative and positive freedom, as suggested by Locke 
himself. A contrast, by the way, that gave rise to momentous reflections in modem political 
thought. In this study, I shall not pursue this distinction, though referring to it on occasion, for 
it does not seem to be very helpful regarding the immediate purposes here. I shall be mainly 
interested in uncovering some of the motivations behind these different senses o f the law that have 
some bearing on self-interest, that is, focus shall be put on the underlying views o f compatibility 
between the private and the public spheres.
Gunn specifies the frame of interest as far as statecraft is concerned around the seventeenth 
century, identifying the elements o f it as well as some new areas into which it would be expanded:
A variety o f  factors forced the political argument o f  these years into the relevant 
patterns. The tendency to conceive o f  the pressing problems as domestic, the need 
o f relating the interests o f governors and governed and the appreciation that the 
significant political units were interests, all contributed to the pattern. 
Circumstances caused writers to frame an understanding o f  the public interest
colored by the requirement that it should be a condition understood by common 
men and realizable by their activities; less persuasively, they sometimes suggested 
that somehow a union o f interests might encompass all antagonistic forces 
(Gunn, 1969:53)
The public interest, these arguments have suggested, might be reconstructed as the compatibility 
o f private interests. Working on this suggestion, we discern, insofar as private interests may be 
conflicting, two alternative insights into the connection between public and private interests, one 
pointing to an interplay between the two which is compatible though conflicting and the other 
pointing to an interplay which is compatible because conflicting.
This point needs some clarification. The idea is that when one departs from a monolithic view of 
the public interest, as implied in hierarchy, then one has to cope with the somewhat difficult issue 
o f  conceiving how the many interests will be compatible with the common interests of all, 
encompassing of course the more likely cases where full coincidence o f those interests is missing. 
Having in mind, then, that conflict is at least a corollary o f the multiplicity o f interests, one has 
to find an argument that accounts for compatibility-cam-conflict.
Two possibilities have arisen: that private interests, though conflicting, are compatible with the 
public, or else are compatible precisely because they are conflicting. In the former case, the task 
is to prove how competitive claims might be rendered compatible, or at the very least to explain 
why we should not expect competition to be disruptive; in the latter, though, one has to prove an 
identity between harmony and conflict, that is, one needs a causal connection, a view of 
competition as the very mode of harmony. In this latter case we might think, for instance, that the 
'social cement*, acquiring an economic meaning - like money, or the 'general equivalent' - relieves 
the environment from direct animosity, the shockingly concrete forms conflict might and has 
taken.
In any case, the present hypothes is that in its modem cradle, that is, from its seventeenth century 
rehabilitation and maturing through the eighteenth century, interest was not properly speaking 
given the prominence achieved in the full 'compatible because conflicting' argument, though a 
w eaker form o f  it was attempted in the eighteenth century. But this weak 'compatible because 
conflicting’ argument provided an excellent occasion for us to  meet the weaknesses of the interest
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’project* itself for in exaggerating the benefits that could unfold from the workings o f mere self- 
interest, however barely conceived, it succeeded in spelling out the dangers o f any utopia based 
on it.
As is now clear, I shall not espouse Elie Halevy's typology straightforwardly, at least not without 
any further reflection. In particular, it is contended that the argument of a natural identity o r 
fusion o f  interests which Halevy ascribes to Smith's Wealth o f  Nations deserves a substantial 
restatement.12
* * *
A paradigmatic form of compatibility was worked out in the seventeenth century in a rather 
complete social philosophical form through the social thought o f the descendants o f French 
Jansenism. It displayed a clear-cut separation between social order and progress on the one 
hand, and morality, on the other.
This compatibility took the sharp and shocking form of a paradox, whereby the lack o f  
morality was made to work for social progress. However, the intellectual sources and 
motivations o f the rhetorical form the argument took have recently emerged.13 According to  
Horne (1978), it was mainly aimed at criticizing contemporary conservative religious and 
social thought.
The social philosophy o f Jansenists, specially Pierre Nicole's, worked out the rehabilitation o f  
self-interest. It expressed essentially a double message, the one that the imperfect creatures 
individuals are, often not well ¡mentioned towards their neighbors, they nonetheless might be 
made to work, precisely as they are, in the common interests o f  all. The second message, 
placed at a deeper level than the former, was a rather skeptical admonition, namely that 
individuals' intentions are hard to uncover, not only to others but also to themselves. Social 
progress is not a matter of morality but o f  how we can make the most out o f  a bad lot. This is
12 See Halévy, 1972.
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not meant to dismiss morality altogether, for Jansenists believed that *the state o f doubt' is morally 
sound, and it is well ingrained in human beings precisely because of the presumption of 
transcendence that man harbors as well as the absence of any evidence of its existence
The knowledge of our humility makes us proud, and the knowledge o f our pride 
makes us humble, We are strong when we know ourselves to be weak, and we are 
weak when we think ourselves strong. Thus this obscurity which prevents us from 
seeing whether we act from charity or amour propre, far from being detrimental 
to us, is salutary, (cited in Van Kley, 1987:77, quoted from Pierre Nicole)
So, in the seventeenth century Jansenists had rehabilitated self-interest in the form of self-love, 
to  its full potential.14 Pierre Nicole's social thought, for example, grounded self-interest in the 
peculiar Jansenist cosmology: man is entitled to self-love in so far as he lacks a metaphysical, 
external reference, for God's support is inscrutable. A prosperous society is then considered to 
result as an unintentional outcome of man's efforts at erecting himself with reference to the next- 
best thing he has available, namely, others in the same environment and the things of this world. 
Accordingly, a flourishing society may be shown to be a consequence of three basic human 
desires: the fear o f death, the love of lucre, and the desire to be loved. These constitute what 
Nicole calls 'enlightened self-love* which may take remarkably congruous forms in social 
intercourse:
although nothing is more opposed to charity which relates everything to God than 
self-love (am our propre) which revolves entirely around the self, yet there is 
nothing more similar to the effects of charity than those o f self-love. So closely ’! 
does it follow the same paths that one could hardly do better in marking those to 
which charity should lead us, than to  discover those actually taken by enlightened 
self-love, (cited in Van Kley, 1987; 73, from De la Charité et de l'amour propre)
The lack of a metaphysical reference, though, leaves an indelible mark: man is always in a state 
o f  uncertainty as to the true premises o f his and others’ acts.
the principles o f charity and am our propre are no more introspectively 
distinguishable than they are in their external effects. Behind 'formal and express 
reflections' flit *transitory thoughts', 'confused ideas' as well as 'imperceptible 
movements o f the heart', which escape conscious attention and render one aware
14 A full report of Pierre Nicole's social thought is found in Van Kley (1987), and pieces of his argument are referred 
to in Home's (1978) comments on the social thought of Mandeville.
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o f  the complexity o f one's own motivations. Charity and amour propre are 
therefore often found mingled together in one's motivations *without his being able 
to  know for certain which of the two prevails.' (Van Kley,1987 77)
A congenial standpoint was worked out by Mandeville. In fact, the Jansenist influence o n  
Mandeville's social thought has been extensively reported .l5 The famous Mandevillian paradox 
of vices turned into virtues carries the double limitation already made explicit by Jansenists and 
many French moralistes highly esteemed by Mandeville, such as La Rochefoucauld and L a  
Fontaine, that neither are vices noxious nor virtues beneficial. M ore to the point, vices and virtues 
cannot be taken at face value. As Home remarks:
The general vision stressing the limitations of reason is buttressed by the reduction 
o f apparent virtues to the effects o f mere passions.(...) The reduction o f virtues to 
amoral or vicious passions means conversely that characteristics normally thought 
o f as vicious can lead to virtuous actions, at least in terms of public appearance.
(H om e,1978:24)
La Rochefoucauld made the point rather crudely:
self interest speaks all sorts of languages and plays all sorts of roles, even that of 
disinterestedness, (cited in Home, 1978:24)
In the end, the private sphere surfaces as something quite opaque, for in it reside at least tw o 
distinctive classes o f driving forces. However, this does not seem to constitute an obstacle for the 
public to  exist or even flourish * provided, Mandeville somewhat prudentially adds, some 
institutions and more generally laws are made so as to channel our motivations to  the public good.
3.2. Compatible-because-conflicting arguments
Despite these complications, some eighteenth century thought appeared to  have been more 
confident about a sort of naturalistic conciliation between the 'fact' (of interest) and the norm o f  
morality. Helvétius,16 for example, identified self-interest with true virtue and acts o f the most 
enlightened charity. The true virtues which he expected to  emerge from interacting self-interested 
individuals were probably grounded in his commercial vision o f social intercourse and its
15 See Horne, op.ciL 
16Cf. Van Kley, 1987.
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underlying view of conflict as diversity. He coined the famous analogy between physical laws and 
moral laws thanks to the discovery of self-interest and additionally stressed the truly moral effects 
of self-interest.
He was, therefore, at the same time revealing his Jansenist ancestry, since he was working on the 
Jansenist's rehabilitation of self-love, and sentencing its dissolution, by short-cutting the careful 
distance Jansenists had traced between self-love and virtue, as Van Kley (1987) remarks.
Montesquieu and James Steuart provided some justification for self-interest in a somewhat 
optimistic mood, stressing, in turn, suitable political effects, according to Hirschman (1977). 
They claimed, in different ways, the unique belief that an interest-based order was bound to 
produce positive political results, provided the beneficial spirit o f commerce prevails. In particular, 
Montesquieu believes,
the spirit o f commerce brings with it the spirit o f frugality, of economy, o f 
tranquility, o f order, and o f regularity. In this manner, the riches it creates do not 
have any bad effect. (Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, cited in Hirschman, 1977:71)
And, in the Hirschmanian spirit of'interest countervailing the passions':
it is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though their passions may 
prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so.
(cited in Hirschman, 1977:73)
Commercial spirit has the ability to make interests prevail over passions. More to the point, 
commercial spirit has the faculty, according to Montesquieu, o f resisting the harmful tendency of 
arbitrary power, and defending the inviolability of individuals, through creative devices, like the 
invention o f the bill o f exchange and trade tout court.
Also, for James Steuart, the intricacy and delicacy of an economic community has remarkable 
political effects:
The power o f a modem prince, let it be, by the constitution o f his kingdom, ever 
so absolute, immediately becomes limited so soon as he establishes the plan o f 
oeconomy which we are endeavoring to explain. I f  his authority formerly
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resembled the solidity and force the wedge (which may indifferently be made use 
of, for splitting of timber, stones and other hard bodies, and which may be thrown 
aside and taken up again at pleasure), it will at length come to resemble the 
delicacy o f  the watch, which is good for no other purpose than to mark the 
progression o f time, and which is immediately destroyed, if put to any other use, 
or touched with any but the gentlest hand.
A modem oeconomy, therefore, is the most effectual bridle ever was invented 
against the folly despotism ... (cited in Hirschraan, 1977:85, quoted from An 
Inquiry into the Principles o f Political Oeconomvl
The interdependence among different people which commerce enables deepens their bonds and  
enlarges the sphere o f  common interests, and again restricts the area of political advances o f th e  
powers that be.
Here we identity the defense o f  a commercial community which would arise form the releasing 
and flourishing o f the complementary interests o f its members. It was expected, except for some 
of Montesquieu's doubts concerning the moral character o f self-interest, that the sovereign should 
eventually succumb to the rule o f generalized self-interest.
In conclusion, according to the rather stereotyped model of conciliation of interests displayed in 
'compatible-because-conflicting* arguments, the many interests are seen as rather directly causing 
the public interest, as they are understood as diverse, complementary and interdependent interests 
(and not, say, as antagonistic, rival and redundant ends). The resulting commercial society both 
requires and yields in its functioning, a suitable moral and political environment.
3.3. Corapatible-though-conflicting argum ents
Hume, however, imagines another way o f connecting self-interest and the public interest, through 
conventions. He sees conventions as a general sense of common interest (which induces everyone 
to regulate their conduct by certain rules), which emerges from a (mutually expressed) common 
sense o f (self) interest. He notes that convention
is only a general sense o f common interest; which sense all the members o f  the 
society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct 
by certain rules. (Hume, 1985:490).
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It is in one's interest to attend to other's interests, he argues Yet not in the same sense of the 
butcher, the brewer, and the baker with regard to the hungry man, which is incidentally, an 
argument Smith raises against the possibility of benevolence in a large and ongoing society (and, 
of course, an argument also for a possible justification of selfish interaction).
Hume, instead, deals here with the following conjecture of an individual: *to leave another in the 
possession o f his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me* One 
performs an act, that is, in the supposition that the other will reciprocate. The expectation of an 
action on the part o f others conditions one's own action, and conventions render the fulfillment 
of this expectation a certainty.
When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, 
it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be 
called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of 
a promise, since the actions o f each of us have a reference to those o f the other, 
and are performed upon the supposition, that something is to be performed on the 
other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or 
convention, though they have never given promises to each other, (ibidem.490)
We should note that what is at stake here is an increase in the degree of predictability o f social 
intercourse. The resulting order, as it were, is not necessarily harmonious compatibility, or at least 
it is not predictably so. The idea, rather, is that we have room for a common ground, so to speak. 
It is in one's interests to pursue common interests, everyone has an interest in the overall 
regulation, but that is all we can say, the solution being somewhat external to the terms o f the 
problem. That is, we cannot deduce or anticipate it, although we know that whenever it obtains, 
then certain conditions must have been present.
At this point, it is worth recalling that, although self-interest can have this regulatory role, Hume 
has some reservations about the widespread use of the category to explain (and justify) social 
interaction. In fact, Hume warns that the notion of self-interest is not something that we may 
discover to govern real life interactions, but something that gains meaning in contrast with some 
disagreeable facts, more basic than it, like factionalism. Interests are only less dangerous than a 
number of more violent and volatile passions', and, he believes, in the words o f Holmes (1990), 
that 'interests, passions and norms conspire together to shape every human action'.
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Interest is governed by opinion, so we should not be bewitched by its apparent clarity It should 
emerge, as far as possible, from a contrast with non-selfish motivations, social (like benevolence) 
as well as non-social (like self-destructive passions, and factionalism). The more lively reality o f  
factionalism seems to show how cloudy our minds can be when they fail to grasp our advantage 
or how blind our acts can be when they fail to  express our advantage. In the evocative somewhat 
Humean words o f Holmes (1990):
Individuals are not clear-eyed about their interests. But they are always impatient 
of being contradicted. We long mightily and involuntarily to  find our own beliefs 
mirrored in those around us. We grab anyone by the lapels who crosses our path 
and hammer the unlucky party into agreement because our minds are shocked by 
contrariness and fortified by consensus. This compulsive intolerance is not a 
symptom of arrogance but o f  insecurity. We do not compare alternatives in such 
situations but clutch desperately at straws. And what we seek is not a strategic ally 
in the pursuit o f power or plenty but symbolic comfort from a fellow believer. This 
primitive need explains why we are so ’keen' in controversy, something neither 
self-interest nor even vanity could explain. (Holmes, 1990:274)
Hume's recommendation o f caution with the notion of self-interest may be said to  parallel those 
o f Nicole and Hobbes, advancing a skeptical doubt concerning the presumption of 'virtuous' 
thoughts and acts. Nicole was drawing attention to the rather moral and external limits o f  self- 
interest whilst Hobbes and Hume emphasized the problematic character o f self-interest in politics. 
Among other things, Hume was probably addressing the open optimism o f some o f his 
contemporaries with regard to the hailed curative abilities of self-interest. And, by the same token 
and still paralleling Nicole's attempts, he was implying that self-interest should be seen cautiously, 
that is, something that we should be attracted to because o f the 'disagreeable alternatives', and in 
this sense, an important piece o f an enlightened (critical, for that matter) political argument. 
Again, Holmes has a nice interpretation:
Compulsive and impulsive reactions as well as spontaneous sympathies and 
antipathies provide a foil for 'calculating self-interest', giving sharp contours to 
that idea. For Hume, and many others, 'interest' is a useless category unless it is 
reserved for one motive contending with others. He rejects imperialistic attempts 
to explain all behavior by invoking the rational pursuit o f  personal advantage. 
Motivational reductionism is unattractive, among other reasons, because it robs 
'calculating self-interest' of the specificity it acquires when viewed against a 
backdrop of selfless urges and thoughtless acts. (Holmes, 1990:275)
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Again, self-interest arises as something upon which we can manage to improve, as a liberating 
category. But what Hume probably cannot accept is the existence o f  a revelation property o f it, 
that might make us see clearly what is going on once uncovered and from this information to  lead 
to the existence of a well-governed community.
So, 'compatible-though-conflicting* arguments stress just the possibility of conciliation o f  the 
many conflicting interests which ultimately depends on there being some mediate forms o f  social 
relations, namely, conventions. These strengthen the overall confidence that everyone shall act 
out of their interests (instead of more harmful motives) by rendering possible calculation o f  some 
sorts.
3.4. The Law that 'hedges us in from bogs and precipices' and Laws of justice
That a sort of morally neutral dimension might emerge form self-interested intercourse has been 
stressed sufficiently, as suggested by the ideas of self-interest being not intrinsically bad or 
injecting an element o f constancy and predictability in human affairs, or else as a potentially 
egalitarian claim to the effect that everyone has interests. Still, another quasi-egalitarian 
consequence has been suggested to the effect that it recommends a generalized distrust in 
discourses about the common good. In other words, distrust as to  the existence of any pre- 
established notion of harmony mastered by a few - aspects to which we have already referred.
But, then, a morality of'negative freedom' might also be conceivably associated with it, in that, 
strictly grounded in self-interest considerations, the legitimate constraints on the self-interest of 
anyone should be the self-interest o f someone else. -
Accordingly, we may identify two kinds o f laws which somehow stand for these constraints. 
Locke recommends laws of justice, which are meant not only to  give a limitation but also a 
direction to the agent's proper interests. These interests are those which are compatible with the 
general good. Proper interests' are there to give freedom a meaning, a measure. Otherwise, 
interests might conflate with a 'man's humor*, which might, in turn, mean domination or tyranny. 
Freedom within the law is not, thus, *to do what he lists' but to 'dispose and order as he lists' 
certain  things (the interest derived from a certain property a person has in herself, her actions,
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and her possessions, which are all somewhat connected) within the allowance o f the law.17 
Following Holmes, the necessity o f laws of justice expresses a view that not every 'interest* should 
be allowed. Let us now turn to this view.
Locke's view of the role of laws of justice is developed to contend with (what is here called) the 
'theory' of hedges' he ascribes to Hobbes. The Hobbesian 'theory o f  hedges', according to Locke, 
makes no claim regarding the content o f people's interests, or ‘true* interests. It makes rather a 
disclaimer to the effect that people are allowed to entertain whatever desires or intentions they 
wish, provided they observe the external restrictions imposed on their acts by civil laws, 
preventing them from falling off into ’precipices' or being stuck in bogs'. Nothing is said, however, 
regarding the ability o f laws to 'elevate* us. Laws of justice, instead, are supposed not only to  
restrict the range of admissible actions but also to indicate the direction o f these actions, enlarging 
the sphere o f  freedom which society itself enables. People will then be aware o f their true or 
'proper* interests, which are those indicated by the 'General good'.
The General Good, hence, seems not merely to overlap with a negative-freedom conception o f  
'self-interest limiting self-interest' but also to  impose from the outside the correct sense o f self- 
interest. Locke's conception of laws o f justice, in contrast, implies a constitutive function o f the 
General Good, in terms o f the definition o f the true interests of people, that is, their interests as 
citizens. What is the source o f the General Good? There seems to exist a place in the social 
intercourse plan that is independently generated, from the logic o f self-interest which is deemed 
by Locke to provide an unsatisfactory account o f the laws as hedges'.
Why does Locke require so much from laws o f  justice? It perhaps indicates that we should think 
about extra guarantees against the privatization o f the public, as somehow suggested in the 
following quotation by Laslett:
[law can be positively defined, in Locke,] as the progressive elimination o f  the 
arbitrary from political and social regulation.^..) [Locke] develops it into the 
denial that government can be a  personal matter, a  matter o f  will: it must always 
be an institutional matter, a matter o f  law. (Laslett, 1988:112/3)
17 Cf. Locke, 1988, #57.
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To be sure, Smith also stresses the point that the self-interested capitalist would be delighted to 
become a monopolist (an 'unjust' interest, Holmes adds), thereby revealing his greatest fear o f the 
State's ability to effect this transformation. As a matter o f course, this uncovers the related and 
broader suspicion that the general motivation Smith ascribes to human action, o f 'bettering one's 
conditions’, may possibly recommend undesirable (if effective) actions.
Looking into this latter possibility, something else emerges from a reading of the Wealth of 
Nations. So, again we resort to Smith, in particular the part he plays in the task o f liberating self- 
interest through the role he assigns to the division of labor. This shall constitute an instance of our 
'weak compatible-because-conflicting' arguments.
3.5. Weak Compatible-because-conflicting arguments
One might argue that the market itself is expected to constrain non laudable behavior by would-be 
monopolists. But the remedy may cause illness, Smith warns. In this respect, let us go through the 
following considerations drawn from Smith's arguments.
Initially let us highlight the skeptical undertones of Smith's defense o f  selfishness.
In the Wealth o f Nations. Smith skillfully explains why we should act (and should suppose others 
to act) from self-interest. First, because of the extension of the interdependence chains, we cannot 
feasibly judge the character of the different people with whom we engage in ordinary intercourse. 
Therefore, it is a prudential maxim not to take for granted the benevolence o f these people.11 
Besides, as also indicated by the brewer-butcher-baker case, since many people are involved in 
these long chains we do not have time to invest in all the special relationships that could ask for 
their benevolence.
Secondly, in his Theory o f Moral Sentiments he also makes reference to  the fact that even though 
we could overcome the consequences o f interdependence, our senses could not feasibly jump the
is Cf. Holmes, 1990.
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barriers between men. We cannot know what others suffer, we are each of us best suited to take 
care of ourselves than o f any other person and it is fit and right that this be so.
Self-interest then is something we prudentially assume that others possess, and something that w e 
know about ourselves. But even this knowledge, though positive, carries a negative undertone, 
our senses confining us to take care o f ourselves.
Fortunately, the division of labor works in such a 'causally* way that our 'taking care of ourselves* 
turns on their 'taking care of themselves*. This argument is carefully worked out in the Wealth o f  
Nations, in particular in book I.
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Therefore, the division of labor is a way o f making the self-interest of some contain the self- 
interest of others and vice versa, and producing beneficial results. But we should not be blinded 
by these desirable effects, Smith warns in book V of the Wealth o f  Nations, as the positive 
composition effects will generate negative 'decomposition' consequences, so to speak, from its 
initial inputs. Smith warns about the intellectual, moral or social, and martial disadvantages caused 
by the division o f labor, which is worth quoting at length:
In the progress o f the division of labour, the employment o f  the far greater part 
of those who live by labour, that is, o f the great body of the people, comes to be 
confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the 
understandings o f a great part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary 
employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few operations, 
of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, 
has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding 
out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, 
therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant 
as it is possible for a human creature to  become. The torpor o f his mind renders 
him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, 
but o f conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of 
forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties o f private 
life. O f the great and extensive interests o f his country, he is altogether incapable 
o f defending his country in war. The uniformity o f his stationary life naturally 
corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regards with abhorrence the 
irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life o f  a soldier. It corrupts even the activity 
o f his body, and renders him incapable o f  exerting his strength with vigour and 
perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His 
dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to  be acquired at the
expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and 
civilized society this is the state into which the laboring poor, that is, the great 
body o f the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to 
prevent it." (Smith, 1976:781/2)
The ambiguity’ o f Smith's account of the division of labor, as we shift from his positive 
assessments in book I to the rather negative ones in book V, has deserved a number of comments 
in the literature. The focus of these comments, to my knowledge, falls on the issue of whether or 
not there is a contradiction or paradox between the arguments in books 1 and V.19
The more optimistic assessment comes from Rosenberg, and yet it shares with Marx's critical 
remarks in the Capital the conclusion as to the low 'social and human' prospects of economic 
progress. Let us briefly go through some aspects of the debate.
Rosenberg rejects the view that books 1 and V display contradictory ideas regarding the economic 
consequences of the division o f labor, at least in what relates to the crucial question of 
technological progress. According to him, the stupidity o f workers that results from increasing 
specialization is deemed to be perfectly compatible with invention and innovation because, for 
Smith, the inventive activity is a consequence of at least three distinct components, and to none 
o f these is 'a less developed intelligence' detrimental. In particular, inventive activity is a 
consequence of: (i) the narrowing o f the focus of interest and attention; (ii) the motivation o f 
'bettering one's condition', and (iii) the complex nature o f  technological process itself, which 
renders the inventive activity quite impersonal. As Rosenberg puts it:
the 'capacity to invent' cannot be assessed or measured in absolute terms; the 
concept is meaningful only in relation to the complexity o f the existing technology 
and the degree o f  creative imagination required in order for new *breakthroughs' 
to occur. (Rosenberg, 1965:133)
Besides, specialization engenders the kind of virtue it needs most, 'intellectual' work or, in Smith's 
words, the work of philosophers:
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19 See Rosenberg ( 1965), for a reconciliation between the two accounts, and Heilbroner (1973) for the suggestion of 
a deep and meaningful paradox.
Major inventions involve the ability to draw upon diverse areas o f human 
knowledge and experience and to combine them in a unique positive fashion to 
serve some specific purpose, (ibidem: 134)
Rosenberg recalls, for that matter, Marx's critique of Smith's account of the division o f labor, in 
the Capital. To be sure, Marx asserts the correctness of Smith’s remarks (originally Ferguson's):
Being a pupil o f Adam Ferguson who showed the disadvantageous effects o f 
division o f labor, Adam Smith was perfectly clear on this point. In the introduction 
to his work, where he ex professo praises division o f labor, he indicates only in a 
cursory manner that it is the source o f social inequalities. It is not till the book, on 
the Revenue o f the State, that he reproduces Ferguson. (Marx, 1977:?)
Still, Marx complains about the situation o f  the working class and develops further the negative 
consequences o f the division of labor, the cure o f  which is not to be found, as Smith thought, in 
homeopathic doses of education sponsored by the state. Marx seems to suggest that it is not only 
a matter o f the 'stupidity1 of the working class which is at stake, if we want to go to the real roots 
of the issue, we should see it as a matter o f  alienation.
So, it may be said that Rosenberg and Marx's remarks have in common the expectation that the 
division o f labor will work for economic progress, both by increasing the productivity o f  work 
and by permitting technological progress. But, now it is obvious that from the point o f view o f 
self-interest a justification of economic progress (in non-economic terms) is missing, unless a 
substantial re-description of self-interest is worked out to the effect that, for example, the 
alienation o f the self is a form of self-accomplishment...!
It is worth quoting Smith from a passage o f the Lectures on Justice. Police. Revenue and Arms. 
where he displays an open disagreement with the happier Montesquieu-Steuart vision on the 
commercial spirit:
These are the disadvantages of a commercial spirit. The minds o f men are 
contracted, and rendered incapable o f  elevation. Education is despised, or at least 
neglected, and heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished, (cited in 
Heilbroner, 1973:254)
49
This image leaves us quite far from our starting point around the almost noble character of 
interests Adam Ferguson sees the whole issue as a perverse causality: ignorance is a natural 
consequence of the division of labor, and at the same time gives birth to industry.
ignorance is the mother of industry as well as of superstition... [in the industry] the 
workshop may, without any great effort of imagination, be considered as an 
engine, the parts of which are men. (Ferguson: 182/3)
Ironically enough, the image of self-interest when pushed too far, as required to work out the 
image of a prosperous and self-governed economic community, gives rise to a debasing engine.
In any case, we have arrived at a powerful source of the 'positive freedom1 fears. Self-interest even 
shaped as true interests, as those sound interests entailed in a modem economic community, may 
engender unsound interests. It has a disaggregating ingredient of its own, one that requires further 
and continuous correction
We are now in a better position to figure out an additional source o f Locke's concern about a self- 
interest based order as well as his uneasiness with the 'theory o f  the hedges' the order so 
conceived may generate perverse fruits. Therefore, he concludes that the law of justice should not 
only be a constraint but also should somehow interfere with or 'direct* our interests. But, then, we 
would need to lift ourselves by our own bootstraps to reach higher altitudes than our height 
allows us.
4. A Final Comment
Self-interest passes the test of these two centuries' as an idea, a sort o f cogUo o f the political 
thought of modem societies. This seems to  mean that it is not a brute fact, a natural or self- 
evident truth, nor a positive ideal, a firm ground from which normative aims spring, which are the 
border-lines within which it has been built up. Our ancestors seem to  have elaborated on it as a 
contending piece of political argument. In particular, they made explicit the external limits as well 
as the internal symptoms of decay connected to this idea.
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PARTI
SELF-INTEREST AND BEYOND 
(THE TWO)
INTRODUCTION
In this part, I discuss some images of social order grounded in the behavioral assumption of 
self-interest where this postulate is justified in virtue o f self-interest's ability to produce 
efficient social states or else social states with equilibrium properties It is as if the self- 
interested behavior o f the individuals were able to produce a sort of self-transcendence or 
•bootstrapping' in the form of coordination o f people's plans as well as efficient cooperation. 
Thus, the title "Self-Interest and Beyond", where it is implied that strict self-interest may carry 
us beyond ourselves (and as such, surely a normative pretense). I shall be referring here to 
cells III and IV of matrix 1, the strategic- public and non-public worlds, respectively.
Recall that it was one conclusion in chapter 1 that, from the perspective of its tradition, there 
is nothing self-evident about self-interest, neither in the sense o f its being an obvious reality 
nor its possessing a universal meaning. Rather, it is to a large extent a construct, or what 
Thomas Schelling calls a Vicarious' category, and, in this sense, it does not possess a value of 
its own, that is, without further reflection on the alternatives. This was taken to provide a 
major constraint on its use, for both explanatory and normative purposes, that is, even in terms 
o f its ability to explain individual behavior or produce desirable interactional effects. Self- 
interest is taken to be a residual category (in relation to more basic and less agreeable 
alternatives) as well as a reflective one (it is a critical standpoint in relation to the received 
view regarding the meaning of the public interest). As such, the category possesses a limited 
potential for universality in terms o f generating desirable political and moral effects, whose 
effectuation depends upon the institutional environment. Considered in the light o f these 
ideas, the role o f self-interest is largely mitigated, at least as compared to the more optimistic 
expectations regarding its qualities that have been cultivated by contemporary theories.
In examining a set o f these theories, and backed by a view o f the political arguments that 
witnessed the modem birth of the category self-interest, I have come to the conclusion that 
some contemporary theories misuse this behavioral assumption in that they disregard its 
obvious limits. This is the case with a branch o f the public-goods literature that presents the 
social order as efficient (and just) cooperation among self-interested or maximizing agents to  a
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collective action. It is also a misuse o f the concept o f self-interest when the standard game- 
theoretical literature proposes a view o f coordination that intends to draw exclusively on 
people's maximizing behavior. Note that the behavioral assumption of self-interest has been 
translated into the tautological sense o f utility maximizing behavior. My examination of both 
literatures concludes that they fail with regard to their initial plans: cooperation which was to  
emerge from strictly self-interested behavior seems to need cooperative behavior, and 
equilibrium in a strategic environment seems to need a non-maximizing explanation concerning 
the convergence of beliefs of maximizing people. These findings reveal both a moral view and 
a 'metaphysical' approach to cognitive issues, fundamentally at odds with the value-free 
starting points o f these theories.
In this way, this Part is divided into two chapters. Chapter 2 presents the public-good case o f  
abuse, for it looks into rational choice accounts of the extent to which self-interest may 
support or provide the public good o f political order. An interpretation o f Olson's law shall 
constitute here the yardstick by which the success of such efforts is assessed. Some failures o f  
this approach will emerge, the more interesting being connected with the separation o f self- 
interest and (some ideal of) efficiency.
In chapter 3, the game-theoretical approach is discussed in connection with its potential and 
the actual tools used to account for social interaction. It is largely a theory o f rationality and it 
is intended to underlie much o f public-goods standard theory. In examining game theory's 
possibilities on the matter, we are indeed pursuing the problems of determinacy o f a self- 
interest based theory, at least in its form as strategic rationality. The separation o f self-interest 
and equilibrium, paralleling that o f self-interest and efficiency, is understood as an important 
indication o f relevant epistemic issues thus far inadequately dealt with.
A final word should address the question o f  why these particular contemporary approaches 
were chosen in the first place. My answer to  that is that they share a conviction and a vision 
that stand out among alternative approaches, namely, the conviction that we should abstract 
from behavioral assumptions or postulates concerning substantive aspects o f human nature, 
and the vision o f social interaction as a complex environment where people's decisions are
53
affected by each other’s decisions and they are aware o f this. The importance of 'otherness' in 
this approach suggests that we are in the world of the *two'. So, in this sense, examining this 
framework is tantamount to probing the limits of a deductive instrumental^' rational theory to 
account for what seems to be a more accurate image of social interaction (at least if we 
contrast it to the image of atoms knocking into each other at random, suggested in the 
parametric-non-public cell I o f matrix 1). Oddly enough, in the course of a solution, this 
epistemic vision o f a world of expectations is exchanged with badly supported behavioral and 
metaphysical views.
Chapter 2
THE PUBLIC-GOOD LITERATURE’S MISCARRIED ’BOOTSTRAPPING'
1. Introduction
In this chapter I will explore a specific offspring o f the notion o f  self-interest, which has 
attempted to work it out as the single element from which social interaction stems In 
particular, this framework claims that self-interest both accounts for the existence o f social 
order and gives it normative features.
An initial warning must be sounded: I will not dispute here the explanatory merits o f this 
literature but only concentrate on its self-proclaimed normative puiposes. In particular, I will 
dispute the idea, usual in this literature, that social or political order as cooperation is the 
likely result o f the rational choice o f individuals. Or, in somewhat standard normative terms, 
that strictly maximizing individuals may find cooperation the reasonable course of action to 
pursue.
To be sure, early modem political thought has undergone a rational choice re-description. The 
steps in this process may be described as follows. First, the political order has been understood 
as a collective action, that is a cooperation o f many rational individuals aiming at the 
achievement o f common ends, who are nonetheless free to choose among different courses o f 
actions. Elster (1985) puts the argument into the rational choice form:
By collective action, I mean the choice by all or most individuals of the course of 
action that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best 
outcome. This course of action I shall ... refer to as cooperative behavior.
(Elster,1985:137)
Secondly, contractarian or conventional images o f  the political order have been translated into 
collective action problems, requiring a rational and determinate solution. Hence, the image o f a 
pre-social state o f struggle among competing individuals is portrayed as a dilemma, a choice
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between a desirable unanimous (viz. conditional) outcome and an individual best response (viz. 
unconditional) outcome.
According to Taylor's (1987) definition, a collective action problem exists whenever individual 
interaction leads to a strictly Pareto-inefficient outcome, or in other words, whenever there is at 
least one outcome that is preferred by everyone. Elsteris (1985) definition further clarifies some 
aspects involved in a collective action problem, thereby suggesting that more accurate 
descriptions of the dilemma might be more conducive to its solution. According to him we have 
a strong collective action problem whenever the following two conditions obtain: (i) that 'each 
individual derives greater benefits under conditions of universal cooperation than he does under 
conditions of universal noncooperation', and (ii) 'each derives more benefits if he abstains from 
cooperation, regardless o f what others do.' This is, roughly stated, the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Elster goes on to argue that we have, however, a weak collective action problem whenever the 
first condition still holds but the second is split into two further elements, namely, the stability and 
the accessibility of the cooperative strategy. Therefore, a revised condition (ii)' holds that 
cooperation is individually unstable and individually inaccessible. The instability of the cooperative 
strategy choice means that if an individual found himself in a situation of universal cooperation, 
he would have an incentive to deviate from it. The inaccessibility of cooperation essentially means 
that an individual has no incentive to take the initiative to cooperate, that is, to move from a 
situation of universal noncooperation. Elster points out that further interesting collective action 
problems may contain one or another o f the above two elements. In particular Chicken-like 
situations are typically the case of cooperation-instability, whilst Assurance-like problems are 
typically the case of cooperation-inaccessibility.1 As the latter are less 'serious* collective action
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1 The configuration of these games are as follows:
(continued...)
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problems, beacuse they lack the element o f  defection-dominance o f the Prisoner's Dilemma, a 
collective action solution is more promising when it convincingly transforms the situation into one 
of these characterizations (but not both).
In addition to reducing order to cooperation and changing its origins into a collective action 
problem, rational choice reading o f the contractarian theories typically use the model o f  the 
Prisoner's Dilemma as a first approach to represent the situation that might be conducive to  
political order. They believe the representation in terms o f  the Prisoner's Dilemma to be faithful 
to the contractarian description of the state o f nature, e.g. Hobbes'. The 'Dilemma' is just the state 
of nature 'in other words'. Then, they try to show that either this representation is inaccurate and, 
hence weaker versions o f collective action problems would be more cogent, or that it is too static 
as a depiction o f the pre-social ambience. In this latter case, it is suggested that we could use a 
more dynamic version o f the Prisoner's Dilemma. In any case, these contemporary approaches are 
characteristically a criticism of the contractarian justification for the coercive role of the state, 
specially that found in Hobbes' Leviathan.2
Underlying the re-description o f the political order as a particular public good to be provided by 
some successful collective action is the hypothesis of individual action as strictly self-interested. 
In other words, this is guided by utility-maximizing considerations alone. This representation has 
been notorious as the economic theory of collective action, and in particular, since our public 
good is political order itself of politics tout court. According to  this view, order and justice might
(...continued)
chicken-game assurance-game Prisoner'* Dilemma
C D C D C D
C 3 4 C 4 3 C 3 4
3 2 4 1 3 1
D 2 0 D 1 2 D 1 2
4 0 3 2 4 2
whereas, in the chicken game we have D O C O C D >D D , and in the assurance game we have CC>DODD>CD, in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma we have a combination of D O C C  and DD>CD, respectively from the chicken and the 
assurance games, i.e., o f the instability of the former and the inaccessibility of the latter.
2 See Taylor (1976; 1987), Hampton (1989) and Gauthier (1986).
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be seen as the outcomes o f a non-cooperative game, or, in other words, a situation of 
interdependence where the agents are aware that the results o f their actions are interdependent, 
and where there is a mixture o f conflict and cooperation driving forces
My claim is that rational-choice descriptions of the problem o f the emergence of political order 
in the sense above cannot find a thorough rational-choice solution. Moreover, it seems to me that 
this failure indicates both the limits o f self-transcendence as far as maximizing behavior is 
concerned and the fecundity of the so-called external solutions.
My argument is organized as follows. Section 2 looks into an interpretation o f Hobbes' account 
o f the origin of political order and Olson's theorem of collective action. The interpretation then 
suggested is that both accounts stress the idea of order as a predictable environment (rather than 
a fully efficient cooperation)3 and accordingly cannot yield a full understanding o f the emergence 
of the political order (or any organization) in 'internal', rational choice terms. This reconstructed 
Hobbes-Olson formulation will constitute the canonical form of'external' solutions to the problem 
of the emergence of political order, which, in turn, is approached 'ecologically', so to speak, rather 
than mechanically. I take this perspective to  be fundamentally faithful to the outlook developed 
in chapter 1. Section 3 digresses on the 'two laws of the social sciences* that explain the social 
interaction in terms of the self-interest o f individuals - the invisible hand and the 'visible'- to the 
effect that these are only two different ways of accounting for the same phenomenon of 
interdependence, In this sense, the two laws ruling the coordination o f self-interested individuals 
indicate the limited reach of the behavioral assumption o f self-interest to account for their 
interaction. *
In section 4, the public-goods literature is presented as a number o f attempts to approach the 
collective action target to frame the political order in terms o f 'internal' solutions. A repeated- 
games framework (Taylor's), a Bayesian approach (Tsebelis), and an account that works out the 
possibility o f modification o f actors' preferences are then introduced. It is claimed that these 
internal solutions are incomplete and just add new contexts for the validity o f external solutions, 
namely, comparative-static and dynamic contexts.
3 Following a typology suggested in Elster, 1989.
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Section 5 examines solutions to the collective action problem that supposedly, in one way o r  
another, get rid o f the assumption o f self-interest, what is called here the 'identitarian collective 
action' solutions; a parallel is set out between this alternative and the problem of factionalism 
discussed in chapter 1.
Finally, section 6 concludes by remarking on the loss o f  'efficiency1 in the translation o f self- 
interest into rational choice terms, and the seemingly dangerous prospects o f group-identity
solutions.
2. Hardin-Hobbes and Olson
It is suggested here that one could gain an insight by considering a different conception o f  order 
than that outlined by rational-choice readings o f the contractarian undertaking. Moreover, the  
hypothesis shall be worked out that order thus understood is compatible with Hobbes* vision as 
well as with an informal version of Olson's argument. Let us turn to the main elements o f this idea.
We may think of order either as cooperation or as a somewhat predictable environment, again, 
in a strong and a weak sense. This double meaning of order comes from Elster's (1989) proposal:
I shall discuss two senses o f  social order: that o f  stable, regular, predictable 
patterns of behavior and that o f  cooperative behavior. Correspondingly, there are 
two concepts o f disorder. The first, disorder as lack o f predictability, is expressed 
in M acbeth 's vision of life as 'sound and fury, a tale told by an idiot, signifying 
nothing'. The second, disorder as absence of cooperation, is expressed in Hobbes* 
vision o f life in the state o f  nature as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short*
(Elster,1989:1/2)
I will adopt Elster's suggestion of a double meaning of order but depart from him thereafter. In 
particular, in my judgment, the idea o f  order as predictability, and symmetrically o f disorder as 
lack of predictability is in accordance with Hobbes image, Macbeth's view being but an 
exacerbation o f  the Hobbesian vision. That we need a framework o f enforceable rules which 
somehow enables us to predict others' behavior and, accordingly, yield prospects for cooperation 
is but a weaker form o f  the radical unpredictability expressed in the absolute lack of symbolic 
bonds.
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To be sure, the understanding of order as cooperation has the heuristic advantage of rendering 
it amenable to the rational-choice treatment, in particular by reducing it to Pareto-efficiency or 
questions o f optimality. It is at least disputable, however, whether this is a 'Pareto-superior' 
explanation, because this requirement is very difficult to match under several collective-action 
descriptions of the problem of the emergence of order. People may rationally converge to a less- 
preferred outcome instead of arriving at the better outcome they could feasibly have.
Approaching order as predictability, instead, leaves it open for us to  achieve an understanding of 
the supplementary means whereby predictability is achieved, built, as it were, upon the gaps left 
by rational-choice explanations. Certainly, we might understand predictability as an equilibrium 
condition, in the strong sense, that is. Indeed, in a even stronger way, standard economic theory 
asserts that equilibrium and Pareto-efficiency go together as far as competitive markets are 
concerned. So, in the provision o f private goods under competitive conditions, predictability of 
individuals' behavior and global efficiency are corollaries, the so-called positive and normative 
sides of the theory. However, for public goods, these conditions are no longer 'naturally* tied 
together, their connection being, to say the least, problematic. Besides, it is not unusual to  find 
problems with the justification of equilibrium notions that rely on rather strong informational or 
rationality assumptions.
Thus, we may understand predictability as the weaker condition o f pattern-regularity which might 
obtain even in the absence of the rationality and information requirements often associated with 
the equilibrium framework. The view shall be taken that this weaker definition of order is 
compatible with Hobbes' vision. We may, in this way, find ourselves stressing the mechanisms 
whereby the predictability of social interaction might be enhanced, and acknowledging that the 
very instant creation o f the enforcement system is somehow external to the rationality o f the 
agents concerned.
Putting it differently, recognizing order and justice as public goods, and trying to solve their 
production through the solution to a collective action problem is tantamount to undertaking the
“ “ »•>****
task of determining the origin of these 'goods'. But we may conceivably ask, as Hardin (1991) 
does, is this really Hobbes' or Hume’s question? (Is it even worth pursuing?)
In my opinion, the answer is straightforwardly 'no* as far as Hume is concerned. But what about 
Hobbes? One might take the strong hypothesis that this is arguably not Hobbes' question, as 
Hardin does. He invokes, as evidence for his interpretation, the logical difficulties commonly 
associated with Hobbes. In particular, the sort o f bootstrapping mechanism, as the very image o f  
the sovereign as materially composed o f the bodies of his subjects seems to require, does not look 
a particularly attractive answer. Why should people abide by covenants, the very need of which 
is a sign o f their structural unfaithfulness? Resorting to sovereign's enforcement is arguably not 
a genuine way out, for we would still have to explain how basically distrustful people could agree 
on a rule and a ruler.
™ --------------------------
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So, according to Hardin, the origin o f the state is not the focus o f  Hobbes concern, for it is an 
insoluble problem at least in rational choice terms. Hobbes' greatest insight, Hardin argues, is to 
grasp the situation o f lawless individuals as a multiplicity o f Prisoner’s Dilemmas requiring 
something like an overruling authority for their common or individual purposes to be reached. But 
the state’s origin itself, though correctly depicted as a situation o f all or nothing, in the sense that 
without the state the payoffs would be dire for everyone, and with it an environment o f 
predictability might come about, is left altogether unexplained. Hobbes did not know how the 
order came to be, though he stressed why it was needed. It was needed because o f the sort o f 
interactions (selfish and even worse) in which lawless individuals would engage. The benefits o f 
it would be the benefits that sprang from a system that provided the means for overcoming the 
everyday sorts o f Prisoner’s Dilemmas that people face with normal interaction.
...I wish to argue that Hobbes' central problem of political order is not the problem 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We need political order, in Hobbes' view, in part to 
help us overcome the logic o f the Prisoner's Dilemma in our quotidian relations. 
But the task o f creating or maintaining political order is not itself a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma but, rather, a coordination problem. Hence its resolution is not 
contractarian in the straightforward sense of that term but is conventional. It 
depends far less (if at all) on what people consent to than on what will work... I 
also wish to argue that the central problem that Hobbes mastered is not the 
creation o f government from the state o f nature but the maintenance o f  the 
government. (Hardin, 1991:158/159)
61
This is a quite unusual inteipretation o f Hobbes' view, for it makes a conventionalist of him, and, 
if we follow Hardin through, utilitarian as well (a political order is desired because of the prospect 
o f higher welfare levels for everybody4). I do not want to claim quite that much, but rather to 
emphasize what I have already remarked upon in the preceding chapter, namely, that there is an 
important element of arbitrariness in Hobbes' account of the origin o f the civil laws which points 
to the limits of what is demonstrably true about the constitution o f the state, which incidentally, 
is also an important element in the definition of a convention. He seems to be highlighting the 
problematic origin o f the political body, something very distant from naive images of public 
interest springing from self-interested action, so that it is hard to conceive the public interest under 
the clothes of a public good emerging from any choice of individuals at all. A Hobbesian message, 
it seems to me, is that unconstrained self-interest cannot provide the public good of civil order 
even if it is in everyone's interest.
Now, in our terminology here, Hobbes' solution to the problem o f the origin of the state is said 
to be 'external', that is, not derived from the rational choice of the individuals living in a lawless 
state of nature. His idea that any political order is better than none betrays the belief that no 
choice is possible where there is no rule. So, in this sense, it is trivially true that the question of 
the origin of the state is external to the individuals' rational choice.
Arguably, Olson's logic o f collective action might also undergo a similar reading. There is a 
certain consensus that Olson's is an economic theory of collective action (Udehn, 1993, is an 
important exception), as a theory, that is, o f  the extent to which self-interest, understood as 
maximization o f  one's utility, recommends cooperation or in other words, the maximization of 
overall utility.
In contrast, I take the view that Olson's is more a 'political' theory of collective action, both in the 
rather trivial sense that he addresses the question of collective action from an 'external* perspective 
(in the absence o f coercion or selective incentives, large groups will typically fail to provide the
4 To make this statement sound more than the vague claim that life is better than death, we would need a more 
sophisticated Value theory that would make it possible to measure and compare individual and collective welfare levels. 
Alas, this is something missing in utilitarian arguments, as Hardin himself openly admits elsewhere (Hardin, 1988).
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collective good), and in the less trivial sense that his interesting question concerns freedom and 
coercion rather than benefits and costs.
Consider that we keep separate benefits and freedom, and costs and coercion, though it might be  
argued that freedom and coercion could be translated into utilities and accordingly undergo a 
maximization calculus. But, consider again the question: what is left of the strength o f  this 
otherwise powerful argument when one takes into account that maximization is rather the key 
idea here, for its rule 'prefer more to less* leads people to take less than more o f what they might 
feasibly get? What if we take the trouble to decompose utility into some of its elements and do  
not take for granted that, say, coercion is straightforwardly deducible from freedom?
So, Olson's question can be posed in a Hobbesian-like fashion as the extent to which free 
instrumentally rational agents will abide by the restraints they might conceivably impose on their 
behavior. It implies the rather paradoxical question, which has already been attributed to Hobbes: 
how much o f my freedom should I give away in order to keep some of it? And the answer is 
'none', if I could get away with it.
To be sure, Olson's answer varies according to some circumstances o f the collective action, the 
most important being the size of the group. But in so doing he takes the trouble to specify all the 
complementary mechanisms needed to fulfill the lack o f cooperative effectiveness o f our 
rationality. Informally, we may understand him as implying the rather prudential question o f how 
desertion is to  be controlled so that the collective endeavor shall not fail altogether, given that 
where this control is not possible the likelihood o f collective action is disastrously low. External 
support is needed for the collective good to obtain, and additional behavioral assumptions are 
gathered to color the argument with more vivid and hence cogent images. But the conclusion is 
strikingly straightforward: we need more than self-interest (even when understood as a harmless 
utility-maximizing behavior) to sustain cooperation. Incidentally, what I claim here is that it is this 
view which is implicit in most rational choice arguments for cooperation, notwithstanding the 
protests to the contrary, as will eventually become clear.
6 3
Any internal solution to the collective action problem in its canonic (Olsonian) form shall be 
considered successful that properly addresses the question of the direct link between self-interest 
and collective action It would provide, then, an 'invisible hand explanation' of the emergence of 
public goods, in particular of political order, and accordingly it should display so-called self- 
enforcing mechanisms whereby this collective action may arise. Otherwise the solution shall be 
considered external. Another 'internal' solution shall be examined by the end of this chapter which 
relaxes either the requirement o f  self-interest (Sen and Pizzomo) or of a thoroughly rational- 
choice (Elster).
My own view is that external solutions have a merit precisely in where they are said to fail. I 
suggest that we should look at the so-called 'incompleteness* o f these solutions as a positive 
attribute, for it may be a matter o f a different way of understanding what is at stake here, for 
example the extent to which 'social control* of some kind is needed to keep people in line with 
their 'true interests'. We can think o f the external viewpoint as simultaneously suggesting either 
self-interest's inability to account for the public interest, or the limited reach of self-interest when 
unconstrained.
3. The two laws of social sciences
Olson has recently remarked that his logic o f collective action has actually uncovered a law o f the 
social sciences, indeed, a second law, which follows the 'invisible hand'. This latter is thus stated, 
in his words: ’sometimes, when each individual considers only his or her interests, a collectively 
rational outcome emerges automatically'.3 With regard to the second, Olson goes on to  say, 
sometimes the invisible hand does not hold, 'no matter how intelligently each individual pursues 
his or her interest, no socially rational outcome can emerge spontaneously(...), only a guiding 
hand or appropriate institution can bring about outcomes that are collectively efficient'.5 6 Sandler 
(1992) suggests an even weaker form of the law, that 'individual rationality is not sufficient for 
collective rationality'.
5 Olson, 1992, p.vii.
6 Olson, 1992, p.vii.
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The straightforward cost/benefit calculation, individually undertaken, is not sufficient to sustain 
cooperation, and this is due to the fact that the benefits of collective action are normally indivisible 
and non-excludable.7 *The non-excludability condition requires that the benefits o f a good be 
available to all once the good has been provided. The indivisibility condition demands that a unit 
of the good be consumed without detracting the 'consumption opportunities available for others 
from that same unit'.* These two conditions fix the circumstances where a choice is to take place, 
in the clear-cut case o f collective action in a large group. Individual calculation is then, twofold: 
on the one hand it indicates the rationality o f one's contribution to  the provision of the good (if 
he is any anonymous member of the group), for the obtention of the good is in everyone's interest 
inside the group. On the other hand, though, it implies second thoughts when the consideration 
of what this calculus might contingently advise enters the stage. In one case, the individual will 
understand that if he is the only one to contribute, nothing happens, the good is not provided. So, 
he thinks, 'this conjecture leads me not to  contribute'. If, however, others contribute, his 
contribution is insignificant. All in all, he concludes, non contribution stands out as the choice to  
make.
We feel an underlying conflict between the maximization logic (the best feasible outcome) and the 
equilibrium logic (the best response outcome) which, to be sure, does not go not unnoticed in 
recent literature9 as a conflict between the Pareto-optimum and the Nash-equilibrium concepts,
7 As a matter of technical precision, it is usefiil to quote Cullity (1995). According to him, "definitions of public goods 
vary widely, but they usually involve some subset of tbe following seven features: (i) jointneis in supply: if  a public 
good is available to ooe member of the group for which it is public, then it is available to every other member at no cost 
to that other member; (ii) nonexcludability: if  anyone is enjoying it, no one else (in the group for which it is public) 
can be prevented from doing so without excessive cost to the would-be excluders; (iii) jointness in consumption: one 
person's consumption of the good does not diminish the amount available for consumption by anyone else; (iv) 
nonrivalness: one person's enjoyment of the good does not diminish the benefits available to anyone else from its 
enjoyment, (v) compulsoriness: if anyone receives the good, no one else can avoid doing so without excessive cost; 
(vi) equality: if anyone receives the good, everyone receives the same amount; (vii) indivisibility: there can be more 
than one consumer of the good, and each consumes the total output." Olson (1992:p.viii), for instance does not 
distinguish between (his conceptions of) nonexcludability and indivisibility: "the benefits of collective action are 
normally indivisible in the sense that, if they are made available to one person in a group they are thereby automatically 
also supplied to everyone in the group. As is by now widely known, nonpurchasers cannot be excluded from the 
consumption of the 'collective goods' or 'public goods' that collective action provides." Again, I take the view that a fine 
characterization of public goods is very important when it comes to explanatory purposes, which is not my aim here. 
I adopt a characterization with a similar level of generality as that suggested by Olson.
1 Sandler, 1992, p.6.
9 Hardin, 1992.
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or group-rationality and individual rationality. The way from individual rationality to collective 
rationality is somehow severed, then.
On reflection, does individual rationality necessarily give rise to collective irrationality in that 
context0 According to Hardin, the problem is rather that we have linked too closely rationality 
with equilibrium, and this need not to be so. In fact, rationality is quite often at odds with 
equilibrium:
That the bonds do not go the other way [from rationality to  equilibrium] can be 
seen from the facts that (1) there can be multiple equilibria with differing payoffs 
to various players, and (2) there can be equilibria that are disastrous for all 
concerned and that are Pareto inferior to other possible outcomes.
(Hardin,1992:194)
Paralleling Hardin's point, the aspect of interdependence that underlies social interaction may be 
understood in two distinct ways. Interdependence, in a broad sense, means that the outcomes of 
everyone's actions are linked, and that this arises as an unintended outcome of everyone's efforts 
to achieve their private ends. In a narrower sense, though, interdependence can be characterized 
as a strategic interaction, in which outcomes and choices are related. This deeper sense o f 
interdependence requires that the agents possess an awareness o f one another's possibilities, and 
o f the very interdependent aspect o f their situation, that are not present in the broader description. 
Does this distinction recommend two different interpretations of what is in one's interest, or two 
distinct rationality criteria? Is the rule of self-interest contingent on the broader choice-setting, 
the one being under the domain o f the first law, the other under the domain of the second?
The motivation behind Smith's attributed 'invisible hand' and Olson's law appear to be very 
different from one another. What we call the 'invisible hand’ law was carved very much in the 
spirit of rescuing 'conflict' from its earlier negative connotations. Indeed it pointed to a potentially 
cohesive aspect of it, provided it had taken the form of universal self-interest (in the form of 
disinterestedness in one another's fate). Thus, vices would produce benefits as far as private goods 
were concerned. However, as soon as public goods enter the stage, the situation changes 
radically. Vices will no longer produce virtuous results, and what the second law stresses is the 
potentially disruptive side of conflict. When people have common interests, the achievement o f
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which turns on their deliberate efforts, the dark side o f self-interest appears as a reminder that it 
cannot be a panacea, since exploitation and opportunism present themselves as forms of rational 
behavior. Olson, indeed, argues that it may be a matter of domains, the 'first law' applying to the 
domain of private goods, and the second, to the domain of collective or public goods
Closer inspection reveals, however, that things may be further complicated if one only considers, 
that some recent work in economics has stressed the importance o f institutions (or hierarchical 
organizations) to overcome market failures whose origin is precisely located at the micro-level 
of individual motivation, as in the idea o f  self-interest with guile and bounded rationality, under 
particular environments.10 1Moreover, the question of externalities of the market somehow 
expresses a degree of'publicness' in the production and consumption o f private goods11 at least 
in the form of public bads', such as environmental pollution. We may also recall here the public 
bad or the negative externality resulting from the free market in the Smithian vision of an idiot- 
producing division of labor. Or, the 'even worse' public outcome that would result were private 
interests to occupy the public space thoroughly, as monopolies would do if the state did not exist.
As a provisional relief to this tension, I suggest a modified version of Olson's predicament in the 
following form: there is no determinate and straightforward relation between individual rationality 
and collective rationality. This version has the merit, I believe, o f putting 'uncertainty' under focus, 
without being fundamentally at odds with Olson's law. In support o f this view, it is useful to quote 
Olson's (1971) assessment o f his finding:
The widespread view, common throughout the social sciences, that groups tend 
to further their interests, is accordingly unjustified, at least when it is based, as it 
usually is, on the (sometimes implicit) assumption that groups act in their self- 
interest because individuals do. There is paradoxically the logical possibility that 
groups composed of either altruistic individuals or irrational individuals may 
sometimes act in their common interests.(...) Thus the customary view that groups 
o f individuals with common interests tend to further those common interests 
appears to have little if any merit. (Olson, 1971:2)
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10 Williamson, 1975.
11 Lessa, 1993.
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Another feature of this latter version is that it mitigates the difference between the 'two laws of 
the social sciences’, in the sense that both fundamentally claim that the relation of the micro-level 
of individuals' motivation to the macro-level o f society or political order is not determinate. In 
between private- and public- spheres, Smith argues, there exist fortunate compositional effects 
(which, incidentally are now recognized as the presence of economic institutions12), as well as 
unfortunate ones, what I term 'decomposition effects', that is, the negative externalities o f the 
operation of the division o f labor the correction of which is deemed to be the state's affair. Also, 
Olson adds, there is a fertile terrain for free-riding, in those cases when one can get what one 
wants without taking the trouble to produce it. Interdependence, the common aspects of both 
laws, contains uncertainty, for good or evil. The implicit suggestion seems then that we should 
cast light on the means whereby the bad might be limited or the good hopefully fostered.
Hence, uncertainty or unpredictability, the essential message o f both laws, is the crucial trait o f 
interdependence that any problem of collective action should be willing to address. The whole 
undertaking of the so-called 'internal solutions' may be restated so as to  display the self-enforcing 
mechanisms that self-interested agents are able to produce in order to overcome the basic 
uncertainty that characterizes their interaction.
4. The public-goods literature: attempts to deviate from the second law
A whole body of literature has considered voluntary cooperation to be a possible outcome o f the 
Hobbesian state o f nature. Roughly, it has been suggested that once this latter has undergone a 
proper description which reveals usually overlooked aspects of human interaction, voluntary 
cooperation shall follow logically. These aspects that stand out most conspicuously, it is argued, 
are the dynamic character o f this interaction as well as the possibility for people to produce some 
self-enforcing mechanisms.
12 In a rather broad sense, economic institutions in Smith's economic analysis have been specified by Knight (1992) 
as implicit patterns of interaction which allow people to profit from specialization gains. The classical reference for a 
less than full-blown laissez faire-like argument in Smith is Viner (1927). For more recent work, see Song (1995).
68
So, again, self-interest is expected to make possible the public interest through its ability to 
repress or neutralize non-social passions. But this is only one side o f the story, for it is admitted13 
that in the circumstances o f a one-off interaction among self-interested individuals, non­
cooperation is still the most plausible outcome, solely on the basis o f the existing rationality 
assumptions. It is then suggested that a case for self-interested, spontaneous cooperation arising 
without the need o f'th e  long arm o f the state* might be made if we only considered recurring 
interactions o f  a multitude o f actors, which in any case seems to be a more suitable description 
o f ordinary social life than the two-person static scenario.
In the following I shall concentrate on two varieties of solutions that resort to the dynamic 
component o f social interaction, those by Taylor and Tsebelis. Taylor's solution draws on 
repetition while on the whole maintaining the information requirements o f classical game theory. 
The iterative nature o f  interaction is expected to provide prospects for cooperation because o f 
agents' concerns for their future. Tsebelis's solution, to the contrary, relies on incomplete 
inform ation, stressing the ability o f uncertainty among players to  enhance the likelihood o f 
cooperation, and therefore deviating the certain and undesirable outcome o f overall defection one 
expects to emerge from Olsonian interaction.
In dealing with Taylor's solution a number o f  issues will naturally arise. In particular one such 
issue is provided by Taylor's professed belief that many sorts o f institutional solutions that claim 
to have overcome the collective action problem involved in the emergence of political order have 
not actually succeeded, for they left unresolved second-order collective action problems.
Therefore, the so-called 'second-order free-rider problem' will deserve a brief mention as well as 
a brief description o f attempts at addressing it as a class of less serious* problems o f collective 
action, sue as Heckathom's.
A more comprehensive treatment is undertaken by the framework o f  nested games imagined by 
Tsebelis. It will nonetheless lend evidence for my hypothesis that increasing attempts at internal 
solutions of increasing degrees of collective action problems end up by displaying the 'irrationality'
13 Taylor (1976) and (1987).
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of obsessive rational choice, for it blurs any possible dividing line between what it is and is not 
rational to do in any particular case.
My conclusion will be that the Hobbes-Olson problem is not overcome, except when an extra- 
rational move is also implicitly assumed, such as additional behavioral assumptions to self-interest 
(that some people are conditional cooperators, or cooperators, in Taylor and Gauthier) and 
implausible forms of'hyperrationalism' (as in Tsebelis). These authors implicitly enlarge the area 
of validity of the Hobbes-Olson predicament, by specifying the need for extra-rational support for 
cooperation in non-strictly static contexts, and in this sense add contingent reasons to its legality 
(Lessa, 1995). A public good with the characteristics of the political order shall be provided where 
it relies less uncompromisingly on bare self-interest or individual rationality.
4.1. Taylor
Taylor (19S7) provides a well-specified definition of an 'internal' solution. It goes as follows:
Internal solutions neither involve nor presuppose changes in the 'game', that is, 
in the possibilities open to the individuals (which are in part determined by the 
'transformation function’, specifying how much o f the public good can be 
produced with a given contribution), the individuals' preferences (or more 
generally attitudes), and their beliefs (including expectations). (Taylor,1987:22)
And, subsequently he provides a justification for adopting an internal solution:
I shall take the view that the internal solution is the basic one, in two connected 
senses. It is, first, the only one which is complete in itself. All the external 
solutions presuppose the prior and/or concurrent solution o f other problems, 
usually (always?) o f collective action problems. Many o f them, for example, 
involve the use o f threats and offers of sanctions, and the creation and 
maintenance o f the sanction system entail the prior or concurrent solution of 
collective action problems.(...) The internal solution is basic in a second sense: 
until we know whether a solution of this kind is possible and what form it will 
take, we cannot say what work, if any remains to be done by other putative 
solutions, (ibidem:22)
The criticism in the first part o f the statement above is meant to  apply to many solutions such as 
'political entrepreneurs' (Hampton), 'property rights' (Buchanan), and 'norms’ (Ullmann-Margalit,
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Elster). That is to say, they all require a second-order self-interest based derivation o f these 
mechanisms, according to Taylor.
So, admittedly, a failure in his solution to the iterated N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, which he 
deems to be an accurate description o f the Hobbesian state o f nature, will display the difficulty' 
in solving the collective action problem altogether. For the recourse to ’other putative solutions' 
still carries the burden o f leaving unsolved prior collective action problems. Moreover, one such 
failure weakens the criticism of the coercive role o f the state, which is the major normative 
purpose of Taylor's efforts:
The most persuasive justification o f the state is founded on the argument that, 
without it, people would not successfiilly cooperate in realizing their common 
interests and in particular would not provide themselves with certain public goods: 
goods, that is to say, which any member o f the public may benefit from, whether 
or not he or she contributes in any way to their provision.(...) The Possibility of 
Cooperation is a critique of this justification of the state, and the heart o f the 
critique(...) is a detailed study o f cooperation in the absence o f the state and of 
other kinds of coercion. (...) Hobbes' Leviathan was the first full expression o f this 
way o f justifying the state, The public goods he was principally concerned were 
social order - domestic peace - and defense against foreign aggression. Without 
these, very little else that was worth having could be had. (ibidem: 1)
Indeed, Hobbes' account o f the origin (and justification o f the existence) of tne state relies, 
according to Taylor, on his description o f the state of nature as a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. Since this game does not offer prospects for cooperation, although it also displays players' 
willingness to  coordinate on a beneficial cooperative outcome, Hobbes' conclusion is that a 
coercive mechanism, the state, is welcome which might enforce the contribution of the individuals.
What, Taylor asks, is the possibility o f cooperation among a large number of individuals in the 
absence of coercion? It turns, in the first place, upon the possibility for the cooperative strategy 
to be the likely action o f these individuals or o f  a sufficient number o f them. And this possibility 
can only be defended if  the strategies are seen as somehow interdependent, in the sense that an 
actor's strategic choice is contingent on the others' strategy choices.
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To be sure, this is a condition that is also present in Olson's setting of collective action as an 
actor's choice o f strategy is contingent on what he thinks others will do as when he considers that 
being in a large group his defection (or his contribution) will go unnoticed And since each 
individual will have the access to the public good anyway, Olson concludes that only a coercive 
mechanism or some separate incentives other than the 'common interest' itself will motivate 
individuals towards cooperation. Yet, Taylor's idea of a contingent strategy harbors a somewhat 
different element, namely, that interaction involves a sequence o f plays among several players. 
Let us put together the main parts o f  his argument, one by one.
As is well known, Hardin (1971) analyzes Mancur Olson's collective action problem as a N-person 
Prisoner's Dilemma. This has entailed a slight modification o f Olson's logic, for the non- 
cooperative outcome appears as a result o f the operation o f the dominance logic: regardless of 
what others intend to do, noncooperation stands out as the individual optimizing strategy. This 
manoeuvre has had the effect of depressing still further the already low prospects o f cooperation 
contained in Olson's idea o f individual invisibility in a large group, for ever since his law has 
implied that individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. I conjecture that the Olsonian 
emphasis on invisibility (or the marginal contribution) instead o f  dominance arguments was 
conducive to his solution to the collective action problem. Collective actions are more likely to 
succeed where visibility is quite high (as in small groups), but they need extra restraints in so far 
as large and intermediate groups are concerned.
In any case, Taylor builds upon the work o f  Hardin, in the sense that he proposes a solution to 
a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) supergame, namely the iterated N-person PD. Though 
Taylor in an earlier work (1976) had already modeled the iterated PD, the most famous results 
are attributed to Axelrod's (1984) computer tournament. It consisted o f an indefinitely repeated 
number of two-person PD games, all participants (a number o f philosophers and social scientists) 
playing against one another; the winning strategy was 'tit-for-tat', that is, cooperating in the first 
round and then imitating what the other player has chosen. Axelrod's conclusion is that
7 2
cooperation is possible whenever two conditions obtain: 'that the cooperation be based on  
reciprocity and that the shadow o f  the future be important enough.'14
To be sure, Taylor argues that many collective action problems take the rather weak form o f  the  
chicken or assurance games, which are games with multiple equilibria, requiring some sort o f  
coordination to select a specific equilibrium. But were one to make a game-theoretical problem 
out of the Hobbesian state of nature, and, accordingly, to  search for a determinate and unique 
solution to it, one, in particular, that reconciles individual and collective rationality, the task is 
surely to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma, as Taylor goes on to argue. So, an internal solution 
requires that the problem itself be modeled under the Prisoner's Dilemma conditions.
What was then missing in the Hobbesian description of the state of nature that obstructed the way 
to a solution? According to Taylor, Hobbes' state o f nature was inadequately static, and being so, 
it unnecessarily narrowed the sense o f self-interest to what Taylor calls 'eminence' The motivation 
of eminence engenders a game o f  difference where payoffs for one player increase with the 
difference between his and others' utilities, instead of his welfare or utility level alone. Had Hobbes 
considered the dynamic nature of interaction he would have concluded that a less harsh sense o f  
self-interest would come about which could somehow neutralize eminence. For this to occur, 
Taylor goes on to argue, it suffices that we introduce a condition that, incidentally, enhances the 
realism o f our model, namely, repetition or 'time'.
Interactions among individuals motivated by self-interest might engender voluntary cooperation 
if only a number o f people give positive value to future payoffs. PD's logic, let alone Olson’s, 
might be overcome through noncoercive means, and hopefully rationality might be unleashed and 
the dilemma solved if only time were considered.
Certainly, as Axelrod had already pointed out, reciprocity is also an indispensable part o f  
voluntary cooperation. So, rephrasing Taylor’s statement, reciprocity (or the use of contingent 
strategies, in his words) is more likely where repetition occurs.
14 Axelrod, 1984, p. 173.
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So, time is a necessary condition for cooperation but not perhaps a sufficient one. That is, if 
people give some value to future outcomes they may come to consider the possibility of 
cooperating. But this possibility is highly contingent on similar plans by a number o f other people 
Given this uncertainty, overall defection is always an equilibrium, as Taylor has shown. But still, 
we are interested in other possible nondefective equilibria, that is, at least on their logical 
possibility.
This possibility, as becomes clear in Taylor's analysis, is contingent on the interplay between two 
kinds of players, namely, unconditional cooperators and conditional cooperators. Further 
restrictive analytical conditions stipulate, the desirable limit to time discounting, the proportion 
o f conditional and unconditional cooperators, the number o f repetitions (that should be indefinite, 
otherwise defection dominates, as he points out), and the number N of the players, which being 
too large would not impose costs to free riding.
So, summing up the requirements o f  a solution, we need two kinds o f cooperative behavior for 
cooperation to emerge from a population, or, to put it differently, we need some players that 
define their strategies conditionally. Additionally the proportion o f cooperators by nature and by 
circumstance must be fixed in equilibrium, and time discounting should be smaller the larger the 
number of unconditional defectors. Last but not least, we should have a 'not too large* population 
to enable fake cooperators to be detected.
The usual comments on Taylor's analysis apply here, his own comments coming first. He 
concludes that PD is not overcome with the introduction o f  time, although multiple equilibria 
seem to be more hopeful an outcome than a unique equilibrium where all players defect. 
Voluntary cooperation is more likely to emerge in small groups than in larger ones, where the 
usual Olsonian caveats apply.
In other words, cooperation is more likely to emerge from models where substantial modification 
o f  the behavioral assumptions is introduced, cooperation being postulated instead o f  deduced as 
would be required by a wholly internal solution. As for the introduction of the repeated game 
framework as a way out o f the collective action problem, we had better quote Aumann who notes
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that repetition 'fails to eliminate the ultimate inefficient outcomes - the payoffs to  a strategy o f 
mutual defection.'15 But Hechter (1992) also complains against the over optimistic informational 
assumptions o f the repeated game framework, for it is blindly confident about complete and 
perfect information. Opposing the assumption o f complete information, Hechter argues.
To impute strategies and payoffs to other players, individuals would need to know 
(1) each other's action resources and constraints (in order to arrive at a mutual 
understanding o f their respective set o f available strategies), (2) the causal 
consequences o f all n-tuples o f strategies (in order to  know the set of attainable 
outcomes), and finally, (3) each other's perceptions and subjective valuations o f 
these outcomes (in order to construct the payoff matrices that would then be 
subjected to the mathematical analysis of game-theoretic solutions). 
(Hechter,1992:36)
Hechter goes on to point out that the assumption o f perfect knowledge implies that players have 
zero monitoring costs which is too unrealistic, especially in the n-person game.
The startling thing about Taylor's model, it seems to  me, is that even having to justify such strong 
assumptions as its behavioral postulates and the informational framework, it still ends up with a 
rather weak solution, in the form o f  multiple equilibria. O f course, with multiple equilibria 
collective irrationality may still be individually rational, for equilibrium reasons: every individual 
has a good reason to take an equilibrium strategy that, nonetheless, may match in a non­
equilibrium strategy profile.
A final comment concerns the introduction o f time in Taylor's argument. As time is incorporated 
as a time-discounting rate we are perhaps justified in thinking that Olson's static approach was not 
completely left behind. Taylor himself acknowledges that his treatment is not properly dynamic 
but comparative-static. Yet, it may be worth looking into this, I shall argue.
The possibility o f cooperation arises hopefully from interaction over time. This latter, in turn, is 
translated into a discounting-rate. However w e are not sure as to  how this discounting-rate is 
itself determined, in other words why people come to  assess the future in an optimistic mood. An 
idea that offers itself to scrutiny is that future outcomes are worth having because we hope to
15 Cited in Hechter, 1992, p,36.
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have built a bridge with others towards that future, in other words, our positive assessment as far 
as future is concerned also depends on the already existing degree o f cooperation. In this sense 
a low time-discounting instead o f explaining cooperation may be assuming it. That time is 
somehow exogenous and objective (replacing Leviathan?) is confirmed by Taylor’s postulation 
o f an invariable discounting-rate.
In short, Taylor's efforts seem not to overcome the Olsonian prediction as to the higher 
probability of cooperation in a small group than in a larger one, due to the additional precautions 
he deems necessary in order to make sure that conditional cooperators will actually cooperate, 
even in the presence of the favorable circumstances for cooperation, namely, some preference for 
future outcomes and a variety of types o f actors. These precautions refer mainly to informational 
conditions, or transparency, less likely in large communities, more abundant in smaller ones. In 
the end, this is the possibility of cooperation (or of'anarchy1). Cooperation exists where there 
already exists a genuine willingness to cooperate or mechanisms to detect non-laudable behavior.
Hence, as a final word we cannot help concluding so far that the introduction of realism into 
Olson's model in the form o f repeated interaction cannot avoid achieving the same results as his 
own, leaving an internal rational-choice solution to the collective action problem of creating the 
political order in the same irreducible plane o f  irreality as in its canonical, Olsonian form. Indeed 
Taylor's efforts seem to have added second-order reasons to  the Olsonian logic: in the absence 
o f coercion or separate incentives, neither will non-strictly static contexts produce cooperation, 
except if small groups are assumed.
As a side point, Taylor's multiple equilibria and informational burdens might well open a case for 
the banality of a collective action deductive theory. This is the route taken by Hechter and Elster. 
They claim for more dense descriptions o f a particular collective actions dilemma and for the 
grasping of relevant norms in each case. Hechter (1992), for example, points out the impossibility 
o f the construction of a payoff matrix if we stick to realism and drop the traditional informational 
assumptions. Elster (1935), in turn, suggests that we should work out rather weaker conceptions 
o f collective action problems than the Prisoner's Dilemma (Chicken and Assurance like 
descriptions of it), which are more realistic and, accordingly, give room for contingent actions and
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prescriptions for actions. Also Udehn (1993) suggests an approach for collective action that 
encompasses mixed motivations and the heterogeneity of people. He argues that in the extended 
literature stimulated by Olson's pioneering Logic, much sight has been lost as to the sociological 
rather than analytical aspects of the problem, which were present in Olson's original formulation.
But this is not the view I shall pursue, being still interested in looking further into the justificatory 
role of self-interest in political arguments, in particular in those concerned with the constitution 
of the political order as resulting from self-interested undertakings.
4.2. Second-order collective action problems?
The second-order free rider problem, pointed to  by internal solutions as a weakness of external 
solutions, is not a fatal critique, or so Heckathom and De Jasay seem to claim. De Jasay (1989) 
rejects the free-rider problem altogether whilst Heckathom (1989) sets out to demonstrate that 
the two levels o f free-riding are distinct to the effect that cooperative behavior is more likely at 
the second level,
In the first place, what is the second-order free riding problem? According to Taylor's suggestion, 
it is the problem of building a system o f  incentives (negative or positive), stemming entirely from 
the self-interest o f participants to it, in order to  solve the problem o f  provision o f the first level 
of public goods that every participant is directly interested in. It is nearly equivalent to Hardin's 
vision o f  participants to  a collective endeavor being able to  pull themselves by their own 
bootstraps in order to change the incentives they face. It seems logically impossible. Recalling 
Hardin's words, such an incentive system is welcome, to be sure; moreover, it is all the more 
logical; nevertheless, it is thoroughly impractical.
However it has been argued that second-order collective action problems are conceivably less 
serious' than first-order ones. Heckathom (1989), for example, states that we all have two distinct 
sets of motivations, namely, what he calls 'inclinations' (or direct concern with one's welfare) and 
'regulatory interests' (concern with others' behavior). Our inclinations are normally in conflict with 
our regulatory interests in the sense that the former tempt us to free-ride whilst the latter advise 
us to engage in the construction of a regulatory system that rewards cooperation and punishes
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defection. He concludes that rational people tend to cooperate in the second order and to defect 
in the first order collective action problem, leading to a behavior of'hypocritical cooperation’
Thus, Heckathom frames the game played in two levels by a person considering the four feasible 
alternatives she is to face when deciding whether or not to engage in the provision o f a regulatory 
scheme, and whether or not to contribute to the first-order cooperative enterprise this regulatory 
framework is supposed to constrain. He will conclude that a likely dominant strategy of hers is 
to engage in what he calls ’hypocritical cooperation’, which means to cooperate in the construction 
of the regulatory or coercive scheme, and to defect in the first order choice. That is, to make for 
the cooperation of the others through an enforcement framework, but to deviate when it comes 
to pay the costs o f the immediate public good. He then takes the route o f exploring the dynamical 
benefits of this strategy insofar as it is expected, as time goes by, to enhance the likelihood o f ’full 
cooperation’ (cooperation in the two levels) itself.
Without going into the details of his model, I will just note a basic failure in his argument that the 
second-order interaction is governed by what he calls regulatory interests, which in my view is 
misunderstood as an interest in the behavior o f others. It is odd that he does not see that the actor 
himself is someone who will be subject to the second-order rules as well, and so defection, on this 
account, should be his more likely strategy.
For that matter, let us briefly refer to Elsteris Ulysses as a correct understanding, in my view, o f 
the kind of problem here at stake. He says that we need to bind ourselves, but how? In the myth 
it is easier to grasp how a solution may be brought about through one’s acting on one’s external 
environment. So Ulysses asks
...you must bind me hard and fast, so that I cannot stir from the spot where you 
will stand me ... and if I beg you to release me, you must tighten and add to my 
bonds, (cited in Elster, 1979:36, quoted from the Odvssevl
In our daily interactions insofar as our welfare is concerned, namely refraining from one’s 
addiction and similar cases, it is also arguable that binding oneself is the best strategy, though it
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does not cease to be problematic.16 But these are clearly not cases o f public goods, and when it 
comes to the yield o f really public goods, as refraining from littering and the like, Hlster (1985) 
argues for norms, which are not deducible from rational choices. According to him, the strength 
o f  rational choice' reasons for abiding by social norms (in our case, norms of cooperation) fades 
away as soon as increasing layers o f ’choices' are supposed, the strategic sense o f our following 
social norms becoming less clear.17 *In particular, to follow a social norm for strategic reasons 
seems to be self-defeating:
Unless rules were considered important and were taken seriously and followed, 
it would make sense to manipulate them for personal benefit. If  many people did 
not believe that rules were legitimate and compelling, how could anyone use these 
rules for personal advantage? (cited in Bister 1989:128, quoted from Edgerton)
Ulysses’s problem, when it comes to social cooperation in rational choice terms, turns out to be 
whether 'rational, selfish, outcome-oriented persons will be able to cooperate', and this will happen 
’only if each o f them is able to impose the cooperative strategy on his successive selves.'"
De Jasay's (1989) argument in turn leads to  a prescription o f tolerance with a 'spontaneous' 
proportion o f freeriders' and ’suckers' brought about by free-exchange. This prescription comes 
with a threat: let this proportion be freely achieved otherwise (that is, with social-democratic 
intervention) the proportion of free-riding will increase with a vengeance (that is, with the 
expansion o f the public goods domain entailed in a social decision rule and the consequent 
perverse incentives to free-riding). Voluntary provision of public goods can be consistent with 
narrow self-interest only if  we accept a spontaneous rate of exploitation, warns De Jasay. In the 
trade-off between liberal' frame (free-exchange) and democracy, De Jasay sides with the former.
On reflection, we may find an argument highly unsatisfactory whose justification relies on the 
scarcely defensible claim that what is 'natural* ought to be set free. Our suspicions concern the
16 Hlster, 1979, p.37.
17 Also Elster, 1989.
11 Elster, 1985, p. 147, my emphasis.
7 9
supposed naturalness, let alone freedom, of so-called 'free-exchange', since market sanctions fall 
heavily on the shoulders o f not-always-conformed suckers.
On De Jasay's account, natural exploitation may lead to efficiency, which incidentally yields a 
curious description o f the so-called 'free exchange', and on Heckathom's account hypocrisy is 
expected to produce social virtues. These claims are much stronger than the arguments for self- 
interest I want to examine here, and for this reason I shall not dwell on them.
4.3. Nested games
In the branch of solutions to collective action problems that take into account new incentives that 
evolving interaction may provide, the endogenous approach to institutions seems to occupy an 
important place. In addition to the notion that institutions may be produced with the purpose of 
changing the situation the actors are involved in, i.e. as self-enforcing mechanisms (like the 
already mentioned entities of'political entrepreneurs', the system of property rights, or norms in 
the sense of Ullmann Margalit19), and in an attempt to escape the hardship involved in such 
theoretical efforts, Tsebelis worked out an original way of understanding collective action, which 
incidentally is highly normative in character.
This research program calls for a dynamic approach to social interaction, contrastingly with the 
usual static and comparative-static ones, relying heavily on a strong version of rational choice. It 
also claims to criticize the informational setting off en required in both static and repeated-games 
framework, by assuming incomplete and imperfect information instead and, thereby, discovering 
an additional incentive to  cooperation, namely that provided by uncertainty itself. Its starting 
point, however, is the assumption of full-blown rationality on the part o f  the actors (that is, in this 
context, Bayesian rationality), which is actually quite a strong rationality assumption. How do 
these two elements relate, namely uncertainty and full rationality?
Tsebelis seems to suggest that we should separate uncertainty from indeterminacy, by asserting 
that actors possess adequate resources to deal with the uncertainty that normally conditions their 
interactions. However, he contends, theoretical undertakings very often misleadingly identify
19 Norms as approached by UUmann Margalit derive from strategic reasoning.
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suboptimal behavior in real life actions that are actually optimal, thus underestimating actors' 
rational capacities. External observers, like the theoreticians, he goes on to argue, often fail to  
perceive the players' real situation, in the sense that they overlook the fact that players’ choice o f  
strategy in one particular arena is quite frequently contingent on what happens in other arenas 
where they are also participating. That is, relevant contexts to players’ decisions are unjustifiably 
omitted, and with this omission one misperceives their real payoffs. Another aspect o f  the 
decision setting that is often underrated is the fact that players may also be involved in a sort o f  
institutional choice, where the very institutional design, that is the rules of the game, is being 
decided, and decided simultaneously with the decisions in an immediate arena. This latter aspect 
casts light on the element o f variability o f the very constraints to be imposed on an optimizing 
choice of strategy,
Taken together, these contextual and institutional aspects modify the direct game the player is 
concerned with and may lend prospects for cooperation even in the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma 
game. Why so? According to Tsebelis it is due to the fact that this framework, what he calls the 
nested games framework, relaxes the traditional informational requirement o f classical game 
theory, of complete and perfect information. If  the game that players are involved in is not taken 
in isolation, contextual and institutional-design factors being needed for their full intelligibility, 
Tsebelis sets out to demonstrate that these factors while introducing some uncertainty as to  the 
likely choices in the primary arena also make for the possibility o f cooperation among players. 
Under the framework o f  the Prisoner's Dilemma, with the usual informational requirements, the 
rational outcome is mutual defection. However, if we simply introduce less than complete 
information even in the single-shot version o f this game and additionally admit that players might 
communicate, an entirely new range o f strategies, contingent or correlated, may appear. In 
particular, the consideration of a larger context than the immediate arena or the single game may 
render other strategies in a given set more relevant. Moreover, the consideration of a modification 
in the rules o f  the game may give rise to  an entirely new set o f strategies.
Correlated strategies mean that each player chooses his strategy according to the opponent's 
strategy. Once communication is permitted and players can coordinate their strategy choices, the  
likelihood o f different strategies varies with the m agnitude o f each player's choices' and not only
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with the usual preference ordering. In particular, the likelihood o f cooperation increases with 
increasing payoffs for cooperation and decreasing payoffs for defection. The important component 
here is players' expectations concerning the use of cooperative (or otherwise) strategies by their 
competitors, without a change in the basic preference structure being required
Since players are now interested in maximizing their expected utility their choice of strategy will 
also depend on the probability they assign to the various courses o f action which may be 
undertaken by others, taking into account the pre-play talk. In particular, the likelihood o f 
cooperation is said to increase with the probabilities p, of instruction (that a cooperative strategy 
shall be followed by others), and q, o f  retaliation (that a defection is likely to be punished).
Of course, it all depends on the binding force o f the pre-commitments. Promises (of cooperation * 
if the other cooperates) or threats (of punishment were the other to cheat on the pre-play 
agreement) are more understandable and trustworthy the more developed are communication as 
well as coercive institutions, and, obviously make sense only in the context o f repeated 
interactions.
Thus, the case for contingent strategies is strengthened by the consideration by Tsebelis of iterated 
games. He undertakes to show that within the setting of repeated games, contingent strategies are 
highly likely to emerge. In the context o f repetition, Tsebelis argues, players' interests are 
furthered to the extent that they maximize their utility over the entire period of their interaction. 
However, according to him, the usual repeated-games framework misses the point in stressing the 
n u m b er of repetitions as the crucial variable. For what matters is not whether repetitions are 
finite or infinite, because in both cases ’always defect' can be shown to be an optimal strategy 
choice, as Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) formalization o f the 'folk theorem' with respect to 
iterated games proved. This theorem states that 'any individually rational outcome can arise as a 
Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting'. The point is that 
Fudenberg and Maskin have also shown the theorem to be valid also for a finite (provided it is 
sufficient large) number o f  repetitions, if there is incomplete information.20
20 Incomplete information is sufficient to eliminate the distinction between a finite and infinite number of founds. 
Fudenberg and Maskin proved that cooperative strategy could be the equilibrium outcome of an iterated game when
(continued...)
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What matters here is the fact that the likelihood of cooperation is enhanced by the players 
entertaining some reasonable hope (backed, as it were, by both credible promises and threats) that 
(some) others will cooperate conditionally on their cooperation. So, contingent strategies are 
worked out in Tsebelis's approach as the enabling devices that create prospects for cooperation.
The deductive framework is developed in the first chapters of Tsebelis's book, and it aims to  work 
out the logical conditions for cooperation to emerge. However, this deductive framework is not 
only to perform the role o f setting out the ideal conditions for rational choice, for Tsebelis also 
makes the empirical claim that real actors are always maximizing and optimizing agents. In this 
sense, rational-choice framework is not only supposed to establish the ideal conditions for 
individual rational choices but also to uncover the optimality o f  apparently non-optimal behavior 
by real actors. This latter claim is heavily dependent on the successfulness of his approach to 
institutions, for contingent strategies are more effective where coercive and communicative 
institutions obtain, that is where promises and threats are both known and credible. Let us turn 
to this now.
Tsebelis argues, then, that players' payoffs are also variable because the games they play are 
sometimes nested in a larger game whose purpose is precisely to change the rules o f the stage 
games. This is a game that intends to change the rules of other games, or institutional design. 
Actors are very often simultaneously involved in these games, and their aim, in so doing, is to  
enhance their outcomes, either by actively participating in the shaping o f efficiency institutions 
(those that offer prospects o f Pareto-improvement), or by engaging in redistributive institutional 
design (that offers prospects o f improvement o f  the position o f  some groups to the detriment o f 
that of others). Putting stress on efficiency institutions, Tsebelis argues that these are institutions 
that normally help to push outcomes towards the Pareto frontier, solving general problems o f  
coordination which are highly likely to appear given our bounded rationality (limited capacity to 
foresee the consequences o f one’s actions as well as others' actions in general), opportunism 
('discrepancy between ex-ante promises and ex-post behavior*), and asset specificity (the assets
x (... continued)
the number of iterations is either finite (if there is incomplete information) or infinite. (Tsebelis,1990:76)
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are somehow tied to certain actors,21 so that actors have continuing interests in the identity o f one 
another).
So, we are told, we need institutions because we have the kind o f problems we cannot 
automatically surmount. Yet, Tsebelis makes it quite clear that his approach to institutions intends 
to address the production o f institutions as a problem of maximization under constraints: 'actors 
maximize their goals either by changing their strategies or by changing the institutional setting that 
transforms their strategies into outcomes.'22 It is not, then, a matter of'emergence' which is here 
at stake, but rather a question of conscious and intentional maximizing behavior aiming at 
producing the maximizing institutions. Tsebelis, then, compares institutions to investments, a 
personal engagement in a long term enterprise whose fruits are to be collected later in time.
Now, uncertainty as to the consequences should also apply here in the context of the construction 
of institutions, just as it applied in that o f multiple arenas. However, oddly enough the fact that 
institutional design is a likely choice under uncertainty receives a very limited emphasis. 
Unintended consequences are deemed to be a side issue, for what is more important according 
to Tsebelis is the fact that institutions are created and modified following conscious and 
intentional actions, that is rational choices on the part of political actors. However, the rational 
choice o f the rules-game, we may object, cannot itself be nested in a bigger game, that is, cannot 
benefit from the heuristic advantages of incomplete information, as with the primary games, unless 
we enter into an infinite regress. Additionally, how do we reveal the rationality of the institutional 
choice without recurring to some functionalist-like argument to the effect that a specific 
institutional design is said to be rationally chosen because it has proved to be beneficial to our 
coordination? Tsebelis's purpose, however, was to show institutional design as the result o f 
conscious actions by rational actors aiming to overcome their coordination failures.
Tsebelis certainly acknowledges that there is a discontinuity in the treatment between the two 
parts o f  his book, his account o f  institutions being far more inductive than the 'games in multiple
21 This definition was suggested to me by Andy Lewis.
22 Tsebelis, 1990, p.96.
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arenas’ framework. Yet we should try to assess the extent to which this failure affects the 
endeavors o f  an endogenous solution to institutional design and change.
My supposition is that it keeps a striking resemblance to Hobbes-Hardin and Olson's difficulties 
Again, coercive (or other regulatory) mechanisms (or institutions) are admittedly needed to 
overcome likely failures o f coordination among rational-choosers. Institutions are generally 
considered rational, Pareto-improving for that matter. It would therefore be wise for people to 
engage in the production o f these institutions. But, still, why should we expect these people to 
do so? How is it possible that limitedly-rationaL, opportunist people overcome their faults in order 
to build the very mechanisms that would prevent them from failing to  be rational? If they could 
do it they would not need it.
A final related doubt refers to the general possibility of building a thoroughly comprehensive 
rationalist approach. In my view this is not possible (after Popper's (1945) statement).23 
Hyperrationalism is but a  childish disease o f rationalism.
Keeping in line with our former trajectory from Hobbes-Hardin, through Olson, to Taylor we may 
conclude that further contingent reasons have been added to Taylor's argument by Tsebelis. It is 
not only that under complete information, (single-played or iterated PD-like), cooperation 
between rational, self-interested, independent players cannot develop,24 but also that under 
incomplete information and stronger rational-choice requirements, cooperation is only achievable 
with the aid o f coercive and communicative institutions whose creation and modification we have 
thus far been unable rationally to deduce.
4.4. Modification of actors' preferences
This section has the purpose of briefly mentioning alternative attempts to deviate from Olson's 
law, that postulate the possibility for people to  so transform their preferences over actions as to 
favor cooperation.
23For a detailed discussion o f the Popperian argument, see Part III, section 8.
24 Tsebelis, 1990, p.102.
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One such account assumes the possibility that people rationally choose to transform themselves 
into cooperators, thus moving from their narrower interests. Preference changes are not assumed 
but derived, as for example, a consequence o f  individual adaptation to situational incentives, as 
has been suggested by Raub and Voss.
Hence, preferences may themselves be a matter o f choice, o f  rational choice. Morality has also 
been assumed as a matter of rational choice by Gauthier (1986). The willingness to cooperate is 
itself assumed to be a matter of choice, motivated by individual interests. Rationality is then taken 
to be twofold: it is both related to self-interest and transcendent to it. Morality, accordingly, is to 
be understood as a rational (utility maximizing) constraint on the pursuit of self-interest, and 
'rational constraints on the pursuit o f  interest have themselves a foundation in the interest they 
constrain'.23 We note here a similarity with the sort of bootstrapping involved in the related 
arguments for long term self-interest.
Morality emerges, according to Gauthier, as a chosen constraint. Morality [impartiality]... can be 
generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premisses o f rational choice.126 His 
conception of rationality, though impartial, he claims, is not universalistic but maximizing; it does 
not, hence, require any Veil of ignorance* assumption. Gauthier claims that under certain 
structures of interaction (like the state o f nature) that may be modelled as a bargaining problem 
agreed mutual constraint emerges as a rational response.
An important question which his approach needs to address is how the ex-ante hypothetical 
agreement on mutual constraints may turn out to be an ex-post facto  one. In order to achieve this 
purpose, Gauthier defines four core concepts: the concept o f market as a morally free zone; the 
concept of minimax relative benefit, that is supposed to solve the bargaining problem; the concept 
o f  constrained maximization, or conditional cooperation; and a proviso, which is a condition 
regulating the initial bargaining position. These core concepts are the tools with which he works 
out the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to emerge among self-interested 
people. 256
25 Gauthier, 1986, p.2.
26 Gauthier, 1986, p.4.
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So, the idea of market as a morally free zone sets out the ideal horizon. Short of a morally free 
zone, we should resort to morality:
But this is not to denigrate the value o f morality, which makes possible an artificial 
harmony where natural harmony is not to be had. Market and morals share the 
non-coercive reconciliation o f individual interest with mutual benefit. Where 
mutual benefit requires individual constraint, this reconciliation is achieved 
through rational agreement. (Gauthier, 1986:13/14)
A necessary condition for agreement among individuals, in other words, its initial motivation, is 
that its outcome be mutually advantageous. Sufficient conditions entail, in turn, that the problem 
of achieving the mutual benefit be modelled as a bargaining problem (instead of, we now know, 
a repeated game or a Bayesian decision making, or more generally, a problem of decision making 
under some veil o f ignorance, as in Rawls and Harsanyi).
Bargaining is used to select a specific outcome, given a range o f mutually advantageous 
possibilities and a carefully specified initial bargaining position. An individual criterion for 
selecting outcomes in the bargaining problem is the minimax relative benefit, Gauthier suggests, 
which specifies the minimum expected individual surplus as a result o f  the bargain. This minimum 
defines, in turn, the willingness of the individuals to  make concessions as well as the threshold 
below which they are no longer interested in the cooperative venture.
However, a crucial condition for his compliance with the final terms o f  the bargain, according to 
Gauthier, lies in the plausibility o f his constrained maximizing behavior and in a well specified 
initial bargaining position (which he sets out in the form o f a Locke-like proviso that protects 
personal and property rights).
He finally sets out to argue for an Archimedean point from the standpoint o f bargaining theory 
rather than the usual rational choice under uncertainty perspective. He certainly claims this point 
to be his fifth core concept, but only addresses it at the end o f  his book.
The central issue that shall concern us here with Gauthier is his idea o f  a constrained maximizer, 
to whom he devotes a great amount o f  justificatory arguments. It seems, however, that the
assumption of constrained-maximizing behavior shares the basic shortcomings of similar 
behavioral assumptions by authors who deal with the emergence o f political order from a 
collective action standpoint. It draws heavily on the capacity of actors to confidently and correctly 
identify other would-be cooperators and join them in the cooperative venture
Of course this issue brings back Olson's concerns as to the visibility o f free-riding Insofar as 
rational agents will only cooperate conditionally on others' cooperation, which is the point o f 
constrained maximization (agent's willingness to restrain their narrow self-interest because o f the 
prospects of the greater benefit were cooperation to be achieved), cooperation draws heavily on 
rational agents' capacity to identify each other's disposition to coordinate. But, on reflection is this 
capacity a conceivable feature of an instmmentally rational agent? Moreover, having identified 
true disposition to cooperate on the part of the others, why should one cooperate oneself? Is it 
rational? We are back to square one, or so it seems.
5. Identitarian Collective Action
Let us now move to what we call 'identitarian' collective action, the meaning of which will emerge 
from some cases considered below.
According to a number o f authors, self-interest is an inadequate motivation to explain social 
interaction. Were we to relax it some interesting possibilities might arise that admit of cooperation 
among individuals. I shall briefly refer to Sen (1985b), Pizzomo (1986) and Elster's (1985) 
contributions.
Sen argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma reflects the problem o f divergence between equilibrium 
points and Pareto-optimal points, which by definition coincide in the model o f perfectly 
competitive markets. Usual ways out, he goes on to state, involve the use o f repeated games and 
lead to  multiple equilibria unless the behavioral structure is altered in some significant way. Also, 
relaxing the assumption of common knowledge helps to escape the dilemma which is a route some 
authors have taken. But, he argues, this latter seems to be an odd way out for 'in order to  achieve
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rational cooperation, it becomes necessary to know ’less'!'.27 His own attempt concentrates on 
relaxing the behavioral assumption of'goal-priority’ or ’self-goal' choice entailed in standard game 
theoretical approach.
Indeed, Sen’s proposal implies the rejection o f rational economic man:
The conception o f the individual as a very 'private' person - unconcerned about the 
rest o f the world - has been seen, in my judgment rightly, as both empirically 
unrealistic and theoretically misleading. (Sen, 1985b;346)
He recognizes three types of'privateness' which are implicit in the behavioral assumptions o f  game 
theory; (i) self-centered welfare - a person’s welfare depends only on his or her consumption (and, 
in particular, it does not involve any sympathy or antipathy toward others); (ii) self-welfare goal - 
a person's only goal is to maximize his or her welfare, or - given uncertainty - the expected value 
of that welfare (and, in particular, it does not involve directly attaching importance to  the welfare 
of others), (iii) self-goal choice • each choice a person makes is guided immediately by the pursuit 
of his own goal (and in particular, it is not restrained by the recognition o f other people’s pursuit 
o f their goals).* 2*
As we move from (i) to (iii) weaker senses o f privateness are suggested. In (iii) sympathy may be 
included and it refers to an emotional link between the self and the fate o f some others. Thus 
relaxing condition (iii) would require breaking the tight link between individual welfare (with or 
without sympathy) and the choice of action, 'e.g. acting to remove some misery even though one 
personally does not suffer from it’. This involves what Sen calls, after Bernard Williams, 
'commitment';
Commitment can also involve violation o f  self-goal choice, since the departure 
may possibly arise from self-imposed restrictions on the pursuit o f  one's own goals 
(in favour of, say, following particular rules o f conduct). (ibidem;348)
27 Sen, 1985, p.344.
2‘ Sen, 1985, p.347.
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To follow particular rules o f conduct may well be a matter o f identity, that is, of how one sees 
oneself, Sen argues. It may be crucial to the way we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral 
obligations, he also suggests. In particular,
the pursuit of private goals may well be compromised by the consideration o f the 
goals of others in the group with whom the person has some sense of identity 
(ibidem; 348)
Conceding that possibility, we may consider that relaxing self-goal choice may resolve the 
Prisoner's Dilemma, for it makes room for an alternative pattern o f behavior toward others.
Pizzomo (1986) suggests something similar, when, in dealing with odd behavior by some people, 
he argues for a non-rational choice explanation. In certain cases, he maintains, there is something 
that precludes rational calculation or the self-interest premise for, in a sense, they involve aspects 
that are somehow antecedent to one's choice and accordingly specify the kind of self a person is. 
Some cases of collective action displays this peculiarity; people more than adhere to a cause; they 
might happen to identify with it, in the strong sense of having their identities defined by this 
particular collective identity (and, in this sense lack the necessary detachment which is the 
condition for any calculation to be performed). Instead of talking about a well structured and 
unified self we should talk about different selves according to the different collective identities a 
person may identify with.
Elster (1985) also argues for the consideration of non-selfish motivations as a way out to 
collective action problems. In particular, he refers to two classes of non-selfish actions, namely, 
those outcome-oriented and those process-oriented. In the former class fall altruistic and moral 
motivation. Altruism, according to him, is a psychological attitude o f  concern with others' 
pleasures whilst morality is a motivation that reflects an impersonal evaluation. Morality, in turn 
may be either a duty-motivation, like the Kantian categorical imperative, or a desire to maximize 
average or even minimum welfare.
In process-oriented cases, on the other hand, people are not guided by moral norms but by social 
norms. Social norms have to do with the way other people see one's self, and how this image 
affects one's self-image. So, the primary consideration when taking an action, when a social norm
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is at work, is to see whether or not the action matches the self-image one possesses, one's 
question being: Am I the kind of person that does this?
Elster, thus, argues that 'my self-image is not a benefit: it is what defines what counts as a benefit*, 
much in line with the previous approaches we have referred to. However, contrasting with these 
latter, Elster warns about the issue of'framing* that may be related to  social norms. Social norms 
are quite sensitive to  framing, in a way that may render them quite corruptible:
even the most fundamental norms may lose their hold on behavior almost 
overnight. In the case of norms o f cooperation, this is facilitated because o f the 
ambiguity o f what constitutes cooperative behavior in any given case. Abstention 
from voting that is forbidden by the norms of duty may turn into an act of civic 
duty if redefined as active abstention in protest against the system. By switching 
allegiance from a smaller to a larger group, cooperation and noncooperation may 
take on new meanings. But to know that such phenomena occur is not know when 
they do. Until we have a firmer understanding of such gestalt changes in normative 
behavior, the study of collective action may not be able to go much beyond 'thick 
description' ! (Elster, 1985:154)
Two comments apply here. Firstly, the issue o f  framing may endanger Tsebelis’s account in the 
sense that we may see cooperation showing up under situations carefully theoretically 
reconstructed so as to look like a cooperative interaction. So, in a sense, a 'social norms' account 
o f cooperation, or an identitarian account o f  it, by presupposing cooperation cannot get rid o f  
the same kind o f frailty some authors showed to have also affected strong conceptions of self- 
interest, namely, to remain essentially tautological. An alternative way, suggested by Elster, is that 
to shift from the deductive and nonnative pretence which theories o f  collective action often have, 
to an inductive 'thick description' where wrong hypotheses might be falsified.
Secondly, an identitarian general approach runs the risk of justifying (perhaps unjustifiably) some 
degrees of particularization of the social dimension, on grounds of identity with particular groups. 
So, on the one hand, bare self-interest is too unreliable a basis for constructing social cooperation, 
whilst on the other hand the symmetrical behavioral assumption of, say, 'identity', is no more so. 
'Identity1 has supported factions in history.
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6. Concluding Remarks
Although not a thorough conclusion, two additional remarks are worth making. First, the rational 
choice translation o f self-interest in terms of equilibrium-seeking behavior along with the 
assumption that social benefits or efficient coordination thereby result is flawed, in view o f the 
arguments the collective action literature has been adding to the earlier canonical version o f this 
problem. From Olson, we have a logical argument severing unconditional individual rationality 
from collective rationality; from Olson's opponents, we have additional conditional reasons for 
this logic.
Secondly, taking the individual as a somewhat enlarged entity, capable o f commitment, besides 
or rather than interest, may open an avenue to solving collective action problems. Groups, 
accordingly may evade the logic o f collective action to the extent that their members are not 
primarily self-interested. Should we welcome the news? It does not seem that we should.
On balance, one may arguably think that we need a public space but conclude that self-interest 
is not a very enabling basis, except, perhaps negatively as a critical standpoint we stick to, from 
which we might cultivate suspicions about self-proclaimed public discourse. Our attempts to 
address this problem indirectly from self-interest alone • that is the problem of having individuals 
act collectively in furtherance of a common end to make everyone better off - could not pass 
Olson’s test. However, attempts to address it directly (self-interest as, broadly speaking, group 
'identity') do not seem to allay our justifiable fears, which have been cultivated all the way from 
early modernity, for at least we have experienced some o f its bloody results. As Hardin has 
recently said:
self-interest can often successfully be matched with group- interest. And when it 
is, it is often appalling. The world might be a far less bloody place, and less ugly 
in many other ways, if many groups failed in relevant moments. (Hardin,1995:5)
Implicitly recalling Hume, he goes on to explain that this is bad because this is 'typically applicable 
to a group whose benefits comes from the suppression of another group's interest.'29
29 Hardin, 1995, p.5.
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Collective action with, in our terms, 'identity1 may lead to factions, and with bare self-interest m a y  
not succeed at all.
Different grounds for the social order might be produced by behavioral assumptions other th a n  
self-interest and group-identity. In this direction, individuals' cooperative willingness may b e  
rooted in a moral motivation, an assumption that is taken up in Part n , specially in the chap ters 
on Harsanyi and Rawls. Before that, however, we shall concentrate in the next chapter o n  
questions o f  strategic interaction. A natural reason for doing so is that strategic rationality o r  
game theoretical reasoning underlies much o f  the collective action literature and we may g a in  
some insight by looking into well established problems in this framework. Another less natural 
motivation is that the analysis of strategic rationality highlights the problematic eplstemic natu re  
of social interaction, leaving behind the behavioral assumption o f cooperative willingness w hich 
got in the way of the episodes of public-goods that we have gone through in this chapter.
In the next chapter, then, I will be thinking o f social interaction as an environment w here 
knowledge is produced and consumed, individually and collectively. I intend to open up this issue 
and uncover within the limit of our present possibilities the extent to  which unargued normative 
convictions rely on at least disputable epistemic assumptions. This move, in turn, shall open th e  
path to Hayekian social philosophy, which will be worked out later in Part III.
Chapter 3
ON GAMES AND PUZZLES: SELF-INTEREST AS STRATEGIC RATIONALITY? 
(the game-theoretical approach to interaction)
1. Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the game-theoretical image of social interaction. The view shall be taken 
here that the game-theoretical vision of social interaction portrays it as strategic interaction 
among rational people, that is, an interaction among utility-maximizers whose choices are 
interdependent. Following this vision, game theory needs to work out a particular notion of 
rationality, as strategic rationality that is sensitive to the various contingencies that typically 
surround interdependent choices. O f course, these contingencies reflect the fact that one's 
outcome depends also on the courses of actions possibly chosen by relevant others, at least by the 
player with whom one is interacting. Since it would be hard to maintain that we have an obvious 
and unequivocal access to each other's plans, in examining strategic interaction we shall find 
ourselves in the realm o f the 'two*.
Towards the end o f understanding game theory's view o f social interaction, I am going to 
elaborate, conceptually and non-technically, on the idea o f strategic interaction starting from its 
formulation by von Neumann and Morgenstern, and Anderson and Moore. The provocative and 
original insight contained in their vision of a complex interdependence will be emphasized, in 
particular their departure from the then fashionable behaviorist approach to the social phenomena. 
Besides, aspects are also discussed that relate to the notion o f strategic rationality in that this is 
supposed to solve the strategic interaction in terms of individual rationality and an equilibrium 
notion. In particular, focus shall be put on the knowledge conditions often attributed to strategic 
agents in that these conditions seem to perform a crucial role in the resolution o f the social 
interaction in terms of the rationality o f the individuals. In this context, it turns out to be relevant 
to  learn how far individuals are able to anticipate each other's intended actions.
On the way to approaching the meaning of'strategic interaction', our steps will be as follows. In 
section 2, two episodes are selected from the early history o f the theory o f games, namely, the
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intellectual collaboration of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Moore and Anderson's view o f  
the superior prospects o f the nascent game theory as compared to the then existing alternative 
accounts o f human interaction. These 'historical' episodes are there for two reasons: first, to  
provide a perspective of the theory o f games as an attempt to formalize an original and compelling 
way of conceiving the social phenomena, and secondly, to give an indication of some o f the  
relevant tensions that the theory has so far been trying to  case as a consequence of its tw ofold 
approach, represented in the search both for relevance (faithfulness to complexity) and 
determinacy (solution concepts).
It seems that the tensions that come out are to a large extent natural outcomes of the novelty 
game theory itself was introducing in standard scientific views regarding social interaction at the  
time it appeared. To begin with, game theory (GT, henceforth) was proposing a different 
representation of a 'rational' decision from the traditional behavioristic one, as a consequence o f  
its peculiar view o f the social phenomena. I shall quite arbitrarily represent these distinct 
representations as follows:
(1) Behaviorist model: s o
(2) GT model: s o, or else s s(o);
where s is the subject, the reasoning actor, and o is the object of his reasoning, which in human 
interaction in general is another s and hence may be represented as s(o). The arrow then indicates 
the expectation of an action or the construction o f a belief concerning the recipient of it. Under 
representation (1) the object is external to the subject's undertakings, whereas under (2) the object 
is somehow affected by the subject's concerns.
At the same time, however, the ultimate purposes of GT are to build up a deductive theory 
capable of finding out the big S whose task it is to  solve the system s *”► (o):
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S s ++ (o) 1
So, the point is that while GT acknowledges the existence o f a modified object, in our terms the 
complex object s (o), it also devotes itself to the construction of the theoretical external 
viewpoint from which a solution might emerge. In this context, some o f the tensions appear to 
be but the fairly inevitable unfolding of GTs twofold scientific program, as I hope eventually to 
indicate.
On the way to approaching the meaning of'strategic rationality1, then, section 3 undertakes to 
explore some of the knowledge conditions of GT and their recent developments. I do this because 
the knowledge issue seems to play a crucial role in the theory, given its peculiar view o f 
interaction. It becomes very important to set out what individuals know about their decision 
problem, and, particularly, what they know about each other's choices. In particular, in standard 
game-theoretical approaches the requirement that the theory o f games be somehow common 
knowledge among the players in a strategic situation seems to  be rather crucial for a determinate 
solution to arise (as well as theoretically demanding). So, the common knowledge assumption 
(CK) shall be firstly presented within the intellectual context of its birth in connection with the 
notion o f conventions, and afterwards is discussed in connection with the solution to non- 
cooperative games.
Although strategic reasoning is one way of reasoning to a solution in strategic interactions, it may 
also engender an uncertainty of its own, a 'strategic uncertainty' (after Johnson, 1993). The 
assumption of common knowledge is normally thought to be o f help in reducing the uncertainty 
that may follow strategic thinking. Different informational levels may be supposed o f the players, 
though. As we move from the standard Nash solution to the Bayesian approach our attention is 
directed at weaker informational structures and stronger rationality assumptions, where the 
requirement of complete information is assumed to be too restrictive and not really necessary in 
order for rational individuals to reconcile their plans. At this point all that is needed towards that
1 The symbolic representation * -*• o, » ^  o, and * «-► »(o) herein adopted is 'stolen' from Santos (1990) (who worked 
it out in a different context) and freely distorted.
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end is to suppose, as Aumann (1987) does, that people are Bayes-rational and that this fact is 
common knowledge.
This latter solution is examined in relative depth, in section 4, as it perceives strategic interaction 
in a rather radical fashion and tries to  address the 'strategic uncertainty'. The vision o f  
interdependence that seems to be implicit in this solution may be provisionally described a s  
follows:
S -+ s"(o) «-* s*(o) «-> s(o);
where the big S and the whole sequence o f  small s's, according to my interpretation, end up  
ironically by restating the traditional behaviorist model s o and its epistemological short­
comings which have already been remarked on in the earlier years of the theory of gam es2
A fifth section presents, in quite a cursory fashion, three alternative approaches to Aumann, which 
undertake to examine necessary supplementation to strategic rationality in its comprehensive 
form.
In its final comments, this chapter considers that a deductive theory of rationality o f the kind 
displayed here needs be supplemented by external elements which, in turn, cannot get rid o f  
context. That is to say, cannot be endogenously deduced, a suggestion that is in line with the 
alternatives examined in the previous section. In addition, this approach hints that to work out this 
possibility we would be required to face the rather philosophical question: what can we possibly 
know? To pose the question in this manner means that the problem o f  knowledge is not supposed 
to be just a problem o f information, and to solve it is not only a matter of maximization under 
uncertainty. It is rather the question o f the place we occupy in a quite autonomous structure itself 
made up of knowledge, and the complex relations thus generated among the parts to it and the 
whole. This is the subject of Part III.
2 Actually, the description that we shall provide in section 4 shows a big S conjecturing on different *(o)'s, that is, 
different action-reaction settings of strategic interaction.
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2. Strategic Interaction
Jst approach: The 1we-action '
Hardin (1988) claims that game theory is the best understanding we presently have of strategic 
interaction. This strategic interaction, in turn, is something that implies that, in trying to achieve 
some end in society, Svhat we do* turns out to be much more important than *what I do”. And this 
fact seems to have, according to him, important moral implications, at least of one kind: that one 
cannot conclude from a choice of strategy whether it is right or wrong, for it alone does not imply 
a particular outcome, but only restricts the range of possible outcomes. So, he concludes, if  we 
are utilitarians we should give up any precise sense of determinacy in our moral theory. But 
perhaps even if we are not utilitarians and still retain the image of interdependence, this 
implication may have something to tell our normative or positive theories.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the 'consequentialist' (or, utilitarian for that matter) consequences 
o f this attitude towards social interaction, we may be interested in seeing in what sense game 
theory is said to underpin the intuition that social interaction is strategic in kind, and to what 
extent it offers prospects for us to limit the apparent indeterminacy involved in our understanding 
o f  strategic interaction. To shed light on these issues it is worth looking briefly at the 
circumstances around the collaboration o f von Neumann and Morgenstern. I will, in the following, 
draw on Mirowski (1992) and Leonard's (1995) reports of the main elements of this collaboration.
2nd approach: The von Neumann-Morgenstem problem
"Whenever the outcome o f  an individual's action depends as much on the actions o f the others 
with whom he interacts as on his actions (and individuals are aware o f this dependence)t their 
activities display a strategic component and thus fa ll within the vNM  (1944) definition o f a gam e"2
In the twenties, von Neumann was highly engaged in two different projects, one being a 
thoroughly formal and comprehensive axiomatical project in mathematics (the so-called Hilbert's 
program) and the other, the quantum mechanics research program. The first project, it seems, was 
to  be defeated, at least in its original form, by Gödel's incompleteness proof in 1930, which is
’ Bicchicri, 1993, p.8.
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kno\Wi&to have pointed out the endogenous generation o f inconsistencies in complete logical 
systems (either a logical system is complete or consistent, it cannot be both).4
Von Neumann, after Godel's proof, retreated from his initial position inside the mathematical field 
In contrast, the second project, quantum mechanics, was destined to achieve great success and 
had an extension in von Neumann's mathematical work on games. How did this come about?
To be sure, von Neumann's work on games was also a reaction to  the failure o f Hilbert’s meta­
math emati cal project, if not in pure mathematics then in the field o f a general theory of rationality, 
because it was also part of the original program to extend mathematical formalism to as many 
areas of human understanding as possible. This mathematical formalism, in turn, meant basically 
that 'the question o f  truth [was] then shifted into the question of consistency.5
In any case, games were already an independent part of von Neumann's research agenda, which 
approached his general interest in the widespread application o f mathematical formalism, in line 
with one particular task of Hilbert's project. On the other hand, his contribution to the new physics 
program encompassed the development o f new mathematical tools. The interesting question 
arises, then, o f how von Neumann's striving for a general theory o f rationality was to meet his 
parallel ongoing research on physics.
At first, we should be clear about the nature o f von Neumann's efforts in physics. He was actually 
working on the mathematical foundations for a new physics, those which would work out the 
stochastic nature o f  the physical world courtesy o f a peculiar effect that mere observation was 
supposed to produce on physical particles. Rephrasing it, one highly suggestive element in the 
quantum project from von Neumann's perspective was the introduction of stochastic relations at 
the most basic levels o f physical postulates, namely, in the very system observer-observed.
4 According to von Neumann's personal assessment: "The very concept of 'absolute' mathematical rigor is not 
immutable. The variability o f the concept of rigor shows that something else besides mathematical abstraction must 
enter into the makeup o f mathematics..." (cited in Mirowski,1992:122, quoted from von Neumman).
5 Leonard, 1995, p.733, after Wcyl.
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Developments in set theory and combinatorial methods were needed to frame the seemingly 
complex phenomenon at hand.
In addition, von Neumann extended his attention to the social world as well, as he became 
convinced that both social and natural worlds shared the characteristic of enabling a complex 
relationship to arise between the observer and the observed, in the pervasive expectation that the 
observer will affect the object of his examination. Von Neumann began to see games as a good 
representation of human interaction (recall the model s «-+ o). It is interesting to remark here that 
von Neumann also adopted the methodological monism characteristic of theoreticians of 
behaviorist persuasion albeit with opposite visions of the physical and social worlds.
Furthermore, von Neumann's recognition o f a subjective element in the core of scientifically 
defined systems may be seen in the special importance probability began to assume in his works.6 
There Probability was expressing not only an uncertainty about the observed, but also pointing 
to a plausible influence of the observer on the observed, capable o f generating further uncertain 
relations, which the observer himself was somehow to grasp. This development added to his work 
on the theory of games, as witnessed by the parallel development o f measures of expected values 
of outcomes and the concept o f mixed strategies, which were supposed to control the influence 
of chance not only on the rules of the game (through the introduction o f measures o f expected 
value) but also on the behavior of players (which was to be grasped by the idea o f a mixed 
strategy).
Thus, the need for a new measurement tool was reflecting a change in the measurable itself: from 
von Neumann's research on parlor games, he became convinced that nearly 'any event could be 
looked at as a game of strategy provided one looked at the effect it had on the participants'.7
So, summing up, the development o f a theory o f games represented von Neumann's personal 
efforts towards achieving a theory of rationality whose model is a game, a situation in which any
6 Mirowski, 1992.
7 Leonard, 1995.
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action will be conditioned on the reaction it releases. His question being: is there a rational w ay  
of going about this situation?
Of course, a very important target o f the game-theoretical project was the discovery o f definite 
rules and solutions to games, not so far from von Neumann's early axiomatical purposes. But, in 
another sense, the theory of games was still to retain, and cope with, the uncertainty element that 
the physical project had injected in scientific inquiry in general, and in von Neumann's mind, in 
particular. Thus, the concepts o f expected value and mixed strategies, with their stochastic 
meaning, provided the essential elements for the proof of a fundamental theorem within the theory 
of games, the minimax theorem.
However, von Neumann's insistence on a determinate though not wholly isolated system led him 
to propose a quite fragile solution to the 'intersubjectivity' problem that is likely to arise whenever 
different descriptions of the same physical event are offered by two different observers: he denied 
the possibility of two divergent 'consciousnesses* and proposed that the first observer should serve 
as a observing tool for the second. In the same way, nor could he accept the existence o f  
conflicting rationalities in game theory.1 It seems in this latter case that von Neumann believed 
that one could deduct or discount, through a suitable solution concept, one's influence on the 
observed object.
The question now remains how economics entered game theory's early concerns. Though it is 
reported that von Neumann had already made an important contribution to the economic debate 
at the time he met Morgenstem in Princeton (1938), it was without doubt the collaboration with 
Morgenstem that provided von Neumann's game-theoretical technique with a fertile field on 
which to expand, namely economics, or, economics as viewed by an Austrian economist.
* Mirowski, 1992.
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In the early thirties, Morgenstem, following the steps of the Austrian school, felt uneasy with the 
current economic explanations and equilibrium concepts, not well suited, according to him, to our 
world of generalized interdependence and limited foresight .9
He too, like von Neumann, was trying to find a better physical analogy than classical mechanics 
to apply to economics. Interdependence of choices as a central trait o f economic life indicates, he 
thought, the use of a notion o f ’subjective' rationality in economic theory (where individuals are 
thought of as taking the plans of others into account when deciding on their own plans), in order 
to capture the strategic relations among people. A better meaning was needed that would 
substitute a lively representation of economic interdependence for the 'auctioneer* and the 'general 
equilibrium' mechanical images taken out of the Walrasian world. Interdependence (in this 
particular lively' light) and the problems of prediction that inevitably follow called for a better 
equilibrium concept than the received one (specially Hick's) which assumed perfect foresight. The 
reason was that:
social sciences have the peculiarity of being able to affect their object of study.
The prediction of the astronomer can have no effect on the subsequent movement
of the stars, but that of the economist can change economic events, (cited in
Leonard, 1995:741, quoted from Morgenstem)
Thus, our concepts of minima and maxima were to be replaced with an alternative one, able to 
capture (the strategic nature of) the interdependence of the agents' decisions, like the minimax. 
In addition, our idea o f 'consistency of plans' was also to be enriched. Instead o f thinking o f 
economic agents as isolated decision makers, constrained only by unrestricted beliefs or maxims, 
as in parametric choices, the more likely decision setting would have us frame their decisions as 
constrained by restricted maxims, those which make their behavior contingent on what they 
assume others’ behavior to be. The question o f how to formalize these issues gave rise to von 
Neumann-Morgenstem's collaboration.
9 He remarked oo something he often considered to be overlooked by conventional general equilibrium analysts, that: 
"always there is exhibited an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions and counter-reactions. This chain can 
never be broken by an act of knowledge but always through as arbitrary act - a resolution ... Unlimited foresight and 
economic equilibrium are thus irreconcilable with one another." (cited in Mirowski,1992:I29fn, quoted from 
Morgenstem)
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Again, the new research program was somehow to harbor the paradoxical aspects of uncertainty 
and unpredictability (which were ordinary characteristics o f human interaction), with mathematical 
technique, within a new equilibrium framework. For von Neumann this represented the 
commitment to achieve a theory o f (strategic) rationality that could be publicly known without 
this 'publicity' causing anyone to change their choices after learning it. The uncertainty aspects 
involved in interaction could be dealt with without any fear of infinite regress, for the theory o f  
games would advise players to play in the uniquely rational way. For Morgenstern, the new 
research agenda was to provide a technical expression, through suitable equilibrium concepts, o f  
the uncertainty and unpredictability o f the social environment, in general, and economic activities, 
in particular. These solution concepts were expected to successfully discount influence o f chance 
on the rules o f the games and behavior o f players.
3rd approach: The Moore-A rider son problem
[a gam e has the capacity to] "change suddenly on us with a  view to thwarting our efforts a t a
solution...”16
A similar uneasiness, this time with current sociological explanations o f human interaction, gave 
rise to a parallel vindication o f a game-theoretical approach to the matter. Thus, a simpler and 
clearer idea of some o f the initial prospects o f the theory o f games can be seen in Moore- 
Anderson (1962). They proposed the games-approach as an alternative to the method that was 
prevalent in the social sciences at their time, namely, behaviorism. Behaviorism, according to 
Moore-Anderson, approached social phenomenon as if it were a 'puzzle' to be deciphered. In their 
criticism to this view, they contrasted the games representation of the social phenomena with that 
o f puzzles. While the games representation describes a situation o f  endogenous uncertainty, in 
the sense that the very attempts at a solution should be seen as part o f  the problem to be solved, 
puzzles, in turn, miss the point o f social interaction for puzzles cannot "change suddenly on us 
with a view to thwarting our efforts at a solution; (...) no social interaction takes place between
the puzzle and the solver. "n So, a puzzle may be represented by s o, while a game can be
either s o, or s s(o). 10
10 Moore and Anderson, 1962, p.413.
11 Moore and Anderson, 1962, p.413.
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Moreover, having a similar intuition as von Neumann and Morgenstem (vNM, henceforth), 
Moore-Anderson nonetheless appear to go even further to the point o f  suggesting a nearly causal 
claim as to how the system observer-observed may be able to  generate unexpected relations and 
ensuing problems for theoretical attempts at grasping them. And here we may identify a first 
disanalogy with vNM’s view. That is, it is not only a matter o f taking stock of the fact that one's 
observation affects what is observed, a condition that would suffice as far as a physical 
observation is concerned, but also that anyone might intentionally change the conditions of 
everyone including one's own observation, as in the social world. And this might be done for a 
number of different reasons not always clearly identifiable. Intentionality in this rather problematic 
sense may complicate the horizon o f prediction thus rendering randomization and the theoretical
strategy of'discounting* uncertainty less attractive. So it is that the distinction between s o 
and s s(o) may become relevant.
Still, like von Neumann, Moore-Anderson spelled out some reasons against the application of 
descriptive mathematical methods in relation to the puzzle model o f behavioral social sciences. 
Following vN&M, they looked for more suitable analogies between the natural and the social 
realms and theories. In this way, they invoked the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which ruled 
out the possibility of a totally isolated system, that is, "even making a physical observation jiggles 
things a little bit - the 'totally isolated system' is affected by being observed."12 Nevertheless, 
Moore-Anderson also stressed the fact that unlike the physical domain, theories about the social 
domain, be it either market behavior or social action, are members o f it and may exert, indeed 
cannot help exerting, an influence on it. Actually, they stated, decent theories are expected to 
influence people's conduct. Therefore, they concluded in a different line from vN&M, our theories 
may be self-defeating in that "our predictions o f human behavior might go wrong if we tell our 
subjects all we know".13
So, at this point, Moore-Anderson clearly distance themselves from vN&M who believed that, 
being faced with the only rational way o f  playing a game, as that provided by the prescriptions o f
12 M oore And Anderson, 1962, p.418.
13 Moore and Anderson, 1962, p .419.
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the theory, people shall adopt it. In any event, Moore-Anderson conclude, better the (incom plete) 
theories which are able to encompass the capacity o f individual agency o f self-consciously 
following and formulating some social rules, and do not assume, as behaviorism does, that people 
just happen to act on externally given problems. In this case, they go on to argue, we should give 
up a mathematical theory of human behavior and stick to  a "theory of cultural objects which 
people have invented and (or so we claim) used to help shape their behavior."14 15Among these 
objects they include the folk-models of game-theory. Unlike behavioral and learning theories, 
game-theory is not primarily concerned with a psychological or biological non-contextually 
defined framework, but with social concepts or group sociology.13
Summing up, the two seemingly most interesting messages conveyed by Moore-Anderson's view  
are that first, there is something peculiar in the influence that observation might exert on the 
observed in the social sphere which makes it refractory to a behavioristic (non-contextually 
defined) treatment, for in the social sphere we are dealing with intentions, surely a hard issue. In 
other words, the fact that the agents are aware that they are the object of each other's conjectures 
may affect their behavior in quite unpredictable ways. Secondly, a theory of social interaction is 
a member o f social interaction, hence it cannot avoid the difficulties concerning self-referential 
reasoning, that is, it cannot be complete, as in affecting its object it in turn becomes part o f  it. 
Therefore complete publicness of the theory seems to be logically impossible.
In conclusion, we seem to have here two divergent programs, one engaged in the search for 
determinate solutions to the games, the other claiming the less ambitious purpose o f properly 
describing strategic situations and pointing to  a non-deterministic and non-purely deductive 
approach.
The next two sections will present some attempts at determinate solutions respectively in classical 
and modem game theory. Underlying these views, we will find either strong informational 
structures or strong rationality assumptions. In either cases my conviction is that the knowledge
14 Moore and Anderson, 1962, p.426.
15 Moore and Anderson, op.cit.
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issue is poorly addressed, and as a result GT fails to differentiate itself in a meaningful way from 
the puzzle model.
3. Strategic Rationality (i): The 'Common Knowledge' assumption 
3.1. Common Knowledge and Convention
The kind of interdependence with which classical game theory is concerned seems to be the 
interdependence betwee one's own outcomes and the someone else's choices. However, there is 
something that it is willing to maintain, which is the independent character of the decisions taken 
by the individuals. The independent and conscious individual actor, that is to say, somehow has 
to take the extant interdependence of choices into account when privately deciding how he himself 
shall act with that knowledge and when aiming at a certain outcome. His choice can be made to 
be very simple, then: given the known rules o f the game (the strategies and preference structure 
of the players, and payoffs) he will select a strategy which is his most preferred given the choice 
of the others.
The knowledge requirements, unlike the usual requirements that classical decision theory assumes, 
refer not only to an acquaintance with some more or less precise possibilities, say, likelihoods o f 
some definite external events, but also to the decisions that might be taken by a symmetrically 
situated actor. If what I may obtain is contingent on the actions taken by my opponent I should 
take the trouble to try and outguess his plans. The only safe way for me to outguess his intended 
actions is to suppose that he, like myself, recognizes the situation we are in as a particular one, 
as a game with particular rules. The claim by standard GT is that if we want theoretically to 
determine a solution to this decision problem we should then note that the relevant knowledge 
requirement is the 'common knowledge assumption' or CK. We should assume that the rules o f 
the game are known by each player, and that they are known to be known by them, and known 
to be known to be known, and so on ad infinitum .I6 More generally, an event e is CK of order 
n whenever (everyone knows that)“ e is true.
16 For a technical definition, the seminal reference is Aoxnann (1976). Many games may require less than infinite CK 
for a solution to emerge, such as those where dominant strategies obtain, like the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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How could we make sense of this logical condition9 The common knowledge concept was first 
worked out by the philosopher David Lewis (1969) in the context o f his discussion of conventions 
which afterwards gave rise to developments in the literature o f conventional coordination- 
equilibria. An example of a coordination game that may reach a conventional solution is provided 
by the ’game* in which one is involved when, while talking to a friend on the telephone, the call 
is suddenly interrupted. What should one do? A  convention might help one in finding one's way. 
Working out some of the main abstract features o f the situation would mean framing the general 
traits of a conventional solution to coordination games.
The possibility of a conventional solution to  coordination games, says Lewis, relies upon the  
stabilizing influence o f  an underlying assumption o f conventions: common knowledge. That is, 
a convention is firmly at work whenever everyone conforms to it, and this obtains because (given 
that there is a general preference for conforming behavior by everyone) everyone believes that 
everyone conforms to it, and so on. The ideal circumstances o f  conventional coordination 
equilibria are those in which coincidence o f  interests among the people involved dominates over 
conflict of interests and this fact is also common knowledge.
In our example there is a general and commonly known preference for resuming conversation and 
whenever there is a convention, implicit or otherwise, that, for instance, the person who called 
in the first place should try again, the convention must be common knowledge for it to succeed 
in achieving the communication, for any doubt may lead to  a coordination failure.
Besides the stabilizing force that common knowledge is supposed to inject in coordination, 
Keynes considered the symmetrically critical element it may introduce under the circumstances 
o f a sudden breakdown o f a convention, that is, a change in its direction.17 This is illustrated by 
the overall imitation that may take place in financial markets, for example, due to  a breakdown 
o f a previous state o f expectations, and which may lead to an endless 'specularity1 in the form o f  
financial speculation. It has been reported, for that matter, how prices may change abruptly due 
to a sudden change in the general expectations concerning stock prices, as when someone feels 
that the price o f the stocks he possesses is going to fall and subsequently attempts to sell them.
17Dupuy, 1989.
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Insofar as this behavior is imitated by others, prices may fall rapidly and confirm the original 
expectations that indeed led to this state o f affairs. According to Keynes, the uncertainty that 
characterizes many economic decisions and above all those in financial markets makes imitation 
genuinely rational way for an individual to go about things. People imitate those they judge to 
know more than themselves. Since nobody actually knows anything but just conforms to what 
others are doing and since everybody conforms to the new convention that prices are going to fall 
and everybody is known to conform to it and so on, the best one can do is to try to get rid o f one's 
stocks as soon as possible and avoid the inevitable disaster that will nonetheless befall everyone.11
Though this process can in one way or another be curtailed, it shows that the arbitrary nature 
of conventions enables them to give rise to instability through the very same 'specular' mechanism 
of common knowledge whereby it operates, and of which 'unanchored' imitation is a problematic 
specimen. By *unanchored* imitation it is meant imitation not grounded in any good evidence, o f 
real benefits. The expectational mechanism underlying our actions may lead us to conform any 
convention, a stabilizing (in Lewis's sense) as well as a critical one (in Keynes’s sense). So, CK 
is something that can be found either beneath coordination or coordination failure.
Dupuy (1989) examines the possible ways o f reconciling this common knowledge assumption 
with the 'finitude of human mind' so that the infinite process o f the kind '1 know x, he knows x, 
I know that he knows x, he knows that I know x, and so on' could be accommodated within the 
limits o f human mind, in terms of possible human practices. The most noteworthy are the 
interpretations of common knowledge as 'common sense', as some conventional points on which 
people just happen to coordinate, and the idea o f a 'bootstrap' mechanism, which he identifies with 
the assumption that the players in a game know the theory o f games. In this latter case, players 
are relieved from engaging in the infinite chain o f  reasoning entailed in the logical assumption o f 
common knowledge as long as they adhere to the prescriptions given by the theory, which would 
provide them with rationally deduced focal points, so to speak, or the theory's solution concepts. 
This latter interpretation o f  common knowledge implies that every player is able to the others' 
decision according to the canons provided by the theory. That is, each player is able to grasp the
11 See Keynes (1973) and Orlean (1989).
108
other's method of choice, for this is the same he himself follows, that is to say, the prescriptions 
given by the theory.
The suggestion of interpreting common knowledge as common sense is not undertaken by 
standard game theory' hi any case, towards the end of this chapter a brief mention shall be made 
o f recent efforts at accommodating common sense within a game-theoretic framework (Scharpf, 
1990). In contrast, the second suggestion, that o f  taking common knowledge as the assumption 
that players in a game know the theory o f games, has pervaded standard GT. It aims to solve the 
problem of the infinite mental process involved in CK in a way that enables the convergence o f 
people's plans.
3.2. Non-cooperative games and the standard Nash concept
Conventions presuppose common knowledge, but the converse is not true, or so standard game 
theory has claimed. In addition, conventions are arbitrary in origin and quite ambiguous as a guide 
since they may generate good or bad equilibria. Common knowledge, then, cannot be relied upon 
to guarantee social interaction as it is framed within the context o f conventional equilibria.
However, CK may function in another way when related to the idea that the implicitly infinite 
mental process supposedly held by players may converge to  a predictable rationally deducible 
point, an equilibrium o f a sorts. Invoking the principle of parsimony, let us assume that we want 
to frame social interaction as the result o f the interaction among rational agents alone, and we do 
not want to make it rely upon any extra substantive assumptions concerning the desirability o f 
interaction or agreement itself (as entailed in Lewis's analysis). Suppose, then, that people are 
likely to have an interest in cooperation only insofar as this interest does not conflict with 
individual rationality, that is, maximization o f  one's utility. For this reason, it is time to examine 
the case of non-cooperative games.
These are games that typically represent a mixing o f  confiictual and cooperational aspects. They 
generally involve some common purpose (either to  achieve some positive aim, as in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, or to avoid a decidedly negative outcome, as in the Chicken game) which nonetheless 
plays a non-dominating role in their solution. Now, my aim is to examine how one particular
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solution concept was elaborated on which supplied the assumption o f CK with a 'focal point* of 
sorts.
So, the basic non-cooperative non-zero sum games reached a solution with Nash’s (1951) 
development of an equilibrium concept for these games. According to Kreps (1987), since then 
the Nash equilibrium has been deemed to be a necessary condition for an agreement among 
rational people to be self-enforcing. That is, if an agreement is to be achieved among rational 
players under the non-existent institutional structure of a non-cooperative game, it has to pass 
Nash's test.
So, let us turn to the definition of a Nash equilibrium, as proposed by Kreps:
A Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) is a strategy profile s such that no single 
player, by changing his own part of s, can obtain higher utility if the others stick 
to their parts. (Kreps, 1987: 584)
Now, the notion of equilibrium broadly implies the idea that nobody is able to improve his 
situation by deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
Generally speaking, an equilibrium is a situation in which each individual is doing 
his best, given the actions undertaken by others and the institutional 
constraints he faces. (Bicchieri, 1993:1, my emphasis)
The emphasis in the above quotation, however, intends to underline the aspect of parametrization 
concerning the equilibrium play by a player, that is, he must take some aspects of his choice as 
parametric in order to identify his equilibrium strategy. As the choice by others is a rather 
problematic element, the parametrization of it turns out to be the crucial question an equilibrium 
concept must address.
In the context o f the Nash equilibrium, it may be argued that underlying the choice of a Nash 
strategy there is the condition that the player is able to anticipate the other's move and select his 
best reply to that move. Insofar as each other player is symmetrically able to anticipate this, he is 
to ratify his opponent's reasoning by choosing the action that the opponent had outguessed
no
because this is anyway his best reply to the intended play o f the other, and so on.19 Therefore, 
rationality (utility maximizing behavior) on the part of the players, and CK. thereof, is required for 
this solution to arise. Note that the choice o f  the optimal strategy presumes that players' beliefs 
are rational in the sense that these are beliefs concerning each other’s choices that are mutually 
coordinated or consistent. Everyone does what is expected by everyone else.
A commentary by Heap and Varoufakis (1995) remarks, in this line, that the Nash concept 
indicates the strategy that is supported by beliefs which do not presume that one's opponent will 
make a mistake by expecting something which the other does not intend to do. Nash strategies 
are often referred to as self-confirming strategies, or as 'the obvious way to play*.20 The 
assumption here seems to be that internal consistency o f beliefs is sufficient to assure m utual 
consistency of beliefs. Again, this is tantamount to saying that players know the theory o f games 
(they would have read a book of it and would have followed its advice, which is opposite to 
Moore-Anderson's prediction).
Now, one problematic part of the definition seems to be precisely Hf the others stick to their parts'. 
Why should these others be thought to  do so? Is this rational? It is conceivable that a situation 
may arise where a doubt concerning what these others intend to do might jeopardize the self­
confirming reasoning o f  Nash's concept so that one no longer has a strong reason to  play his Nash 
strategy,21 and instead is given a reason to deviate from it. This contingency seems already to have 
puzzled Anderson and Moore. If we admit this, we no longer have 'an obvious way to play the 
game'. As one comes to  entertain doubts as to the extent to which one's opponent will stick to his 
Nash component, so the rationale o f one's playing his component becomes itself flawed.
19 Note, however, that this is the standard way in which non-cooperative GT interprets the Nash solution. However 
Weibull (1995), an evolutionary game-theorist, rescues Nash's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation to point out that the Nash 
equilibrium concept is also compatible with less than full-blown rationality as in a "population-statistical interpretation 
o f his equilibrium concept" (p.xiii, &). See also Weibul and Bjoraestedt (1996). I am grateful to Alan Kirman for 
calling my attention to this point
20 Cf. Kreps (1990), p.404.
21 See Aumann (1987). B&su (1990), and Tullock (1992).
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Under this particular perspective, Nash's solution appears to be too strong in its underlying 
behavioral assumptions, since it requires implausibly strong constraints on the conjectures held 
by players. That is, it only works if  players' conjectures concerning each other's actions are 
correct. It is too strong precisely in that it is not robust (after the jargon), as any plausible 
deviation on the opponent's part might render one's Nash play wrong
Another problematic aspect of the definition, as remarked by Kreps (1987), is that if it is supposed 
to spell out the kind of rationality which prevails in a non-cooperative game, the likelihood o f 
cooperation among players is dramatically low. Indeed, Nash equilibria will too often share the 
characteristic of being inefficient, a result which is unwelcome by anyone willing to ground 
people’s cooperation in strategic rationality. Moreover, Kreps went on to point out, the Nash 
solution may give rise to multiple equilibria and claim, for that matter, for a theory of equilibrium 
selection.22
Still, Nash's solution may be useless in games where it provides no equilibrium points at all. So, 
together with the multiple equilibria issue, Nash's concept appears rather unhelpful in this light,
22 Actually, the literature regarding refinements on Nash equilibria is concerned with proposing stronger logical tests 
than those entailed in Nash's proposal (which basically entails iterated elimination of dominated strategies). Thus, on 
its way to providing more restrictive conditions that might afford both unique and compelling equilibrium points, this 
literature is willing to incorporate in the equilibrium strategies a measure of predictable deviations from Nash's strategy 
profile, thus enlarging the initial belief-structure of each player concerning each other's behavior. Kreps assesses the 
situation in the following way: "For normal form games, one is concerned with how strategies perform if one's 
opponents take actions that have 'zero' probability in the equilibrium; one has to reason about the relative likelihood 
of things one feels are not going to happen with any significant probability. In terms o f extensive form games, this 
tension takes the following form: Most refinements that are based on extensive form considerations are keyed to what 
will happen ’out of equilibrium' - that is, at points in the game tree that will not be reached if the equilibrium is played." 
(Kreps,1990:418). However, refinements have been inconclusive as well, for the question (as Kreps puts it) *how can 
we reason about what will happen conditional on things that are not meant to happen in the first place?* does not have 
a unique answer. And this may be a reason for theoreticians to move towards 'repetition’. This latter move would tend 
to relieve the rather strong conditions on beliefs and would give room to a learning process of sorts. Yet, according to 
R mm ore (1993:357), the accomplishment of the standard literature dealing with repetition has been to show that 
'cooperation is not necessarily irrational when the Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated an indefinite number of times'. Still, 
as Alan Kinnan pointed out to me in personal communication, repetition could be approached in terms of a learning 
process under an evolutionary game-theoretical key. This view however would trespass the boundaries of this section.
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for it is scarcely restrictive as a solution concept. Or else it may look quite abstruse in games 
where the uniquely optimal solution it proposes looks unattractive.23,24
In conclusion, Nash's standard solution to non-cooperative games may be considered, on the one 
hand, helpless in its inability to provide unique or even determinate equilibrium points, convincing 
equilibria in some cases, or hope for the emergence o f cooperation. On the other hand, though, 
it can be seen as too strong in its underlying assumption o f 'rational beliefs', unambiguously 
pursued by rational agents, whose rationale is unique. The solution, then, seems to be twice bad 
heuristic, as the heroic assumption concerning beliefs that supports it - that internally consistent 
beliefs also are mutually consistent ones - is unable to provide determinate and unique results.
One way out of the objections raised to Nash's basic concept is Aumann's 1987 article. He 
proposes a more general form to the Nash equilibrium, restating its assumption of common 
knowledge as CK o f  rationality. Aumann's move implies a relief from the strong conditions on 
beliefs assumed by Nash, and at the same time it also implies a strengthening of Nash's rationality 
conditions with the adoption of Bayesian rationality: that is, it will accept whatsoever beliefs 
about beliefs provided that the former be generated or updated according to the canons o f 
Bayesian rationality.
In order to reach Aumann's solution we should first go through Harsanyi's relaxation o f the 
complete information structure which was entailed in the standard Nash solution.
231 have in mind, for instance, the well-known chain store paradox reported by Selten (1978).
24 So, in terms of the three main justifications of a solution concept in GT, namely, that it be congenial to individual 
rationality, equilibrium (a requirement concerning coordination of actions/expecrations among individuals), and 
efficiency (a requirement concerning the prospect for Parcto-optimality), the Nash standard concept appears rather 
unjustified. The hypothesis undertying the equilibrium play is that rational players* actions are supported by mutually 
consistent beliefs, so that in order to achieve an equilibrium we should add to individual rationality a further restriction 
on the beliefs entertained by players. And this restriction itself is not justified, not even in die name of heuristic benefits 
for the theory, because in many cases it cannot stop multiple equilibria arising, in which case Nash's solution does not 
strictly speaking prescribe any. As for the efficiency o f Nash equilibria, it has been longing for new prospects under 
the research program ofinfinitety or indefinitely repeated games, which seem to have performed poorly for that matter.
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3.3. Types and Mistakes
Harsanyi (1967/1968), on his way to dealing with informational uncertainty, developed a model 
of the transformation o f  a game of incomplete information into one of complete information (to 
be sure, into a game o f  imperfect information), and developed, in this regard, the concept of 
Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium. Its rationale is to  internalize the informational uncertainty so that 
a player can attribute probabilities to the unknown courses o f actions possibly undertaken by the 
other players, according to a certain number of'types' these latter might assume. In this way, one's 
opponent may be labeled 'tough' or 'soft' according to his disposition to accommodate or to 
retaliate to one's actions. Hence, having a probability estimate on the type' the other player might 
be (or impersonate) he is able to find his best response to his opponent's strategy choice. We have 
then transmogrified the incomplete information as to the opponent's payoff into the information 
about his expected payoff given his type.
To the Nash notion, Harsanyi added the Bayesian rationale concerning the formation and revision 
of beliefs. So, in games with this level o f uncertainty, where to a large extent one does not know 
with whom one is playing, the supposition is that players will assign probabilities to the possible 
events, and, in particular, epistemic or subjective ones, reflecting their personal beliefs as to the 
occurrence of those events. Moreover, without any previous experience of the occurrence of these 
events, players will entertain the same prior beliefs about the likelihood o f any of the 'types' which 
are the surrogates of the real players.
Hence, after Harsanyi's transformation the payoff matrix increases in complexity due to the 
incorporation of probabilities in the above sense, but it is still visible. In the words o f Heap and 
Varoufakis:
all that is needed is that you hold common prior expectations with your 
opponent(...) about the likelihood of your opponent turning out to be one type o f 
player or another and the game has become one of complete information. (Heap 
and Varoufakis, 1995:29)
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The adoption of subjective probabilities makes room for the definition of a unique ra tio n a l 
behavior even under incomplete information. Under this circumstance, the rational behavior is tha t 
consistent with the logical constraints imposed on subjective probabilities.25
As for the possibility that the agents make mistakes in their strategic choices, Harsanyi (1973) 
provides a rationale for the use o f mixed strategies that takes them as reflecting one's sensitivity 
to the small mistakes or deviations from the equilibrium strategy profile conceivably made by 
others.
In relation to that, a crucial question seems to be then how to anticipate behavior that is no t 
expected on the part o f rational players? And, then, how to design a rational policy to  face the  
possible odd behavior on the part o f those with whom one has dealings?
According to Aumann (1987), uncertainty is characteristically widespread in strategic interactions. 
It is so pervasive as to render it nearly vacuous to affirm the independent character o f  personal 
choices (as does classical GT). In this way, the information that each person possesses is not so  
much important as his or her estimates on what relevant others conjecture about the information 
that he or she possesses. It is on the basis o f these conjectures that the person's opponents will 
decide on what to do, and their 'decisions' in turn will affect the person's decision.
In this respect, the epigraph to Aumann's article is illuminating:
"O wad some pow'r the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as ithers see us!"
The focus on the information possessed by the agents, in particular the requirement o f  complete 
infoimation as well as CK thereof which was characteristic o f  the classical phase o f game theory, 
is now being replaced with an approach that emphasizes strategic uncertainty and where standard 
solution concepts as the Nash equilibrium and Nash Bayesian equilibrium are considered as 
particular cases. Types and mistakes would then be given greater room.
2S These conditions may be found in Savage (1954).
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4. Strategic Rationality (ii): Common Knowledge of Bayesian Rationality, after Robert 
Aumann
In his discussion of correlated equilibria, Aumann enlarges the uncertainty space in order to 
encompass every aspect o f the decision problem that may concern the player including the 
information he himself possesses, except the rationality assumption and CK thereof In fact, 
informational requirements are replaced with the assumption of Bayesian rationality.26
So, players are rational in the sense o f  being utility maximizers under an uncertain environment, 
which means that their choices are constrained by the consistency conditions imposed on uncertain 
choices This, in turn, basically means that the players are able to impute personal or subjective 
probability numbers (in Savage's sense) to every possible event that pertains to their decision 
problem.
The set of beliefs that each player maintains as to  the parameters of the game corresponds to the 
set o f the 'states o f the world', each one being a particular combination o f those parameters. So, 
uncertainty refers to what state of the world among the many possible ones will prevail. The 
players then attribute probability numbers to each possible state. Each state of the world, in turn, 
reflects a correlated equilibrium (a non-independent one), that is, a situation where parameters 
are given and the equilibrium strategy profile is deducible from maximizing behavior as well as 
from the relevant CK.
The idea of an independent personal choice, Aumann observes, no longer makes sense as long as 
the strategic decision problem is modelled in this way. The reason is that the rationality o f one's 
personal choice is in a non trivial sense contingent on the personal choice o f the other player with 
whom one is interacting, as the 'personal choice* seems to  depend not so much on one's 
conjectures on the other's possible actions as on one's estimate of the other's estimate of one's own 
choice.
In Aumann's words: "indeed, in our treatment, die players do not in general know how others are playing. We assume 
only that it is common knowledge that all the players are Bayesian utility maximizers, that they are rttional in the sense 
that each conforms to the Savage theory." (Aumann, 1987: 2)
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4.1. Probabilities, Bayes's rule and  Common Priors
Bayesian rationality implies more than that players are able to assign subjective probabilities to 
everything. It also implies that the probabilities thus assigned somehow converge to 'objective' 
probabilities. Aumann tries to find some support to this view in the developments of probability 
theory by Savage. However, as shall become clear, Savage recognizes at least three distinct 
interpretations of the mathematical concept o f probability.
So, according to Savage (1954), the mathematical concept of probability is crucial for the 
definition of consistent action in the face of uncertainty. However, he goes on to remark, though 
the axiomatic concept o f probability is fairly clear, there is much disagreement regarding the 
interpretation o f its meaning. In particular, Savage identifies three main classes o f interpretation 
of the mathematical concept of probability: (i) the objectivistic (or frequentist, as it is presently 
known), which understands probability as reflecting observed repetitions of an event; (ii) the 
personalistic (the view espoused by Savage himself), which sees probability as measuring the 
degree of confidence of an individual in the truth o f a particular proposition, allowing for different 
such degrees among reasonable individuals faced with the same evidence; and (iii) the necessary, 
for which probability measures the extent to which one set of propositions, out of logical necessity 
and apart from mere opinion, confirms the truth o f another.
So, having in mind this map, a Bayesian view would imply taking both the personalistic and the 
necessary views of probability to the extent that it accepts that probabilities are subjectively 
generated as in the former, but requires that they converge to an objective measure whose content 
is given neither by empirical frequencies (as in the objectivistic view) nor by any conceivable 
intersubjective agreement, so to speak, but by some prior or logical necessity (as in the necessary 
view).
Savage's objections to the necessary view are worth quoting:
it is appealing to suppose that, if  two individuals in the same situation, having the 
same tastes and supplied with the same information, act reasonably, they will act 
in the same way. Such agreement, belief in which amounts to  a necessary (as 
opposed to a personalistic) view of probability, is certainly worth looking for.
Personally, I believe that it does not correspond even roughly with reality... I do 
insist that, until the contrary be demonstrated, we must be prepared to find 
reasoning inadequate to bring about complete agreement. (...)
It may be, and indeed 1 believe, that there is an element in decision apart from 
taste, about which, like taste itself, there is no disputing. (Savage, 1954:7)
To be sure, Savage also contends that personal beliefs that prove wrong when confronted with 
a (somehow intersubjective) consistency test should be corrected. In my judgment, however, this 
is not to subscribe to the objectivistic, let alone necessary, views. In any case, the decision 
problem Savage was addressing was that of choice under uncertainty as to external events. We 
may justifiably ask whether there is any sense in talking about somehow objective probability 
estimates where there is interaction between agents and environment, as happens in social 
interaction. There, probability estimates should reflect agents' beliefs or expectations concerning 
the behavior o f others who are also entertaining expectations concerning the actions o f the 
former. The question naturally arises of whether is there a rational procedure whereby these 
beliefs are generated or revised so that they might turn out to be genuinely rational beliefs, and, 
thus, converge?
According to 'Bayesianismists',27 there are two devices that may guarantee both the internal and 
the intersubjective consistency of our beliefs, rendering them rational in a quite strong sense. 
These are the Bayes's rule and the assumption o f common priors (CPA).
Originally, the Bayes's rule was designed as a device for the computation o f posterior 
probabilities.* 2* Bayesianismists, however, insist on interpreting it as a mechanism of'learning' or 
as an inferential process. Very often, non-Bayesianismists (but still Bayesians, like Binmore) 
object to the strategy o f  interpreting the Bayes's rule as either a learning mechanism of a sorts 
(Binmore, 1993) or a synthetic description o f a rational mental process in terms of an inferential 
process (Heap and Varoufakis, 1995). According to Binmore, the Bayes's rule can hardly be seen 
as a genuine learning process for when the agents come to revise their beliefs in the manner
27 Binmore (1993,1994) coined the term Bayesianismists to designate those people who use the Bayes's rule as a 
mechanism of'learning*.
2* It computes the conditional probability as a ratio of the joint probability and the prior probability.
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indicated by the rule then the real learning process, in the sense o f getting an understanding of 
one’s experience, is actually over. In the suggestion of Binmore, this learning' process is just a 
passive process of absorption of unambiguous data and being so understood it overlooks the not 
unusual fact that our becoming aware o f particular facts might have the effect of changing 
precisely what we want to leam'. Heap and Varoufakis (1995), in turn, seem to warn against the 
excessive simplification involved in the reduction o f a rational mental process into an inferential 
process alone, as this provides a very partial and mechanical image o f  rationality. They appear to 
be concerned with the exclusion of the processes o f judgment also connected with the idea of 
rationality whereby we normally regulate the very application o f the rules o f logical inference. In 
this regard, they ask: if reason is but a set o f rules o f inference 'can any finite set o f rules contain 
rules for their own application to all possible circumstances?'.29
As for the CPA, Aumann (1976) states that with common priors people cannot 'agree to disagree* 
even though they started out with different information. As long as they know the past record of 
the occurrence of some event (the 'posteriors'), they will come to revise their original prejudices 
and come closer to the 'true' probabilities. Generically, the only motive that would lead rational 
persons to diverge in their probability estimates would be their having access to different 
information; in the absence of this difference they should tend to entertain common priors.
Actually, this is the so-called Harsanyi doctrine, and it goes like this:
Differences in beliefs are explained by differences in information; therefore 
individuals with the same information must have the same beliefs. 
(Morris, 1994:236)
CPA turns out to be a very important assumption in interactive environments where there is such 
differential information.
According to Morris (1994), though, the CPA is not as innocuous as it may seem at first glance. 
For one, the co-extensitivity of beliefs and information may be objected to, even without raising 
the issue of interpretation, by referring to the work o f Savage who developed the personalistic
29 Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, p.59.
119
notion of probability on the sound premise that with the same information people may entertain 
different beliefs and still be rational. O f course, as we have already remarked, Savage adds that 
this disagreement cannot last in the face of the consistency tests imposed by the numerical 
properties of probabilities on our personal estimates. Nonetheless, as Morris remarks, we are here 
dealing with probability estimates as to the occurrence of endogenous events, whose probability 
of occurrence is affected by the actions o f the individuals whose behavior we want to model. In 
this case, the meaning o f CPA becomes even more obscure, for we are dealing with probability 
estimates of the behavior o f others (which, in turn, is affected by the beliefs we hold about them) 
instead of some external event, like the weather.30
The introduction of the CPA by Aumann seems to be targeted to guaranteeing that even in an 
environment of strategic uncertainty (that generated by strategic reasoning itself) and generalized 
ignorance as to the main parameters o f the game, it is still possible to reason to an equilibrium. 
Recall that, in contrast to Nash's standard solution, the notion o f correlated equilibria proposed 
by Aumann is weaker in its beliefs-scheme insofar as it does not require certain knowledge about 
the strategy chosen by the other player, or, in other words, it does not assume that internal 
consistency of beliefs leads of necessity to mutual consistency. At the same time, Aumann's 
equilibrium notion seems to address the kind o f  uncertainty that Anderson-Moore had in mind 
when they suggested that agents' intentional choices might render their coordination theoretically 
intractable.
As a consequence, if only we could accept the CPA while at the same time interpret the Bayes's 
rule in the manner indicated by Aumann, we could free the notion o f rationality from its 
troublesome corollary of intenrionality, and by so doing we would have entered into game theory's 
modem phase. In particular, we would have found a procedure whereby the beliefs o f rational 
individuals come to be aligned.
30 The formal problem, according to Moms, "is that assuming a common, logical, prior about endogenous events makes 
the logical relation (if one existed) between information and priors self-referential." (Morris,1994:236) As for the 
em pirical content of the difference between information and priors, matters are just as difficult. Take the following 
example: "If you are an 'expert* on U.S. politics, I may well want to alter my beliefs, on learning your beliefs, about who 
will win the 1996 presidential election, even if you have already told me all the relevant 'information' in the usnal sense. 
Your 'expert prior1 is an information signal for me, so we must interpret it as information." (Morris,1994:240)
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From the preceding, a question imposes itself: what is the new 'agency1 in Aumann's model?
4.3. The Outside Observer
In a world o f widespread uncertainty, the assumption of independent choices or intentional and 
conscious action seems to be useless. As stressed in the epigraph chosen by Aumann, strategically 
interacting agents show great concern with their images as perceived by the others with whom 
they are interacting. In this sense, an individual can be thought o f  as at least two different 
'persons'; indeed, he can detach himself from his actual self and conjecture from 'outside' how 
many different persons he can be supposed to be. For each o f these 'persons', that is to say, given 
some parameters and a certain information level that is attributed to  him, there is an equilibrium 
strategy that he can 'choose' given the choices o f the other(s) individual(s) with whom he is 
interacting. Inside each o f these 'states o f the world', the individual chooses his optimal strategy, 
that which maximizes his expected utility, and all he needs to know about the other(s) is that he 
(they) is (are) Bayes-rational like himself, and that this is common knowledge among them.
So, the individual from 'outside' considers how many different 'persons' he can be, according to 
the different beliefs the other players hold about his information level, and attributes a probability 
distribution to the n  states of the world thus obtained. In each o f  these states, a correlated or non- 
independent equilibrium obtains as a corollary o f the assumption o f  maximizing behavior and 
common knowledge thereof.
Now, in each state o f  the world, the players 'choose' in the sense o f  classical game theory, for 
given the choice o f others each one selects his optimal strategy. However, which state o f  the 
world shall prevail - and accordingly what 'person* the player shall turn out to be - is ignored by 
players. This situation is expressed in the probability distribution attributed by the 'outsider1 to 
these states.
The assumption o f an outside observer is vindicated by Aumann in terms o f a standpoint that we 
may take which provides a thorough perspective o f the set o f possible contingencies that might 
affect one’s decision. From a theoretical point o f view, the external observer perspective is
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justified by Aumann as a device designed to lead with the radical ignorance that his model allows; 
it would allow a full specification of an all-inclusive model.31
In terms of our notation:
Si «“► s,(o)
S s, +-* Sj(o)
Sj «-► Sj(o)
S. s.(o),
where each s «-► s  (o) is a possible state of the world, j=l,...,n is a finite number o f such states.
In this context, then, uncertainty is translated into a distribution o f  subjective probabilities 
assigned by an external observer over the set o f possible contingencies that surround people's 
decisions. In contrast to the classical Nash concept, and even to the Nash Bayesian version, 
Aumann's model represents a genuine expansion o f the uncertainty space since it allows for a large 
variety of beliefs about others' beliefs.32
A whole series of questions emerges in reaction to Aumann's undertaking. To begin with, how 
can we justify the external observer viewpoint in terms of Aumann's own initial vision o f strategic 
uncertainty? Two difficulties would then have to be addressed: the one o f epistemological nature, 
and the other of logical nature. From the epistemological viewpoint, if there is no metaphysical 
assumption excluding the 'outsider1 from the very system o f  beliefs that he tries to give an 
expression via his probability distribution, there is no point in overlooking his own beliefs as mere 
beliefs and no justification at all to exclude the beliefs o f this 'meta-player1 from the set o f possible
31 In Aumann's words: Player 1 must take the ignorance o f the other players into account when deciding on his own 
course of action, and he cannot do this if he does not explicitly include in the model signals other than the one he knows 
he got. The 'outside observed (...) is thus a surrogate for the ignorance of the system as a whole - the lack of common 
knowledge (of information in our sense] * of the signals received by each player." (Aumann,1987:8).
32 Notwithstanding, as we have seen, this extension comes at a non trivial price, namely, that players' initial beliefs are 
deemed to be homogeneous so that we actually do not have the interaction of genuinely heterogeneous agents, holding 
different yet plausible beliefs, courtesy of CPA and Bayes's rule.
States of the world. However, if this is so there is no point in disregarding, in turn, the set of 
beliefs of the 'meta'-meta-player and those o f the 'meta'-meta-meta-player and so on. But this 
situation would be logically unsound in the event o f the set o f possible states of the world being 
finite, for in this case it could not contain the list of the states, and also the list o f the list and so 
on
However, the set of states of the world might conceivably be open or incomplete, and this seems 
to be Aumann's suggestion when he states that his approach deliberately neglects the distinction 
between 'internal' and ’external' states.33 If  this is the case, we could not justifiably use 
probabilities, at least after Savage's canonical approach to it, for the use of probabilities is only 
legitimate, Savage warns, in a closed universe where you can look before you leap', in opposition 
to an open universe, where you can only cross a bridge when you reach it.34
In addition, we would also have to argue for the practical possibility o f such capacity on the part 
o f the players, who, although radically ignorant, are endowed with ilimited cognitive intelligence 
and computational abilities If the model is heading in the right direction, the (meta)n-player, 
endowed with hyperrationality will replace the behaviorist scientist who imagined the social 
phenomenon as thoroughly external to himself In this way, the strategic interaction will have been 
solved in terms o f a behaviorist experiment: the game representation would have collapsed into 
a puzzle representation, endogenous uncertainty will have collapsed into exogenous uncertainty,
and Moore-Anderson's problem will not have not reached a genuine solution. (Thus, S -+ O, 
where O stands for the range of all possible 'states of the world’, as if they were thoroughly 
’external', and S is the reasoning outside observer.)
In a less-than-perfect world, the image suggested by Aumann in the epigraph of his 1987 article 
could add more nuances and overtones than light: the fact that when deciding we would have to 
take into account not so much the information we know we have as that we suppose others have 
about what we know does not allow us to take these others as mirrors on which we might see our
1 2 2
33 See Aumann (1987).
34 See Savage (1954) andBinmore (1993).
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image clearly reflected The image of ourselves that the others give us back must be affected by 
the image we have of these others, and it will already be obsolete at the time we get it back Too 
much 'information', or too extended a capacity of generating information seems not to be really 
restrictive enough a condition (in practical terms) while at the same time too restrictive (in 
epistemological terms) It requires that we be able to lift ourselves by our own bootstraps 
resorting to rationality alone, but it actually achieves the ’bootstrapping’ by appealing to implicit 
substantive assumptions about beliefs (such as our metaphysical ability to anticipate all possible 
contingencies and define an unconditional and unconditioned policy to cope with them, as well 
as the assumption o f convergence of beliefs).
A good reason for further investigation seems to be the suspicion that measuring ignorance is 
feasible only in the event that 'measurement' and 'ignorance' are sufficiently independent If not, 
we should give up measuring and try something else.
5. Three Alternatives: institutions, selection and free will
We have already mentioned Scharpfs objection to the foregoing argumentative strategy, against, 
that is, strong rationality assumptions. Here is a good occasion to turn to it Sharpf prefers to stick 
to the classical informational requirements rather than to unlimited computational abilities of 
human beings.
In addressing the 'real critique', he argues that many mechanisms may be invoked to enhance the 
informational basis of social interaction, and thus to increase the degrees of mutual predictability 
in our interactions. This way we avoid resorting to requirements stronger than the bounded 
rationality assumption. He thus appeals to different kinds of mechanisms of'individual and social 
construction of higher degrees o f mutual predictability'.33
He dismisses, in the first place, the 'endogenous solution* (self-enforcing agreements) on the 
grounds that more unrealistic assumptions would need to be incorporated for it to obtain, like 
low-cost choice among partners, low-cost monitoring of the past performance of potential 
'partners', and no information costs associated with idiosyncratic perceptions and preferences. 35
35Sch*ipf, 1990.
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These latter, for example, draw too much on the 'communicative capacities of real life actors who 
would need to recollect, specify, transmit, and correctly interpret all decision premises that are 
potentially relevant in characteristically ambiguous interaction situations.*36
So, he argues, we need institutions, rules and conventions in order to reduce the information costs 
as well as the vast range o f feasible strategy options. These mechanisms substitute 'common sense* 
for common knowledge. They make cooperation possible but not necessarily efficient.
Still, choices are constrained by a subjective element, namely, 'actors' perceptions o f the situation 
and their preferences among outcomes.' Scharpf undertakes to differentiate this motivation from 
self-interest, insofar as this latter may be externally constrained and 'internally shaped by socially 
constructed criteria o f relevance and rightness', like norms o f universalistic justice, morality and 
fairness, 'or in terms o f socially defined roles and collective identities to which actors must refer 
for their self-interested evaluation o f outcomes.'37 In addition, another mechanism would be the 
networks or 'relation-specific orientations', which may have a positive effect on the predictability 
o f the overall interaction.
Scharpf acknowledges that the consideration o f these mechanisms greatly enhances the 
complexity o f  our theories, yet he is not willing to  deduce them 'endogenously' It is something 
we should give up, he suggests.
Another direction is given by the evolutionary approach to games, which has developed from the 
seminal writings o f Maynard Smith (1982) and Axelrod (1984). According to Kirman (1992), this 
approach is seemingly more convincing than classic non-cooperative game theory in that it 
remains faithful to G T s original 'radicalism'. In fact, in its early years, as we have seen, GT 
proposed to deal with a different phenomenon from the one conventional economic theory had 
so far dealt with, namely the teasing question o f  how heterogenous individuals might coordinate 
their actions so as to give rise to an overall order. The image o f  a representative individual, as in 
conventional economic theory, as well as its equivalent in the classic non-cooperative game
36 Scharpf, 1990,p.482/483.
37 Scharpf, 1990, p.485.
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theory, which makes different individuals collapse into the image of a well-informed and 
'commonly known to be rational' agent, miss the point of coordination: there is no question o f  
coordination when you just have one single agent. A less conventional and yet game theoretical 
view of the economic system is thus expressed:
In reality, individuals operate in very small subsets o f the economy and interact 
with those with whom they have dealings. It may well be that out of this local but 
interacting activity emerges some sort of self organization which provides 
regularity at the macroeconomic level. (Kirman,1992:132)
Here it is easy to read between the lines a major uneasiness with reductionist efforts taken by 
standard theory to the effect that any coordination might be inferred from the strategic rationality 
of its parts. Full-blown rationality is to be replaced with less perfect forms, such as imitation, and 
further stimulated by external forces, like selection. Thus, maximizing behavior as well as common 
knowledge are dismissed. Economic agents strive to adapt to their environment through a process 
of trial and error, based on imitation of the behavior o f those who have thus far succeeded. Some 
evolutionary stable strategies will emerge over time, and chance will select one among them.
Another interesting suggestion is that entailed in Dupuys (s.d.) notion of'temps du project' (plan's 
time) and the kind of rationality associated with it, namely, libre arbitre' (free will). It displays a 
kind o f rationality that appears to be 'irrational' according to our instrumental view o f it, for it 
involves the subject’s capacity of modifying his past as well as detaching himself from his 
circumstances. Counterfactual reasoning, self-criticism and self-improvement are (rational) human 
traits that may and indeed should be accommodated within a broader vision of rationality, as free 
will, he suggests. Incidentally, Dupuy claims that this view of rationality might help us in 
understanding the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative games.
¿.Concluding Section
In this chapter I have tried to  go through the game theoretical view o f social interaction in terms 
o f strategic interaction as well as to pick up some ways in which this strategic interaction was 
resolved in terms of strategic rationality alone. To this end, I looked into two slightly different 
approaches to strategic interaction, those of vNM and Moore-Anderson, with a view to finding
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out what is it peculiar about a strategic interaction. The two approaches appeared to sustain that 
the behaviourist view of social interaction is ill-founded as it overlooks the fundamental fact that 
in social life action affects and is affected by possible reactions in a quite unpredictable manner; 
therefore people always need some 'theory* to  go about their affairs, to help them thinking about 
the ways they may affect and be affected. Where these approaches disagree is over the possibility 
that these 'theories' converge to a fully articulable Theory1. VNM believed that there could be 
such a theory, determinate enough to provide unique rational ways o f  going about interaction 
problems, whereas Moore-Anderson deny this possibility and think o f the Theory' as just a set 
of heuristic devices. My guess is that Moore-Anderson have the better insight for that matter, as 
the question o f formation and revision o f beliefs in interactive contexts seems to me to be fairly 
tough and requires one to step into the examination o f complex mechanisms of generating mutual 
predictability.
I then attempted to discuss some of the views o f strategic rationality. My interest was not so much 
to  describe equilibrium notions or solution concepts as to examine the question of how wise 
should people be assumed to be in order to be able to find their way to the equilibrium strategy 
profile. My attention was then directed to  the common knowledge assumption. This assumption 
is very difficult to make sense of outside the formal apparatus, specially in the way it has been 
worked out in the context of modem GT. Nevertheless, Lewis has cast some light on it, and 
Dupuy has investigated some of the intuitions behind it. In the context of the Nash concept, 
complete information, rationality, and common knowledge are deemed to be sufficient for an 
equilibrium to arise. Apart from the meagre relevance of the standard Nash solution to solve many 
strategic problems, it also revealed its overly strong belief-structure which assumes certainty as 
to the other's optimal choice. The relaxation o f Nash's belief structure by Harsanyi has introduced 
the Bayesian framework into game-theory, admittedly with a view to turning a game-theoretic 
problem into a decision-theoretic one, as Harsanyi says. Aumann even more radically assumes that 
uncertainty is widespread to the point o f almost eliminating any idea o f a 'personal' choice. To 
cope with uncertainty under this strong sense, people are assumed to be able to calculate 
subjective probabilities which are to reflect their beliefs concerning the behavior o f others. In 
order to ensure that different people will think their way to  the equilibrium profile, Aumann 
introduces the Bayes's rule and the assumption o f common priors. In this way, subjective
1 2 6
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probability distributions held by different people will converge to a probability distribution held 
by an outside observer. This is said to impersonate the ignorance the model attempts to deal with. 
However it appears to be a meta-player displaying a view of ignorance as something quite external 
to the efforts undertaken by the players to acquire some knowledge of their situation. The 
question then arises how this position can be justified in terms o f the very game-theoretical 
original objections to an outside perspective?
Consistent maximizing action in the face o f uncertainty is certainly not the view espoused by the 
alternatives mentioned in section 5. Sharpf and Kirman call attention to the social and historical 
nature of rationality. In these views, much o f the information needed for successful strategic 
interaction is socially provided either by mechanisms intentionally constructed to this end, as in 
Sharpf, or by evolving institutions that have been somehow 'rationalized' (selected), socially and 
over time as in Kirman. Scharpf, echoing Moore-Anderson’s concerns, would not recommend a 
fully-embracing theory, able to deduce those mechanisms, as he sides with a view of a more 
descriptively dense, or complex theory, whereas Kirman would like to see a theory of a more 
complex object, his heterogenous agents. A non-instrumental view o f reason, or a more complex 
idea of reason, is recalled by Dupuy. All these contributions may be integrated into game-theory 
in a way that may render it richer. I would however like to address the epistemic problems raised 
by strategic thinking in terms of a more general philosophical outlook.
The purpose o f this chapter, then, was not to provide a review o f the 'state of the arts’ in game 
theory, neither in terms o f its accomplishments nor failures, but to in terpret GT as producing a 
particular view of social interaction. My claim is that GT can be interpreted as providing an 
epistemic-like vision o f that interaction, as it emphasizes the extent to which individual action is 
often enough a reaction to potential action by others and can only be understood in the light o f 
the beliefs, conjectures and expectations held by the acting people with respect to one another. 
However original and thought-provoking this vision may be, the way the theory has been evolving 
has turned out to be quite frustrating, since this epistemic vision, short o f good philosophy, ends 
up as a poor exercise in behaviorism.
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To think of different people as having to choose among different strategies corresponding to what 
they expect the other's choice to be suggests an idea o f social interaction as an intercourse 
between at least two distinct individuals, in the sense that one important constraint on someone's 
choice and its outcome is precisely his awareness that the other's choice will affect him The 
exercise o f outguessing the other's choice may be made trivially easy to undertake, as one 
conjectures that there is only one rational way o f going about a  certain problem and that all that 
is needed in that search is to describe the decision problem properly and find the equilibrium pair 
of strategies. However, as this may happen quite rarely, the exercise of outguessing may become 
a very intriguing one and might even gain some philosophical overtones. In the route followed in 
this chapter I have called attention to  the fact that the strategic interaction as an interaction that 
involves a great deal of uncertainty, and uncertainty o f  a very peculiar kind, has prompted a 
response from the side of Bayesians like Aumann who try to address the crucial issue of how 
beliefs o f different people may come to be aligned and support a suitable equilibrium. Two tools 
were then presented in favor of the possibility both of an alignment o f beliefs and an equilibrium 
point, namely, Bayes's rule and the assumption o f common priors, the use of which I believe still 
deserves a more solid philosophical justification. It is unclear to  me why we should reduce our 
reasoning process to an inferential mechanism such as Bayes's rule. It is also obscure to  me why 
different people with the same information should hold the same beliefs; perhaps they are not so 
different. In this case, we may well be in the universe of the 'one* instead. That is why I proceed 
to examine, in Part III, a different framework, in search for a better philosophically situated 
position about the importance of knowledge in the social world as well as what we can possibly 
know.
The suggestion I shall pursue further in chapter 7 is that we should turn to inquire as to how we 
have come to acquire the knowledge we need in order to act and interact with others, or in other 
words, what our epistemic condition is. In short, is social interaction a matter of outguessing, 
bluffing and signalling? My contention is that it is more than this, and that to understand social 
interaction we should first gain an understanding o f the social content of our rationality. So, in 
acting we resort to  condensed forms of knowledge, like rules, institutions, habits and traditions 
o f which we are not (and cannot be) fully aware. These forms constitute both the measure of our 
ignorance and its redemption. In any case, this perspective may display the advantage o f not
taking the knowledge-ignorance game' as naively as a zero-sum one, or even a non-cooperative 
game, in which *the more I know the less ignorant I am', for it also encompasses the possibility 
that 'the more I know the less I know*, as when we take knowledge as constitutive o f our world 
so that every time one consumes some o f it one further produces it.
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PART II
AUTONOMY- BEYOND SELF-INTEREST
(THE ONE)
INTRODUCTION
In this Part, I take up arguments that propose that the social order is the result of rational 
(parametric-public) choices made by individuals who are not exclusively motivated by self- 
interested considerations, in however enlarged a sense. These approaches assume that there 
can be a motivational sphere that goes beyond self-interest and this they call a moral 
motivation. They also postulate this motivation to be the decisive foundation for a well- 
grounded social order. The moral motivation is supposed to provide an objective point of 
reference that transcends the individual subjective sphere and objectively connects the 
individual with his whole community, and mankind. In terms o f their main elements, these 
arguments conceive o f the social order as a well-established social unity, underscored by well- 
grounded interpersonal comparisons where the reasoning needed for such comparisons is 
provided entirely by the intrapersonal comparisons of one rational individual, endowed with a 
special moral inclination.
The label 'autonomy' is meant to indicate the assumption of the moral priority o f the 
individuals that these images o f social order proclaim and also, more importantly, that the 
society is conceived as well-ordered whenever it is so designed as to satisfy individual ends, 
as these are properly described in terms o f possessing some moral properties. In this sense, 
autonomy means not only that each individual has well-defined personal (egoistic or altruistic) 
preferences over a given set of social alternatives, but also that the preferences over these 
states may on occasion be moral (non-personal) ones, indeed they should be so if we are 
talking about a well-grounded social order. In a sense, this Part may be seen, looking 
backwards, as an inquiry into the Kantian alternative view of individual reason, keeping 
however a forward-looking interest in its feasibility, both from a utilitarian and a contractarian 
perspective. In relation to chapter 1, this Part aims to go beyond self-interest into what was at 
the time the mysterious Lockean imperative of making the General Good part o f the 
individual's ends.
Thus, in relation to Part I, this Part addresses the problem o f producing a sound argument for 
non-exclusively self-interested behavior, a question that particularly hampered the account o f
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political order in chapter 2. Recall that cooperation appeared possible only so long as 
cooperative behavior was assumed, and this could not be proved to be the unique maximizing 
behavior This part takes up the hypothesis that cooperative behavior may have a source other 
than maximizing considerations alone
It is one conclusion here that the approach to  interpersonal comparisons wholly in terms o f the 
intrapersonal deliberation of one individual considering what the best possible social 
arrangement is, our world of the 'one', draws heavily on a "rationalistic conception o f  
rationality", to put it in the words o f Bernard Williams, and, in this sense, displays a sort o f  
'abuse* of reason. This means, in our context here, that the m oral reasoning, the search for an 
objective viewpoint, was somehow settled in terms o f a theoretical reasoning. As this route is 
open to diaphonia, indicating plural and conflicting moral principles to rule the basis o f our 
social arrangements, we lack the expected unity here. As a consequence, a different 
perspective is pursued in Part III. In that Part, the individual deliberation iato sensu is assumed 
not to be a mere matter o f method and information, because a genuine question arises 
concerning our rather limited knowledge capacities. A different link between knowledge and 
normative purposes is then suggested departing from the reductionist view taken in the present 
Part.
The exposition of the ideas in this Part pursues the following scheme. Chapter 4 tackles the 
main characteristics o f  the second 'type' proposed in matrix 1, the 'parametric-public' model, 
which sketches the elements of the broader 'autonomy' perspective. This chapter digresses 
around Kenneth Arrow's social choice theory, as this invites a reflection on a certain way o f  
seeing the social coordination. Explicitly, the insight, borrowed from Arrow, is that if  
individual ends, to which the social order should be responsive, are interpreted in terms o f bare 
individual or personal preferences over a set o f alternative social worlds, where preferences 
are only constrained in a formal sense, then it proves impossible to attain the social 
coordination that would result from putting together these preferences in a noncoercive way. I 
take this as a rather 'inductive' question and the impossibility result as an expression o f  a kind 
of'inductive fallacy*.
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Next, in chapter 5, a sort o f 'deductive' rejoinder to the above fallacy is presented, stemming 
from the rule-utilitarian approach by John Harsanyi. Restrictions on the individual ends are 
proposed in order to overcome the Arrowvian impossibility and reasons for these restrictions 
are also offered. Two main sets of restrictions deserve mention here, namely, the introduction 
of a new apparatus for defining rationality (the so-called Bayesian rationality), and the 
assumption of a moral faculty of human beings, sympathy. Both capacities, it is then implied, 
are better developed in better educated people, as they are better trained in logical inference, 
are not supposedly hindered by emotions, and have access to the best information available. In 
this way, grounds for objective interpersonal comparisons are offered which are based on 
morally constrained intrapersonal deliberation. The social order is solved as a peculiar rational 
choice of one individual.
Chapter 6 surveys the Rawlsian solution to the Arrow impossibility, as we have interpreted 
this latter in chapter 4. It is also displayed as a deductive-like approach to that impossibility as 
it presents arguments for restriction on individual ends drawing both on traditional rational 
choice view and on a Kantian view of individuals as 'standpoints' endowed with a moral 
motivation. Two books by Rawls are referred to, A Theory o f Justice and Political Liberalism. 
as well as a number o f writings that came to light between their publication. The earlier 
Rawlsian moral argument is rather a premise, whose backdrop is a certain moral conception o f 
human beings as moral capacities with certain finalities. The 'decisive' argument, issued from a 
rational choice perspective, is, nonetheless, constrained by the assumed moral backdrop. More 
sensitive and responsive to the diversity and complexity of individuals' ends, the later Rawlsian 
argument relies on a conception of public reason, where an agreement on rules to regulate the 
social coordination is nevertheless to an important extent coextensive with an agreement on 
theories about social life as well as on procedures and methods of science and common sense 
(since we would want to have a common evaluation of our institutions as well as to monitor 
the correct application o f the principles, which we all understand in the same way). As in the 
case o f  Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism, a basis for objective interpersonal comparisons is 
provided stemming from morally constrained intrapersonal deliberation. Similarly, the social 
order is viewed as a morally constrained rational choice.
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A final word is required to state a number o f disclaimers that call attention to the obvious 
limits of the task undertaken here. In particular, the discussion around the Arrowvian 
impossibility is not a technical one, nor is that around the utilitarian theorem in the chapter on 
Harsanyi. As far as Rawls is concerned, my argument is not a thorough interpretation o f the 
Rawlsian theory (or theories) o f justice, nor a contribution to the debate on the earlier and the 
later Rawls. I have attempted to make sense o f  the arguments by these authors as far as my 
particular question was concerned: I wanted to study their views o f  social order, from (what I 
presumed to be) the shared premise o f theirs that the social order is a kind o f  arrangement o f  
individuals' actions towards the furtherance o f  their ends. To this end, I have concentrated on 
the kind o f idealization they assume (how well ordered the coordination of individuals' ends 
can be) as well as the extent to which this involves constraints on individual ends that have a 
basis on certain knowledge assumptions. In particular, I have attempted to characterize their 
views in terms of a common pattern, that o f  taking the social order as grounded in objective 
interpersonal comparisons (IC) and these as being given to our knowledge through a peculiar 
deliberation procedure undertaken by any rational individual. In critically assessing this 
pattern, I indicate the precariousness o f making objective IC rely on theoretical knowledge.
Chapter 4
SOCIAL ORDER AND JUSTICE
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set up a provisional frame for a certain view of social order. 
It draws essentially on Arrow's social choice theory as this yields, in my interpretation, the 
main elements for that particular view. Thus, this chapter looks into what I call the 
'aggregative' or 'parametric-public' model, cell II according to the taxonomy developed in the 
Introductory Chapter. It will represent an initial frame for the quite 'rationalistic' conception o f 
the social order taken up in the present Part o f the dissertation. This Part intends to account 
for the social order in terms o f individual (parametric) rational choices among alternative 
social states.
A technical discussion o f  Arrow's theory is skipped, as stress is put on other less developed 
aspects o f it. In particular, the Arrowvian impossibility (a consistent social ordering cannot 
result from consistent individual orderings of preferences) is elaborated here as a suggestion 
for the further quest for the difference between the social order and a bare social ordering o f 
individuals preferences. Arrow was generous enough to append to his impossibility theorem 
the hope for a way out, in his suggestion that interpersonal comparisons should be permitted 
on the way to a solution; it is only that they need to be justified. This suggestion by Arrow is 
here worked out while the enterprise o f justification of these comparisons undertaken by other 
authors is examined in chapters 3 and 4.
More to the point, the hypothesis taken up here is that the Arrow result may in some 
meaningful way be interpreted as suggesting that to justifiably aggregate individuals' 
preferences one would need a moral argument that properly addresses the issue o f 
interpersonal comparability. The possibility that this aggregation may successfully be achieved 
through the relaxation o f the Arrowvian conditions will not be pursued here.
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In section 2, the ’parametric-public' approach is renamed as 'order as justice' to spell out the 
specific connection between order and justice that is present in an aggregative account o f  the 
social order. To this end, some o f the premises o f  Arrow’s social choice theorem are outlined (in 
subsection 2.1) that characterize the broad approach, such as individual preferences as the 
sources of a social state, the kind o f justice-wanting conflict that is likely to emerge (distributive 
issues and conflict o f rights), and the kind o f  solution most conducive to internalizing these 
undesired 'interactional frictions'. Following that, this section sets up both the possibility o f a 
normative reading o f  Arrow's impossibility result different from the usual technical one (in 
subsection 2.2), and a conjecture about a possible conceptual connection between order and 
justice to which the Arrow theorem gives rise (in subsection 2.3). The Arrow result, it is then 
argued, evokes the thought that the social order is, at some deeper level, conditioned by a 
criterion of justice, o f the just interpersonal comparisons among its members. In subsection 2.4, 
the Arrow result is presented and interpreted in terms of the issue o f interpersonal comparisons. 
Of course, in their personal preferences people make their subjective interpersonal comparisons. 
The question is, How can these comparisons be made and incorporated in the social preferences 
in a way that respects individuals' autonomy?
Finally, in section 3, an introduction to the issue o f interpersonal comparisons from an ethical 
viewpoint is attempted.
i
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2. O rder as Justice
In the following subsection, we will be going through some of the more visible aspects concerning 
a view of social order as portrayed in cell II, the 'aggregative' or 'parametric-public' outlook. In 
the subsections that follow, increasingly risky interpretations o f that approach are undertaken with 
a view to presenting some elements o f a common paradigm, namely, the 'order as justice' view o f 
social order.
2.1 (Imperfect) Param etric Public Choices
To begin with, the notion o f parametric public choices needs some clarification. A 'parametric* 
rational choice requires the exclusion o f  a number o f aspects from the framing o f the choice
1 3 7
situation, as in Arrow's (1951,1963) proposal: game-like aspects, interaction between preferences 
and methods of decision, and any irrationality of the individuals in the form of violation o f the two 
requirements o f completeness and transitivity of the orderings (whenever more than two 
alternatives are considered) are to be disregarded
As for the game aspects, Arrow states that 'no consideration is given to the enjoyment o f the 
decision process as a form of play1.1 More importantly, he also stipulates that no consideration be 
given to the game-like phenomenon that people may happen to misrepresent their preferences by 
their actions.
As for the interaction between preferences and methods, he further states that:
If individual values can themselves be affected by the method of social choice, it 
becomes much more difficult to learn what is meant by one method's being 
preferable to another.(Arrow, 1951,1963:8)
Rationality is understood, as he puts it, as maximization of some sort. Finally, summing up his 
initial qualifications, he puts them together in the following assertion:
In addition to ignoring game aspects of the problem of choice, we will also assume 
in the present study that individual values are taken as data and are not capable of 
being altered by the nature of the decision process itself... Finally, it is assumed 
that all individuals in the society are rational (Arrow, 1963:7-8)
For our purposes, this shall suffice to identify 'parametric' rationality in Arrow's decision-makers.
On reflection, it seems that the above exclusions aim to reinforce the autonomy or the 
'decisiveness' of individual decision-making, as well as its coherence, in terms of connecting 
individual choices to the preferences of rational individuals alone (to repeat, to the exclusion 
of strategic thinking, interactions between ends and means, and irrationality).1 2
1 Cf, Arrow, op.cit., p.7.
2 A related question is whether 'preferences' can be the substrate of such autonomy, as Elstcr (1982) has pointed out 
(Sen, 1970,1985a; Broome, 1991), because of cognitive cacophony. For example, people may happen to adjust their 
preferences relying on considerations of feasibility. Sen (1970,1985a), in turn, argues that preferences aboold not be
(continued...)
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The 'public' nature of the issues that are the object of the preferences o f the individuals, in turn, 
is indicated by the fact that they configure a set of alternative 'social states', thus defined by 
Arrow:
a social state is a complete description o f  the amount of each type of commodity 
in the hands of each individual, the amount of labor to be supplied by each 
individual, the amount o f each productive resource invested in each type o f 
productive activity, and the amounts o f various types o f collective activity, such 
as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other means, and the 
erection of statues to famous men. (ibidem: 17)
So, Arrow argues that the preferences over social states are still individuals' but their content does 
not o f necessity reflect egoistic inclinations but may well accommodate values to which the 
individuals happen to subscribe, other than mere personal welfare considerations. Put somewhat 
differently, preferences are autonomous (in the sense that they are generated in the individuals), 
but their motivation is not necessarily so (in the sense that the preferences also express aims other 
than the individuals' direct advantage).
Indeed, Arrow is dear enough about this point and insists that 'tastes' or 'egoistic desires* cannot 
be relied upon as guidance for choices among a certain class of alternatives, for example, the 
amount of public expenditure, or its distribution among different items that have no direct bearing 
on the individual's welfare, or some particular pattern o f equity the individual may happen to 
desire o f the alternatives. In these cases it is natural to assume, Arrow argues, that individuals 
refer to their values, not only to their tastes. 1
However, Arrow also indicates that different tastes and values are sources o f conflict when many 
wills are involved. Possible objects o f  conflict are different profiles o f income distribution, he 
admits, and 'other-regarding' preferences (the preferences one has regarding the behavior of 
others), a point stressed by Sen (1970).
(...continued)
viewed as such a substrate, because of rights and distributive issues.
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There is a natural way o f overcoming such seemingly intractable differences, thus waiving these 
'interactional residues' (distributive and rights issues), which is to suppose the existence o f a 
'general will', incidentally an image that abounds in political philosophy. As Arrow recalls:
The assumption ... o f complete agreement among individuals on the ordering of 
social alternatives, may seem obviously contrary to fact. But, properly interpreted, 
it is at the basis o f a great portion o f political philosophy, namely, the idealist 
school. The fundamental doctrine of the group is that we must distinguish between 
the individual will, as it exists at any given instant under varying external 
influences, and the general will, which is supposed to inhere in all and which is the 
same in all; social morality is based on the latter. This view is expressed in the 
works o f Rousseau, Kant, and T.H. Green, among many others.(ibidem:81)
The idealist doctrine then may be summed up by saying that each individual has 
two orderings, one which governs him in his everyday actions and one which 
would be relevant under some ideal conditions and which is in some sense truer 
than the first ordering, (ibidem: 82/83)
Moreover, Arrow asserts that some sort o f consensus on the ends o f society is indeed necessary 
'or no social welfare function can be formed*, and it is to be found either in the individual 
orderings or 'in the moral imperatives o f various members of society*.
What could possibly be the reasoning in support o f the idea o f the splitting of the will into two 
different ones, in order to find the 'ends of society'? Rawls and Harsanyi address this question: 
they frame the social choice, the choice o f a social state, as to somehow force the individual into 
choosing, abstracted from his circumstances but still taking his own advantage into account and 
in use of his reason, an ideal society, one in which he, whoever he happens to be, would be willing 
to live.
Put this way, the ideal society can no longer be fully specified, as were the Arrowvian social 
states; in fact, this is not the expected result o f individual decision making. What is actually 
expected as an outcome o f this kind o f mental process is a principle or a set of principles that 
should order such social state.
It may be argued that, different as they may appear to be (and really are, on a number o f accounts 
that are disregarded here), Arrow and Rawls-Harsanyi are only departing from diametric points
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along the same line o f reasoning: the former, from actual (or weakly constrained) individual 
choices to desirable social states; the latter, from individual choices under ideal conditions to 
desirable social states. Arrow wonders whether rational people unconstrained in any sense other 
than their rationality may not shape a rational society in a somewhat axiomatic way, and he 
concludes with an impossibility result, which he suspects may well be an expression of what are 
here called the interactional frictions or residues. Rawls-Harsanyi wonder what the conditions are 
for people to succeed in such a construction; theirs is the standpoint o f an ethical observer that 
will supply the necessary conditions (and in this sense modify the initial set o f conditions imagined 
by Arrow) for people to design an ideal order. Indeed, it is possible to characterize Arrow's 
parametric-public model in terms of an imperfect parametric-public choice, to contrast it with the 
more developed forms worked out by Rawls and Harsanyi where there are almost no interactional 
residues lefr and the social state is designed in a more abstract way.
2.2. Normative Social Choice
In his Social Choice and Individual Values. Arrow concludes that the passage from the individual 
level to the level of society is not rationality-preserving, no matter what (collective) procedure is 
adopted. At least when rationality is defined as a weak-ordering (where suitable axioms apply, 
viz., completeness and transitivity), the autonomy of the choices is assumed (which is to  be 
guaranteed by a set o f  conditions), and interpersonal comparisons (IC) are excluded.
An immediate reading o f  the theorem is that a set o f reasonable conditions to be imposed on any 
(collective) procedure that is supposed to link individuals1 preferences to  social states will conflict 
over an unrestricted domain of the individuals' choices. Therefore, unrestricted (although well- 
behaved) preferences o f  the individuals, when taken together, could lead to collective chaos.
Still, one may ask, what is this sort o f reversed composition fallacy a symptom of? If we discard 
the case of improper description of the social coordination,3 two alternatives have been taken up,
3 This alternative is pursued in Parts I and III o f this dissertation. In Paît I, for instance, the social coordination is 
described in terms of strategic interaction, and in Part III in terms o f a non-rednctionist 'interacting individuals' 
interpretation.
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respectively by social choice theory and moral theories, namely, that the resulting irrationality is 
a symptom either o f lack o f logical depth on the part of the theory or o f ethical shallowness.4
Accordingly, one way out is to look for 'possibility' techniques, in the form of second thoughts 
regarding the initial Arrowvian 'reasonable' constraints on the procedure. Consequently, relaxation 
of these conditions has been widely pursued in the literature, motivated by the view that one 
should restore the consistency conditions of the social utility function.
An admittedly less natural way out is to skip the 'impossibility* issue in its logical aspects and look 
at a practical form of the problem, as for example a conflict among a certain set of values, where 
the conditions are interpreted in somewhat normative terms, that demands that we take a different 
step than possibility techniques in order to decide on a solution. In Hylland's (1986) suggestion, 
we would then be looking for the standpoint of an ethical observer who is properly to judge the 
values that should be kept and the ones that could be discarded Again, the idea here is that the 
formal conditions should then be interpreted in normative terms.
In this particular way, being provoked by the impossibility result one might be required to go deep 
into ethical considerations. In particular, it might be of interest to identify and come to grips with 
the more likely sources o f conflict, as the literature has done, for example the distribution o f 
income or rights issues (Sen 1985; 1970).
Indeed, Arrow himself ventures on a direct connection between the social choice theory and a 
theory o f justice, in his Social Choice and Justice (Essay 11). Though he indicates that the 
domains of each of these theories are clearly not the same, he nonetheless believes in an intimate 
relation between them. So, on the one hand, he says, if one takes the Pareto criterion as part o f  
the definition of a satisfactory theory o f social choice (Arrow,1984:147) one already has a 
'distributive' constraint on the feasible set o f alternative social states. On the other hand, a theory
4 Hylland (1986), for instance, accepts the following view: "On one level, social choice theory is a mathematical 
discipline; conditions are formulated precisely in the form of axioms, and theorems proved. But if the theory is to be 
of any use, the story cannot end there. The results must tell us something about 'real' issues.” (1 lyHand, 1986.45)
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of justice can be said to result from a collective decision (even if this decision favors some 
decentralized mechanism of distribution).
2.3. Aggregating and  Weighing: order as justice
I want to take up and build on Arrow's suggestion of an intimate relation between the social 
choice and the justice theories. My own view is that axiomatic social choice gives an insight into 
a peculiar conceptual connection between order and justice, intimating an even closer relationship 
than that spelled out by Arrow between the social choice theory and the domains of moral and 
political philosophy.
It may be argued that the conceptual connection between order and justice is twofold. On the one 
hand, Hardin (1988) argues that justice can be understood as order. He stresses the difference 
between what he calls 'justice as order1, where justice is seen as a synonym for order, and 
distributive or social justice, it seems, he still argues, that the notion o f justice has now acquired 
a chiefly distributive connotation but it has also been
and... very clearly a notion o f order. The thirty-first Principle Doctrine or Sovran 
Maxim of Epicurus is: The justice which arises from nature is a pledge o f mutual 
advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being 
harmed' (Whitney J. Oates, ed., The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. New 
York: Modem Library, 1940, p. 37, cited in Hardin, 1988:36fh).
On the other hand, what seems to be characteristic of the approaches in cell II is precisely the 
conceptual autonomy and priority o f justice over order, in the sense that, ideally, the social unity 
is conceived as springing solely from a prior criterion o f justice in a broad sense, that is, as a rule 
o f adjudication of conflicts concerning the distribution not only o f rights and duties as in a 'justice 
as order* view, but also of economic and social advantages. The resulting principles of justice are 
the outcomes of a social choice, and are to work as constraints to be imposed on the set o f social 
states rather than thorough social states. The theories located in cell II are interested in 
articulating this criterion; they also want to evaluate a conception o f justice with respect to some 
desirable attributes it should have. These we will call theories o f  'order as justice', just to 
emphasize the above priority.
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I intend here to capture the peculiar connection between order and justice presented by 
approaches in cell II through the idea of'aggregation'. In this way, images of social order as the 
result of choices performed by parametric-rational individuals share the assumption that the social 
order is the outcome o f an 'aggregation' of largely autonomous individuals, where strategic and 
interactional considerations of the means-ends kind are excluded. In particular, the idea of the 
social order as an aggregation here presupposes the existence of a prior conception of justice in 
the broad sense.
Aggregation is quite straightforward as far as Arrow's argument is concerned, for he utterly 
commits himself to the search for a rationality-preserving aggregation procedure of individual 
preferences, like voting, to design a social state.
As far as Harsanyi and Rawls are concerned, the idea of aggregation still arguably underlies the 
image of a well ordered or just society, as this is regarded as a well arranged gathering of 
individuals which are seen as self-generating sources of aims and claims. In particular, society is 
seen as the assembling of individuals who are expected to somehow use their equal capacities as 
rational beings to accommodate their different concerns. As a consequence, and making the most 
of these 'equal capacities', the aggregation procedure that takes place, replaces the set of many 
and diverse individuals with just one individual, through specific mechanisms, namely, the 
Rawlsian device of the original position, whereby an individual's reasoning process (when properly 
constrained) comes up with the two principles o f justice, and the Harsanyian ideal observer, where 
the preferences o f a sympathetic spectator lead to the utilitarian principle.
We may wonder, however, what the path is to achieve that 'replacement'. A crucial question 
relates to the brute fact' o f the heterogeneity o f individuals's ends. In constructing the aggregation 
procedures, these approaches have to address the question o f how to  find a common ground in 
order to accommodate the differences between the individuals, so as to reach a coherent picture 
o f society. The implication is that social unity involves more than the sum total o f individuals' 
ends, on the basis of some minimum common denominator (let us say, that everyone wants to  
seize the benefits o f social cooperation) as these ends may conflict; it also involves a preceding 
and articulable common notion of how to solve the likely conflicts that are to emerge on account
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of the differences between them. 'Order as justice' gives primacy to this latter aspect. According 
to this approach, social order is dependent upon a prior proper weighing o f different people's aims 
and claims, prior principles of justice, that is. To aggregate we need to weigh To justify our 
aggregation we need to  know and be able to  justify the criterion for interpersonal weighing that 
we have used.
The hypothesis worked out here may be restated as follows: the 'order as justice' approach 
elaborates the idea that a conception of social order as an aggregate of many and diverse 
individuals aims, however interpreted, presupposes a criterion o f  justice (as implied in the idea o f 
a distribution o f weights); it should also be able to develop such a conception so as to fully 
articulate the criterion in terms of some general principles. This criterion of justice itself results 
from a peculiar social choice. In other words, to  achieve the social preferences we would need 
to have established a criterion o f justice, o f  the just interpersonal comparisons o f people's 
preferences, in the first place. This criterion itself can only result from a specific social choice 
where considerations other than personal preferences, be they egoistic or altruistic, apply. This 
aspect is worked out by Harsanyi and Rawls.5
5 This characterization may encompass to a variable extent many foundational works in social choice theory (Arrow 
and Sen's, for example) as well as the theories of justice of John Rawls and John Harsanyi, however different their 
conclusions happen to be. In any case, the largely inductive way whereby social choice theory proceeds on the way to 
the aggregate format of social states contrasts with the largely deductive manner adopted either in the Rawlsian 
construction of a reasonable viewpoint or in Harsanyi's moral standpoint. These latter perspectives are to provide 
restrictions as well as reasons for restrictions to be imposed. (However, one must not exaggerate the contrast, for social 
choice efforts to derive social states from individuals' preferences restrict our attention to preferences only, and also 
already embody a (weak) restriction on these preferences in the form of the rationality axioms already mentioned. In 
this sense they are somewhat deductive from the onset; whereas, Rawls and Harsanyi's views might be regarded as 
somehow contaminated by an unconfessed piece of inductivism, and of intuitionism it might be argued, as particular 
beliefs entertained by the authors are elevated to the status o f shared beliefs, although not always in a cogent way.) So, 
it is of interest here the fact that the 'inductive' procedure ends up with an impossibility, an induction fallacy of sorts, 
escape from which seems to be pursued by 'deductive' approaches. How well these approaches have managed to 
overcome the problems o f the former without ending up with a renewed impossibility of their own is open to debate. 
(In fact, I contend in later chapters that a renewed induction fallacy is likely to arise in the search for objectivity 
undertaken both by rule-utilitarian and Rawlsian approaches.) Another way of interpreting the connection between the 
Arrow result and deductive approaches, in a more integrative key, is to regard the former as clarifying what the issues 
are that need further (deductive) argument for an individualistic approach of the kind considered here (Parametric- 
public) to succeed in giving rise to a cogent image of social order. It is worth adding, however, the following 
qualification: as far as Arrow's theorem is concerned the assumption of individualism is understood in the sense that 
social choices are seen exclusively as the result o f individual (rational) choices and these, in turn, are to stem only from 
individual preferences over a set of given alternatives. The deductive arguments to be examined shall draw either on 
a preference-scheme, as in Harsanyi's approach, or on a non-preference scheme (at least not in terms of'utility*, such 
as Rawls'.
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Let us now turn to Arrow’s teasing problem in order to pave the way for Rawls and Harsanyi's 
contribution, as they will appear in the next two chapters.
2.4. Social Ordering and Social Order: Arrow's problem and the IC issue
In connection with the preceding section, the purpose o f this subsection is to take on an 
interpretation o f the Arrow problem in terms o f the issue o f interpersonal comparisons. This is 
not to deny that the Arrow impossibility is the formulation of a logical inconsistency that follows 
a certain description o f how social preferences are formed, as stressed by Samuelson (1967). 
However, Arrow’s statements on different occasions reinforce the impression that his ultimate aim 
while working on his social choice theory was mainly normative. In particular, as he declared 
(Arrow, 1984:160), he was interested in providing a basis for a theory o f justice from a social
choice theory framework. It is to this particular aspect of his impossibility result that we now turn.
* * *
Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem states that there is no collective procedure that connects 
individuals' preferences over social states to a particular social state, in a satisfactory way. By 
collective procedures he means those decision methods that are characteristically unimposed 
(by external forces like customary rules) and non-dictatorial (someone's preferences prevailing, 
regardless of what the others' preferences are), such as markets and voting; although he only 
concentrates on voting procedures. By a satisfactory way he means a rational way implying 
that the procedure should abide by the requirements of completeness and transitivity of the 
ordering of the alternatives (a set of social states) and satisfy a number o f other conditions 
(originally five, and, later, in the 1963 revision, four).6
6 The above mentioned conditions for the construction of the collective decision device, the social welfare function, are, 
as reported by Sen, the following: "Unrestricted domain (hereafter, condition U) demands that the domain of the social 
welfare function must include all possible individual preference profiles (Le., no matter what preferences the member 
of the society holds, the social welfare function can successfully aggregate them into a social preference ordering). The 
Pareto Principle (hereafter, condition P) demands that if  everyone prefers x to any y, then x is socially preferred to 
y. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (hereafter, condition I) requires that Ihe social ranking of any two states 
s and y depends only on die individual rankings of these two states. (...) Finally, non-dictatorship (hereafter, condition 
D) prohibits the presence of a dictator (i.e., a person such dial whenever he prefers any x to any y, the result is that x 
is socially preferred to y). Arrow's impossibility theorem states that if there are at least three distinct social states and 
the set o f individuals is finite, then there is no Social Welfare Function satisfying conditions U, P, I, and D." 
(Sen, 1985a: 1766)
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Arrow's formal question, to which he devotes his 1951 book, is whether:
[it is] formally possible to construct a procedure for passing from a set o f known 
individual tastes to a pattern of social decision-making, the procedure in question 
being required to satisfy certain natural conditions? (Ibidem:2)
Arrow's reportedly informal question is: can the consistency achieved at the level o f  the 
individual be attributed to collective modes o f choice, where the wills of many people are 
involved?'(my emphasis).
In a different statement, Arrow also warns that the resulting impossibility comes as a natural 
consequence o f its own starting point, viz. the rejection o f  Interpersonal Comparisons (IC) o f 
utility. The impossibility is then restated in the following form:
If we exclude the possibility o f  interpersonal comparisons o f  utility, then the only 
methods o f passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be 
satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range o f individual orderings are 
either imposed or dictatorial. (Arrow, 1963:59)
O f course, we could rephrase Arrow's above statement in terms o f  any of the five (or four) 
conditions for a satisfactory social choice that he stipulates, and select this particular one as 
'responsible* for the impossibility result and then undertake its relaxation on the way to a solution, 
as many authors have done thus far.7 However, Arrow selected the prohibition o f IC in this 
passage and this seems to be meaningful in our context here. The exclusion o f IC is explicitly 
stated by Arrow as a sort o f background constraint that seems to have for him a different status 
from the other axioms. This problem seems to be related to the way he puts his informal question, 
referring to the difficulty in achieving consistency 'where the wills o f  many people are involved'. 
He appears to be interested in knowing the possibility o f this achievement without resorting, 
however, to a premise which he finds very difficult simply to assume, unlike for the other axioms:
In a way that I cannot articulate well and am none too sure about defending, the 
autonomy of individuals, an element o f mutual incommensurability among people, 
seems denied by the possibility o f interpersonal comparisons. (Arrow,1984:160) 1
7 1 am grateful to Alan Kinnan for calling my attention to this particular point
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So, overcoming the impossibility result in the strict Arrow context might require the acceptance 
of IC, a step Arrow himself was reluctant to take fully.
3. Interpersonal Comparisons: a preview
Arrow declared that economists qua economists are not entitled to undertake interpersonal 
comparisons Still, he also argued that the exclusion of these comparisons (by the way, the 
received view in economics and welfare economics at the time Arrow completed his 
demonstration), and given his idea of a satisfactory method of aggregation, would necessarily lead 
to the impossibility result. IC are not justifiable, yet without them social choice is an impossibility
Since Arrow’s proof, however, welfare economics has launched a deep change in its stance 
concerning IC. Actually, the Arrow result provoked a fertile reaction in the form of subsequent 
work by a great number o f authors in the field, building on his suggestion that the IC constraint 
should be dropped on the way to a solution.* (Arrow himself worked out an ordinal approach to 
IC, the lexicographic maximin or 'leximin' as a social welfare criterion.* 9) As a consequence, 
interpersonal comparisons have since become an infatuation in social choice theory.10 (In 
particular, as they were elaborated on with the tools of Bayesian decision theory, IC were given 
a ground that could in turn support the utilitarian moral principle, as discussed later in chapter 5)
However, one is entitled to  ask, echoing Weber and Hirschman’s pathos on a different matter: 
how did it all happen? How is it possible that after decades of deep aversion, interpersonal 
comparisons have become widely accepted and incorporated, and, finally acquired the status o f 
an almost incontrovertible axiom? The answer, here as elsewhere, lies in the realm o f ethics, as
* Relaxation of some of the other axioms has also been attempted, but 1 will not focus here on these alternative ways
out.
9 The kxtmin criterion entails 'judging the social welfare of a state by the well-being of the w ont-off individual; if two 
states tie in this respect, then by the well-being of the second worst-off, and so on'. Cf. S en ,) 985a, p. 1772.
10 Sen reports on die matter as follows: "there has been a great revival in the 1970s is making and using interpersonal 
comparisons, and for this purpose Arrow's original social choice format has been appropriately adopted. Arrow himself 
contributed to this revival through some remarks in the second edition of his book (Arrow, 1963, pp. 114-15), following 
an important paper of Patrick Suppes (1957)." (Sen, op.cit, p. 1771). Hammond (1991a) provides a detailed reference 
list on IC of utility.
148
the main reason for such aversion stems from ethical considerations. IC have been increasingly 
regarded and portrayed as a crucial foundation for a properly ordered social unity, at least by 
people persuaded o f  the 'parametric-public' model, after the usual caveats have been properly 
addressed."
Closer inspection reveals that the original rejection by Arrow o f  interpersonal comparisons 
follows his similar rejection of cardinal measures o f utility, be they individual or interpersonal.
The viewpoint will be taken here that interpersonal comparisons of utilities
have no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare 
comparisons in the measurability o f individual utility ... I f  we cannot have 
measurable utility, in this sense, we cannot have interpersonal comparability o f 
utilities a fortiori, (ibidem; 9, my emphasis)
Many authors before Arrow had questioned the meaning of such measures, the selection o f which 
always involves a decision that is taken beyond the realm of economics. On this view, an 
economist qua economist is not entitled to proffer judgments on welfare policies (as much as 
measure individual utilities), for the substance o f what he is to judge surpasses its disciplinary 1
11 See chapters on Harsanyi and Rawls. Arrow also undertakes an ordinalist IC exercise. On the similarity between 
Rawls and Arrow’s view of IC, I quote Arrow, reporting on the leximin solution to IC of utility: "The work I am 
reporting on here has an ironic relation to Rawls' difference principle. Under certain epistemological assumptions about 
individual utilities, a social choice approach leads to Rawls* difference principle - but in terms of utilities, not primarily 
goods.” (Arrow, 1984.Essay 11:149) Also Sen's remarks stressing the above similarity are worth quoting: "The 
theorems presented by Arrow are about getting scalar values for u-vectors (given neutrality, i.e., ignoring non-u 
features), and the axiomatizations tell us when we should sum, when we must look at the minimum value, and so on. 
They are not specifically about utility vectors at all.” (Sen, 1985,1773) An important difference between them refers 
to a somewhat impersonal character of the Rawlsian 'primary goods', in contrast to the rather personal dimension of 
'utilities,:"It can be asked in this context whether Rawls' indices of primary goods may not be usable in exactly the same 
way as utilities in the form of u-vahies in the analysis presented by Arrow. One problem arises from the fact that, strictly 
interpreted, the holding of primary goods is not a feature o f a person's state of existence, but of the means to his 
achieving one state or another. The contrast between intra-personal and inter-personal comparisons ... cannot strictly 
speaking arise with the primary goods index. If the primary goods bundle held by A has higher value than that held by 
D, then we do not know that in this perspective A is simply more advantaged than B is. The contrary case, which can 
easily arise with advantage interpreted as utility, to wit: UB(xA)>UB(xB)>UA(xA)>UA(xB), simply cannot arise with 
holdings of primary goods. If  xA has a higher index value than xB, then die value I of advantage of the person, 
interpreted in terms of holding primary goods, will be quite independent o f everything other than which bundle the 
person bolds, that is IA(xA)=TB(xA)>IA(xB)=TB(xB). Utility has a 'personal* dimension that indices o f primary goods 
do not; the latter have to be 'impersonal*, in this sense.”( 1773)
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competence and tackles essentially ethical issues.12 This is, in general, the position defended by 
Lionel Robbins:
I still think, when I make interpersonal comparisons that my judgments are 
more like judgments of value than judgments of verifiable fact I think that the 
assumption of equality comes from outside [of economic science], and that its 
justification is more ethical than scientific. (Robbins, 1938 660-641, cited in 
Hammond, 1991a)
This position of Robbins had been pursued by economists for decades before cardinalism's revival 
in the 1970s.
We can trace Robbins's argument back to its origins in the work of Stanley Jevons (1965) In The 
Theory of Political Economy. Jevons works out the limits of possibility as far as measurement o f 
economic phenomena is concerned, and these do not seem to accommodate interpersonal 
comparability, at least o f  an hedonic kind. Minds are always opaque to one another, Jevons 
contends:
there is never, in any single instance [in Jevons's theory], an attempt made to 
compare the amount o f feeling in one mind with that in another I see no means 
by which such comparison can be accomplished.
Every mind i s ... inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of 
feeling seems possible. (Jevons, 1965:14)
Additionally, aspects of difficult intrapersonal measurement were stressed by Jevons;
Pleasures, in short, are, for the time being, as the mind estimates them ,... It is true 
that the mind often hesitates in making a choice of great importance: this indicates 
either varying estimates of the motives, or a feeling of incapacity to grasp the 
quantities concerned, (ibidem: 13)
As a consequence, Jevons argues, it is difficult to assert that 'one pleasure is an exact multiple of 
another', and this limits his theory to the so-called 'marginal' scale, in the sense that the theory 
cannot involve
12 Though, of course, alter a set o f values has been given, the economist can always evaluate their coherence in terms 
of the formal apparatus with which he is endowed. This point is emphasized by both Arrow and Robbins, op cit..
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the comparison of quantities o f feeling differing much in amount. The theory turns 
upon those critical points where pleasures are nearly, if not quite, equal.
(ibidem: 13)
In summary, Jevons's skeptical viewpoint underlines an empirical impossibility as far as a hedonic 
view of utility is concerned. The implication seems to be that without empirical support no 
judgment o f the kind implied by IC can be uttered at all.
Thus, the acknowledgment of a certain 'empirical opacity1 with respect to interpersonal 
comparisons gave rise to two rather distinct attitudes, represented here by Robbins and Jevons's 
statements. In the case of Jevons this has implied an abandonment of ethical concerns as hopeless, 
whereas in the case o f Robbins it has issued a recommendation that economists should not meddle 
in value judgments, and ought, in economics, to  remain attached to judgments of verifiable facts 
alone This latter seems also to be Arrow’s view, which he spells out in the context of his essay 
on 'interpersonal ordinal comparisons';
if your satisfaction depends on some inner qualities that I do not possess, then I 
really have not had the experience which will enable me to judge the satisfaction 
one would derive from that quality in association with some distribution of goods. 
Hence my judgment has a probability element in it and therefore will not agree 
with your judgment. But it is essential to the present construction that the 
[interpersonal] comparisons (...) be the same (...)(Arrow,1984:160)
Addressing mainly the former contention, as a political and moral philosopher John Rawls states 
that this kind o f skepticism concerning IC is disputable:
skepticism about interpersonal comparisons is often based on questionable views: 
for example, that the intensity o f pleasure or of the enjoyment which indicates 
well-being is the intensity o f the pure sensation; and that while the intensity of 
such sensations can be experienced and known by the subject, it is impossible for 
others to know it or to infer it with reasonable certainty. Both these contentions 
seem wrong. Indeed, the second is simply part of a skepticism about the existence 
o f other minds, unless it is shown why judgments o f well-being present special 
problems which cannot be overcome. (Rawls, 1971:91)
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Accordingly, this does not rule out the study o f other foundations for these judgments, and the 
motivation might well be the fact that people make IC daily. Of course, as Rawls has pointed out, 
these 'daily IC do not necessarily have a sound basis:
Simply because we do in fact make what we call interpersonal comparisons of 
well-being does not mean that we understand the basis of these comparisons or 
that we should accept them as sound. To settle these matters we need to give an 
account of these judgments, to set out the criteria that underlie them.(ibidem:90)
John Harsanyi, in turn, rejects the hedonic approach to utility and takes the view that interpersonal 
comparisons of preferences can meaningfully be made on the way to the social preferences, by an 
ideal observer, a theoretically constructed standpoint. This device would restore the consistency 
of the social utility on the basis of sound moral arguments, so he claims. It is to these arguments 
that we now turn.
C hapter 5
ORDER AS JUSTICE (T):
JOHN IIARSANYI'S RULE-UTILITARIANISM
1. Introduction
According to the argument developed in the previous chapter, a well accomplished view o f social 
order in rational parametric-public terms would require a full articulation of the question of 
interpersonal comparisons (IC). That is to say, according to the undertaking in cell II, in order to 
conceive o f the social order as a satisfactory aggregation of individuals’ preferences over 
alternative social states it is necessary to provide a proper view o f IC.
Harsanyi's rule-utilitarian view provides one such an articulation. In particular, he produces a 
justification o f the IC entailed in a social state wholly in terms o f a specific intrapersonal 
comparisons process undergone by a rational individual. In other words, towards the construction 
of a social state from individual preferences people are to be compared in a way they would 
individually agree, were they to undertake the appropriate hypothetical reasoning process.
In this chapter, Harsanyi's version o f the utilitarian principle as a ’principle of justice*, o f the 
justifiable IC, is examined. This principle essentially says that in order to construct social 
preferences people should be assessed equally after their preferences have been established and 
compared in a proper way. Harsanyi argues that the utilitarian principle is the result o f the 
reasoning process to a principle of justice undergone by any rational individual under appropriate 
hypothetical conditions. Towards the end o f  reducing the interpersonal dimension into the 
intrapersonal, the question of'order as justice' is reduced into the question of individual rational 
choice under risky or uncertain circumstances.
This approach, therefore, provides a very reductionist view o f  the social order in the sense that 
this latter is understood in terms of individual rationality alone. The social order is, then, built up 
in terms of an aggregate or social utility, which is the weighted sum o f  individuals' preferences, 
where the weights are assigned by an ideal or sympathetic observer and the individual preferences
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are properly calibrated Furthermore, society's institutions are to perform so as to maximize that 
aggregate
In section 2, the utilitarian principle is presented here under two versions, the veil of ignorance 
argument and the axiomatic Bayesian argument- Some of the axioms o f this latter are discussed 
in later sections, along the following lines.
The knowledge assumptions regarding the individual utilities as well as the possibility o f 
interpersonal comparisons are inspected in sections 3 and 4, respectively. It is remarked, in section 
3, that 'preference autonomy' relies heavily upon a theoretical reason, complementing the 
instrumental role o f rationality with some 'truth' achieved through theoretical means It is also 
argued, in section 4, that the proposed IC view rests importantly on the premise that people's 
thought processes tend to converge to an objective standard in a particular way. Section 5 reacts 
to the proposed link between uncertainty or risk and moral reasoning in the context of the 
Harsanyian defense of the utilitarian principle. This section indicates that the two versions o f the 
utilitarian principle presented by Harsanyi are very closely connected.
2. H arsanyi's utilitarian theorem
According to the classical Benthamite utilitarian precept, society should maximize the happiness 
of its members, or should seek the 'greatest happiness o f the greatest number1. Under the 'total 
utility1 approach this is translated into the rule of maximization o f social utility, utility meaning a 
measure o f the hedonic substance which society is supposed to maximize. A modem version o f 
the old canon states that society should try to maximize its average utility.
Though the two definitions are mathematically equivalent, they may, however, produce different 
policy recommendations whenever the population is not held constant.1 What is more, the updated 
version o f the utilitarian principle takes utility not as a measure o f the net balance of pleasure and
1 Cf. Harsanyi (1982), p.46.
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pain but as a mere mathematical representation o f people's preferences, following Pareto and 
Hicks’s contributions to modem utility theory.2
As far as modem economics is concerned, the shift from happiness to revealed preferences has 
essentially meant that the theory is freed from the subjectivist burden involved in its hedonist 
psychology and introspection. Accordingly, it acquires a more empirical content, for 'people's 
preferences are revealed by their publicly observable behavior'.3 People reveal their preferences 
through their choices. Therefore, a rational economic agent is only required to observe some 
consistency conditions when mapping his preferences, for his behavior to have economic meaning, 
and hence to be representable by a utility function.
Harsanyi believes, however, that additional more stringent conditions than the standard revealed 
preferences approach are required o f an individual when it comes to welfare and ethical 
considerations. We need then to map the 'social preferences', and indeed to give them meaning, 
starting from the preferences of the individuals. What preferences should we consider? What are 
the conditions we should impose on them?
According to Harsanyi, ethics is primarily a branch of'the general theory of human behavior'. It 
is concerned with rational behavior towards a particular end, as in 'a theory of rational behavior 
in the service of the common interests o f society as a whole’.4 The implication, he contends, is that 
as far as ethics is concerned 'the secondary definition o f rationality is in terms o f maximizing the 
average utility level o f all individuals in the society1.5 Why so? Let us follow Harsanyi's argument 
towards that end.
In his 1982 article, Harsanyi presents his theory of morality as a branch of the general theory of 
rational behavior by postulating it in terms o f a  theory of the rationality of our moral judgments.
2 C f Harsanyi ( 1992), p. 1.
3 Cf. Harsanyi (1992), p.2.
4 Cf. Harsanyi (1982), p.43.
5 Cf. Harsanyi (1982), p.44, my emphasis.
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Moral judgments, he says, are those judgments which are expected to achieve certain standards 
of universality and impartiality. In what sense are our moral judgments, thus defined, rational?
First o f all, a moral judgment is a judgment of preference. However, it is a preference of a 'very* 
special kind', it is not expected to reflect the kind of preference we would hold only as rational 
and self-interested persons. In order to achieve the standard of universality or impartiality 
involved in a moral judgment, we would need to impose certain constraints on our preferences.
Even if both an individual's social welfare function and his utility function in a 
sense express his own individual preferences, they must express preferences o f 
different sorts: the former must express what this individual prefers (or rather, 
would prefer) on the basis of impersonal soda! considerations alone, and the latter 
must express what he actually prefers, whether on the basis o f his personal 
interests, or on any other basis The former may be called his 'ethical' preferences, 
the latter his 'subjective' preferences. Only his 'subjective* preferences (which 
defines his utility function) will express his preferences in the full sense of the 
word as they actually are, showing an egoistic attitude in the case of an egoist and 
an altruistic attitude in the case of an altruist. His 'ethical' preferences (which 
define his social welfare function) will, on the other hand, express what can in only 
a qualified sense be called his 'preferences': they will, by definition, express what 
he prefers only in those possibly rare moments when he forces a special impartial 
and impersonal attitude upon himself. (Harsanyi,1980:14)
Note that this does not mean that we are not choosing from a self-interested perspective, as when 
information about the content of our self-interest is missing we could possibly achieve an 
impersonal attitude. In fact, Harsanyi claims, a self-interested perspective with the addition o f 
factual ignorance o f one's identity is condition enough for us to achieve a moral judgement, an 
'impartial' or 'universal' standpoint. As a result, when morally judging a social arrangement, we 
should judge it under the special circumstance o f factual ignorance, which recommends (on behalf 
of our self-interest and for rationality's sake) that we adopt an assumption o f equal probability 
of our occupying any particular position within that particular world.
(...) an individual's preferences satisfy this requirement of impersonality if they 
indicate what social situation he would choose if he did not know what his 
personal position would be in the new situation chosen (and in any o f its 
alternatives) but rather had an equal chance o f obtaining any of the social positions 
existing in this situation, from the highest down to the lowest. (Harsanyi, 1980:14)
This is Harsanyi's equiprobability postulate which he believes to  be enough to guarantee the 
universality of our moral judgments. Harsanyi insists that this is human and humane morality In 
terms of its consequences, this is tantamount to asking individuals to judge among different 
institutional arrangements according to their intrinsic merits. In that context, we expect them to 
recur to their moral preferences as defined, that is, preferences that do not depend on their 
particular roles inside the arrangements they are to judge, preferences formed from behind what 
John Rawls has called a Veil of ignorance1.6
It now becomes clear which particular rational decision-rule is to apply under the circumstances 
of morality, which are circumstances o f uncertainty (real or putative) concerning the individual's 
identity in the social arrangement.
(...) an impersonal choice (preference) of this kind can in a technical sense be 
regarded as a choice between ‘uncertain' prospects, (ibidem)
The individual performing the 'moral choice' will use as his decision-rule the principle o f expected 
utility maximization, which is recommended as a principle o f rational decision making under 
uncertainty, here (in the realm of ethics) as elsewhere (in the realm of decision theory). In 
particular, under the circumstances o f morality which make appeal to the equiprobability model, 
as argued above, an individual i will be rational (in his moral judgments) whenever he chooses or 
judges among different social arrangements that which offers the greatest average utility level, 
W (:
n
W ,= l/n £  Uj
J-l
where the Uj stands for all individual utility levels, and n is the number o f the individuals. (The 
factual assumptions that interpersonal comparisons of utility are meaningful, and that the 
individual utilities are additive, are so far taken for granted).
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61 should add the important difference that Rawls invites other conditions as also relevant to the original position apart 
from what is here called the 'self-interested' perspective. See chapter 6.
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Thus, the utilitarian moral rule of the maximization of social utility is interpreted here as the 
maximization of expected utility, and, in particular along with the equiprobability model, as the 
maximization o f average utility.
Harsanyi (1982) provides two kinds of justification for his utilitarian conclusion, one bearing on 
the Veil of ignorance' assumption (the V-assumption, henceforth) and the other being essentially 
an axiomatic justification.
The first justification argues plainly enough that a moral judgment is a judgement from behind a 
veil of ignorance, for that is the natural deliverance from a personal or self-seeking bias that finds 
support in our common behavior. Without knowledge of our future position, though knowing 
some basic facts about social life and human psychology, it is natural that we place the same 
probability to the event o f our occupying any particular position within a social arrangement when 
judging its relative acceptability. It is true that the full equiprobability assumption is only a fiction, 
but for an individual it can quite closely account for his serious effort to disregard his particular 
position and 'make his choice as if he thought he would have the same probability o f taking the 
place o f any particular individual in the society',7 Harsanyi contends.
The idea o f morality as a rational choice from behind a veil o f  ignorance has been attacked on 
many grounds. For one thing, different people might rationally have different attitudes to the same 
kind o f life, Broome (1991) has argued. For another, Brian Barry has asked,1 why bother to  
identify 'moral'judgments with those judgments made by someone trying to maximize his own 
prospects from behind a veil o f ignorance? With yet another objection, Hammond (1991b) and 
Kelsey (1988) focus on the issue of attitudes to risk, the former arguing against the possibility that 
someone knows the different attitudes to risk that different people entertain, the latter pointing 
out the likely biases that we might expect to encounter in moral reasoning stemming from one's *
7 Cf. Harsanyi (1980), p.46.
* Cf. Broome, op. cit., quoting from B. Barry's Theories o f Justice.
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knowledge of one's own attitude to risk. In summary, there is much controversy surrounding the 
use of the V-assumption 9
Now, one argument in favor of the utilitarian principle seemingly different from the one relying 
upon the V-assumption alone is the so-called axiomatic argument. It recommends the utilitarian 
principle on account o f rationality considerations alone in the context of'moral choices', like the 
decisions concerning 'what the common interests o f society are’.10 What are the demands that 
consistency alone imposes on our moral judgements or preferences for them to be rational? 
According to Harsanyi these are to be found in the von Neumann-Morgenstem utility functions 
and Bayesian rationality.
What is peculiar about these functions that renders them so attractive as far as ethical 
considerations are concerned? Firstly, says Harsanyi, they are a representation o f  one’s rational 
preferences when faced with risky choices; they are estimated in terms o f one’s behavior under
A
We shall later concentrate on Rawls’ criticism of Harsanyi's use of this postulate and his own alternative approach. 
It is worth mentioning here the Rawlsian defense of an alternative decision rule that would emerge from our rational 
choices from behind a veil of ignorance, as well as Harsanyi’s reaction to that. This is the idea of maximin as the 
decision rule to be used by rational individuals in the original position, that is, that under uncertainty as to his own 
identity the individual should choose the action that offers the greatest prospect for the worst outcome. In contrast to 
Rawls, Harsanyi (1973,1980) regards the maxiinin principle as an irrational decision rule in the circumstances of the 
original position. His argument is quite straightforward: to suppose the maximin as the rational principle in the original 
position is equivalent to postulating probability one (or nearly so) to the person occupying the worst position in the 
social arrangement. But why should we? Harsanyi opts, instead, for the principle of expected utility maximization for 
he considers that the individuals are able to assign probabilities to the likelihood of their happening to fall under any 
particular place in the society, and also that, in the absence of information to the contrary, they shall assign equal 
probability to the occurrence of any such event According to Rawls, however, it is not possible that individuals attribute 
objective probabilities to these events for they do not have any empirical evidence supporting these calculations. Rawls 
also argues against the Laplacian principle of msufficient reason that would recommend the equiprobability rule. 
Harsanyi replies that individuals assign aabjective and not objective (empirical) or logical probabilities to the likelihood 
o f these events. For him any rational decision maker, that is someone whose behavior is consistent with 'a few very 
compelling rationality postulates cannot help acting as If he used subjective probabilities. (More precisely, he cannot 
help acting as If he tried to maximize his expected utility, computed on the basis of some set of subjective 
probabilities.)' Cf. Harsanyi (1973, 1980), p.47, author's emphasis. In discussing the choice of a social arrangement 
in the original position, Harsanyi models it as a rational choice under uncertainty, as follows: "What decision rule would 
rational individuals use in the original position in deciding where a given set o f institutions was or was not acceptable 
to them? In the terminology of modem decision theory, the initial position would be a situation of uncertainty because, 
by assumption, the participants would be uncertain about what their personal circumstances would be under any 
particular institutional framework to be agreed upon. There are two schools of thought about the decision rule to be used 
by a rational person under uncertainty. One proposes the maximin principle (...). The other - Bayesian - school of 
thought, which is now dominant, proposes expected utility maximization as decision rule under uncertainty. 
(Harsanyi,) 980:38).
10 Cf. Harsanyi (1982), p.48.
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risk, and, therefore, they are expected to reflect people's attitudes to risk apart from the 
preferences themselves. Secondly, and more significantly, they also can be seen to represent, in 
terms of a cardinal utility measure, he claims, one's assignment of relative weights to the things 
one values in life, 'it express the subjective importance people attach to their various needs and 
interests'.11 According to Harsanyi, this serves as a basis for the priority to be given to these claims 
in a conception o f  justice. In somewhat more technical language, the axiomatical justification o f 
the utilitarian principle goes like this:1 2
Axiom 1: Individual rationality. The personal preferences o f all n individuals 
in society satisfy the Bayesian rationality postulates.
Axiom 2: Rationality of moral preferences. The moral preferences of at least 
one individual, namely, individual i, satisfy the Bayesian rationality postulates.
Axiom 3: Pareto optimality. Suppose that at least one individual j (j = l,...,n) 
personally prefers alternative A to alternative B, and that no individual has an 
opposite personal preference. Then individual i will morally prefer alternative A 
over alternative B.
Commenting on the axioms, Harsanyi adds:
Axiom 3 is a very weak and hardly objectionable moral postulate. Axiom 1 is a 
rather natural rationality requirement. Axiom 2 is an equally natural rationality 
requirement: in trying to decide what the common interests o f society are, we 
should surely follow at least as high standards of rationality as we follow (Axiom 
1) in looking after our own personal interests.
On the way to the utilitarian principle, the argument follows:
Axiom 1 implies that the personal preferences of each individual j (j -l,...,n ) can 
be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstem (=vNM) utility function UJ( 
Axiom 2 implies that the moral preferences of individual i can be represented by 
a social welfare function W,, which mathematically also has the nature of vNM 
utility function. Finally, the three axioms together imply the following theorem:
11 Cf. Harsanyi (1980). In Harsanyi (1982) there is the following statement concerning the 'real' purpose of the vNM 
utility functions: "even though a person's vNM utility is always estimated in terms o f his behavior under risk and 
uncertainty, the real purpose of this estimation is to obtain cardinal-utility measures for die relative personal importance 
he assigns to various economic (and noneconomic) afternatives."(p.53)
12 1 quote from Harsanyi (1982), p.48/49.
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Theorem  T. The social welfare function Wt o f individual i must be of the 
mathematical form:
Wj= ajUj with a>0 for j= l,...,n .
This result can be strengthened by adding a fourth axiom:
Axiom 4: Symmetry. The social-welfare function W, is a symmetric function o f 
all individual utilities. (That is, different individuals should be treated equally.)
Using this axiom, we can conclude that 
Harsanyi then concludes:
the four axioms of the present section make only very weak philosophical 
assumptions. They should appeal to  everybody who believes in Bayesian 
rationality, in Pareto optimality, and in equal treatment o f all individuals. Yet these 
very weak axioms turn out to be sufficient to entail a utilitarian theory o f morality. 
(Harsanyi, 1982:49)
As a result, the common interests of society’ are solved in terms o f a weighed sum of individuals’ 
utilities, where the weights are equal. The practical consequence is that these interests conflate 
into those o f the average individual, that is, with the average utility.
We now proceed to the discussion o f some pieces o f the axiomatic argument .13 In the next two 
sections I turn to the so-called factual or knowledge assumptions on which the utilitarian principle 
thus restated is based, respectively, the knowledge of the individuals' utility functions in section 
3, and the possibility o f interpersonal utility comparisons in section 4. These are crucial 
knowledge assumptions as far as an additive social welfare function is concerned. In section 5, 
I discuss the symmetry axiom in relation to the equiprobability assumption.
Let us turn now to the issue o f the knowledge o f  the individual utility function.
13 For a (borough criticism o f the use of the vNM utility functions to underscore the utilitarian morality, see Hampton 
(1994). As for the Pareto optimality as a ’nataraT requirement, I recall Sen (1970) and Elster's (1982) criticisms, as well 
as Hardin's (1984). The former point out die frailty of a preference approach as a supporter of any view of autonomous 
choices; the latter points out the implicit and controversial distributive impact of die Pareto criterion.
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3. The Knowledge Assumption of Individual Utilities: practical reason in terms of 
theoretical reason
To begin with, Harsanyi's utilitarianism stresses the role o f’preferences' instead of desires in the 
explanation of human rational behavior, as I have already remarked. In particular, he rejects the 
subjectivism implied in the hedonic version of classical utilitarianism and adopts a quite objective 
stance with respect to human motivations.
In a recent work, Harsanyi (1992) clarifies a little further his dissatisfaction with the classical view 
and also the need for expanding utility theory in order to accommodate ethical issues. As a result, 
he works out a preference-based theory of human motivation that includes a detailed normative 
argument for domain-restriction. The grounds for further restrictions on preferences, besides the 
usual consistency requirements, stem from the need to put them on a par with the idea o f a 'social' 
(as opposed to an individual) dimension o f utility. In the following we shall go through Harsanyi's 
initial steps towards the idea of social utility from his peculiar rule-utilitarian perspective.
The starting point is the assumption of'preference autonomy', which states that what is good or 
bad for an individual depends only on his own desires and preferences as these exist a t a 'deep 
level'.
In examining this assumption we should note that the rule-utilitarian standpoint demands that our 
actions be in line with a particular moral rule, applicable to the circumstances, and that this 
particular rule, in turn, be in line with the utilitarian moral rule o f maximization of overall utility 
(or, for that matter, average utility). Therefore, in contradistinction to  'act-utilitarianism', the 
morality of our acts is not to be judged directly in terms of their effect on overall utility. In other 
words, the rule-utilitarian requires strict restrictions on individual preferences in the sense that 
actions are to be judged permissible according to whether they abide by a particular norm (or set 
of norms) applicable to the circumstances, and, through the particular norm, on account o f its 
effects on overall utility.
So, our acts are to be judged against some standard of correctness that makes appeal, suggests 
Harsanyi, to a notion o f what our 'real' or 'true' interests are as well as to what extent these
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interests are genuine For that matter, Harsanyi (19S2) defends the exclusion of'anti-social* 
preferences based on spurious motivations like sadism, envy, resentment and malice: these feelings 
o f people 'cannot claim for a hearing when it comes to defining our concept of social utility .14
As for the 'truth-content' o f our interests, this will become clear as soon as we realize what is 
involved in the shift from desires to preferences in utility theory. Essentially, Harsanyi argues, the 
desires-approach fails to capture the fact that we are 'social creatures', which explains to an 
important extent the corollary fact that we have non-subjective motivations as well. In other 
words, we also have some objective goals, some outside accomplishments besides achieving 
desirable states of mind:
By nature and by choice we are social creatures rather than solitary ones. Perhaps 
this is the deeper reason why we have genuine altruistic concern for other people; 
why we want to make worthwhile contributions to some objectives we share with 
many other people in intellectual, artistic, social and political life; and why our 
interests reach out far beyond our own inner experiences and very much extend 
to states of affairs in the outside world. (As I have already suggested, to pay close 
attention to the outside world is also dearly in our self-interest.) (Harsanyi, 
1992:3/4)
This objectivity usually implicit in a broad preference-approach is strengthened by circumstances 
peculiar to matters o f  welfare and ethics, Harsanyi asserts. This means that in these fields we 
should like to distinguish the 'true' preferences and interests o f a person from his ill-informed or 
badly grounded ones.
in welfare economics and ethics we want to distinguish between those choices o f 
a person that really express his true preferences and his true interests at a deeper 
level, from those choices o f his that fail to do so because they are based on 
incorrect information or on ignorance or neglect o f some important information.
(ibidem: 5/6)
So, whereas generally in economics all we need is some suitable consistency axioms that might 
render our preferences representable by utility functions, in welfare economics and ethics we want 
to  constrain our preferences further, we would also like to  know whether our preferences are 
well-informed. In addition, as we have already mentioned, Harsanyi asserts that we would like
14 Cf. Harsanyi (1982), p.56.
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to consider only those preferences that are genuine, and not spurious such as those springing 
from many forms of compulsive behavior and self-deception. Our welfare or ethical judgments 
should have as their raw material the personal preferences o f individuals but only as far as these 
are informed-preferences (which might be in opposition to the individuals' actual, ill-informed 
preferences) Additionally, they should be genuine preferences. The relation between our informed 
and our actual preferences is as follows:
A person's informed preferences and desires are defined as what his preferences 
and desires would be like under some hypothetical conditions. This of course 
means that they are not directly observable empirical variables as his actual 
preferences and desires are but rather are theoretical constructs, (ibidem:6)
So, in welfare economics and ethics, individual utility functions represent only the 'true' or 
informed-preferences in the above sense:
It seems to me that, at least in welfare economics and ethics, a person's utility 
function should be defined in terms o f his hypothetical informed preferences 
rather than in terms of his actual preferences because some o f  the latter may be 
badly mistaken, (ibidem:6/7)
How do we know the informed-preferences o f  a person? These can be identified as his actual 
preferences as freed from factual errors. All we can do, Harsanyi warns in a footnote, 'is to define 
i's informed-preferences as the preferences he would have if his beliefs about the relevant facts 
were correct as judged by the best information I have about these facts, which of course might 
contain some errors'
When discussing informed preferences with regard to the problem o f  drug-addiction, Harsanyi 
compares our informed preferences or true interests to our well-considered judgments on the 
matter, thus calling attention to the cognitive aspect of our motivations. Indeed, this issue is 
deepened in a brief commentary by Harsanyi on Hume's model o f  human motivation. There 
Harsanyi clarifies the role of reason (in the form o f factual assumptions or well-grounded beliefs) 
in the determination of our motivation, in contrast to the Humean dictum that reason is but the 
servant o f our passions:
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unlike Hume, I assume that our 'passions', i e., our desires and preferences, 
themselves crucially depend on the factual assumptions suggested by our reason. 
It is not the 'activist' nature o f our reason itself that establishes this relationship 
between our reason on the one hand and our desires and preferences on the other 
hand but it is rather the dependence o f the latter two on such factual assumptions, 
(ibidem: 17)
( . . . )
Moreover, whereas Hume wants to restrict our reason to suggesting means to our 
ends, themselves determined by our 'passions', my model assumes that our reason 
not only suggests means to our ends, on the basis o f the instrumentally desirable 
attributes o f  various alternatives, but also suggests ends worth pursuing, on the 
basis o f the intrinsically desirable attributes of these alternatives, (ibidem: 17)
Therefore, in a sense, ’true' preferences are rational ones, and not only instrumentally, as a means 
to produce pleasure, but also intrinsically, as ends in themselves, for they spring from the 
suggestions (the factual assumptions) that reason provides. Here, the normative role o f  
theoretical reason is suggested as a source o f  morality: whenever we disregard something which 
should be valuable to us, reason may indicate that thing to us. But, what should be valuable to us? 
Harsanyi, following Parfit, suggests a list o f  such things, that are our 'natural desires'.15
In addition, preferences express a view of our personal priorities when it comes to the satisfaction 
of these desires. So, the preferences-account may capture the fact that our preferences, actual and 
informed, vary a great deal among different people (although the basic desires are nearly the 
same):
Their preferences may be very different between alternative ways of satisfying the 
same basic desires. For instance, they may prefer very different jobs. Moreover, 
they may have very different priorities in satisfying different basic desires. Thus, 
they may have different priorities in dividing their time between their job and their 
family, (ibidem:24)
15 Cf. Harsanyi (1992), there follows a list o f our basic desires ('even though with considerable interpersonal variation 
in intensity): "desire for material comfort and for physical and economic security; for freedom to control their own lives; 
for having good health; for jobs suitable to their personal abilities and personal interests; for further developing their 
abilities; for deep personal relations in mutual love, in marriage and in true friendship; for having children and for being 
a good parent; for knowledge and for imArstanding the world and their own place in the world; for enjoyment of beauty 
in nature aod in art; for having access to the ordinary pleasures of human life; for worthwhile accomplishments of some 
kind; and for making their own behavior consistent with their basic moral values." On reflection, are these basic desires 
not a set of values to some extent? Suppose they are not, then, the role of reason in indicating them to our 'will' is 
somehow impossible to fulfill.
165
That there are some such substantive goods intrinsically valuable to human beings is a 
consequence o f the fact that we all share a common human nature and common biological and 
psychological needs. However, we also have distinct personal attitudes towards those goods 
The preference approach can cope with both aspects. It gives room for a theoretical reason to 
suggest what our ends should be, in accordance with our ultimate natural ends. It is also sensitive 
to the different priorities reflecting different personal attitudes o f people when trying to satisfy the 
same natural ends. Likely constraints embodied in this approach are, on the one hand, reason itself 
understood as a capacity o f revealing the true connections between one’s personal ends and one’s 
ultimate (natural) ends, on the other hand, the consistency requirements for rational preferences 
as dictated by the canons of rational choice theory.
Harsanyi contends that in the end, we may evaluate a person's choices and preferences with the 
aid o f the informed-preferences approach, as well as the norms o f morality that specify other 
people's morally protected interests as these latter are dictated by rule-utilitarianism. These norms 
would eventually recommend an action on the ground of its impact over social utility.
To establish what one person's informed-preferences are we have to contrast his actual 
preferences with those o f other knowledgeable people:
suppose that most knowledgeable people assign a high utility to some benefit A 
because they know from personal experience or from what they have learned 
about other people's experiences that A tends to add a lot o f extra satisfaction 
to one's life. Yet, a particular individual seems to have no interest at all in 
obtaining A. Then, it will be a reasonable assumption that if he were better 
informed then he would likewise assign a high utility to A, more or less within the 
same range as other people do - except if he has some special disability 
preventing him from taking full advantage of this benefit A. (For example, some 
people may have special psychological difficulties in making friends and in 
retaining them over any length o f time. Other may be unable to  enjoy some o f the 
greatest works o f world literature for lack of education, and so on.) (ibidem: 30, 
my emphasis)
In this passage Harsanyi sets down some grounds for paternalism, as proper education and 
therapy are invoked as mechanisms for the correction of mistaken factual assumptions. We also 
have a hint of how these assumptions are inductively formed, i.e. from (some) people’s direct or
166
indirect experience. However, what is missing is a view of how these inferences relate to  th e  
supposed objective or true belief.
In conclusion, a distinct view of preferences than the 'revealed preferences* approach is undertaken 
here. The 'revealed preferences' approach has vindicated the dismissal of the 'desires account' on 
the heuristic basis that a theory o f what motivates an agent is not really necessary, it is indeed 
costly in 'heuristic currency', as far as the explanation o f  economic behavior is concerned. The 
Harsanyian informed-preferences approach builds, instead, upon the desires approach. It tries to  
say something about 'rational' desires as well as 'true* or 'rational* preferences; it ultimately accepts 
that there is some basic psychological state we want to foster and it only adds a 'social' dimension 
to our search for satisfaction. This 'social' dimension, however, is given as the assumption o f  a  
common nature and psychology which all human beings share, and which may be best known in 
the experience o f some knowledgeable people. A view o f how these experiences relate to o u r 
common nature and psychology and therefore how we come to recognize the truth-content o f ou r 
preferences, although crucial, is however, absent.
4. The Knowledge Assumption of Interpersonal Comparisons
Apart from the possibility of knowing someone's informed-preferences, and thus granting an 
access to that person's utility function, a rule utilitarian would want to establish the possibility o f  
making meaningful interpersonal comparisons o f such utilities, for this is a crucial assumption as 
far as an additive social utility function and the utilitarian principle are concerned. That is, we can 
only add the utility functions of different people, therefore forming a social utility or social welfare 
function, if these functions are commensurable.
To begin with, according to Harsanyi, we cannot avoid making interpersonal comparisons 'if we 
want to make our moral decisions in a responsible manner4.16 He goes on to state that making an 
interpersonal comparison 'between the utility levels of two individuals i and j  amounts to  asking
16 Cf. Harsanyi (1992), p.31.
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the question how much satisfaction each of them derives from his own objective position, given 
his own preferences and, more generally, given his own personal attitudes'.17
Indeed, the possibility o f interpersonal comparisons of utility turns, first of all, on the ability to 
decompose the individuals' utility functions into two distinct sets, namely, the set of objective 
positions (the 'substantive goods', economic or otherwise) and the set of personal attitudes 
(biologically and biographically determined). It also depends on the strong assumption that these 
distinct personal attitudes may be incorporated by someone going through the appropriate thought 
experiment. And finally, it depends on there being an appropriate standpoint from which to 
compare the different levels of satisfaction in an adequate way.
Harsanyi (1992) suggests that there are two different perspectives that could be followed in 
making these comparisons. These are the third-person perspective and the first-person 
perspective.
According to the third-person perspective, we would want to infer the individuals' satisfaction 
levels from the laws of human psychology, and from a knowledge o f  each individual's extended 
alternative, that is, his pairs o f objective positions and personal attitudes. Thus, in a 1973 
article,1* Harsanyi proposes the following justification for interpersonal utility comparisons:
the ultimate logical basis for interpersonal comparisons (...) lies in the postulate 
that the preferences and utility functions of all hum an individuals are 
governed by the same basic psychological laws. My utility function may be very 
different from yours. But, since both o f  our utility functions are governed by the 
same basic psychological laws, if I had your personal characteristics - and, in 
particular, if I had your biological inheritance and had your life history behind me - 
then presumably I would now have a utility function exactly like yours. This 
means that any interpersonal comparison I may try to make between your present 
utility level and my own, reduces to an intra-personal utility comparison between 
the utility level I  myself do now enjoy, and the utility level I myself would enjoy 
under certain hypothetical conditions namely if I were placed in your physical, 
economic, and social position, and also had my own biological and biographical 
background replaced by yours. *1
17 Cf. ibidem, p.31.
11 Reprinted in Harsanyi (1980).
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This means that interpersonal utility comparisons have a completely specific 
theoretical meaning, in the sense that, 'under ideal conditions', i.e., if we had full 
knowledge o f the psychological laws governing people’s preferences and their 
utility functions, and also had sufficient information about other people's personal 
characteristics, then we could make perfectly error-free interpersonal utility 
comparisons. (Harsanyi, 1973,1980:50/51 )
Harsanyi argues that this possibility has its shortcomings. In particular, the fact that 'our 
understanding of these psychological laws is far from being sufficient for doing so'.19
He goes on to suggest the first-person perspective:
we must use an alternative approach by taking a first-person perspective and by 
trying to achieve an empathetic understanding o f what it may be like to be in 
either individual’s objective position with the relevant individual's own personal 
attitudes Moreover, in keeping with this first-person perspective, I have also 
suggested that each of us should ask himself whether we ourselves would prefer 
to be faced with the extended alternative (A^PJ [for the objective positions and 
personal attitudes, respectively] or with the extended alternative (Aj,Pj). I have 
argued that in deciding which way our own preference would go between these 
tw o extended alternatives, we should concentrate on these two alternatives 
themselves, and should try to abstract from our own personal attitudes as much 
as we can. (ibidem: 31/3 2)
As for the possibility o f success in such undertaking, Harsanyi warns:
O f course, I have realized that we can never get rid completely of our personal 
biases in making interpersonal comparisons o f utility, but have been convinced that 
we can go a long way in doing so if  we really try. (ibidem: 32)
Still, some factual evidence seems to lend support to the possibility of meaningful interpersonal 
comparisons:
When different people make interpersonal comparisons o f utility between the same 
two individuals or between the same two social groups, they may perhaps arrive 
at somewhat different conclusions, but most of the time their conclusions will be
19 Cf. Harsanyi (1992), p.31.
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close enough to show that making such comparisons is not an altogether hopeless 
undertaking. (ibidem:33)20
However, it may be contended that there is no clear-cut conceptual distinction between the first- 
person and the third-person perspectives, for the third person perspective actually invites us, first- 
persons, to take up the standpoint o f an external ideal observer (Harsanyi's terms). That we 
cannot eventually fully succeed in achieving this standpoint is but an inevitable consequence of 
our actual limited knowledge, a state of affairs, by the way, that could be improved upon, he 
seems to believe. Besides, he asserts, there is plenty of evidence for agreement on the side of 
competent observers in such matters.
Binmore (1994), however, insists that we look at Harsanyi's contribution as twofold: on the one 
hand, Harsanyi lends support to the conception of an ideal observer whose interpersonal 
comparisons stem from a sympathetic understanding of everyone's positions; on the other hand, 
a later Harsanyi seems to stress a more inductive empathetic understanding, to which Binmore 
is frankly sympathetic.
The ideal-observer perspective is akin to what has been known as the Harsanyi doctrine', after 
Aumann's (1987) suggestion. This is the sympathetical ideal carried to  perfection:
if Peter had Paul's biological makeup, had Paul's life history behind him, and were 
currently subjected to Paul's environmental influences, then he would presumably 
have the same personal preferences as Paul, (cited in Binmore, 1994:61, quoted 
from Harsanyi)
Therefore, the ideal observer, being capable of performing such exchanges, appears as the 
aggregative procedure through which personal preferences are put together in a proper way in 
order to generate social preferences. Putting it somewhat differently, the social utility function is
20 A possible way to achieving such comparisons is suggested with the use of Charles Taylor's theory of sympathetic 
understanding of the values o f a foreign culture: "Taylor suggests that we must give a sympathetic hearing to these 
foreign values, retaining our owu old values as much as we feel reasonable to do, perhaps with appropriate 
modifications, but being also willing to revise our own values in the light of these foreign values whenever this seems 
to be the proper course to take. By foDowmg this approach, in the end we may achieve a broader point of view that does 
justice both to our own values and to those of the foreign culture we are trying to onderstand. In trying to understand 
another person's attitudes and values, we must follow a similar approach." (ibidem:32/33)
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the utility function o f an ideal observer, whose preferences are an aggregate o f  the individuals' 
preferences in the society. He produces the scale on which everyone's utility functions are 
compared, for he knows and expresses the *true' conversion ratios between the various individuals' 
utility scales. In this way, the interpersonal comparisons are solved as the intrapersonal 
comparisons of a rational individual after having performed the sympathetic experiment o f putting 
himself in everyone else's shoes
The ideal observer can then be any rational and well-informed individual:
a rational individual will try to base his social welfare function on the true' 
conversion ratios between the various individuals' utility units (i.e., on the 
conversion ratios that would presumably be used by observers who had full 
information about these individuals' personal characteristics and about the general 
psychological laws governing human behavior). But if he does not have enough 
information to ascertain these 'true' conversion ratios, then he will use his best 
estimates o f the latter. (Binmore,1994:62)
That a rational individual will converge when assessing his situation to the individuals actually 
happening to fall under the various positions in the social arrangement will only happen if we 
adhere to an assumption o f convergence o f  thought processes, Binmore warns. But why should 
we?
If a person's state  of mind is understood to include each nuance of attitude and 
shade of opinion, then it is surely impossible for one person ever to be certain o f 
the state o f mind with which another person approaches a problem. 
(Binmore,1994:213)
Additionally, we cannot be certain whether a particular small difference is irrelevant or instead 
may render someone's thought process quite unpredictable.
A more convincing 'non-teleological' view o f  interpersonal comparisons, according to Binmore, 
would be based on the possibility o f em pathetic (the first-person perspective) rather than 
sympathetic preferences. This is also justified by the work o f Harsanyi, he points out. It is the 
view that
to make sense o f comparisons of utility across individuals, it is necessary to go 
beyond the personal preferences (...) One also needs to take account o f the 
empathetic preferences (...), the 'extended sympathy preferences’, (ibidem:283)
It will be helpful to distinguish between sympathy and empathy. In the sympathy approach, 
Binmore argues, a person happens to identify so strongly with another that he is unable to 
separate his interests from that person's. In the more appealing empathetic case, he contends, a 
person may still identify with another without losing sight o f his own preferences, that is, he does 
not cease to separate his own preferences from the others'. This latter kind of identification is 
more cogent in Binmore's view.
Besides, when making fairness judgments, he adds, we need more than empathetic identification; 
we also need to develop empathetic preferences. 'Eve must be able to  say how much better or 
worse she feels when identifying with Adam than when identifying with herself. In order for Eve 
to  do so she must be equipped with empathetic preferences: '1 am expressing an empathetic 
preference', says Binmore, 'when I say that I would rather be Eve eating an apple than Adam 
wearing a fig leave'.21
Suppose, as Binmore suggests, that some individual i is morally evaluating a social arrangement 
C. Since he does not know whether he will be Eve or Adam within this arrangement, according 
to Harsanyi he should follow the equiprobability model and assign equal probabilities to these two 
events. He has then two possible outcomes consisting of the outcomes associated with Eve's and 
Adam's positions in such a social arrangement, each available with probability 1/2. His situation 
can be represented as an expected von Neumann and Morgenstem utility function:
W i(C )-l/2 { v l( C ^ )  + vt(C,E)},
where vj(CA) stands for the utility individual i associates to his being Adam in the social contract 
C, and v,(C,E) stands for the utility he assigns to his being Eve in C.
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21 Cf. Binmore (1994), p.290.
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There is nothing to guarantee that people will arrive at the same empathetic preferences, which 
is a condition we would like to see met. So, Binmore asks, under what conditions are these value 
judgments to be the same for everybody in the society? He himself sides with a view that social 
evolution will tend to produce an agreement in these judgments.22
Harsanyi, however, states that a rough agreement is already in existence. However, if  he insists 
on this line, he will miss the distance between this fact and the norm of morality he has been 
cautiously trying to construct: ought what exists to exist? In other words, should the agreement 
that exists exist, and if so, then why? On closer inspection, Harsanyi lets these empirical 
judgements be made by competent observers and he believes that they would agree on a scale to 
be used for comparisons. But, again, why take any such agreement as evidence of 'truth* (or 
convergence to ’truth') about interpersonal comparisons?
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Summing up what we have arrived at so far, a ’sympathetic' approach sticks to a view that 
interpersonal comparisons are possible thanks to the so-called Harsanyi doctrine or, in his own 
words, the 'similarity postulate'.23 The meaningful IC are those arrived at through the standpoint 
o f an ideal observer. The similarity postulate can be restated as a view that t hought processes are 
convergent, that is, placed in the same situation people will reason in the same way therefore 
leading to the same results. In addition, in morally assessing a social arrangement, people are 
taken to form their sympathetic preferences from behind a veil o f ignorance. So, apart from being 
thought to come up with the same interpersonal comparisons, people are supposed to abide by 
the equiprobability model which asserts that under uncertainty (or ignorance) of their actual 
identities people assign the same probability o f  their happening to occupy any of the possibly
22 On this interpretation, it seems to me, we have a mixing between the utilitarian and the evolutionary approaches 
where the overall happiness emerges as an unpredicted consequence of an individual rational choice under uncertainty. 
We may. however, ask: how can anyone know that in advance?
Cf. Harsanyi (1982); he explains his ’similarity postulate' in terms of imaginative sympathy: 'We imagine ourselves 
to be in the shoes of another person, and ask ourselves the question. If I were now really in hla position, and had his 
taste, his education, his social background, his cultural values, and his psychological make-up, then what would now 
be my preferences between various alternatives, and how much satisfaction or dissatisfaction would I derive from any 
given alternative? (An 'alternative' here stands for a given bundle of economic commodities plus a given position with 
respect to various noneconomic variables, such as health, social status, job situation, family situation, etc.). In other 
words, any interpersonal utility comparison is based on what I will call the sim ilarity postulate, to be defined as the 
assumption that, once proper allowances have been made for the empirically given differences in taste, education, etc., 
between me and another person, then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological reactions to any 
given alternative will be otherwise much the same.'(p.50)
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existing positions within a social arrangement. The 'sympathy* view bears on the postulates of 
Harsanyi doctrine and of equiprobability, the former providing grounds for interpersonal 
comparisons, and the latter translating the utilitarian moral principle of'maximization of social 
utility'1, into the 'maximization of mean utility'. Two over strong assumptions of the argument 
deserve mention: that thought processes are convergent, and that under uncertainty' people tend 
to assign equal probability to the various events.
An 'empathetic* perspective, on the other hand, starts from an assumption that people are capable 
of performing empathetic identification and forming empathetic preferences, which though not 
perfectly identical, tend in practice to be close enough to provide a justification for the utilitarian 
principle. It does not turn, at least directly, on the Harsanyi doctrine, but still keeps the 
equiprobability postulate. Still, in this case, how can we know whether the actual intersubjective 
agreement is correct? We lack an objective standard, which seems to be necessary if we want to 
utter 'ought-statements', not derived from 'is-statements', alone. Actually, this objective standpoint 
is sometimes identified with that o f a competent observer, where the meaningful IC are those 
arrived at by some 'more knowledgeable people'. Again, a view of how the knowledge held by 
those people relates to the truth-content of 1C is lacking.
In view of the preceding, the two approaches do not appear that different, revealing instead a 
common way o f dealing with 'mistaken factual assumptions.' The empathetic approach may be 
seen as a special case o f the more general rule (worked out by supporters of the Harsanyi 
doctrine, i.e., Aumann (1976)24) that with different information people end up with different 
beliefs; these beliefs would be the same were people to be fed the same information. They would 
then think in precisely the same way. With this in mind, empathy seems to be the best proxy for 
sympathy.
24 Refer to chapter 3, on game theory, where 1 discuss the Harsanyi doctrine.
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5. The equiprobability model, the principle of insufficient reason and the symmetry am ong  
people
We now turn to Harsanyi's proposed relation between his equiprobability postulate, the principle 
o f insufficient reason, and the symmetry axiom. It will emerge that the utilitarian morality is not 
so much firmly based upon an axiomatic for rational choices as upon a rather badly argued moral 
assumption.
The idea that 'equal probabilities should be assigned to different events unless some reason can 
be found for distinguishing between them,25is usually credited to  Pierre Laplace's 1713 work. 
However, it actually goes back to a work by Jacob Bernoulli (1654-1705) the first formulation 
of the principle of insufficient reason (IR-principle), as Luce and Raiffa (L&R) report. It runs like
this:
if there is no evidence leading one to believe that one event from an exhaustive set 
of mutually exclusive events is more likely to occur than another, then the events 
should be judged equally probable. (Luce and Raiffa,1957,1964:284)
The vagueness of this definition has given rise to a number of qualifications, but, L&R argue, 
these have not settled three important difficulties: one concerning the listing o f  the states, for 
there will be in numerous cases the possibility of different descriptions of the states o f  nature; 
another, which is connected to the former, referring to the meaning o f  equally likely, for it is not 
independent o f the enumeration of the states itsel£ therefore implying a circularity in the criterion; 
a third relating to the difficulty of enumerating the states when 'there are an infinite set o f pertinent 
states of nature'.* 26
In spite of these analytical difficulties, the IR-principle appears to be the reasoning supporting the 
Harsanyian equiprobability postulate. And this, in turn, is to be given an ethical connotation. To 
begin with, how can this postulate, whose logical roots in the IR-principle are quite clear, be given 
an ethical meaning? Let us quote Harsanyi in search for clarification:
23 Cf. Binmore (1994), p.305.
26 Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957,1964), p.285. O f coarse, as Alan Kinnan pointed out to me, equal probabilities may be 
meaningful over an infinite non-countable set, as for example the unit interval. However, the objection raised by L&R 
seems to be sound when it comes to an indefinite se t
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My equiprobability assumption obviously can be regarded as an application of the 
principle of indifference [the Laplacian principle]. But it also has another possible 
interpretation. It may be regarded as an expression o f the purely moral principle 
that, in making basic moral value judgments, we must give the same a priori 
weight to the interests of all members o f the society (Harsanyi, 1980:63,fnl0)
Being proposed in this way as a principle that by attributing equal probabilities (the uniform 
probability argument) to the events called 'personal* or 'social positions', thereby showing equal 
respect for persons and positions (the symmetry argument), the utilitarian principle emerges as 
the humanistic moral code par excellence:
Moral philosophy can point out the fact of fundamental importance that in 
ultimate analysis all non-humanistic codes of behavior are merely expressions of 
contingent personal preferences - though possibly of very disinterested preferences 
• on the part of the people adopting these codes: whereas the code of impartially 
sympathetic humanism is the only one which by definition gives the same equal 
weight to the preferences o f any other person as well, (This last statement, of 
course, presupposes the possibility o f making operationally meaningful 
interpersonal utility comparisons.) (Harsanyi, 1958,1980:35)
The defense of the equiprobability model, then, seems to rely on the warrant this model yields as 
to the non-personal character o f one's moral judgments; to assume equal probabilities is to provide 
a mechanism whereby personal considerations would play no relevant role in a person's 
assessment of a social arrangement. Moreover, this is supposed to be tantamount to securing 
different people and positions an equal treatment. The argument is twofold: on the one hand, we 
want an impartial judgment about the relative merits of different social arrangements, one that 
secures equal treatment to everyone's preferences; on the other hand, we recognize that this 
achievement is only successful in the event that we neutralize the impact of'contingent personal 
preferences'. Is this enough on the way to 'impartiality?
There are, one might object, other relevant considerations on the way to  impartiality, beside the 
neutralization o f personal preferences. To begin with, we might similarly want to constrain 
'altruism'.27 We may want to limit the values o f  people not just their interests, that is to say, the
27 See chapter 1, for some problematic issues related to altruism.
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different personal views of the common interests and good o f society, to some standard o f 
universality (as in Rawls) Certainly, Harsanyi makes room for genuine altruism when he includes 
objective outside accomplishments and values as possible objects of people's 'personal* (as 
opposed to 'moral') preferences, so that what a person wants may be not only selfish pleasure but 
also the pleasure or satisfaction that comes to other people. In this sense, the neutralization of 
personal preferences would also encompass altruism.
Still, one may also want to accommodate a concern about 'equality' into one's moral reasoning. 
For that matter, the IR-principle is claimed to make an appeal to one's concern about equality, for 
it recommends that equal weights be assigned to the preferences o f everyone in the Harsanyian 
interpretation. In this way, symmetry would stand for equality. On reflection, however, equal 
probabilities are not applied to different people's lives as they themselves see these lives; these 
were already calibrated by a view of what their well-informed and genuine preferences should be 
before probabilities are assigned to them. Of course, we might conceive o f people's agreeing with 
the calibration once sound objective arguments for it are offered; on this matter, however, there 
remains the pending problem of a unsatisfactorily grounded intersubjective agreement as discussed 
in section 3. Moreover, the additive form of the utilitarian principle presupposes that interpersonal 
comparisons have already been made so that the individuals' utility functions were already given 
different weights from the ideal observer's scale, a point we have pursued in section 4. Therefore, 
the assignment of equal weights, in the end, is equivalent to stating that social utility is a mere sum 
o f people's utility functions as corrected by appropriate factual assumptions and cleaned of 
spurious motivations as well as put on a par by the ideal observer's IC. Turning to our previous 
remarks on the difficulties in handling the principle of insufficient reason, the problems o f listing' 
and 'giving meaning' to the 'equally likely' condition stand out strikingly here. The equiprobability 
model cannot be claimed to express our genuine concern for equality: the alternatives themselves 
(the individual utility functions and their weights) were listed' so as to match one's prior 
conception o f what should be 'equally likely*.
As a final remark, it is worth noticing that the IR-principle gives 'Harsanyi rule-utilitarianism’ a 
different flavor than the pure subjectivist probability view he claims to  adopt. To be sure, Harsanyi
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seems to see the logical probabilities as a special case o f the broader subjective probabilities 
framework: logical probabilities are subjective probabilities governed by a principle of symmetry:
(...)by logical probabilities I mean subjective probabilities completely determined 
by symmetry considerations (if appropriate symmetry postulates are added to the 
standard postulates of Bayesian theory)." (ibidem: 63,frill)
In this view, the twin approaches to the utilitarian principle, the V-assumption and the axiomatic, 
are not independent from each other.
6. Conclusion
The utilitarian theorem o f maximization o f social utility has been restated by Harsanyi in terms of 
expected (truly, mean) utility maximization. On different occasions Harsanyi justifies this principle 
in terms of the moral preferences of a rational individual or his social welfare function, where, that 
is, he takes a thoroughly impersonal or impartial stand. The aggregative procedure proposed, 
which seemingly skips Arrow's stylized impossibility, is the ideal observer who is able to know 
the right IC of preferences
The moral preferences expressed in the individual's social welfare function can be known by 
modelling his choice as a rational choice under uncertainty where this uncertainty refers to his 
ignorance (real or putative) regarding the basic qualities and resources that he happens to possess. 
What kinds o f arrangement would the individual favor as a result o f this exercise? He would 
choose the one that offered the greatest average utility, Harsanyi argues. In reality, two arguments 
are given in favor of the utilitarian principle, the V-assumption argument and the axiomatic one.
The argument stemming from the V-assumption runs like this: since the individual does not know 
his position in each possible social state he will be inclined to attribute equal probabilities to his 
falling on each possible position and then choose that social arrangement which offers the 
prospect of greater mean utility. The axiomatic argument deriving from the requirements of 
rational 'moral' choices establishes the utilitarian principle via Bayesian rationality, Pareto 
optimality, plus a symmetry axiom. But, then we learn that the equiprobability argument (the V-
l l  il u . u »
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assumption) is a possible extension o f the axiomatic argument, where logical (equal) probabilities 
are only subjective probabilities complemented with symmetry considerations.
Symmetry', then, is at the core o f the argument It appeals to our equality concerns: people’s 
preferences should be treated equally, Harsanyi declares. Closer inspection however reveals that 
different personal or group preferences had already passed through the riddle o f 'preference 
autonomy' and been given proper weights before they were considered equally. So, the core o f  
the argument shifts to the knowledge assumptions that assume that there are true preferences 
(non-spurious and well-informed) as well as true IC. The argument now becomes either inductive 
or authoritative. Since there is no guarantee that people's ordinary experiences will necessarily 
converge to true propositions as the inductive version wants us to believe, the authoritative 
branch appears more promising. Yet, if we are to let some more knowledgeable people find out 
what is better for us, why bother to have our agreement thus far?
Chapter 6
ORDER AS JUSTICE (II):
JOHN RAWLS* CONTRACTARIANISM
1. Introduction
Our concern in this chapter shall be exclusively with Rawls' view o f social order and the way he 
relates it to a conception of justice. Rawls shall constitute our third example of models of the kind 
suggested in cell II of the matrix shown in chapter 1, where, that is, parametric-rational individuals 
are to choose the social world most to their liking. This, in (early) Rawlsian terms, is translated 
into a constrained individual rational choice o f public principles of justice.
In fact, Rawls portrays the rationality o f individuals choosing principles o f justice in the following
way:
a rational person is thought to  have a coherent set o f preferences between the 
options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further 
his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more o f his desires than less, 
and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed. (A Theory of 
Justice: 1431
Moreover, these individuals are supposed not to have an interest in others' interests. However, 
they are not necessarily narrow egoists, but are endowed with an 'interest of a self. Furthermore, 
individuals are not motivated by strategic considerations, they are not 'concerned to win but to 
get as many points as possible judged by their own system of ends'.1 For our purposes in this Part, 
this suffices to characterize their rationality as parametric.
In addition, it is characteristic of this approach that the individuals are 'theoretically defined 
entities'* 2 in accordance with a peculiar interpretation of the contractarian tradition, thus relying 
little or not at all on any view of human nature. Individuals are seen as constructed viewpoints
'C f. Rawls, 1971,p .145.
2 Cf. Rawls, 1971.
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that owe some consideration to social life, on both instrumental and intrinsic accounts. In relation 
to this, and in contrast to rule-utilitarianism, the role o f  general facts about human behavior is 
circumvented by certain moral conditions one should impose on human choices, in particular 
choice of principles o f justice, to render them justifiable in the eyes of everyone at any time.
The conception of justice that emerges from this morally constrained rational choice should then 
specify not so much the configuration o f a particular social state, but how the society, in the form 
of its major institutions is to assign basic rights and duties, as well as distribute the advantages o f 
social cooperation among its members. It should therefore indicate what social arrangements 
might be considered acceptable.
Rawls attempts to show that proper reasoning (some suitable intrapersonal deliberation) may lead 
to the rejection o f the major contemporary alternative conceptions based on utilitarianism and 
intuitionism, as well as perfectionism, and hopefully reach his conception of'justice as fairness'. 
'Justice as fairness' is simply the view that justice is a matter of proper justification of the choice 
o f principles (which express a certain criterion for interpersonal comparisons) to the widest 
possible audience; it should want to articulate the fair situation for the principles to be chosen.
The Rawlsian principles o f justice are defended with appeal to our considered judgments 'duly 
pruned and adjusted' as well as with the assistance o f the canons o f rational choice, for the choice 
of principles o f justice may also be understood as constrained decision making under uncertainty. 
In addition, a certain Vision' is also advanced by Rawls in support o f  the principles recommended 
by 'justice as fairness'. Some of these perspectives will be pursued in what follows.
Our purpose here is to  examine the way the proposed relation between social unity, justice and 
interpersonal comparisons is worked out throughout significant pieces o f Rawls' work.3 To this
3 Of course, the implicit assumption here is that Rawls' work has undergone substantia] change in recent years. Ever 
since A Theory o f Justice (TJ. henceforth), his major 1971 work, Rawls has not considered his arguments for 'justice 
as fairness' terminated. In the 70s and the 80s he wrote a number of articles and lectures where he qualified in many 
respects his earlier undertaking. In 1993 he eventually published a second tour de force, Political Liberalism (EL 
henceforth), where die new developments of his thinking are put together and an effort to give them unity is undertaken. 
One of the most impressive shifts in his thought concerns the central role that the question of pluralism or 'reasonable 
pluralism' is to play, to the detriment of die emphasis that distributive issues had acquired in the context of the XI* The
(continued...)
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end, the views expressed by Rawls in a number of articles and, specially, in the H  arc pursued as 
they bring to light assorted arguments for that relation
Provisionally, Rawls' view can be summarized thus: a society* is well-ordered when the balance 
o f  reasons' among the individuals that pertain to h have a prior solution in the balance o f  reasons’ 
within a properly defined individual, as far as a rule of adjudication of competing demands among 
citizens in the society is concerned. 'Social order* thus envisioned is a construction that springs 
from another construction which is the individual as a certain 'person', bearing on a certain 
hierarchy of reasons. An intermediary conception is designed to make explicit the constraints that 
this person is to be subjected to when deliberating. We say, then, that a criterion for interpersonal 
comparisons is made dependent upon an intrapersonal deliberation under certain constraints, the 
precedence of a 'moral' person over a bare self3 4 accounts for the possibility of the intrapersonal 
hierarchy of reasons.
From the preceding chapters, it appears that the straightforward understanding of social order in 
terms of rational individuals' motivations, for the normative purpose of designing a criterion for 
social choices, faces a number of difficulties, and has done ever since the Arrow result came to 
light. On the way to a solution, the IC, it has appeared, could not possibly be introduced into the 
analysis without further reflection, in particular because of the special incidence of value
3(...continued)
radical message o fth eJJlo sta lo tasa  consequence of Rawls' looking for« wider basis of consensus to his theoretical 
construction that could encompass the most distant criticisms. The more intellectually tolerant Rawls was then accused 
of relativism, of proposing an unacceptable 'modus vivendi' when he was attempting to articulate the common ground 
of deeply divided (although reasonable) political, religious and philosophical doctrines that compound the mosaic of 
western democratic public culture, whose values at a deeper level his 'justice as fairness' wanted to express On this, 
see Baynes, 1992. What is more, he was also charged with failing in that enterprise for be was oot able to forsake a 
partisan attitude towards that very division (see Kukathas, 1990). As for his distributive message, critics complain dial 
the demands of an overlapping consensus admittedly could be more easily met by the lesser and rather trivii) (at least 
as Rawls himself considers, in the context of the U ) social-justice target of equal basic rights and a social minimum 
rather than die mare stringent difference principle. Cf. Rawls (1993a): "Whether the constitutional essentials covering 
the basic freedoms are satisfied is more or less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and bow these can be 
seen to work in practice. But whether the aims of the principles covering social and economic inequalities are realized 
is far more difficult to ascertain. These matters are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion..."(229) 
And: "(...)freedom of movement and free choice of occupation and a social minimum covering citizens' basic needs 
count as constitutional essentials while the principle of fair opportunity and the difference principle do not."(230). 
However, those who had rejoiced with the way Rawls' argument for the difference principle seemed to have properly 
addressed die question of die impact of arbitrary contingencies (social or whatever) in the distribution of resources in 
society felt justifiably frustrated with his withdrawal. See Baynes (1992).
4 Cf. Rawls (1982), "Social Unity and Primary Goods".
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judgments that seem to be attached to their incorporation. Harsanyi has provided a justification 
and a basis for interpersonal comparisons whose major liability lies in the cognitive assumptions 
adopted. Rawls wants to ground interpersonal comparisons in objective values.5 To this end, he 
deepens the connection between morality and uncertainty in his account of the 'initial situation' 
the individuals face when choosing principles o f justice, as if somehow trying to evoke deeper 
layers that ground their identities as rational individuals - those that should count when it comes 
to selecting principles o f justice for regulating the basic institutions that are to preside their 
cooperation. The implication seems to be that the less we know materially about ourselves, the 
greater the prospect that we find some common grounds with others whom we are compelled by 
circumstances to interact with. Or, putting it differently, the lesser the contingent knowledge we 
have about ourselves, the more we have to rely upon a form of understanding, o f self­
understanding as some objective 'entity*, to  find our way.
I will concentrate on two distinct approaches Rawls has taken to accomplish this latter task, an 
earlier being deductive reasoning properly constrained, and a later one, the articulation o f 
principles that seem to be latent in a public culture. In the course o f our investigation, it has 
emerged, however, that the former argument falls down in the face o f the veil o f ignorance 
restriction, while the latter task falls down in the face of the 'publicity condition', or the extent to 
which we may speak interestingly o f a 'public* reason.
The organization o f the subsequent sections is as follows. In the next section, an overview o f 
'justice as fairness' is offered and special emphasis is given to  the connection between social unity 
and justice. 'Justice as fairness* is presented as proposing a criterion for legitimate interpersonal 
comparisons in terms o f an index of primary goods, which, it is claimed, renders social unity quite 
reliable.
5 I quote here Rawls' statement on the IC issue: "Simply because we do in fact make what we call interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being does not mean that we understand the basis of these comparisons or that we should accept 
diem as sound. To settle these matters we need to give an account of these judgments, to set out the criteria that underlie 
diem For questions of justice we should try to find some objective grounds for these comparisons, ones that men can 
recognize and agree to. At the present time, there appears to be no satisfactory answer to these difficulties from a 
utilitarian point o f view. Therefore it seems that, for die time being at least, the principle of utility makes such heavy 
demands on our ability to estimate die balance of advantages that it defines at best an ambiguous court of appeal for 
questions of justicc."(TJ:90/91)
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Sections 3 and 4 then undertake to explore the connection between interpersonal comparisons and 
intrapersonal deliberation as the Rawlsian arguments suggest, trying to address the question why 
(and which) IC are legitimate. In section 3, the deductive argument of A Theory of Justice for this 
connection is examined, with special attention to the role of ignorance in the devising of the 
principles, where these latter are the outcome of a constrained rational choice under uncertainty 
undertaken by the parties to the agreement. In section 4, a different argument is set out where 
stress is put on a conception of the person, starting from an idea that citizens in a well-ordered 
society view themselves as free and equal moral persons. The ideas of freedom and equality that 
are embedded in our public culture are expressed in the principles, it is then claimed
I conclude, in section 5, with an outline of some of the difficulties with the arguments offered in 
sections 3 and 4, with a view to emphasizing a number of aspects (in particular, the unexpected 
importance of a theoretical reason in the agreement to the principles) that will prove relevant 
when it comes to comparing Part II with the remaining Parts of the thesis
2. Order as Justice: an overview
According to Rawls, the best conception of justice should be judged in terms of its broader 
consequences to social unity, that is, if it fosters the many qualities one wants to see in one's 
community, namely, coordination of everyone's expectations, efficient allocation of community's 
resources, and stability o f the social arrangement. We quote from the first paragraph of the 
Theory:
In the absence o f  a certain measure of agreement on what is just and unjust, it is 
clearly more difficult for individuals to coordinate their plans efficiently in order 
to insure that mutually beneficial arrangements are maintained. Distrust and 
resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act 
in ways they would otherwise avoid. So while the distinctive role of conceptions 
o f  justice is to specify basic rights and duties and to determine the appropriate 
distributive shares, the way in which a conception does this is bound to affect the 
problems o f efficiency, coordination and stability.(.,.) one conception of justice is 
preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable (IT  6)
So, overall consequences matter greatly when it comes to the choice of a conception o f justice. 
However, this does not make Rawls a consequential for though it is obvious that consequences
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do matter, he says,6 one is not forced, simply by agreeing with this proposition into accepting a 
view that what is right is that which maximizes the consequences or *the good', a view typical o f  
consequentialist reasoning. It is of great importance, he argues, to  know and assess the ways in 
which a conception o f justice brings out desirable consequences.
The assumption here seems to be that a conception of justice stands out among the necessary 
conditions for the social unity as the condition of possibility for the other requirements (viz. 
efficiency, coordination and stability) to be fully effective, because it has a certain connection with 
people's motivation to  trustfully adhere to a social arrangement in the first place. We want a 
conception o f justice to  attend to our concerns regarding the way a desired consequence, namely, 
the social arrangement, is brought about.
This latter idea becomes even clearer when one figures out who is the subject o f a conception o f  
justice, namely, the basic structure of society or its major political, economic and social 
institutions. A conception of justice specifies the way the public system of rules embodied in or 
identified with these institutions determine the assignment of rights and duties as well as the 
distribution o f the benefits from social cooperation. The way a conception of justice does this is 
o f fundamental importance for the effectiveness of social unity, claims Rawls. The existence o f  
such a system, he notes, may be responsible for the desirable unintended consequences of the 
interaction o f many individuals (a view, he argues, Adam Smith suggested in the Wealth o f 
Nations by resorting to the image o f an 'invisible hand'), as well as the possibility o f strategic 
interaction to arise among people in society. In this regard, Rawls’ view o f social interaction is not 
at odds with a variety o f social theoretical images o f that interaction, only he devotes himself to
6 In this regard, he notes that all "ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging 
rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." (TJ.30)
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articulate a fundamental premise o f these images.7 Without a well-grounded conception o f justice, 
the desirable consequences of various interactions among individuals would be far less certain.
In this connection, Rawls remarks that 'although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage',
it is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity o f interests. ... A set 
of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements 
which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on 
the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of justice: they 
provide a way o f assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and 
they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens o f social 
cooperation. (TJ.4)
We therefore would like our society to be well-ordered:
a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its 
members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice. (11:4/5, my emphasis)
Which means that
(1) everyone accepts and knows that the other accept the same principles of 
justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally 
known to satisfy these principles. (TJ:5)
That the acceptance of the principles by individuals is common knowledge, as well as the fact that 
they effectively regulate the basic structure of society (and are known to  do so), is made a crucial 
condition for trust. This, in turn, is deemed to be the cement of the social arrangement.
Only Hayek would deny, on epistemological grounds, that this system of rules could be fully articulated. See Part III 
for a detailed exposition of Hayek's general argument. We should, however, also note here a remarkable similarity 
between Rawls and Hayek in terms of the way the former describes the system of rules as a complex system. He says: 
"We may also distinguish between a single rule (or group of rules), an institution (or a major part thereof), and the basic 
structure of the social system as a whole. The reason for doing this is that one or several rules of an arrangement may 
be unjust although the social system as a whole is not. There is the possibility not only that single rules and institutions 
are not by themselves sufficiently important but that within the structure of an institution or social system one apparent 
injustice compensates for another. The whole is less unjust than it would be if it contained but one of the unjust parts. 
Further, it is conceivable that a social system may be unjust even though none o f its institutions are unjust taken 
separately: the injustice is a consequence of how they are combined together into a single system. One institution may 
encourage and appear to justify expectations which are denied or ignored by another."(JJ:57)
We need, then, to find grounds for agreement, the basis for a consensus on the conception of 
justice that could be reliably accepted by everyone in the society, and that could be effective as 
far as its major institutions are concerned.
In this case while man may put forth excessive demands on one another, they 
nevertheless acknowledge a common point o f view from which their claims may 
be adjudicated. (TJ:5)
The nature o f  the agreement is by now clear enough: it refers to the settling down o f  principles 
of justice for the basic structure of society once and for all, principles everyone could understand, 
accept and abide by. The procedure, then, follows the contractarian tradition. In fact, Rawls 
proposes the theory o f  justice as a particular chapter of the theory of rational choice, following 
the steps o f earlier contractarian thinking. 'Justice as Fairness' is then proposed as a particular 
view of justice,
as principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position o f  equality as defining the fundamental terms 
of their association These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they 
specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms o f 
government that can be established. (TJ: 11)
The argument is proposed in terms o f a procedure of 'construction'. It amounts to deriving a 
theoretically constructed well-ordered society from constructed individuals specially 
circumstanced, as the constraints represented in an initial situation are there to suggest.1 The 
features of society, as well as the individuals and their constrained choice, are intuitively selected, 
there is no way to avoid intuition, Rawls declares. However he expects his argument intellectually 
to persuade and also he expects the principles o f justice that are to emerge from the rational 
choice of such individuals to match our considered convictions in reflective equilibrium (they can 
be supported by a comparison between our considered judgments and the practical impact of the 
principles in terms o f the specific policies they would favor).
Bringing the matter closer to home, in his 1982 article, "Social Unity and Primary Goods" (SU, 
henceforth), Rawls explores in a quite explicit manner the connection between justice, social unity
* See "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 1980 (KC, henceforth), for a further development of the 'constructive* 
project.
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and interpersonal comparisons and he notes that justice enables social unity in that it establishes 
a criterion for comparisons between people. It establishes principles for evaluating distributive 
arrangements in terms o f how well they cater to the individuals proper needs. The nature o f  the 
principles are further clarified: we need to discover principles that everyone can accept and that 
reflect a common understanding of what are the legitimate claims as well as the legitimate ways 
of advancing them in society. In contrast to utilitarianism, Rawls claims, an agreement on these 
principles needs only reflect a partial identification between people, enough to support the social 
unity, and not a complete identification as suggested by the idea o f one 'rational good' to be 
pursued, such as happiness.
So, in contractarian terms, we need to set up an enabling initial situation, that is, a state of affairs 
conducive to the terms of a fair agreement. The traditional conception of the state of nature of 
contractarian thinking is, according to Rawls, o f no direct use here, for it is rather a no-agreement 
point, of generalized egoism and, in this sense providing no ways out, if any, to the problem of 
reducing the likely conflicts that one should expect to emerge in such a form of interaction. On 
the other hand, Rawls points out, one should expect as a result of one's reasoning to a conception 
o f justice to consider that this conception be general in form, as well as universal in application, 
that it be a public conception and that it be a 'final court of appeal in practical reasoning'.9 What 
is then the 'appropriate status quo' for these principles to be reached, given these formal 
constraints and the rejection of the early-contractarian 'state of nature?
First of all, one needs to distinguish the so-called 'circumstances o f justice', for much o f the 
answer turns on the way they are tailored. These are the circumstances where principles of justice 
apply and, therefore, characterize the choice problem that individuals would be facing:
the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and 
necessary (...) although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, 
it is typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. (TI: 126)
9 Cf. ILp-135.
1 8 8
Building upon Hume’s definition, the Theory’ selects 'moderate scarcity* as an objective 
circumstance of justice, as well as the subjective circumstance that the parties are 'mutually 
disinterested', in order to characterize the justice-wanting set.
Moderate scarcity means that
While mutually advantageous arrangements are feasible, the benefits they yield fall 
short o f the demands men put forward. (TJ: 127)
Stated in this way, the objective circumstance stresses the fact that any advantageous 
arrangement likely to  spring from an identity o f interests would entail a distributive conflict.
That the parties display mutual disinterest (the subjective circumstance o f justice) means 
essentially that they do not take an interest in each other's interests. Mutual disinterest has two 
meanings It suggests that people are not moved by altruism, for, as Rawls argues, we do not need 
to think o f people as benevolent for justice to be possible. It also suggests that people are not 
envious: they are not made better off by a worsening o f another's situation. They just prefer a  
greater share of the social benefits to a smaller one as long as this improves their expectations 
towards the furtherance o f their system o f ends or conceptions o f  the good.
Having in mind the circumstances o f justice thus described, with a view to choosing commonly 
acceptable principles o f  justice, we want to find the reasonable conditions one should impose on 
anyone’s choice o f principles if we want these principles to meet the above formal conditions 
involved in the very concept of right or in any ethical principle. (And especially if as Rawls does, 
we want the principles to embody some arguably widely acceptable substantive features as well.) 
We also want to know how persons submitted to the subjective circumstances are regarded when 
performing the choice o f  principles, that is, we need a proper description of the motivation o f the 
parties to the agreement. All this amounts to constructing a 'fair initial situation' for the choice o f 
principles, a situation where agreements reached at are considered fair. Rawls calls this situation 
the 'original position', a properly shaped starting point for the original agreement on regulative 
principles for the social cooperation.
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The main features of this position are the Veil of ignorance' assumption and a description o f  the 
choosers as free and equal 'moral persons'. In accordance with the circumstances o f justice, the 
veil of ignorance is to address the issue o f identity-conflict involved in social cooperation. The 
description of the choosers as moral persons is to address the question of the admissible systems 
of ends (as those aiming at the oppression o f others would be ruled out), as well as suggesting 
some (regulative) ends worth pursuing (springing from a sense o f justice of the parties).
The veil of ignorance represents a very important knowledge constraint which is to guarantee that 
the agreement on the principles will not be the result of bargaining over contingently acquired 
natural or social positions; it represents a situation of pure procedural justice.10 1It excludes the 
knowledge of particular facts concerning the parties in the original position, their natural or social 
characteristics, their knowledge o f their conception of the good and their ends, their special 
psychological propensities, etc. The veil does not exclude, however, the knowledge of general 
facts concerning human nature, laws o f human psychology, political affairs and economic theory, 
and the basis of social organization, and, of course, the knowledge o f the circumstances of justice.
The question arises as to why it is necessary to impose such an unrealistic restriction. According 
to Rawls, the veil o f ignorance can be seen as a requirement o f proper reasoning towards a 
conception of justice. This condition would render one's reasoning regarding a conception of 
justice a rational deliberation satisfying certain reasonable restrictions and, accordingly, reaching 
some appropriate conclusions.11 Moreover, he continues to argue that the veil should be regarded 
merely as a device for placing us in a certain perspective, which anyone might adopt at any time. 
Besides, it would insure that an unanimous choice of a conception of justice arises, for any person 
selected at random would choose the same principles. As a consequence, it would successfully 
eliminate arbitrariness in the selection o f the principles whilst generating significant results.12
10 Rawls characterizes a situation of pure procedural justice in contrast to perfect and imperfect procedural justice, in 
the following toms: "pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead 
there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the 
procedure has been properly followed. "(11:86)
11 Cf. I!» P-138.
12 I quote from Rawls: "If the original position is to yield agreements that are just, the parties must be fairly situated 
and treated equally as moral persons. The arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by adjusting the
(continued...)
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In short, the veil o f ignorance ensures that an unanimous, timeless, and unambiguous significant 
conception will be selected.
Still, one might argue whether there is anything to deliberate about after the exclusion o f  
particular knowledge. This question is addressed by the description o f the parties in the original 
position: the parties do not know the particular facts that compound their identities, but they 
know that they have interests they would want to further as best they could. With this in mind, 
as we have seen, Rawls supposes that the parties are rational in the sense familiar to social theory. 
To that, however, he adds two further clauses: that the parties are not motivated by envy, which 
is contrary to rationality for it tends to make everyone worse off, and that they are capable o f a 
sense of justice, and, hence, of complying strictly with the agreements they enter into:
it means that the parties can rely on each other to understand and act in 
accordance with whatever principles are finally agreed to.(...) the parties have a 
capacity for justice in a purely formal sense. (TI: 145)
What interests animate the rational parties, then? Rawls supposes that the parties are ’moral 
persons'. To describe the choosers as moral persons means essentially that the rational and 
mutually disinterested parties that are to reach an agreement are seen as being free and equally 
possessing some moral powers they want to effect. That is to say, they are capable of having ends 
and a conception o f  their good as well as having a sense o f justice that makes them abide by the 
fair agreements they have entered to, and have a (regulative) interest in realizing these powers. 
As a consequence o f  this starting point, different systems o f ends and conceptions o f  the good 
should be seen as equally worthy. Besides, though they have different conceptions of the good, 
the parties recognize that to realize these conceptions they need the cooperation o f  others so that 
they must abide by, and expect others to do so, the fair agreement on principles o f justice that 
they shall eventually reach and which shall enable their cooperation. The sense o f justice ensures 
that the agreement will be strictly complied with. Again, people so defined are understood only 2
I2(...continued)
circumstances of the initial contractual situation. Moreover, if in choosing the principles we required unanimity even 
when there is full information, only a few rather obvious cases could be decided. A conception of justice based on 
unanimity in these circumstances would indeed be weak and trivial. But once knowledge is excluded, the requirement 
o f unanimity is not out o f place and the fact that it can be satisfied is o f great importance. It enables us to say of the 
preferred conception that it represents a genuine reconciliation of interests." (TJ: 141/142)
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in terms of ’capacities' and not as 'actualities', a condition which is warranted by the veil of 
ignorance which prevents people from catching a glimpse o f the content of these 'capacities'.
The question remains what the preferences of these persons could possibly be, what would be the 
rational ones, that is to say the goods (and their ranking) they would prefer to have more than less 
of in the absence of a knowledge of the very content of their particular ends or conception o f their 
good. These are solved by Rawls in terms of social background conditions, o f liberties and 
opportunities, and all-purpose means, things that everyone would prefer to have more than less 
o f regardless o f his particular conception o f the good, for these are things they would need to 
possess in order to realize their interest in furthering their moral powers. These are called the 
'primary goods', and they are ranked by these persons in a certain order of priority which is, in 
turn, reflected in principles of justice and the way they are ordered.
In this regard, Rawls claims that primary goods solve the problem o f  interpersonal comparisons 
o f well-being which has thus far had no utilitarian solution. On this account, he argues, we would 
not need to make reference to any particular or aggregate system o f  desires or preferences in 
order to find a suitable index for comparison. All we need is to establish what is reasonable to 
count as the appropriate claims in questions o f justice, expressing the objective needs of free and 
equal moral persons, in particular, the social background conditions and the all-purpose means 
for any conception of the good to exist and flourish. These goods should emerge from a reflection 
about the needs of free and equal moral persons - capable o f a conception of the good and o f  a 
sense o f justice - and from a recognition o f the regulative primacy over any other consideration 
o f the interest they possess in exercising their moral powers:
this implies a regulative desire to conform the pursuit o f one's good, as well as the 
demands one makes on others, to public principles of justice which all can 
reasonably be expected to accept. (SU: 165)
The primary goods account, in contrast to utilitarianism, Rawls claims, reflects an understanding 
o f the hardship o f comparing the intrinsic value o f different systems o f  ends or ideals o f  happiness. 
A reliable agreement should, instead, concentrate on the preferences o f moral persons in the 
original position. In particular, given their sense o f justice, the citizens in a well-ordered society 
regulated by the principles of justice are assumed to be capable o f moderating their claims in
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consideration of what they have agreed upon as the legitimate claims regarding questions o f  
justice.
So, 'the persons in the original position try to  acknowledge principles which advance their system 
of ends as far as possible'.13 They are moved by an interest 'of a self, not necessarily egoistic, and 
of necessity, not an interest in others' interests. Moreover, in the context of the deep ignorance 
that surrounds their choice, they are moved by a regulative interest of realizing their m oral 
personality, of being a certain kind o f person, a purposeful and responsible one.
In short, the primary goods are the index o f legitimate interpersonal comparisons among persons 
constructed as moral persons and choosing principles of justice in a properly constrained situation. 
The problem of trust that might arise on the way to social unity is, in this conception o f  justice, 
for the most part addressed by the constraints represented by the veil o f ignorance assumption as 
well as by means o f assuming a sense of justice as an important part of people's motivation.
3. Interpersonal Comparisons and Intrapersonal Deliberation (I): the deductive argum ent 
and the veil
3.1. The general scenario
The way the original position is constructed is to ensure that by placing the parties symmetrically, 
a problem o f justification (to others) is turned into a problem o f (individual) deliberation. 
Moreover, we may think that in reasoning about public principles, the parties will achieve also 
a greater self-understanding. To think of the parties as rational means not only that they further 
their ends but also that they are capable of strictly complying with the fair agreements they have 
entered into so that a sense o f justice is made part of the parties' motivation. Furthermore, one 
may think o f a conception of justice as being the mere articulation o f  a (educated) person’s sense 
o f  justice, in that, in Rawls' words, everyone has within himself the whole form o f a moral 
conception. Different as they may be, these arguments all reflect a conviction that reason at the 
individual level has a peculiar access to an ideal community o f  individuals through principles, and
13 Cf. Rawls (1971), p.144.
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that these principles are articulable at the level of individual rationality. Or, in our terms here, 
interpersonal comparisons may be solved in terms of an intrapersonal deliberation
Now the problem of deliberation has a unique determinate solution, according to Raw ls So, we 
should like to understand Rawls' idea o f the principles of justice as the right criterion for IC as the 
unique rational outcome o f a peculiar process o f  deliberation. Given the objective and subjective 
circumstances of justice, the restrictions imposed by the original position regarding the knowledge 
conditions as well as the interests and beliefs of the parties, and, still, given some formal 
constraints which are associated with the very concept of right, which principles of justice would 
result from the rational choice of the parties? This problem, according to Rawls calls for the tools 
of two distinct theories, social theory and moral theory.
Social theory would yield the tools o f equilibrium analysis, in the sense that it would give us the 
feasible solution of a standard problem of rational choice; given the options open to the 
individuals, it would recommend the best action to further one’s interests consistent with the 
actions taken by others. The equilibrium framework fails, however, to provide a just or right 
solution on its own: it would bring about possible coordination outcomes but would be silent as 
to their relative justice or rightness. Moral theory, on the other hand, places constraints on the 
equilibrium analysis, in the sense that it would help us to select those outcomes which are just or 
right according to its standards. Indeed, moral theory would produce the background 
circumstances from which to assess the different equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the constraints 
which the original position is to embody come from moral theory:
the philosophically favored interpretation of the initial situation incorporates 
conditions which it is thought reasonable to impose on the choice o f principles (...) 
it is a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons 
and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative 
balance o f  social forces. (TJ: 120)
The principles of justice would be chosen in the original position. That is, the rational parties seen 
as moral persons under circumstances that would be free of arbitrariness, would choose as the 
first principle of justice the principle of equal freedom to regulate their basic rights and duties, and 
as the second the principle o f fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle to regulate
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the division o f social advantages. They would also agree to a priority rule so that the principles 
should be serially or lexicographically ordered: it would give precedence to the first principle over 
the second and to the first part of the second principle over the second part. In other words, they 
would agree to a conception of justice where everyone is entitled with an equal freedom and fair 
opportunity, and where social and economic inequalities are to everyone's advantage, or to the 
advantage of the less well off in the society.
We now turn to the 'deductive argument* where these principles o f  justice, o f the legitimate IC, 
are derived from a deliberation procedure o f  a rational individual.
3.2. Ignorance and incom parability: the maxim and the prim ary goods index of IC
Although a number o f  intuitions underlie these principles, we shall concentrate on what Rawls 
calls the 'decisive' arguments for the two principles which aim to be entirely deductive. In addition, 
this will give us an opportunity to contrast the Rawlsian principles of justice with the also 
deductive argument for the utilitarian average principle which is based, according to Rawls, on 
a misunderstanding o f the proper restrictions that one should impose on one's choice o f principles 
of justice.
According to  Rawls the two principles o f  justice may be seen as the maximin solution to the 
problem of social justice. Generally speaking, three features o f choice situations justify the use o f 
the maximin decision rule, namely, the impossibility of calculating probabilities, the unwillingness 
to take chances on a better outcome that might jeopardize a guaranteed minimum, and the 
rejection of certain alternatives. For Rawls these three features are present in the original position, 
and, taken together, they fully justify the maximin rule as the rational decision rule in that context.
Rawls argues that the maximin is not a self-evident rational rule, but looks more like a maxim or 
a 'rule of thumb', 'that comes into its own in special circumstances':
Its application depends upon the qualitative structure o f possible gains and losses 
in relation to one's conception o f  the good, all this against a background in which 
it is reasonable to discount conjectural estimates o f  likelihoods. (TJ: 155)
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In accordance, the original position has been shaped as a situation of severe ignorance in which 
the knowledge o f likelihoods is excluded, for the parties have no basis on which to determine 
them:
Not only are they unable to conjecture the likelihoods of the various possible 
circumstances, they cannot say much about what the possible circumstances are, 
much less enumerate them and foresee the outcome of each alternative available 
(11:155/6)
Also, the parties want to assure a minimum. In this connection,
[t]he minimum assured by the two principles in lexical order is not one that the 
parties wish to jeopardize for the sake of greater economic and social advantages.
( I I  156)
Besides, 'other conceptions of justice may lead to institutions that the parties find intolerable',14 
like restrictions on the equal liberty of the individuals.
Thus, ignorance plus the importance o f the issue at stake recommend a maxim, that is, a 
principled choice that rejects certain compromises. In the end, the maximin ensures that the 
greater outcome will be selected amongst the worst possible alternatives.15
Now it is well known, and our study o f Harsanyi's ideas seems to confirm it, that a similar 
knowledge restriction is imposed on individuals in the utilitarian average principle framework. So, 
in the reasoning leading to the average principle Rawls identifies three veils hiding particular 
information from the choosers, much in the same line as his veil: they do not know their places 
in the society and ignore their natural abilities, they have no access to the preference systems of 
the members in the society nor that o f a deciding person, and have no particular knowledge about 
the structure o f the societies. Considering that the average principle framework does not make
14 Cf. Rawls (1971), p. 156.
15 Just as the maximin has an analogy with the rational decision rule in the choice o f principles of justice in the original 
position, so too the parlies choose analogously with risk-averse choosers. However, as before, this does not mean that 
the parties have a particular psychological attitude but rather that the original position is so tailored as to incorporate 
die throe restrictions on choices that render the maximin appealing. In this way, the argument by Harsanyi to the effect 
that the maximin assumes risk aversion on the part of the choosers misses the point.
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any special allowance for people’s motivation (unlike Rawls who requires them to be choosing as 
moral persons), except for requiring that there be genuine and informed-preferences (Harsanyi), 
such people under the above knowledge restriction would choose the average principle:
The average principle appeals to  those in the initial situation once they are 
conceived as single rational individuals prepared to gamble on the most abstract 
probabilistic reasoning in all cases. (TJ: 166)
The utilitarian view understands that individuals under such uncertain choice would resort to the 
principle o f insufficient reason to estimate the likelihoods o f the various circumstances they might 
happen to be in after the veil were lifted. By attributing equal probabilities to the occurrence o f  
the various circumstances, they want to  ensure, Rawls points out, that in the absence of any 
information no alternative is discarded. However, is this a sensible view? Considering the 
characteristics o f the original agreement, Rawls argues, the answer is 'no':
I shall assume that the parties discount likelihoods arrived at solely on the basis 
of this principle [the principle o f insufficient reason] This supposition is plausible 
in view o f the fundamental importance o f the original agreement and the desire to 
have one's decision appear responsible to one's descendants who will be affected 
by it. (IJ: 169)
The use o f probabilities in the circumstances o f the original agreement on principles o f justice is 
thoroughly ruled out by Rawls, this prohibition refers not only to  the Laplacian probabilities, and 
objective probabilities, but also to the subjective neo-Bayesian probabilities that attempt to 
systematize people's intuitive estimates. These latter are entirely out of place, Rawls claims, for 
there are no known particular facts that could provide a ground for these judgments. Referring 
to the Bayesian probabilities, Rawls declares:
Surely it is better when possible to use our intuitive knowledge and common sense 
hunches in a systematic and not in an irregular and unexplained manner. But none 
o f this affects the contention that judgments of probability must have some 
objective basis in the known facts about society if they are to be rational grounds 
o f decision in the special situation o f  the original position. (TJ: 173)
At this point it is worth remarking on a very important distinctive role that the veil o f ignorance 
is to play in the Rawlsian framework in contrast to its use in the utilitarian context. To deprive 
the chooser o f the knowledge o f  particular facts is not done with the intention o f denying him
197
particular reasons from which to choose, but rather the intention of leaving certain reasons as 
candidates for having intrinsic value, so that they would be reasons everyone could adopt. Thus 
the original position wants to produce the kind of circumstance conducive to that state o f mind. 
In accordance, the analogy with the maximin aims to point out that there are some values that 
admit of no trade. So, we strive for a principle that may guarantee them.
A second problem with the average principle, Rawls contends, refers to the way expectations can 
be formed and known, and therefore the way the interpersonal comparisons of utility may be given 
sense, given the restrictions of the veil o f ignorance. Rawls believes that his primary goods index 
is a sounder approach to the question o f IC than the average utility one. Following Rawls, the 
utilitarian choice is thus described:
the individual is thought to choose as if he has no aims at all which he counts as 
his own. He takes a chance on being any one o f a number of persons complete 
with each individual's system of ends, abilities, and social position. (TJ: 174)
A question remains however, Rawls contends:
We may wonder then whether this expectation is a meaningful one. Since there is 
no scheme o f preferences by which its estimates have been arrived at, it appears 
to lack the necessary unity, (ibidem: 174)
How this expectation is arrived at depends on the individual's capacity to evaluate the other 
individuals' detailed circumstances, but this is not without its problems, again, given the veil ' 
restriction:
It suffices to observe here that what we cannot do is to evaluate another person's 
total circumstances, his objective situation plus his character and system o f ends, 
without any reference to the details o f our conception o f  the good. If we are to 
judge these things from our standpoint at all, we must know what our plan of life 
is. The worth to us of the circumstances of others is not, as the constructed 
expectation assumes, its value to them, (ibidem: 174)
The primary goods account, then, comes to  address an important degree of incomparability at 
the level of the individuals' diverse conceptions of the good, which Rawls compares to 'styles of 
art':
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it seems pointless to try to define a measure between persons which includes the 
full range o f final ends. The problem is similar to comparing different styles o f art.
There are simply many things in which human beings become engaged and find 
fully worthwhile depending upon their inclinations, (ibidem: 174/5)
This argument by Rawls stresses the irreducible diversity of people's conceptions o f the good, 
which he deems a fundamental difficulty for utilitarianism in so far as this latter relies upon a 
conception of a rational good. In this respect, it is worth reporting Serge Kolm’s16 suggestion that 
people may agree to a sort of shared highest order preference, a function whose arguments would 
be the common parameters of everyone's preference functions.
Rawls (SU, 1982) looks into this in great detail. He concludes that such a proposition fails to  
come to terms with the irreducible diversity o f the conceptions o f  the good that characterizes a 
deeply divided society. In this latter people would fail to agree on common terms to  adjudicate 
their conflicting claims:
[their] final ends and aspirations are so diverse, their specific content so different, 
that no common basis for judgment can be found. (SU: 180)
Instead o f supposing shared preferences, Rawls assumes the possibility of a shared conception o f  
justice, which accepts that the 'self has a precedent moral structure relative to a bare satisfaction­
seeking self, capable of giving priority to equal basic liberties over preference satisfaction. In this 
way, the primary goods account may provide a basis for interpersonal comparisons which is 
compatible with 'autonomy’ (with respect to the precedence o f a 'moral* self) as well as 
'individuality* (in the form of an irreducible plurality of conceptions of the good) within the limits 
of a conception o f justice. A workable list o f these goods is arrived at from a 'political conception 
of citizens as free and equal':
It is this political conception o f persons, with its account of their moral powers 
and higher-order interests, together with the framework o f goodness as rationality 
and the basic facts o f social life and the conditions o f human growth and nurture, 
that provides the requisite background for specifying citizens needs and
16 The reference is in Rawls (SU, 1982).
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requirements. All this enables us to arrive at a workable list of primary' goods.
(PRIG25517)
A shared conception of justice, defining the primary goods as the index of interpersonal 
comparisons is to be worked out not starting from the diverse conceptions of the good but from 
a conception of person that gives precedence to our 'moral structure’. Still, the later Rawls does 
not want to think o f  this moral structure as a transcendental structure which would still refer to 
a particular comprehensive moral doctrine, as in his Theory, but rather as something that acquires 
sense from the backdrop of a certain public culture, as in his later writings. Let us now turn to this 
view.
4. Interpersonal Comparisons and Intrapersonal Deliberation (II): the 'political* moral 
doctrine and the condition of publicity
As a matter o f course, the more deeply divided the society, the less stable the social arrangement 
and the stronger the demands on a conception of justice. Moreover, a conception of justice 
inevitably excludes some conceptions of the good as altogether unfit for the social arrangement, 
while at the same time encourages other conceptions that appear to be more supportive o f the 
public conception o f justice and the way society is arranged.
Rawls, in his "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good" (1988), tries to accommodate his 
conception o f justice in between the demands of'neutrality* among different conceptions o f the 
good and those of a well-defined conception o f it. There he rejects the idea o f full neutrality of 
a conception of justice, for it is not possible that it be neutral with respect to its final 
consequences in terms of influence and effects, but both necessary and possible that it embody 
neutral procedure and purposes On the other hand, to adopt the standpoint of a moral 
comprehensive doctrine would show a lack of respect to the irreducible fact o f pluralism which 
characterizes our public culture.
17 PRIG stands for "The Priority of Right and Ideas o f the Good" (1988).
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However, the objectivity concerns o f a theory o f justice should address these difficult questions. 
In between the demands o f neutrality and perfectionism, a conception of justice should be faithful 
to some objective values whose foundations we need to  articulate. This issue is developed by 
Rawls w'ith the notion o f an 'overlapping consensus' among the reasonable yet irreconcilable 
political, philosophical and religious doctrines that one expects to co-exist in the society.
In the article "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" (PNM,1985) Rawls provides a 
detailed analysis o f the grounds for the objectivity of a conception o f justice which must articulate 
the latent values o f a public culture, in particular of our democratic western public tradition. As 
a political conception o f justice for a democratic society, 'justice as fairness' builds upon some 
salient basic intuitive ideas that are embodied in the political institutions of a democratic 
constitutional regime and the public traditions of interpretation o f these ideas:
Justice as fairness is a political conception in part because it starts from within a 
certain political tradition. We hope that this political conception of justice may at 
least be supported by what we may call an 'overlapping consensus', that is, by a 
consensus that includes all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines 
likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional 
democratic society. (PNM.225/6)
The ’political' attribute is to oppose the 'metaphysical' in the sense that a conception o f  justice is 
presumed not to express the values o f any moral comprehensive doctrine that makes reference to 
a particular conception of the good but to  express in the form o f regulative principles political 
ideals and values that underlie a democratic regime. What is more, this political conception must 
be the basis for an 'overlapping consensus':
this political conception needs to be such that there is some hope of its gaining the 
support o f  an overlapping consensus, that is, a consensus in which it is affirmed 
by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over 
generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion o f 
justice is that conception itself. (IOC: 1M) 1
1S IOC stands for "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", 1987.
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So, a political conception wants to articulate ideals and values of our public culture in a way likely 
to be supported by the opposing views that co-exist in society19
The possibility o f an overlapping consensus is grounded in a restatement o f the Humean 
circumstances of justice in terms of circumstances of'political'justice (the social and historical 
conditions of democratic societies), namely, the fact of enduring pluralism that can only be 
overcome with the oppression o f the state, and the fact of moderate scarcity, that there are 
'numerous possibilities of gains from well-organized social cooperation, if only cooperation can 
be established on fair terms.'20 These conditions together with the assumptions o f moral 
psychology, 'that is, a psychology of human beings as capable o f being reasonable and engaging 
in fair social cooperation'21 make room for the overlapping consensus or how 'political allegiance' 
is generated.
In his "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" (1980), Rawls produces an array of arguments 
for his conception o f justice whose grounds are given by what he calls a Kantian notion o f moral 
objectivity. This latter amounts to acknowledging that moral objectivity is bound to  the 
construction of a 'point of view', apart from which no further moral facts are said to exist. This 
time, justice as fairness and the principles it yields are vindicated in terms of a different analogy 
from the earlier one (with rational choice theory and the maximin decision rule), namely, with 
Kant’s moral theory.22
At any rate, the core question now amounts to establishing the basis of acceptance of certain 
principles from a recognition of certain qualities of persons, from the supposition that these 
persons have a common desire for agreement as well as there existing principles and notions that
19 The ideal of an overlapping consensus gives primacy to the fact of pluralism which is the hallmark of a democratic 
constitutional regime. Therefore, a close neighbor is the notion of a ’modus vtvendi, which Rawls rejects on the ground 
that such a compromise carries an undesirable instability to the social arrangement On the other hand, the more stable 
the ’modus vivendi, he contends, the more likely that it will have acquired the features of an overlapping consensus.
20 Cf. Rawls, IOC, p.22.
21 Cf. Rawrls, op.cit, p.22.
22 Here, as elsewhere, Rawls stresses the fact that this is just an analogy as there are a number of differences, the main 
one, it seems to me, being the fact that individuals are supposed to act as If led by a pure practical reason, actually 
thanks to the restrictions imposed on them.
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they implicitly share, which can be made explicit if necessary. To this end, Kantian constructivism 
selects a particular conception o f the parties to the agreement, as free and equal moral persons.
The question arises how the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons could be better 
safeguarded in the society'. Since there is no agreement in democratic though: concerning the best 
institutional arrangements to that end, a Kantian conception o f justice asks for trad itiona l 
principles that would be accepted by persons seen as free and equal moral persons and thought 
of as citizens in a ongoing society over a complete life. Political philosophy should make explicit 
the shared notions on the basis o f which principles of justice could be agreed upon:
What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent 
to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves, 
and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our 
public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (KC:519)
For that matter, the freedom and equality o f moral persons in a well-ordered society are 
represented, in the procedure o f construction, as the constraints imposed on the parties as well 
as the way the parties are described.
As for freedom, Rawls defines the original position in terms o f ’pure procedural justice', and the 
parties are seen as 'autonomous' in the sense o f being Independent with respect to a prior and 
given morality. The parties are also seen as autonomous because o f the interests that animate 
them, the regulative interests in realizing their moral personality. There is an additional sense o f 
autonomy, that of'full autonomy', which is only effective in the normal life o f citizens in a well- 
ordered society, where citizens effectively act upon the principles of justice, though its 
prerequisites are already present in the original position.
Thus described, the parties are subject not only to the constraints o f the 'rational', that they are 
to act in a way conducive to the attainment o f their ends, but also to those o f the 'reasonable'. 
These latter constraints are to express the notions of reciprocity and mutuality involved in the idea 
of'fair terms of cooperation'. The relation between the reasonable and the rational is as follows:
the Reasonable presupposes and subordinates the R ational... The Reasonable 
presupposes the Rational because, without conceptions o f the good that move
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members o f the group there is no point to social cooperation nor to notions o f 
right and justice, even though such cooperation realizes values that go beyond 
what conceptions of the good specify taken alone The Reasonable subordinates 
the Rational because its principles limit, and in a Kantian doctrine limit absolutely, 
the final ends that can be pursued (KC 532)
In short, the parties are seen as autonomous for they have their own ends, regulative interests, 
and are also reasonable.23 Deliberation can still take place, after final ends have been excluded 
from consideration, because free persons can always decide on the grounds of their regulative and 
effective desire to be a ’certain kind of person'. Recall that the conception of person or o f a point 
o f view is worked out as a construction, and not as rooted in any theory of human nature.24
As for equality, citizens are seen as equally capable of determining, understanding, and abiding 
by a conception of justice, as well as having an equal sense of justice So, equality is represented 
in the original position by describing the parties as equal and then locating them symmetrically: 
'Everyone has the same rights and powers in the procedure for reaching agreement ’(KC: 5 50)
Now the notion of publicity as well as 'public reason' is of great importance in the constructive 
argument that is to express the basic ideas of freedom and equality. First and foremost, the 
condition of publicity is understood as a precondition for freedom. At the level of a well-ordered 
society, it is worked out in three ways, namely, that society should be effectively regulated by the 
public principles of justice, that there is an agreement concerning certain 'general beliefs' relating 
to human nature and social institutions among the citizens in a well-ordered society as they could 
be proved conect through 'publicly shared methods of inquiry and ways of reasoning thought... 
appropriate'; and, finally, that there is a ’complete justification o f the public conception o f
23 Rawls (1993b) gives the following further explanation of whit is involved in the 'rcasooibk': "In English we know 
what is meant when someone says: Their proposal is rational, given their circumstances, but it is unreasonable all the 
same.' The meaning is roughly that the people referred to are pushing a hard and unfair bargain, which they know to 
be in their interests but which they wouldn't expect us to accept unless they knew their position is strong, Reasonable 
can also mean judicious, ready to listen to reason, where this has the sense of being willing to listen to and consider the 
reasons offered by others. Vemunftig can have the same meanings in German: it can have the broad sense of 
reasonable as well as the narrower sense of rational to mean, rough!)', furthering our interests in the most effective 
way.”(296)
24 Indeed, Rawls develops three distinct standpoints, namely, that of the parties in the original position, that of the 
citizens in a well-ordered society, and the we-viewpoint, of us examining 'justice as fairness' as a basis for a conception 
of justice that provides a convenient comprehension of'freedom' and 'equality*. The test for this latter is the possibility 
o f a 'wide reflective equilibrium'.
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justice...in its own terms',25 and not just in terms of a specific conception of the good. Taken 
together, and given the characteristics o f  the conflict, the three levels of publicity can only apply 
'to the public moral constitution and the fundamental terms o f  social cooperation',26 concludes 
Rawls
A notion of public reason is there to support our search for 'general beliefs' as well as to  provide 
the criteria for individuals to assess the existing institutions in terms o f whether they satisfy the  
principles o f justice. Public reason is o f  a special kind:
In public question, ways o f reasoning and rules of evidence for reaching true 
general beliefs that help settle whether institutions are just should be o f a kind that 
everyone can recognize. (KC:539, my emphasis)
The publicity condition, then, is represented in the original position as a condition that should 
preside over the agreement on principles as well as 'the companion agreement on ways o f  
reasoning and rules for weighing evidence which govern the application o f those principles.' Public 
reason, in this case, is limited to the shared beliefs, the procedures o f  science and common sense:
The subjective circumstances o f justice limit this companion agreement to the 
shared beliefs and the recognized procedures o f science and common sense. 
(KC:541)
Now, an agreement on principles (as well as on ways o f reasoning and rules for their application) 
that respects the autonomy of people turns on the possibility that the publicity condition be fully 
effective and public reason be in existence; in particular, the general knowledge in the original 
position must be equally shared or else may be proved correct to anyone with the assistance o f  
public reason.
Here it is useful to  quote the paragraph in which Rawls connects the condition of full publicity 
with a 'wide view o f the social role o f morality1, in what appears to be his 'utopian' vision:
25 C f Rawls, KC, p.537.
26 Cf. Rawls, op.cit., p.539.
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the realization of the full publicity condition provides the social milieu within 
which the notion of full autonomy can be understood and within w hich its ideal o f 
the person can elicit an effective desire to be that kind o f person. This educative 
role of the moral conception defines the wide view. (KC:553)
5. Concluding Comments
The latter two sections present contrasting arguments for 'justice as fairness', the penultimate 
takes on a deductive argument, and therefore one that holds quite unconditionally; the last justifies 
the contractarian enterprise in terms of the articulation of latent values or principles embedded in 
western democratic culture, such as the ideas of freedom and equality.
Rawls declares, in the Political Liberalism, that his arguments in the Theory were launched from 
the perspective o f a moral (and metaphysical) conception, a position, he claims, PL wants to 
redress in terms of a 'political not metaphysical' moral conception.27 28Many have wondered to what 
extent PL has actually amended this position, for it has appeared to some that, although Rawls 
attempts to enlarge the basis for his overlapping consensus, it is quite significant (and equally 
frustrating) that he advances his political philosophy as capable o f articulating this basis.21
One may still wonder whether this is possible at all, that is, to articulate the fundamental grounds 
o f a consensus without any reference whatsoever to one's particular place in the world. This 
question has been taken up by a great number of critics of Rawls' ideas on the side o f the so-called 
communitarianism. Authors o f this persuasion have called attention to the fact o f the 
'embeddedness of the self, that the 'self is culturally determined and just cannot get rid o f its 
culture to conjecture in the heights and vacuousness of an abstract person.29 However, one might 
arguably ask, how can we make sense of the standpoint o f these authors that are anyway trying
Rawls versus Rawls is worth quoting: "The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines - the fact of reasonable pluralism * shows that as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice 
as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the best of foreseeable 
conditions. The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in part III is therefore unrealistic and must be 
recast...The ambiguity of Theory is now removed and justice as fairness is presented from the outset as a political 
conception of justice. "(PL. 1993 :xvii)
28 See Kukathas (1990).
29 The 'Liberals-versus-Communitarians' debate is given a quite detailed overview in Mulhall and Swift (1992).
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to articulate a general truth about our irreducible differences? It seems to  me that a co m m o n  
ground has been denied by them, inconsistently, though. They are paying lip service to  c u ltu ra l 
differences in so far as they fail to accommodate their own view as just one amongst the m any .
However, there is a more convincing way to deal with these issues which is able to conceive o f  
’common grounds’ for social life and yet denies that individual rationality can fully articulate th em .
I cannot discuss this view now, although it will be addressed in the next part o f this dissertation.
As for interpersonal comparability, our topic here concerns values, or, as Rawls puts it, 'th e se  
comparisons must reflect values which it makes sense to pursue*. The utilitarian cardinal p ro jec t 
thoroughly neglects the incommensurability between distinct lives, the fact that ’happiness’ is n o t  
an unambiguous unit of measurement.30 Rawls' primary goods index wants to come to grips w ith  
incommensurability, for these goods are only social background conditions and all-purpose m eans, 
and they are to be distributed according to a certain easily identifiable order o f priority, he claims. 
What is more, they are to reflect the fact that there are some objective values worth pursuing 
regardless of one’s particular view. However, the problem of incommensurability is waived w ith  
the device of a supposed hierarchy, which is reflected in the design o f the two principles o f justice. 
And, this hierarchy, in turn, is supported by a certain vision o f things. Can this latter conceivably 
come from no conception of the good at all?
In contrast, the undertaking in PL is to  enlarge the basis o f  a consensus starting from an  
articulation o f western democratic public culture, or latent values'. Still, to what extent is this 
articulation feasible? The terms o f a possible agreement are destined to drop the substantive 
principles and matters of social and economic inequalities, as too much stress is put on an idea o f  
'public reason’. The common terms are reached at through methods and procedures o f science 
when undisputed and common sense. To limit the agreement to what a ’public reason’ might 
endorse has the ethical effect o f trivializing the consensus in terms of freedom and a social 
minimum (in their more consensual forms), as well as the philosophical consequence of granting
30 In this regard, Rawls states the following: MI believe that the real difficulties with utilitarianism lie elsewhere. The 
main point is that even if interpersonal comparisons o f satisfaction can be made, these comparisons must reflect values 
which it makes sense to pursue. It is irrational to advance one end rather than another simply because it can be more 
accurately estimated. The controversy about interpersonal comparisons tends to obscure the real question, namely, 
whether the total (or average) happiness is to be maximized in the first pIace.MQ2;91)
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to 'theoretical' reason the final word in the realm of practical reasoning The former effect brings 
the Rawlsian view o f ’order as justice' closer to a view of'justice as order*. The latter effect, in 
turn, shows remarkable similarity with the utilitarian conclusions
[
PART III
IN T E R A  C T IN G  IN D IV ID U A L S  
(T H E  M A N Y )
*The incredible thing about life...is just this interaction between our actions and their 
results by which we constantly transcend ourselves, our talents, our gifts. (...)
This is how we lift ourselves by our own bootstraps out o f  the morass o f  our ignorance; 
how we throw a rope into the air and then swarm up it - i f  it gets any purchase, however 
precarious, on any little twig.
"Ele nào tinha ido a nenhuma parte. Só executava a invençâo de se permanecer 
naqueles espaços do rio, de meto a meio. sempre dentro da canoa, para delà nào saltar, 
nunca mais. A  estranheza dessa verdade deu para estarrecer de todo a gente. Aquilo 
que nao havia, aconteció.10 12
1 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge.
2 Free translation: "He had not gone to any place. Just did the invention of remaining within those spaces of the river, 
from the middle to the middle, always inside the canoe, never to go away from it ever. The strangeness of that 
truth bewildered people. That which did not exist, did happen." Jolo Guimarles Rosa, "A Terceira Margem do Rio" 
(The Third Bank of the River).
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INTRODUCTION
In this Part we are going to examine Hayek’s epistemological premises as well as the conditions for 
action in an extended order he sets up, as these are important elements of his view of social order. 
In relation to the previous parts o f this thesis, Hayek's undertaking is clearly not reductionist in that 
he sees the social order not as a strict consequence of individuals’ rational choices. In feet, he sees 
these choices as being already conditioned by evolving intersubjective multi-level rules that are not 
fully articulable at the level of individual consciousness. This position by Hayek concerning our 
limited epistemic condition also imposes limits on reason’s normative reach, where rules that we 
follow without being fully aware of like our sense of justice cannot similarly be articulated so as to 
provide a firm basis for a well-ordered society. However, the exercise I undertake here concludes 
that, although Hayek can quite safely affirm this, he cannot as safely rule out reason's inclination for 
design on the grounds of the perversity of the consequences.
So, two major purposes are pursued, namely, to retrieve Hayek's inspiring insight concerning the 
knowledge conditions within the social world, and to so reconstruct Hayek's argument as to 
identify the elements within it that might fevor a reconciliation with designed intervention.
The arguments for design shall be taken from within the very tradition Hayek is said to dwell in, in 
particular, from pieces of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi's works. Two major results are that 
such a reconciliation is possible, and that it entails a revision both of traditional modes of 
interpreting Hayek's undertaking and the meaning of conscious action so that these might 
accommodate what turns out to be a synthesis or a 'third bank' o f the river of social philosophy, 
between, that is, reason and tradition.
As for the reconciliation between Hayek's social philosophy and design, my exercise concludes 
rather negatively that design is not thoroughly ruled out from the Hayekian epistemological 
premises (actually the Hayekian actors are constructivists without success); the Hayekian 
epistemological premises cannot disentitle any action on the ground of its consequences, because
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they entail a radical ignorance of them. As for the interpretation of Hayek's epistemological 
premises I have undertaken here, it stresses the cognitive nature of the social world and the fact that 
knowledge within this world is often uncertain, as well as the corollary fact that in trying to acquire 
knowledge we end up by adding to the amount of knowledge to be mastered within the social 
world itself Social world is only possible because of stocks of knowledge concentrated on  
intersubjective spaces, such as traditions, habits, institutions, rules of every sort, which acquire in 
the Hayekian world a rather ontological status. However, in contrast to traditional sociology, these 
social forms do not dominate over the individuals determining their actions, on the contrary, the 
individuals perform a very important role both in apprehending intersubjective rules and adding to  
them. Popper and Polanyi's ideas add to those of Hayek's in conveying a more vivid image o f  a  
social world grounded on a Hayekian foundation where nevertheless there may be more active 
individuals. Then we come to the 'third bank of the river" of social philosophy which, though non­
existent, may render us apt to dream about a world in which we are not alone since we have the 
company of our contemporaries, predecessors and successors and we may also be creative.
In the course o f my exercise on Hayek's philosophy I have come up with an intuitive 
phenomenological-like approach o f his conception of social order. Steven Lukes foresaw this trend 
and suggested to me the writings o f Alfred Schütz. In iact, Schutz's rather original 
phenomenological approach to the social life bears a striking similarity to that of Hayek's in many 
respects, to a number of which I make explicit reference in footnotes. I shall not, however, 
undertake here a thorough reconstruction o f Hayek's argument in terms of Schutz's philosophical 
contribution, which would be alien to my purpose here, although the points of contact are so 
numerous that they are worth mentioning and even worth pursuing on another occasion. Suffice it 
to say that the phenomenological approach to the social world undertaken by Schütz represents, 
along with that o f Hayek's, a major challenge to behaviorist perspectives which take as given what 
are for the former the very starting points o f  our efforts to understand the social world, that is, what 
the conditions for individual rational action are, and how knowledge is acquired in our social world. 
As thinking is taken as a form o f action, these questions refer to the limits o f our understanding 
both as actors in the social world and observers thereof
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Before proceeding to the description of the following sections, I warn to warn that this exercise 
does not intend to offer an interpretation of Hayek's work, not even an idea of what Hayek meant 
by his argument on the crucial role of knowledge. I realize that there are important tensions and 
incoherences in his work in this and other respects. I have tried, however, to offer the best 
Hayekian arguments in favor of the convincing premise of radical ignorance, and have attempted to 
separate this set o f ideas from Hayek's more conservative ideas, an undertaking which I feel is 
possible and does not commit anyone who accepts the Hayekian premises to the Hayekian 
conclusions. Elements for different conclusions are extracted from works by some of Hayek's 
partners of paradigm, such as Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi
This Part is organized as follows. In section 1, a picture is given of the broad landscape where the 
key features are transcendence, emergence and unconscious rules. It is contended that Hayek is 
proposing a particular view of transcendence, as the possibility, that is, that an order of radically 
ignorant individuals may come to emerge. This section touches upon almost the entire range of 
issues entailed in this picture without looking into them in depth, though This latter task is 
undertaken by the following sections.
Section 2 undertakes the question of who is the subject of such an order and what are the limits to 
social theory which are implied by this view of the social actor. This section stresses the non­
reductionist move taken by Hayek under the image of Interacting individuals' and the suggestion he 
makes to the effect that intermediate formations like institutions and traditions, or multi-level rules, 
should be the objective of our explanatory purposes.
Section 3, in turn, outlines the problematic character of the rules themselves and the related issue of 
interpretation. Section 4, then, turns again to Hayek’s view of individuals in order to see what their 
capacities are which they might count upon whenever they have to overcome problems of 
interpretation of the rules.
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Section 5 explores the ambiguities of the Hayekian concept of order and the room given for change 
to come about. In section 6 it is argued that we should explore the possibility for design to interfere 
in the order on the basis that tradition may encompass contradictory forces of preservation and 
change, and among them even entropic forces. Another sense o f tradition is suggested which gives 
consciousness an active role.
Lastly section 7 sets up the elements of a dynamic interplay between the conscious and the non- 
conscious parts o f our actions and asserts that some indeterminacy is better than an account that 
leaves aside one o f the following two intuitions, radical ignorance and the desire we have to  
overcome it.
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Chapter 7
INTERACTING INDIVIDUALS
1. Transcendence as emergence1
We are going to examine one particular sense, within the individualist tradition, in which we might 
say that we can lift ourselves by our own bootstraps: we might do it without purpose, 
Transcendence would then be possible through emergence (instead of the purposive action of the 
individuals), as the product of human action though not of will.
To be sure, what we are to examine is the contention that if transcendence is to have any relevant 
meaning it must be conceived within the human circumstances of radical ignorance, as the 
possibility of any persisting 'order* coming about among radically ignorant men. How is this 
possible?
When we imply that individual purposive action is not able to generate transcendence we might 
think of another subject being suggested as a candidate to effect it, such as 'society1, or 'history*. But 
the odd thing about the framework we are going to examine is that within it the individual is still the 
protagonist of the capacity to produce something, like social order, which is bigger than himself 
However, it does not rely upon the usual division of our motives, for example interests and morals, 
body and soul and so on, as the basis of any possible self-transcendence.
So, if the relevant action is not purposive and the relevant subject or actor is still the individual, we 
are invited to think o f some kind of non-conscious 'action' of his as relevant to supplement 
conscious and purposive actions towards an understanding of a persisting social interaction among
1 In the following I shall add some comments on the text in a smaller letter whenever a clarification is in order. 
As for the footnotes, they will be included as presently non-explored extensions to the main text, or else as 
additional references to what has been said
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many individuals. Moreover, it is contended that purposive conduct itself is not a fully conscious 
and articulable conduct. What we deem to be purposive action is actually an action with deeper and 
hidden roots.
LI Ignorance
Under the condition of radical ignorance, that is, that there are insurmountable positional barriers 
that prevent anyone from having an all-encompassing perspective of his situation, an evidence o f  
this non-consdous supplement to our actions is given, it is claimed, by the recognition by others o f  
our actions as meaningful. If this recognition obtains, the argument goes, we may in principle think 
that the action that was carried out followed some common (though unarticulated) standard, 
shared, that is, by both the acting person and the observer.
Clarifying this issue a bit more would require us to better specify the sense of radical ignorance. What is entailed in 
this latter is a statement to the effect that we have in our social world (the extended order) insuperable positional 
barriers. We might think that the statement 'under radical ignorance any recognition should be taken as an evidence of 
commonality1 has almost a tautological taste, for if we occupy thoroughly non-interchangeable positions and may still 
make sense of each other's acts, we must have something in common in some (prior-to-experionce) dimension. But we 
should not dismiss 'coincidence* as an alternative hypothesis. This latter point is suggested by Turner (1994) who 
considers the whole approach of 'tradition-social practices-presuppositions-tacit knowledge' to lead to under- 
determination in the epistemological level. By this contention he means that it is not possible to determine exclusively 
by the fact that the action is somehow meaningful to others whether an action stemmed from a commonly shared 
social practice or tradition. Other alternatives might be equally or even more cogent, as the one he himself gives to the 
effect that commonality in external performance might derive from different private habits that were somehow 
'trimmed' to look alike. Still, Turner points out real explanatory disadvantages involved in the concept of sharing, like 
the failure properly to account for transmission and acquisition of the public thing supposedly shared. Another route is 
taken by Hayek: this 'sharing something' is worked out as an analogy, that is, we attribute intelligibility to other's acts 
according to our own framework of references (which includes habits, traditions etc.), and we engage in an interaction 
with him in the hope that both the questions he addresses and the answers we provide are meaningful within a 
presumably commonly possessed system of rules. The approach is still individualistic as Turner's; selection just 
chooses the more suitable answer and, in this way, selection provides an ex-post confirmation of some ways (habits, 
traditions) of behaving, to 'rules'. So, I take Hayek to agree with the following minimum statement of 'sharing' or 
'following the same rule': To take an act as belonging to a rule implies that we expect the act to commit the acting 
person through time within a social context, that is, that we expect certain actions to follow it, as Winch's (1938) 
Wittgenstein.
Now, we, the observer and the observed person, need not necessarily explicitly know the rule the 
action followed. Nor do we need to be able to spell out what particular instances of the action have 
led to our recognition of it as an action o f  a particular kind. Our knowledge may well have been
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confined to the recognition of the action as belonging to a certain pattern that we both recognize 
without being required to fully articulate the knowledge we proved to possess.
What we recognize as purposive conduct is conduct following a rule with which we 
are acquainted but which we need not explicitly know. Similarly, that an approach 
of another person is friendly or hostile, that he is playing a game or willing to sell us 
some commodity or intends to make love, we recognize without knowing what we 
recognize it from (S, 55)
We may introduce here, as an instance of the foregoing, Polanyi's (1958) idea of the character of 'unspecifiabihty 
involved in the mastery of some aits, in skill. Some arts are unspecifiable in detail, so transmission would be confined 
to example, to personal contact, and not to prescription. Two instances of related difficulties are the lack of formal 
guidance towards the articulation of a spatial topography from abundant access to its particulars (parts to whole), and 
the symmetric difficulty in specifying the subsidiary particulars that dwells in a maxim (whole to parts). These two 
symmetric limits to articulation reveal in the suggestion of Polanyi that the gap in between recognition and (articulate) 
knowledge is filled by a subsidiary awareness we develop in the activities and acts we are focally aware of. Polanyi 
goes even further to suggest that the act of frying to shift our awareness from its focus to its subsidiary particulars 
could destroy the vciy context that evokes the flow of the activity be it the understanding of a gesture, the playing of a 
piece of music, the act of speaking etc.
We might still think that conscious actions and non-conscious rules are standing for traditionally 
appointed cleavages of our internal motives or purposes, such as selfish and moral motives, thus 
keeping our actions characteristically purposive. But the idea here is rather that the non-conscious 
rules that we follow in fact work as a meaning-giving framework to our conscious conduct: they 
indicate a place to our conscious action inside a broader and unarticulated system of rules.2 The 
snag, it seems, is that the knowledge assets (knowledge of various norms) which are the 
presuppositions of our actions, and which are situated at both the conscious and non-conscious 
levels, are bigger than our capacity to understand and articulate them at the conscious level.
In Hayek's words:
there are many grounds which make it probable that, in order to be conscious, 
processes must be guided by supra-conscious order which cannot be the object of 
its own representations. (S,61)
2 We might see this meaning-giving framework as still normative, for it provides norms of locating elements 
within an order. Yet this order is not supposedly static, for it might happen that the order be modified by a 
challenging element within it, as we shall see later.
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A logical reason is then:
if *to have a meaning' is to have a place in an order which we share with other 
people, this order itself cannot have meaning because it cannot have a place in itself 
(S,61)3
From this knowledge condition two immediate consequences follow: in acting, (1) we know (in the 
non-articulable sense - N) more than we know (in the articulable sense - A), (2) we cannot know A 
what we know N .4
These consequences are practical and theoretical, quite analogously to Kant's distinction between practical and 
theoretical reason. The important difference is that for Hayek practical rationality is an intersubjective and evolutionary 
capacity placed in an indhidual's mind, and theoretical reason is confined to the narrow limits of individual's 
consciousness. It should be also clear that the 'cannot* in the statement above stands for a logical impossibility’.
Of course many rules may be followed consciously. The point here is that not every rule which is 
followed may be conscious, there will always be some rules which will be followed without being 
articulated for they are the very condition o f  the possibility o f action (and, more generally, o f 
thinking).
In particular, the closer we are to other persons the less we have to rely on unconscious rules o f 
conduct to find our way. As far as we go through larger circles, however, thus missing the 
knowledge o f particular details and circumstances, we have no choice but to rely on more general 
rules.
Compare a congenial quotation from Polanyi (op. cit): T h ey  (the set of presuppositions which is our 
interpretative framework) are not asserted and cannot be asserted, for assertion can be made only within a 
framework with which we have identified ourselves for the túne being; as they are themselves our ultimate 
framework, they are essentially inarticulable. "(60)
4 In this connection, Hayek also refers to Gilbert Ryle's distinction between *knowing that' and *knowing how*, 
as expressing the above contrast. In a footnote, in his Studies...(Si. he refers to Michael Polanyi's contribution 
on the whole issue, in the latter's Personal Knowledee. chapters on 'Skills' and 'Articulation*. Cf. Studies.... 
p.44.
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In an extended order the model o f interaction can no longer be o f direct concern: "man's eyes see 
no further. His memory holds no more."5 Now we have a world o f unknown circumstances. In fact, 
within this world coordination o f efforts is directed to the adaptation to the unknown (and the 
model of interaction should take advantage of the positional differences of the parts within a system 
of rules of conduct).
In society, therefore, rules are supposed to supplement our knowledge of particular facts and 
circumstances; they make action possible insofar as they substitute some regularity for the need for 
detailed knowledge o f the other persons and alternative circumstances. Given our ineradicable 
ignorance of these facts and circumstances, we follow rules (like ’customs' or ’habits') in an attempt 
to mitigate, through some 'routine ways’, the unpredictability of our environment. We follow them 
because of our limited knowledge.6
1.2 Rationality
However, we follow rules for another reason: simply because we are rule-following animals, says 
Hayek. This is the way our mind works or has evolved to work from innate to learnt mles, that is, 
largely through a classificatory scheme, a network of rules or patterns that has enabled us to give 
meaning to our many experiences. Mind is one such a classificatory scheme that operates, on 
analogy of society, as a complex system.
Thus, in understanding, we have to resort to (or look for) regularities or patterns in what we find 
around us The experiences we have, whose meaning is given by rules we follow, may encompass 
either our future or our relation to other fellow human beings. So, a rule may help us to cope with
5 C f Vernon, 1976, p.265.
6 In saying that knowledge is segmented and that nobody can possibly know everything, Schütz also recognizes 
the existence of a Vorld within common reach*, which, of course, leaves out part of each individual's total 
world within common reach. However, "this 'common' knowledge will not have to be identical in thoroughness 
and detail: it may range from the pragmatically limited common-sense knowledge of the 'man in the street' to 
the knowledge of the expert. In certain matters, the Veil-informed citizen' occupies an intermediary position 
between the two. What Schütz said about zones of relevance applies here in a way: each man, in terms o f his 
whole life situation, approaches expertness in some area or other, but he is and remains the 'man in the street1
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uncertain choices, in this way connecting any' coherence of our choice to something beyond our 
conscious purpose and thus committing us to other actions. Moreover, our relationship with other 
people starts from our recognition o f certain patterns being used by them which render their actions 
meaningful to us.
If we recognize other people's action as meaningful, this does not imply that these people are 
actually using particular rules. What is implied, instead, is just a belief in an identification with them, 
a supposition that we all follow the same system of rules. We may think that this identification also 
constitutes the basis o f imitation, in situations, that is, where in trying to arrive at a decision we just 
imitate what others have successfully done. Actually it should be clear at this point that the 
contraposition we/others is just hypothetical and the argument o f making sense of what others 'do' 
on analogy of what we 'do' may be stated the other way round, that is, we may make sense of what 
we 'do1 through analogy with what others 'do'. This is because imitation - an innate capacity to learn 
from others - provides the possibility for other rules to be learnt. Again, note, however, that this 
identification is worked out by Hayek as mere analogy: we suppose others to be rule-governed 
because we are.
An interesting contrast that may help to clarify Hayek’s move here is that between analogy and symmetry. Symmetry, 
the imaginative capacity of ours to change places with the others, is ruled out in Hayek’s approach because it would 
entail the denial of our epistemological condition in the social world. So, along with symmetry 'sameness' is dismissed 
as well, every identification, therefore, is being confined to analogy. 'Sameness' is thus just presumed and, moreover, 
amenable to mistakes which may ultimately provoke change.
So, we follow rules because we can only understand through patterning. If  what others do 
somehow matches our patterns, it has a meaning for us. We may then act on the basis o f this belief 
and see how the others will reciprocate. If their reactions are still meaningful to us we may proceed, 
and so on.* 7 If this is so, our implicit assumption has proved to work which proposed that the others
A
were, as we are, rule-following animals, and that they were using the relevant rule.
in many others; finally, he may strive for additional enlightenment in a few."(Wagner,39)
7 Schütz also remarks that social action is 'meaningful action', and analyses, accordingly, the chain of actions 
and reactions that takes place in social action in terms of his famous dual motivation, namely, the in-order-to
All this entails that our 'rationality*, the guideline we use while acting, is itself a result o f an 
interpersonal process: it is shaped as an abstract capacity of recognition of our own and others' 
actions as meaningful within an abstract framework of rules we follow, though this cannot be 
entirely known in the consciousness.
13. Emergence
Now, let us attempt to draw together this foregoing talk about rules. There are, as we have seen, 
two different senses o f our question *why follow rules?: because of ignorance, which is our social 
predicament, and because of the constitution o f our mind, which is our individual virtue. They may 
be connected through an explanation o f the emergence of rules, that is, of rules as an emerging 
effect of interaction. Thus, for Hayek, rules are the result o f human action; moreover, rules have 
evolved as a result of human interaction both because they have proved beneficial to it, in 
overcoming ignorance, that is, and because they are the properly human device to cope with the 
human circumstance o f radical ignorance. Cultural evolution has it that we shift from the sole 
command of innate rules (like our instincts) to the command of learnt rules, which is very much 
enabled by the interactional inclination already implicit in the instinct o f imitation. *
motives (subjective) and the because-motivcs (objective): "A social actor, in directing himself to another 
person, expects to bring about a certain action by that person. The desired and expected reaction of the other, 
then, is the in-ordcr-to motive of the first actor. If the other understands this intention and responds, the in- 
ordcr-to motive of the initiator becomes his because motive. While at first answering because a question was 
asked, however, the second actor may in turn address the first one out of a now awakened interest of his own. 
Having thus established an in-ordcr-to motive for himself, he provides a because motive for the first 
person. "(Wagner,33)
g
So, the nature of understanding is patterning, that is, giving/recognizing meaning in the world, in other’s 
actions. The importance of 'meaning1 bears on the only possible predictability within a world whose inhabitants 
possess limited knowledge. It refers to something that goes beyond ostensive gesture, utterances, actions, of 
persons we do not directly know, causing these latter to be instances of a chain o f possible sequences to which 
we may intelligibly react. Still, Outwhaite (1975) and Winch (1958) spell out many possible senses of 
meaningful action, from the rather causal Weberian account to a less determinate Wittgenstein!an sense; 
meaningful action is, at the minimum, the action that has followed a rule that may be subjected to an external 
check (though it needs not actually be so).
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Evolving rules could be replaced by a designing mind only at the expenses o f the richness and 
progress o f the overall order9 First, Hayek argues, because it is beyond any individual mind's 
capacity to master the immense amount o f dispersed knowledge that exists in society Secondly, 
and more importantly, because the ignorance o f the parts within a spontaneous order is tantamount 
to the knowledge socially accumulated:10
The first peculiarity of a spontaneous order is that by using its ordering forces (the 
regularity o f the conduct o f its members) we can achieve an order of a much more 
complex set of facts than we could ever achieve by deliberate arrangement, but 
that, while availing ourselves of this possibility of inducing an order of much greater 
extent than we otherwise could, we at the same time limit our power over the 
details o f that order. (S,163)
Again, this amounts to seeing the whole that emerges from the interaction o f the many parts as 
something not reducible to their conscious and purposive actions. In this connection, having in 
mind the constructivist attempt to make individual reason converge to social or collective 
rationality, we may see that in the Hayekian world the intellectual experiment o f one person facing
9
Hayek acknowledges the influence of Michael Polanyi's The Logic of Liberty in this finding of his, that there 
is a "difference betw een an order which is brought about by the direction of a central organ such as the brain, 
and the formation of an order determined by the regularity of the actions towards each other of the elements o f 
a structure. "(S,73) Polanyi's terms are ’monoccntric' and 'polycentric’ orders, the latter referring to what Hayek 
calls 'spontaneous order'. In another passage, the influence of Michael Oakeshott is also referred to; this time 
the distinction is recast in terms of the 'nomocratic' (law-governed) character of a free society and the unfree 
'telocratic' (purpose-governed) social order, as Hayek is expressing his own view on the principles of a liberal 
social order. An interesting topic of discussion would be the correspondence between Polanyi's and Oakcsbott's 
distinction, a correspondence Hayek seems to take for granted However I shall not take up this question, but 
quote a passage that shows the kind of liberalism (and individualism) Hayek had in mind: T h e  conception o f 
the common welfare or the public good of a free society can (...) never be defined as a sum of known particular 
results to be achieved, but only as an abstract order which as a whole is not oriented on any particular concrete 
ends but provides merely the best chance for any member selected at random successfully to use his knowledge 
for his purposes. Adopting a term of Professor Oakeshott (London), we may call such a free society a 
nomocratic (law-governed) as distinguished from an unfree telocratic (purpose oriented) social order. "(S. 163) 
What characterizes a spontaneous order is that it is based "on abstract rules which leave individuals free to use 
their own knowledge for their own purposes.”(S, 162)
10 This argument by Hayek is usually followed by the Hayekian curse that any pretense of fully articulating the 
social knowledge thus obtained would undermine the very basis of its growth. This is, however, a non-seqvitur 
for from the very Hayekian epistemological premises any such prediction is impossible, as it is impossible to 
fully predict the whole chain of consequences o f one's actions in a spontaneous order.
an intra-personal decision problem (like a risky choice) is analogous to the interpersonal level 
embodied in the society only in the sense that both levels have to recur to abstract rules placed 
beyond the reach o f consciousness and will." Thus, as intentional attempts they will clearly fail (or 
only succeed by accident).
We have to consider the three components that seemingly weakens the role of will (i) the strategic 
component; (ii) the evolutionary component; and (iii) the role of chance Thus, the gap in between 
what we do and what we consciously know we are doing is filled by the collective dimension of our 
individual actions. For one thing, action is individual but its results are interactional (the strategic 
component); for another, even the individuality of our actions cannot be taken as a given, for it is 
something requiring explanation as well. In fact, our individual actions are conditional upon an 
interpersonal presupposition, namely, the system of rules (the evolutionary component) Moreover, 
that some system o f individual rules of conduct prove beneficial to the whole is something that 
cannot be a priori known and decided, the rules individuals follow must have reached a co­
ordinating effectiveness for a system of rules to persist, and this can only be checked against the 
circumstances prevailing (the role of chance).
*»*> I
2.1nteracting individuals 
(the anti-reductionist move)
The foregoing requires us to consider the whole of social order as a complex structure for it 
appears to be more than the mere aggregation of its parts,* 12 and yet it results from the combined 
actions of the many pans. The effects of the acts of individuals aiming at particular results are
See the preceding parts of this thesis where the social order is posed as stemming from individual rational
choices. In particular, see pan II.
12 Two features of complex structures are: (i) small inputs can lead to Urge consequences; and (ii) slight 
differences in starting conditions can lead to big changes in the outcomes. These make for the unpredictability 
of these systems, (cf. Lewin, 1993: 11)
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beyond the reach of their calculations in that when these acts o f theirs combine with the acts o f  
others a wholly unpredictable effect shall result.
The effects of individuals1 actions in an extended order cannot be anticipated mainly because o f the 
'positional* effect such that the expectations individuals form cannot but reflect their particular 
position within the social world and their radical ignorance of the rest. Besides, there is also the 
composition effect in that unforeseen results, problems and decision situations are likely to arise as 
a consequence o f these (otherwise motivated) combined acts, that will be constantly demanding 
new answers, thus constituting further circumstances for individual actions.
Thus, in one sense this whole is constituted by the actions of the individuals but in another sense it 
'constitutes*, 'shapes' and restrains the actions of the parts in the manner of a quite autonomous 
structure. We have here the intersubjective space playing a rather important role, by affecting the 
very parameters o f individual actions. What is this 'intersubjective space' like?
One claim by Hayek regarding the intersubjective space is rather a disclaimer: it is not meant to be 
any collective social agency as in a 'collectivist' approach, for he denies that social entities can be 
any more real than individuals. It seems that in saying this, he is envisaging all realistic or 
essentialistic approaches to social interaction, either individualistic or collectivistic. He then declares 
that he sticks to individualism not as in any sense a more realistic hypothesis than collectivism but 
as a sort of'nominalistic* approach to social life.13
The adoption o f philosophical nominalism is justified by Hayek in contrast to essentialism: 
individualism is a necessary hypothesis towards the understanding o f social phenomena which is 
the *understanding o f  individual actions directed toward other people and guided by their
13 Schütz also stresses the essential character o f intersubjectivity as a 'fundamental ontological categoty of 
human existence', a ‘precondition of all human experience in the life world'. However, his approach, as I 
presume Hayek does too, differs from traditional sociology in that "the collective elements in human 
orientations neither eliminate individual spontaneity and volition nor even prevent idiosyncratic interpretations 
of cultural typifications and definitions." (Wagner,47/48)
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expected behavior1 (my emphasis). That is, towards the understanding of social life we should 
suppose 'men whose whole nature and character is determined by their existence in society.'14 In 
this way, Hayek's individualism assumes individualism as an hypothesis and the individuals as social 
creatures
Thus, towards our understanding of social life we cannot directly comprehend the social whole as 
collectivists want us to; nor can we take individuals as isolated and self-contained realities or 
essentials (as in the essentialistic individualist tradition). To understand individuals we need society, 
to understand society we need individuals. We want, then, some intermediate category as 
individuals in society, or individuals as interacting individuals.15 This is labeled the “true 
individualism'.
What is at stake, it seems to me, is Hayek's rejection of any reductionist approach to social phenomena either 
resolving social interaction as stemming from any reasonable individual's behavior or explicating individual’s behavior 
from a comprehensive understanding of the social whole. Every understanding of social phenomena must be indirect 
and must take as its minimal category this intricate object constituted by individual and social interaction, a category 
not reducible to its constitutive parts,
In this connection, Hayek reads Adam Smith not as a defender of any natural harmony of 
individuals' interests but as stressing something else, namely, the role o f evolving institutions (an 
intermediate category) in bringing about a reconciliation o f these interests. Another instance of this 
'nominalist* argument is found in Hayek's interpretation of Mandeville's work. He considers 
Mandeville's greatest contribution to reside in the insight that any ’rationality1 that may be found in 
human action has its source in the restraints imposed on men by institutions and traditions of 
society. The alpha and omega of Mandeville's predicaments are, then, that
14 Cf. IEO- p.51.
15 Schütz pointed out. in the same line as Weber's sociology, that the relevant social phenomena are social 
actions. I quote from Wagner's comment on Schutz's individualistic perspective, very similar to that of 
Hayek's: "Schütz, of course, proceeded from a preliminary individualistic perspective to the direct analysis of 
social relationships. Social interaction involves the social action o f at least two people who orient themselves 
upon each other. And living in the world of everyday life, in general, means living in an interactional 
involvement with many persons, being entangled in complex networks of social relationships* (Wagner, 30)
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we do not know why we do what we do, and that the consequences of our 
decisions are often different from what we imagine them to be. (NS, 250)
( . . . )
While he [Mandeville] still seems most concerned to show that it is merely pride (or 
'self-liking') which determines men’s actions, he becomes in fact much more 
interested in the origin o f the rules o f conduct which pride makes men obey but 
whose origin and rationale they do not understand. After he has convinced himself 
that the reasons for which men observe rules are very different from the reasons 
which made these rules prevail, he gets increasingly intrigued about the origin of 
these rules whose significance for the orderly process of society is quite 
unconnected with the motives which make individual men obey them. (NS, 257)
Rules, we may conjecture, are there to help individuals to achieve their particular aims and help 
order to be preserved or enhanced thereby. That is, they are supposed to enhance local 
predictability and global preservation at once.
In "Between Instinct and Reason", Hayek argues that institutions and traditions, learnt rules in 
short, restrain our instincts or innate rules. In focussing more precisely on two major driving forces 
of human action - altruism and aggressiveness - Hayek makes quite clear the interplay of 'inner 
motivation’ and 'restraints'. He seems to suggest, then, that restraints would help us in shaping both 
the particularity and universality o f our actions. For in restraining our innate altruism learnt rules 
would prevent us from losing the knowledge we would be more competent to provide in our 
particular position within the world as well as losing the independence of our aims, the lack o f  
which would make us the prey o f particular interests o f others. Note that self-interest loses its 
appeal as an explanatory category, and becomes almost senseless as an independent explanation o f 
individual action. As for the universality o f our actions, restraints on our innate aggressiveness 
would place us under general rules equally applied to everyone.16,17 Let us turn now to Hayek’s 
critique to what he calls the false individualism'.
16 It is worth-noting that for Hayek we live in two worlds at once: innate and learnt. It will be the object of 
specific and further consideration the possibility that we also live in a third world that would render us less 
passive. In Hayek's sense we may think of an economy of instincts, of some instincts, that is, as helping us to 
displace others, as has imitation. Imitation is thought of as a capacity to learn from others. Again, we may 
conjecture that this capacity is less passive than it may look, as suggested by Folanyi. See the last section.
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This false individualism (of Rousseau and the physiocrats, o f Cartesian origin) belongs to the 
constructivistic approach and, contrastingly with Hayek's account, starts from a presumption of 
Reason, with a capital R, of the individuals, a reason which is
always fully and equally available to all humans and that everything which man 
achieves is the direct result of, and therefore subject to, the control of individual 
reason (NS, 8)
It is a 'false* individualism because it leads to 'practical collectivism'. To this approach Hayek 
opposes his presumption of ignorance on the part of the individuals:
It is the contention that, by tracing the combined effects of individual actions, we 
discover that many of the institutions on which human achievements rest have 
arisen and are functioning without a designing mind;... and that the spontaneous 
collaboration of free men often creates things which are greater than their individual 
minds can ever fully comprehend. (ibidem:51)
This latter contrast gives Hayek the opportunity to vindicate his rejection of a rationalistic approach 
to social interaction, as his initial presumption concerns precisely the limited capacity of individual 
reason to account for interaction within an extended order, either practically or theoretically.
Some of the major short-comings of individual rationality17 8 seem to be, then, (1) the discontinuity 
between what the individual wants and what he really achieves; (2) the poor explanatory power of
17 Since we dislike these restraints, Hayek wonders why they came about. His answer is that rather than being 
selected by our will, these rales have selected us. as the enabling survival devices they have turned out to be. 
This kind of contention has been identified as Hayek's 'dogmatic evolutionism' by Espada (1996) who rejects 
what I call the 'perfectibility' aspects of Hayek's account of evolution. I want to distinguish here Hayek's 
inspiring 'evolutionary approach' from his more disputable 'evolutionist' approach. This distinction is worked 
out in later sections.
18 As for the limited role of man's rationality, the following passage picks out some of Schutz's insights: 
"Insofar as action is based on conscious planning, it has frequently been called rational. (...) In view of the 
existing ambiguities, [Schütz] considered Weber's concept of rational action an ideal not attainable in 
everyday-life conduct. Of course, he did not deny that men make rational choices in terms of their relevant 
knowledge on hand Yet, he preferred to call everyday action characterized by such choices reasonable rather 
than rational, making allowances for the unavoidable shortcomings of practical knowledge. No individual,
...................................................................................
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psychological assumptions in the understanding both o f the emergence and prevalence o f  any 
overall order; (3) the autonomy of the whole, in that the whole is ever changing as a non- 
anticipated aggregate consequence o f the actions of interacting individuals (though its 
inarticulability prevents it from being a privileged agency).
Hence, towards the understanding of the social world we should cast light on the places where 
action is significantly taking place; we should then highlight the plausible role o f intermediate 
formations and the scarcely significant influence of a conscious subject, either individual or 
collective, on the process which generate that world.
Accordingly, Hayek stresses the role of tradition as an intermediate category between instinct and reason, in 
connection with his idea of mind as a capacity to restrain instincts with the aid of learnt rules. Mind, for him, is 
nonetheless a capacity for generating testable knowledge and interpretation about the world. Individual reason, 
however, cannot test mind because its effects are on the group and over cultural evolution.
3.Good and bad presumptions: Verstehen and Equilibrium
Institutions have arisen from action, which means that the combination of individual actions has 
given rise to some restraints to actions over time, although in a thoroughly undesigned way. If 
institutions, and more generally rules are in turn the condition of the possibility of social life, that is, 
if they have evolved to overcome inherent limitations of knowledge available to man that otherwise 
would have rendered social life impossible, social theory should attempt to cast light on these 
institutions and practices, on the restraints, that is, rather than on the psychology or the rationality 
of the individuals,
Relevant questions are, then: how may ignorance have worked for social life? what kind of 
ignorance is it? It becomes more and more irrelevant whether the individuals are moved by pride or 
self-love, or by rationality and insight, and more and more relevant to understand how some 
restraints have been built up which enable the orderliness o f our societies to arise given our limited
probably, is ever to have knowledge o f all actually and  potentially relevant factors in those situations in which 
he ‘w orts' toward the realization of his plans.' (Wagner,p.26\27)
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knowledge. Rather than trying to grasp human nature and from this knowledge to deduce human 
society, we should insert individuals in their society - as interacting short-sighted individuals, 
groping their way, trying to guess what the others' actions will be, what the results of their acts will 
be, acting from rules not fully understandable through rationality - and try to grasp the constraints 
that have appeared as necessary to contain their ignorance within manageable limits. The initial 
purpose of the individual acts will practically disappear in contrast to the effects they may promote 
in the whole, hence their intelligibility to a distant fellow actor (or to a more sophisticated 
interpreter, like the theoretician) is increasingly being given by the meaning of one's action within a 
system of the general rules we follow.
So, let us take the question of how we can make sense of ignorance. Under ignorance we may be 
guided by some common rules which so far have proved to function to the benefit of the whole. 
The market provides an example of the preceding, for it is a mechanism, as any other institution, 
that is supposed to make the dispersed information possessed by many individuals available to all in 
the form of positive or negative incentives.
But how does it operate, this ignorance which turns us into potential consumers of rules? We can 
find implicit in Hayek's view the idea that our ignorance may work both actively and passively for 
the overall order. Taking passive ignorance first, this is an ignorance we cultivate without being 
aware of it, actually as a paradoxical effect of our being steeped in a particular, positional 
knowledge. This ignorance is tantamount to the distance we create between what we particularly 
know and what the others taken together know, it is analogous, in the division of labor, to the 
ignorance of the expert in some very specialized thing. That is, we increase the distance between us 
and we improve the map at the same time. So, in being ignorant in this passive sense we actually 
contribute to the growth of accumulated knowledge (or the complexity of our society).
We may also think o f ourselves as profiting from our own ignorance in a rather active sense: when 
we let ourselves be guided by some practical knowledge embodied in a rule instead of a more 
demanding theoretical knowledge for which would need to make stressful and impossible
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calculations of causes and consequences, we can possibly know more (N) than our knowledge 
possibilities (A). Again, not because we consciously know what we are doing but because our 
actions will be more knowledge-intensive, actions in reference to the others and to the whole
In this active sense, ignorance is really a recommendation in line with Hayek's curse that we should 
not pretend to know (A) what we know (N), otherwise we would undermine the spontaneous 
order on our way to shifting from (inarticulable) rules to reason. Since h is helpless to strive on the 
basis of our predictive powers alone, we should consciously give them up and follow the rules. 
Even granted that an awkward 'active ignorance' is posable, which I doubt, an additional doubt 
remains as to what Yules' we should follow. This is not altogether unproblematic.
Hayek is well aware that these 'actions in reference to others' actions and to the whole' involve a  
great deal of interpretation. Are these references, or rules, some sort of price system, a general 
objective signal? This is absolutely not Hayek's idea. Though the market image might suggest that 
there is a mechanism that would lead to a perfect coordination among the actions o f the many 
individuals, Hayek is very much a critic o f this view of the role o f the market mechanism. For him, 
the market is not the place where division o f labor is actualized, it is more than this; it is, more 
significantly, a place where the division o f knowledge among economic agents is expressed, 
meaning that different knowledge positions (knowledge o f the different alternative possibilities) are 
confronted, different capacities to predict and take advantage o f the particular position (or 
information) each agent possesses. The market is a procedure of discovery.
In this sense, Hayek argues in Individualism and Economic Order that traditional equilibrium 
analysis begs the question when it takes for granted the knowledge people possess. The really 
relevant question for an understanding of economic coordination is precisely how people come to 
acquire the knowledge they possess. If this latter is really the relevant question we should try to 
grasp the role of institutions in affecting these bits of knowledge that each one o f us possesses, thus 
enabling actors to alter their plans, and theoreticians to make sense o f change. For change, after all, 
is what economic system is all about. So, in a sense, it is essential that expectations be disappointed,
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either because this reflects inevitable differences in the knowledge o f the agents (again, not only of 
current and past prices, that is, not only differential information but also of alternative possibilities 
to the plans the agent has designed) or because this situation enables change and progress of the 
whole to take place.
Here is an occasion to comment on what is to my mind a misleading interpretation of the role of market in Hayeks 
thought. 1 think that we may find in his work, as emphasized in this section, many grounds to support the idea that the 
market is an institution concerned with change and not a static mechanism of matching different expectations formed 
under ideal knowledge conditions. This latter view is implied in Vernon (1976) and Crowley (1987) when they claim 
that Havek unfairly models political society on the image of a market which is characterized as a mechanism of 
exchange of essentially complementary and commensurable goods. A more inviting understanding of Havek's view of 
the market (more in line with his epistemic premises, 1 believe) seems to be that he displays a very distinctive view of 
the market to the effect that it is concerned with a system of rules operating behind the backs of differently positioned 
individuals. What the market metaphor suggests to the understanding of a political society is, on the contrary, the 
contention that nothing is perfectly commensurable (not even goods). Actually, the market is modeled on the analogy 
of politics; it is the place of confrontation of different and, to a considerable extent, conflicting and non-perfectly 
commensurable expectations.
The difficulty of unambiguously following a rule has its roots, it seems, in the difference that there 
is between symmetry and analogy. We may say that according to Hayek actors are analogously 
positioned but not symmetrically. If this were the case we would collapse into a form of 
essentialism (that 'individuals' are self-contained realities or essentials) or false individualism (that 
starts from a presumption of Reason with a capital R) that he had rejected from the outset.
In any case, interpretation comes inevitably to the centre o f our concerns for we do not have any 
objective and externally given mechanism of signaling that is able to get rid o f the subjective 
evaluation of each agent concerning the interaction.19 We cannot help entertaining expectations as
In this regard, Caldwell (1994), drawing on Havek. remarks that "(...) Hayek's larger project was to 
determine how the actions o f agents whose subjective beliefs differ could ever become coordinated Because of 
its focus on equilibrium end-states, equilibrium theory was rejected as a tool for furthering our understanding 
o f the coordination problem. (...) Equilibrium theory assumes that the coordination problem has already been 
solved"(311) But then he concludes that: "If one focuses instead on how our interpretations create and change 
the world then the whole question o f interpersonal coordination may become problematical."(311) 1 do not 
quite agree with this second contention if  by 'problematical' Caldwell means that Havek did not account for the 
problem of interpretation, as shall be clear from the following parts of this dissertation, especially section 4 . 1 
do believe that the way Hayek addresses the problem of interpretation also suggests a view of 'coordination' 
different from that implied in standard general equilibrium analysis.
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to what others know or believe, since we cannot ignore - it is indeed daily before us - that the 
achievement of our aims depends to a great extent precisely on the expectations entertained by 
others.
In implicitly acknowledging a place for interpretation, Hayek is pointing to the crucial question that 
the genuine problem of social life is not the amount o f information individuals possess. Again, 
what is really envisaged by Hayek is rather the capacity of knowing. And it is not so much our 
limited computational capabilities that are at stake, though they play a part (as the epiphenomenon):
The number of separate variables which in any particular phenomenon will 
determine the result of a given change will as a rule be far too large for any human 
mind to master and manipulate them effectively. (CR.42)
More important is the fact that knowledge, the stuff out o f which our social world is made, is itself 
a complex structure with its own domain o f autonomy, something that moves away from us, at the 
very moment we try to catch it.
Though this is not explicitly stated by Hayek, this interpretation is compatible with many relevant 
parts of his work and it refers to the consideration by Hayek that the social world is entirely built up 
o f ‘theories', and that any of these theories affects it unpredictable In this way, the path to design is 
rather severed.
This latter consideration is bound to limit not only the ordinary theories entertained by social actors 
but also any social theory. So, anyone attempting to grasp this world would have to be aware that 
among the huge number of separate variables the theoretician is looking at he should include his 
own efforts. As no one single mind wields the power to  gather all the required knowledge (a 
complex structure itself) to run or understand the social intercourse, so every single mind cannot 
but work on the modest presumption of ignorance of what others think and will do and, therefore, 
what the consequences of his own actions will be.20
20 Yet, why add to the 'impossibility* a recommendation of active ignorance? It does not seem to follow
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As far as social theory is concerned, this presumption is translated into the form of an explanation 
of the 'principle', which is only a negative form of knowledge:
(...) While we can explain the principle on which certain phenomena are produced 
and can from this knowledge exclude the possibility o f certain results, e g., o f 
certain events occurring together, our knowledge will in a sense be only negative, 
i.e., it will merely enable us to preclude certain results but not enable us to narrow 
the range o f possibilities sufficiently so that only one remains, (ibidem, 42)
The way to design is blocked because the way to full prediction is similarly blocked, says Hayek, in 
a statement that ties our epistemic condition to limited normative prospects. Social interaction, 
individual actions and theoretical undertakings all remain bounded to Verstehen, to intelligibility, to 
make sense from within, for it is impossible for any part to postulate an external point of 
view.2l.Just as people base their actions on the perceptions they have of the meaning o f other 
people’s action, so will the social theorist take these as a datum and he cannot help adding his own 
interpretation of people's actions and beliefs when trying to re-construct their reasoning.22 In
logically from the 'impossibility* argument and actually renders it rather awkward. The only justification I can 
see is that there is an implicit normative assumption which does not follow from the epistemological argument 
at all. In fact, from this latter we may deduce an intricate relationship between subjectivity and objectivity 
instead of an unequivocal convergence to an objective, and for that matter disastrous, equilibrium.
21 The specific problem to w hich Hayek refers is that of the role of perception of the meaning of other people's 
action in the scientific explanation of the interaction of men To quote. "The problem which arises here is 
known in the discussion of the methodology of the social sciences as that o f Verstehen (understanding). We 
have seen that this understanding of the meaning of actions is of the same kind as the understanding of 
communications (i.e., o f action intended to be understood). It includes what the eighteenth-century' authors 
described as sympathy and what has more recently been discussed under the heading of 'empathy'* 
(Einfhhlung). Since we shall be concerned chiefly with the use of these perceptions as data for the theoretical 
social sciences, we shall concentrate on what is sometimes called rational understanding (or rational 
reconstruction), that is, on the instances where we recognize that the persons in whose actions we are 
interested base their decisions on the meaning of what they perceive. The theoretical social sciences do not 
treat all of a person's actions as an unspecifiable and unexplainable w hole but, in their efforts to account for the 
unintended consequences of individual actions, endeavor to reconstruct the individual's reasoning from the 
data which to him are provided by the recognition of the actions of others as meaningful whole$.M(S,59)
22 Schütz has a  well known formula to state the case here: the  world is a typified world1, as for him ideal types 
pervade our world both as observers and  objects o f  observation. To quote from  a  comment on Schütz by Walsh: 
"ft]he use o f ideal types does not, then, enter at the stage when we pass from prescientific to scientific 
observation. It enters rather when we pass from direct to indirect social experience."(ibidem, p.xxviii)
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understanding, the social theorist is actually judging people’s judgments with respect to the meaning 
of other people's actions. And the basis for this knowledge o f others is provided by rules. Even 
theoretical knowledge is constrained by the practical knowledge of some common rules, 
supposedly shared by interpreters, that is, the acting individual and the theoretician:
We shall indicate this limitation by speaking o f intelligibility and of
comprehending the meaning o f  human action rather than of understanding.
(S,59)
As far as both ordinary and sophisticated observers are concerned, every viewpoint is internal, that 
is, to this universe o f commonly shared rules where every position is to be meaningful. Yet every 
evaluation is an interpretation subject to error, for intelligibility is certainly a matter o f degree. The 
suggestion Hayek offers as a practical guideline here is that we should not dismiss our presumption 
of shared rules if it can be seen to work.
But, take care: the notion of equilibrium in the traditional analysis is a bad presumption, for the 
objectivity it entails is both misleading and undesirable. I do not have space here to explore the 
logical problems Hayek identifies in the notion of equilibrium23 and which I have just hinted at, but 
the question concerning its desirability is internal to our scope. The reason is that the richness of the 
whole, something highly desirable in the Hayekian world, depends on asymmetries, different 
subjective evaluations o f the individuals, and different circumstances of choice for each individual, 
all of them at odds with traditional equilibrium conditions. Disequilibrium is practically the motto o f 
the spontaneous order.
In any case, Hayek is not claiming the end o f objectivity when he criticizes the equilibrium concept, 
for objectivity is not altogether dismissed but just reinterpreted. In my view, Hayek presumes 
objectivity to be a matter of degree, being more meaningful as the boundary conditions o f the very 
subjective assessments o f the individuals. Those conditions are subject to change, but, in contrast to
23See IEO, specially p. 55.
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these latter, they evolve slowly in time. Objectivity is therefore in the time-dimension, not alien to 
(slow) change and, in the space-dimension, quite intersubjective:
We can judge and modify all our views and beliefs only within a framework of 
opinions and values which, though they will gradually change, are for us a given 
result of that evolution. (S, 75)
4. Individuals: Experience plus Constraints 
(limiting subjectivity on the way to Verstehen)
Let us pause to consider more closely what this approach assumes the individuals to be. My 
hypothesis is that the individual is an indefinite extension of knowledge surrounded by the deep seas 
of what he ignores. More to the point, the individual is a locus o f experience and constraints, a 
complex structure himself He is prey to the circumstances and particular facts and it is through him 
that rules are experimented and tested, yet the result of his efforts is not alien to him.
The individual experiences the circumstances and the particular facts and then experiments and tests 
the rules, each experience being quite irreducible to any other. So, the individual is defined with 
reference to the whole (the system of general rules) as well as with reference to his idiosyncratic 
experience. It is his experience of the circumstances which commands a combination of rules to be 
applied and a further testing of the suitability o f these rules.
On the other hand, though, the sense of an individual's experiences is already given to him by some 
set of largely untestable rules. So, we have two levels o f rules operating through the individuals, 
namely, testable and largely untestable rules. Although even these latter can be tested in the long 
run, not all rules can be simultaneously tested because some of them are the very premises of 
individual experiences (but contrast Popper's view in the last section). In this connection, Hayek 
evokes the familiar feeling of dizziness that comes about every time we realize that the parameters 
o f any one of our acts are missing and we experience the fear of having the ground taken from
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under our feet. He takes this as an evidence that we act to a large extent on an unarticulated 
presumption that our action has a place within a more comprehensive order24 25
From the preceding we can see a fundamental tension in Hayek's image of the 'interacting' 
individual, as the locus of both freedom and constraints that he conceives the individual to be. In 
short, one can say that Hayek emphasizes the role played by constraints, as in his idea o f  freedom 
confined to freedom to en1 under these constraints, that is, freedom in a 'negative* sense. However, 
he also sees a quite innovative function o f  this freedom, in a more 'positive' sense, as it takes the 
form of an ’additive* capacity of the individuals when making their way in the world. Now let us try 
to understand the conditions of individual action and try to examine the interplay between these 
paradoxical elements.
Some initial driving forces, such as hunger (which is one of Hayek’s examples), plus external 
circumstances establish the situation requiring action from the individual. He looks, then, for the 
rules applicable (a combination of a number o f abstract rules), and acts accordingly to satisfy his 
desire. In doing this the individual is simultaneously making use o f some explanatory knowledge, o f 
causes and effects, that is, concerning the means available and the immediate ends he has in mind, 
and some normative knowledge, referring to the more abstract and unarticulated rules constraining 
his choices. Among these latter, there are more general rules that shape the situation as the decision 
problem it looks like, rules, that is, that are already at work when the individual begins to search for 
rules applicable to his situation. This description gives us the opportunity to examine a little further 
what is the ’real’ action and how complex the actor may appear23
24 According to Schütz, in Wagner's words, "all hum an experiences are experiences in and of their life-world: 
they constitute it, they are oriented toward it, they are tested in it." (...) "The life-world ... is the whole sphere 
of everyday experiences, orientations, and actions through which individuals pursue their interests and affairs 
by manipulating objects, dealing with people, conceiving plans, and carrying them out.*(pp. 14/15) Man 
operates in this world with the help of a  'natural attitude* (pragmatic, utilitarian and realistic), 'biographical 
factors’, and o f a 'stock of knowledge on hand' (routine character). According to phenomenological theory, 
each individual constructs his own 'world'. But he does this with the help of building blocks and methods 
offered to him fay others: the life-world is a  social world which, in  turn, is prestructured for the 
individual, "(ibidem, pp  14/15)
25 Even the aim s of our actions do not appear either as clearly given before us or as something revealing in
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4.1 Explanatory and Normative Knowledge
We have then two different 'actions' taking place inasmuch as two different sets of knowledge are 
required We may refer to them as the explanatory or 'subjective' knowledge and the normative or 
'objective' knowledge.26 The explanatory knowledge is a ’subjective' knowledge in the strict sense 
that it is a knowledge with a knowing subject, one that requires a subject searching for means to 
achieve its pre-established aims, taking advantage of his concrete knowledge. It is subjective also in 
the sense o f a knowledge of causes and their known effects, its efficiency being circumscribed to 
the sphere o f the particular facts that regard the individuals. So;
the knowledge and beliefs o f different people, while possessing that common 
structure which makes communication possible, will yet be different and often 
conflicting in many respects (...) the concrete knowledge which guides the action of 
any group o f people never exists as a consistent and coherent body. It only exists in 
the dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in many 
individual minds, and this dispersion and imperfection of all knowledge is one of the 
basic facts from which the social sciences have to start. (CR, 30)
The normative knowledge, on the other hand, is a sort o f objective knowledge, a knowledge 
without a knowing subject in the sense that it goes beyond the subject’s sphere. We may examine 
this surplus, so to speak, with the help o f two dimensions, namely ’production’ and ’consumption'. 
So, this objective knowledge is said to be a knowledge without a knowing subject because, though
terms of an understanding of social phenomena. It is true that our actions start from some more or less 
immediate aims, as purposive actions, that is. But the relevance of this initial impulse on the overall chain of 
consequences it sets in motion quickly fades away. Besides, the ultimate ends of the individuals are quite 
unknown to them, in the uncertain world we all live in. They are beyond their decision sphere for they are 
susceptible to variation according to the circumstances and new possibilities offered by the ever growing 
amount of knowledge that society possesses. All the individual can autonomously do is to procure himself the 
‘means' - that is, the immediate ends • he thinks will help him to satisfy those socially given ultimate ends, 
whatever they may be in the future. However, even some immediate ends take a social form; money, in an 
advanced society, actually one of its institutions, will function as an immediate end that works as a 'generalized 
means' to ultimate ends. So, the adage goes, each individual searching for a position to achieve his immediate 
ends (socially given as this 'generalized means' - money (a statement about which the adage has so far been 
silent)) will derive widespread desirable and unforeseen consequences. And in order to accomplish it, each 
individual ought to be free to err in his search which no one could do in his place.
26 I am forcing here an approximation between Hayek's explanatory/normative opposition and Popper's 
subjectiv'e/objectiv e opposition, thanks to which I may 'free-ride' Popper's hopes. See the last section.
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resulting from the subject's endeavors to causally know something, it exceeds the subject’s efforts. 
On the consumption side, we have to think of it as something that is already conditioning 
individual's explanatory efforts to address some choice situation; for it frames the hidden premises 
of his choice, actually constraining and reducing the scope o f his free choice.
In other words, the objectivity o f this normative knowledge comes from the role it plays in 
meaningfully delimiting the sphere o f individual action (the consumption side), and from the fact 
that, though resulting from individual action, it is quite autonomous with regard to  the initial 
stimulus the subjective sphere exerts on it (the production side).
We are now going to examine the delimitative function o f normative knowledge, its consumption 
side. I shall leave the question o f its autonomy to a further treatment in the next three parts, 
although we shall anticipate in this section the extent to which normative knowledge is constructed 
by individuals' expectations.
What do we mean when we say that the objective knowledge delimits the sphere o f individual 
action? We mean that it makes us perceive some situation as we perceive it, that it gives form even 
to our sensory perception, and that, more generally, our sense perceptions, our actions and our 
perceptions of other's actions are governed by its norms. This role is largely negative:
(Rules) will often merely determine or limit the range o f possibilities within which 
the choice is made consciously. By eliminating certain kinds o f actions altogether, 
and providing certain routine ways o f achieving the object, they merely restrict the 
alternatives on which a conscious choice is required. (...) Thus even decisions 
carefully considered will in part be determined by rules o f which the acting person is 
not aware. (S,57)
However negative the role of rules may be, when it comes to internal constraints placed in the very 
sensorial capacity o f the individuals, this negative aspect o f the rules becomes almost positive. (I 
wonder whether, in Hayek's view, any positive 'activity1 o f an action would have a positive value 
whatsoever, for the 'positive* aspect of an action seems to lie in a thoroughly irrelevant initial
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stimulus to it. I return to this point later in this section.) Anyway, let us turn to Hayek's idea of rules 
delimiting the universe of our perceptions and actions.
/ .  Seme-perceptions (SP)21
Recall that we are rule-following animals; we perceive and understand the world and ourselves by 
resorting to the classificatory scheme our mind provides us. And thanks to it we can make sense of 
what we see, hear and, more generally, feel. Abstract principles or patterns superimposed on our 
sense perceptions and instincts provide a more sophisticated classificatory scheme than would be 
provided by our bare instincts, and specify "what we are to  regard as objects or events of the same 
kind or different kinds", that is, they relate external objects to an order. Hence, our sensorial 
experience o f the world, in general, turns on our thoroughly mastering a highly abstract scheme of 
patterns and regularities, a system of rules, in short. But, as we have already seen, this capacity of 
ours cannot entirely appear at the conscious level. But we can still know N it.
2. Sprachgejhh! (S):
Beside this sense-sphere, we may also recognize that we 'buy' some rules by learning a language, 
without being aware o f it, though. So, when a child learns a language she learns more than she is 
able to articulate in terms of the rules {Sprachgejhh!) she now gets a practical knowledge of. 
Moreover, by learning a language we leam more than the language itself in the sense that we 
acquire through it a picture o f the world in which our own and others' actions become 
meaningful27 8
27 The mark that hereinafter follows each set of rules, namely, SP, S, R, and T, are later to be used in a 
diagram in subsection 4.2.
28 This passage is reminiscent of Hayek's relative Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular of the latter's later work, 
Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein is only mentioned once in Hayek's Studies.... but most significantly, 
in the context of Sprachgefhhl and Rechtsgefhhi, as these are defined as capacities of ours "to follow rules 
which we do not know in the sense that we can state tbemll(S,45). The reference to Wittgenstein is in the 
footnote where Hayek quotes from the Philosophical Investigations the following extract: '"knowing" it only 
means: being able to describe it.'
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As we leant as children to  use our language according to rules which we do not 
explicitly know, so we learn with language not only to act according to rules o f 
language, but according to many other rules of interpreting the world and of acting 
appropriately, rules which will guide us though we have never explicitly formulated 
them. (S,87)
3. Rechtsgefhhl (R):
Analogously to our judgments o f meaning, our judgments o f the justice or injustice o f our own o r 
other people's actions {Rechtsgefhhl) are also based on our possession o f some abstract and 
unarticulated rules; they are somehow to help us coordinate our actions to others' and to the whole 
according to how far these actions fit into the abstract system of the rules of conduct.
Thus we acquire a practical knowledge o f grammar and other practical rules as we acquire a sense 
of justice, in a way, that is, which we are unable to specify and fully articulate. Both capacities, says 
Hayek, must be based on ourselves possessing and being governed in our perceptions and actions 
by a highly abstract system of rules, inhabitants of the world of normative/objective knowledge.
4. Perception o f others * actions (T) :
Another important instance o f our actions and perceptions being rule-guided is that rules guide our 
perception o f other people's action, the relevant world in which we act where not only are we 
guided by rules but we also perceive other people's actions as rule guided too. It is worth noting 
that here we have a different class o f rules than Sprachgefhhl, a class which is located in a lower 
level of non-consciousness, because these rules are usually represented as 'customs' and habits', and 
as providing 'routine ways' o f dealing with situations.
So, we are always looking for patterns and regularities in other people's conduct, and we may say 
that what they do has a meaning for us whenever their actions seem to conform to a recognizable 
rule which we judge applicable to the situation:
we take it for granted that other men treat various things as alike or unlike just as 
we do, although no objective test, no knowledge o f the relations of these things to 
other parts o f the external world justifies this. Our procedure is based on the
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experience that other people as a rule (though not always - eg . not if they are 
colorblind or mad) classify their sense impressions as we do. (CR, 26)
In this connection, what is important is that this common 'acquaintance* happens, in the sense that 
the interpreter and the people involved in a particular situation recognize it as one of a certain kind 
It is not required that they be able to articulate every particular that makes the situation an instance 
o f a more general class. The point by Hayek is that more often than not this latter knowledge does 
not obtain, as we have already hinted at. This is the kind o f problem better illustrated by 
physiognomic perception, whereby we understand a gesture or a fecial expression as expressing 
something else. But it can be extended, Hayek contends, to wider domains insofar as this capacity 
to respond to signs o f which we are not aware seems to guide our 'recognition of action as directed 
or purposive' It constitutes an instance o f the very important statement that in many o f the 
situations in our social world we understand without knowing how we understand
Whenever we conclude that an individual is in a certain mood, or acts deliberately 
or purposively or effortlessly, seems to expect something or threaten or comfort 
another, etc., we generally do not know, and would not be able to explain, how we 
know this Yet we generally act successfully on the basis o f such 'understanding' o f 
the conduct o f theirs. (S.48)29
4.2 Recognition
What kind of recognition is that? The basis o f recognition is some sort o f identification. But instead 
of taking this recognition as evidence of the existence o f some essentia] common ground, Hayek 
warns that we have not so far arrived at any firm ground. That is, recognition is a problematic 
matter and shall be further explained. All that we may conclude is that our capacity o f recognizing 
an action as rule guided relies upon our already possessing this rule. What is it that makes Hayek so
29 On the role of physiognomic perception as a guide for practices and. more generally, of intuitive Gestalt 
perception of patterns, Hayek refers, in a footnote, to an earlier work by Michael Polanyi, namely, "Knowing 
and Being”, Mind.70.196l. On that occasion, Hayek launches an attack against behaviorism and its 
physicalism. I quote: "we must also take into account in explaining the effects of men's actions that they are 
guided by such perceptions. (...) We shall find that perceptions of this sort, which the radical behaviorists wish 
to disregard because the corresponding stimuli cannot be defined in *physical terms', are among the chief data 
on which our explanations of the relations between men must be built.” (S,54)
240
prudent at this point o f the argument? Why does he not take recognition as an evidence of'sharing? 
We should recall here that for Hayek the locus that each individual occupies in the social space is to  
a large extent unique, it is something resisting simplification o f any sort, full comparability, or 
commensurability. So, if we recognize some action o f others as meaningful it is because it matches 
our own interpretation of the situation that they face and, accordingly, seems to follow the 
applicable rule:
This knowledge by acquaintance' presupposes therefore that some o f the rules in 
terms of which we perceive and act are the same as those by which the conduct o f 
those whose actions we interpret is guided. (S,59)
All we may say is that
we must be made up of the same ingredients, however different the mixture may be 
in the particular instances. (S,59)
In this regard, Hayek advances in his The Counter Revolution of Science the idea that individuals in 
social interaction are "merely the fo c i in the network of relationships". This is an idea that seems to 
encompass a quasi-constitutive notion of expectations, for in a sense it is the way individuals are 
looked upon by others which affirm what they are doing/intending etc. So, in understanding what 
an individual is doing or intending to do or believes, we should not be concerned with the totality o f 
his mind in all its complexity. In particular,
if the social structure can remain the same although different individuals succeed 
each other at particular points, this is not because they succeed each other in 
particular relations, in particular attitudes they take towards other people and as the 
objects of particular views held by other people about them. The individuals are 
merely the foci in the network of relationships and it is the various attitudes of the 
individuals towards each other (or their similar or different attitudes towards 
physical objects) which form the recurrent, recognizable and familiar elements o f 
the structure. If  one policeman succeeds another at a particular post, this does not 
mean that the new man will in all respects be identical with his predecessor, but 
merely that he succeeds him in certain attitudes o f his fellowmen which are relevant 
to his function as policeman. But this is sufficient to  preserve a constant structural 
element which can be separated and studied in isolation. (CR,34)
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But again, to conclude that recognition amounted to ’function' would be an impoverishment of 
Hayek's broader intuition. For he acknowledges the complexity surrounding the arrangement o f the 
superimposed and interrelated rules:
The complexity o f the arrangement in which these mles may be superimposed and 
interrelated is difficult briefly to indicate. We must assume that there exists not only 
on the perceptual side a hierarchy o f superimposed classes o f classes, etc., but that 
similarly also on the motor side not merely dispositions to act according to a rule 
but dispositions to change dispositions and so on will operate chains which may be 
of considerable length. (S, 57)
Additionally, this complexity is set in motion in a particular action when both a combination o f the 
rules may be in order and a change in the usual way of dealing with it:
It is this determination of particular actions by various combinations of abstract 
propensities which makes it possible for a causally determined structure o f actions 
to produce ever new actions it has never produced before, and therefore to produce 
altogether new behavior such as we do not expect from what we usually describe 
as a mechanism. (NS, 49)
In The Fatal Conceit Hayek suggests that as far as a concept o f order in the external world is 
concerned we should think of a scheme like the following:
Learning of the Principles Principles superimposed External order affected
over senses and instincts by senses and instincts
Of course the process of teaming may vary enormously and accordingly afreet the whole chain. 
More generally, though, it is the complexity o f the arrangement of principles itself which is at stake, 
which would have to include the multilevel rules we have been considering in the process o f rule 
selection that an action sets forth. Consider the following diagrams:
A B 4
Learnt Innate
rules rules
SP -  S F - SF  
Instincts 
Action
3
2
1
As mind and society are not monocentric orders but only polycentric ones, problems of hierarchy 
and interrelation are more likely to arise and accordingly they will not always provide convergent 
solutions. We might agree that evolution has settled down the hierarchy A — B, as in (I), but 
certainly not any specific 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 hierarchy or combination in (II), as it would amount to  
denying the dynamic forces that evolution itself releases.
So, recognition carries the difficulty that we can never be certain of the interpretation we have 
given to an action of others, as we can never be certain that some particular fact actually 
corresponds to the place we have assigned to it within some pattern, as has already been remarked 
upon That is, individuals are as complex structures as social interaction, their actions being 
"determined by the relation and mutual adjustment to each other o f the elements o f which (they) 
consist".30
This is the kind o f uncertainty that knowledge by acquaintance* cannot get rid o£ although it is 
true that the presumption that 'rules underlie people's actions' works for the improvement of the 
predictability o f the environment. To be sure, action would falsify the local 
theories/expectations/interpretations held by agents because of the composition effects unless rules 
were followed. However, uncertainty still persists to the extent that we cannot be sure about the 
rules themselves.
30 Cf. Studies... p.73.
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However, the very benefits we hope to  derive from the presumption of a knowledge by 
acquaintance' stem from the fact that where there is some uncertainty, action is still possible for we 
may have the basis to  attach ’a degree o f confidence' to our interpretations.
The degree of confidence we attach to the interpretation we have made of someone's action is a 
function of the distance between u s 31 If we are quite distant from one another the reliability o f any 
physiognomic knowledge is quite low. In this case, we do better to stick to more general and 
abstract rules to understand each other's actions, such as customs, habits and tradition.
Again, we may behave according to norms because this makes the consequences of our actions 
more predictable. O f course to make sense o f this statement we have to consider that there are 
lower and higher level norms, that is, norms we abide by in a strategic sense (e g., by deliberately 
following a habit which gives prospects of success) and others that are operating behind our backs, 
like Sprachgefhhl We might opt for predictability in the sense of actively following the lower level 
norms, but this is less clear with respect to the higher level norms. We may wonder whether higher 
level norms, less likely to be used in a strategic sense, will still encompass more contradictory 
guides to actions and accordingly lead to conflict.
We should note, then, that according to Hayek to follow a rule is also a way towards predictability, 
though not a prospect for a well informed utility maximizing choice:32
31 Schütz makes a similar point, when he refers to the extent to which we resort to 'ideal types' when going 
about the social relations as a function of what he calls the 'degrees of anonymity* or indirectness in these 
relations. We quote from Wagner's comments: "indirect relationships fall into extended continuum patterns of 
growing anonymity. They range from the region of persons 1 have encountered and may encounter again to the 
artifacts which merely bear witness of the one-time existence of their entirely unknown makers.” (ibidem,p.37) 
The degree of anonymity of the indirect relations determines whether I am ’We-orientecT or They-orientcd*.
32 The idea here is that even probabilistic calculations are ruled ou t for they would be reliable just in an 
environment where repetition is likely to occur. Since Hayek deems our social world to be just circumstantially 
repeatable, not essentially, measures of expected utility are not applicable.
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Man does not so much choose between alternative actions according to  their 
known consequences as prefer those the consequences o f which are predictable 
over those the consequences o f which are unknown. What he most fears, and what 
puts him in a state of terror when it has happened, is to lose his bearings and no 
longer know what to do. The world is fairly predictable only so long as one adheres 
to the established procedures, but it becomes frightening when one deviates from 
them. (S,80/81)
Still, this instrumental view of the rules does not fit well into Hayek's idea of normative knowledge 
as a constraint on actions. One conciliatory conjecture is to presume that the normative knowledge 
is made up of a mixture of internal (subjective) elements and externally given ones. We turn now to  
the 'internal' side o f normative knowledge.
4.3 Addition
What is the basis o f our understanding o f what surrounds us, o f our grasping the rule, under 
uncertainty? It seems that we understand, Hayek suggests, by adding things to the existing things, 
persons, objects around us. The image suggested here is that of the social actor as the 
superimposition o f a quasi-material supplement gathered to him by the others and reciprocally by 
him to them, This material is 'opinions’.
Recognition is, according to Hayek, projection, 'reading into'. This is something Hayek makes quite 
clear when he analyses the meaning of what he calls 'social facts'. The objects of human activity 
(tools, food, medicines, weapons, words, sentences, communications, and acts o f production)
are defined not in terms o f their 'real* properties but in terms of opinions people 
hold about them. In short, in the social sciences the things are what people think 
they are. (IEO,69)
(...)
People do behave in the same manner towards things, not because these things are 
identical in a physical sense, but because they have learnt to classify them as 
belonging to the same group, because they can put them to  the same use or expect 
from them what to the people concerned is an equivalent effect. In feet, most o f the 
objects of social and human action are not 'objective facts' in the special narrow
sense in which this term is used by the Sciences and contrasted to 'opinions’, and 
they cannot at all be defined in physical terms. So far as human actions are 
concerned, the things are what the acting people think they are. (CR, 27)
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Still, if we want to understand someone's acts we shall then try to think what the observed person 
thinks she is doing, what her intention is. Yet, just as in the case o f objects the understanding of 
which turns on what people's opinions about them are and if we want to know them we have to 
look at what people know about them, this is also so in the case o f actions. Whenever we want to 
understand someone's actions as intentional or purposive we have no other choice but to impute 
this intention or purpose to the person on the basis of an analogy of our own mind (which we 
should think in terms of the same superimposition) and see if rt works.
On watching a few movements or hearing a few words o f a man, we decide that he 
is sane and not a lunatic and thereby exclude the possibility o f his behaving in an 
infinite number of'odd' ways which none of us could ever enumerate and which just 
do not fit into what we know to be reasonable behavior - which means nothing else 
than that those actions cannot be interpreted by analogy o f our mind. (IEO,64)
Recognition entails constraining, that is, limiting the range of alternative possibilities within which 
we can make sense o f what others are doing, but also constructing. In 'consuming' normative 
knowledge we are also 'producing' more o f it and adding to it, as our opinions and expectations 
testify.33 This is done deductively, not inductively, Hayek contends:
in discussing what we regard as other people's conscious actions, we invariably 
interpret their action on the analogy of our own mind (...) We thus always 
supplement what we actually see o f another person's action by projecting into that 
person a system of classification o f objects which we know, not from observing 
other people, but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves. 
(IEO,63)
33 That we are not passive recipients, determined by preexisting cultural ideas is also Schulz’s view. I quote the 
comment by Wagner: "Schütz showed that even the socially most stereotyped cultural ideas only exist in the 
minds of individuals who absorb them, interpret them on the basis of their own life situation, and give them a 
personal tinge (ibidem,p.l7)
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We can never be sure about this imputed intention or knowledge, although this will not be cause fo r 
complaint as it may be sufficient for practical purposes. Moreover, this practice seems to be one o f  
the sources of the realities (and conflicts) in our social world.
Another suggestive illation seems to be that this interpretative work, which is always taking place 
within social interaction, is analogous to  the theoretical work o f the social theorist, for both kinds 
of interpretation are fairly constitutive o f their objects. A social theorist is only a more sophisticated 
observer than ordinary observing individuals engaging in daily interaction. These latter are also 
always acting on suppositions about the behavior o f some others; by performing their decisions 
they generally display a high degree o f confidence about the overall order that contains the farther 
frontiers o f their acts. The social theorist, who works on second level suppositions, is bound to  
contain the variability of the world within some ideal types.
The similarity between action and theory is remarkable. Social theorists and actors are both building 
up their worlds based on suppositions on suppositions. In fact, Hayek contends that social sciences
are not about the social wholes as wholes; they do not pretend to discover by 
empirical observation laws o f behavior or change of these wholes. Their task is 
rather, if  I may so call it, to constitute these wholes, to provide schemes o f 
structural relationships which the historian can use when he has to attempt to fit 
together into a meaningful whole the elements which he actually finds. (IEO,72)
And we may extend the analogy to the actor in the social world as the actor 'constitutes' the social 
world within which he acts:
The question is here not how far man's picture o f the external world fits the facts, 
but how by his actions, determined by the views and concepts he possesses, man 
builds up another world o f which the individual becomes a part. And by 'the views 
and concepts people hold' we do not mean merely their knowledge o f external 
nature. We mean all they know and believe about themselves, about other people, 
and about the external world, in short everything which determines their actions, 
including science itself. (CR, 24)
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All in all the issue of imputation seems to preserve a distance between the explanans (social 
interaction) and the expkxnanda (rules), for the implication is that each actor works on 
presumptions concerning others' actions and whenever they prove not to work a change is set in 
motion.34
One kind of'constitution', however, is ruled out by Hayek. In discussing the nature of the facts' in 
the Social Sciences, Hayek points out that our facts should be the 'ideas' held by people we, the 
theoreticians, are observing. At this point he distinguishes two levels o f ideas that we should 
consider whenever we analyze social life, the one being opinions and beliefs ordinarily held by 
people about some object of their interest, which are constitutive o f the whole called 'society1, and 
the other being those speculative concepts that amount to popular theories or generalizations from 
the concrete knowledge people may have (that is, that ‘normative’ knowledge which has an 
inductive origin in explanatory knowledge).
The beliefs and opinions which lead a number o f people regularly to repeat certain 
acts, e g., to produce, sell, or buy certain quantities o f commodities, are entirely 
different from the ideas they may have formed about the whole of the 'society1, or 
the economic system, to which they belong and which the aggregate o f all their 
actions constitutes. (CR, 37)
These latter may be wrong and a major task for the social theorist it is to improve on them with the 
aid o f the compositive method.35 In fact, Hayek warns against the danger of mistaking these ideas 
for the 'facts' o f our social sciences.
34 This seems to fulfill one of Turner's criticism, that against the assumption of 'internal sameness' of the 
actors generally implied in the approach Practices'Tradition-Tacit Knowledge'. According to Turner, this 
approach does not keep the necessary distance between the explanans (order) and the explananda (practices, 
tradition and so on) when they explain order through practices, for they do not consistently display how' 
different people came to acquire the same practices which are deemed to be conducive to order. See Turner 
(1994).
35 Hayek proposes the compositive method in his CR
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We may infer from this digression that speculative reasoning might improperly compete w ith 
established rules on the level o f practical life. Given the ineradicable synoptical illusion entailed in 
the generalizations that people make (always from their ineradicably particular positions), Hayek 
finds a ground for rejecting (all too readily) any positive, constitutive function of these concepts 
whatsoever. These latter would release entropic forces within a spontaneous order, or so it seems. 
This is more difficult to make sense of. W e shall turn to this point later in sections 6 and 7.
5. O rder and disorder
So far we have come to the conclusion that every action in our social world is somehow ex-ante 
interaction, in the sense that it is based on our following rules and it is performed on the basis o f a 
quite subjective interpretation of others' behavior as rule-guided as well. Yet we should not be 
misled into concluding that conformity to an orderliness is an inevitable outcome o f the interplay 
between these interacting rule-following individuals. The positional differences, so to speak, among 
the individuals can be a source o f both orderliness and disorder. We may provisionally refer to two 
sources of differences: the differences that might come about from different positions o f the parts 
relative to the whole; and those which might arise from different positions of the parts relative to 
the other parts. So we have to spell out further conditions that might provide for orderliness. These 
will be the elements that contribute to the characterization o f the autonomy of the whole with 
regard to its constituting parts.
Again, though this common background o f rules was what made it possible for an orderliness to 
emerge from the interaction of the many individuals over time, it is important to  note that 
orderliness is not a necessary achievement o f the interaction itself according to Hayek. Rule-guided 
interacting individuals may also produce an overall disorder. In other words, a system o f individual 
rules may produce other order or disorder:
Not every system o f rules o f individual conduct will produce an overall order o f the 
actions o f a group of individuals; and whether a given system o f rules o f individual 
conduct will produce an order o f actions, and what kind o f order, will depend on 
the circumstances in which the individuals act. The classical instance in which the
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very regularity of the behavior o f the elements produces 'perfect disorder1 is the 
second law of thermodynamics, the entropy principle. It is evident that in a group 
of living beings many possible rules o f individual conduct would also produce only 
disorder or make the existence o f the group as such impossible. A society of 
animals or men is always a number o f individuals observing such common rules of 
conduct as, in the circumstance in which they live, will produce an order o f actions. 
(S,67)
In other words, systems of rules may produce two different effects, order or entropy. Besides, an 
overall order of actions may be the result o f different sets of rules o f individual conduct. The same 
effect may result from different causes. What characterizes structures that permit an overall order 
to appear, then, is that they not only spring from a system of rules but also that these rules have 
somehow enabled under the circumstances a certain relationship between the parts and the whole 
which, in turn, conveyed a high degree of autonomy to the structures themselves:
The orderliness of the system of actions will in general show itself in the fact that 
actions o f the different individuals will be so co-ordinated, or mutually adjusted to 
each other, that the result o f their actions will remove the initial stimulus or make 
inoperative the drive which has been the cause of activity. (S,69, my emphasis)
So, one important element is the emphasis that is being put on the co-ordinating effects of an action 
rather than on the aspect of individual initiative it contains. It is still true that each part produces the 
whole but it is no less true that it does so through the effects that its actions produce on the others 
and on the overall, its very existence turning on the results it causes in this external world made of 
all the others and o f everyone.
The process that is launched can be described as follows: some circumstances may render a practice 
more conducive to an order of actions; this may be a motive for this practice to persist, as each 
acting individual will tend to conform to it on his way to achieving particular ends, plausibly by 
imitating others who successfully followed it.
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Let us try, now, to  spell out the elements that make for the autonomy of the outside world, Some 
auxiliary ideas we need to work out are the ideas of complexity, organized complexity and the 
statement that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
Societies are complex structures, or structures with essential complexity, that is,
structures whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up 
of relatively large numbers of variables. (NS,26, my emphasis)
Societies, moreover, are structures exhibiting a rather organized complexity:
[this] means that the character o f the structures showing it depends not only on the 
properties o f the individual elements o f which they are composed, and the relative 
frequency with which they occur, but also on the m anner in which the individual 
elements are connected with each other. (NS,27)
So, on the one hand we have the question o f a large number o f variables, the individual parts and 
their relative frequency - which makes a mechanical treatment o f this structure quite implausible. 
(And possibly also excludes a probabilistic treatment, for repeatability is not a necessary feature o f 
the phenomena within this structure as we have already mentioned.) On the other hand we have the 
question o f the way the parts adjust. This refers to the local-coordination among the parts.
Still, these complex structures, such as societies, individuals, language, and law, are orders that can 
be said to be more than the totality of the regularities observable within their parts Cand cannot be 
reduced to them'). They exceed the sum total o f local-coordinations. The idea here is that not only 
are the irreducibly many elements within this whole related in a particular manner but also that there 
is a peculiar Interaction of the parts with an outside world both o f the individual parts and the 
whole'. This must be an order-enhancing interaction. That is, horizontal or local co-ordination 
must have a global effect:
If there exist recurrent and persistent structures o f a certain type (i.e., showing a 
certain order), this is due to the elements responding to external influences which 
they are likely to encounter in a m anner which brings about the preservation or
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restoration of this order, and on this, in turn, may be dependent the chances of the 
individuals to preserve themselves. (S,71, my emphasis)
There must have been a certain interplay among the parts and the outside world if there exists 
order, in particular that which proved somehow to benefit the parts and the whole simultaneously, 
and the part-in-relation-to-the-whole, through the effects the part itself produces on the whole. So, 
for it to be successful with respect to individual's adaptation, co-ordination in the local dimension 
must be capable of preserving or even launching global co-ordination
We have to deal here with integration on at least two different levels, with on the 
one hand the more comprehensive order assisting the preservation of ordered 
structures on the lower level, and on the other, the kind o f order which on the 
lower level determines the regularities of individual conduct assisting the prospect 
of the survival o f the individual only through its effect on the overall order of the 
society. (S, 76)
Diagram of a complex system:36
Local Interaction
The resulting order is then submitted to the test o f the circumstances, to selection, that is. It should 
be noted in this regard that Hayek's notion o f selection has a cultural connotation. He utterly rejects 
social Darwinism and claims that, with respect to human societies, we should be concerned with 
cultural rather than biological evolution and, accordingly, he approaches it with a Lamarckian 
perspective. This essentially means that for him, cultural evolution bears on the inheritance o f
36 This diagram is taken from Lewin (1993), p. 13.
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acquired characteristics - learnt rules guiding the 'inter-individual' relations - which are basically 
transmitted through external imitation.37 To be sure, transmission is individual but selection 
operates on the group in that it is supposed to select an order o f actions emergent from a system o f  
rules which proves to adapt to external circumstances.
In this sense, selection cannot operate through falsificationism, for defeated rules can revive under 
favorable circumstances. Recall that different systems of rules may lead to order:
systems o f rules will develop as wholes, selection process o f evolution will operate 
on the order as a whole: so, a new rule of individual conduct which in one position 
may prove detrimental, may in another prove to be beneficial (...) (S,71)
This fact may generate an endogenous movement, an internal testing to other rules:
(...) and changes in one rule may make beneficial other changes, which before were 
harmful. (S,71)
However, the nature o f this potential change is not really deeply examined by Hayek, as it is 
sometimes put on a par with spontaneous genetic mutation. But given that circumstances are ever- 
changing in a quite unexpected way, changes in the whole are highly likely to occur. Moreover, the 
whole’s adaptive responsiveness turns on there already having been changes in some parts of the 
overall order of actions. How have these formerly undesirable changes appeared in the first place? 
How have they managed to subsist under unfavorable circumstances? How were they able to 
survive until the moment o f their ultimate success? And what about the extension o f the change 
itself? Could a given change manage to survive which we suppose to  challenge important features 
o f the overall order o f actions? If so, isn't it conceivable that this new rule by itself forces its way on 
the order? To summarize, a convincing account o f change is clearly missing.
For a list of differences between cultural and biological evolution, see Hayek's The Fatal Conceit "Between 
Instinct and Reason", p. 25 specially.
3 7
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Now, there is something startling here. On the one hand, the surplus that complex and organized 
structures may generate is associated with the interactional ability in generating an order-enhancing 
interplay, at least in the weak sense o f’order-preserving' On the other hand, though, this surplus is 
identified with another thing, perhaps the opposite of the previous one, namely, the imbalance a 
circumstance may generate within these structures when, in affecting some parts, it launches a 
critical test o f the rules, and this may generate a disequilibrium in the system of rules that may 
induce further and unforeseen changes. That is, an order-disturbing move. Is this surplus itself a 
capacity to produce order or change? In conclusion, any overall coherence of the system of the 
rules, any compatibility with what we may call our tradition, is urgently calling for further 
vindication. Two clues apply: to get rid of consistency as the critical test, and adopt a dynamic 
image of order. In any case, a crucial question remains of how we are to discern whether 'disorder' 
(inconsistency) is preparing change or else setting deleterious forces in motion In other words, we 
need to differentiate 'good' inconsistency from entropy. It is time to examine the Hayekian concept 
of order.
fi.Prospects for the third world
6.1 Tradition: cloudy horizon
Summing up, the elements that yield an autonomous arrangement are its essential complexity 
(composed by many variables), its organized complexity (it gives rise to local adjustments among 
its parts), and, finally, the feet that as a whole it exceeds the sum total of its constituting parts (local 
adjustments produce a relatively larger global adjustment).
Now from his epistemological premises alone Hayek cannot tell us whether an arrangement is 
'order*. However, he does tell us so. He speaks rather vaguely (and naturalistically, as it were) about 
'adaptation' or 'adaptive capacity* and 'group survival'. These are, nonetheless, very difficult things 
to ascertain, as we have seen from Hayeks approach to the system of the rules, unless one has 
some preconceived naturalistic idea of'order1 in mind, namely in terms of physical features such as 
quantities of population and wealth.
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So, the implication is that Hayek seems to  be taking the ’surplus’ that a complex arrangement o f 
individuals' actions produces not only as an epistemological one (that combined actions o f the parts 
result in richness and unpredictability o f the overall actions), but also as a 'moral' one (that the 
overall actions are a better suited arrangement), where this moral is expressed in a quite naturalistic 
fashion in terms o f the whole's capacity for survival and the individual's ability to adapt to  h.
I identify at this crucial point a tension between what I call Hayek*s evolutionary approach and his 
more compromising evolutionist inclinations.
By his evolutionary approach I mean those interesting pieces o f his epistemology that we have so 
far focused on, where the idea o f evolution is worked out in terms of a way o f generating 
knowledge, individual and interactional, in our social world. That is, Hayek's suggestion that we 
should think of our world as a changing structure, and change as having an important root in 
ongoing intersubjective relations; and, as a consequence o f these findings, Hayek's conclusion that 
predictability and design are quite limited in our world.
However, Hayek surpasses these boundary conditions o f a social order that are rooted in our 
knowledge predicament, which he can quite safely assert - that our world is composed o f an array 
o f intricate acts o f production and consumption of knowledge - with a more substantive 
evolutionist view rather at odds with the predicament, where a sort o f law of evolution' is implied, 
where social arrangements are succeeded by increasingly better ones, where the improvement is 
given in terms o f certain ’efficiency* attributes.
To be sure, the concept o f evolution is very unclear in this respect. As Lewontin (1968) reports, the 
concept o f evolution entails, to varying degrees, some combination of the following elements: 
change, order, direction, progress and perfectibility. Change enwraps the idea o f evolution in its 
simplest form:
The idea o f evolution, in its simplest form, is that the current state of a system is the 
result of a more or less continual change from the original state. The qualification 
that the change be continual, or at least frequent or regular, is an essential one and 
distinguishes the evolutionary from static world views. (Lewontin,1968:203)
As for order, this is more difficult to assert. How can we know whether an arrangement of the 
elements constitutes some 'order4? Should we accept any such arrangement as so? This is a matter 
that has divided those of evolutionary persuasion, as some have included direction, progress and 
perfectibility as features of an orderly state whereas others have been more reluctant in this 
respect.38 In terms o f our interest here, all we can say is that there is nothing in the Hayekian 
epistemology that authorizes him to establish a normative dividing line. However, Hayek cannot 
help displaying his normative preferences in terms o f his views o f direction, progress and 
perfectibility, the other seemingly more disputable elements of the concept of evolution which are, 
nonetheless, frequent in his later The Fatal Conceit 39
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The evolutionary approach teaches us something about the epistemic foundations of our social 
world, it may warn us about some limits that this foundation imposes; but it cannot predict nor can 
it justify any substantive view o f order on its own epistemological terms as an evolutionist view 
would require.40
In his more substantive idea of order, change has then a direction in time, in terms of achieving an 
ideal of progress and perfectibility, whereas his more formal account works out a sort of ontology 
of the social dimension, based on the premise o f human ignorance alone.
38 See Lewontin. op cit.
39 For a discussion of Hayek's defense of liberal principles in evolutionist terms, see Espada (1996). who 
claims that Hayek's view, for that matter, is both morally and logically untenable.
40 We may trace some considerations to the effect that liberal societies have a comparative advantage over non- 
liberal ones to the extent that the former are structured as complex systems and, hence, allow a larger amount 
of knowledge to be freely disposed of through the operation of free markets, as Espada (1996) suggests. 
However this is not to demonstrate the absolute superiority of these arrangements. In Espada we may find a 
forceful criticism of Hay ek's evolutionist view and the instrumental arguments issued therefrom in favor of 
liberal societies.
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As an example o f this more substantive view, a circular and rather static account o f selection as an  
efficiency-searching method describes the relation between individuals, rules and overall order a s  
follows:
Although the existence and preservation of the order o f actions of a group can be 
accounted for only from the rules o f conduct which the individuals obey, these rules 
o f individual conduct have developed because the individuals have been living in 
groups whose structures have gradually changed. In other words, the properties of 
the individuals which are significant for the existence and preservation o f the 
individuals themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those from the 
individuals living in groups which at each stage o f the evolution of the group tended 
to act according to such rules as made the group more efficient. (S,72, my 
emphasis)
However, as Hayek admits, a circumstance may cause a hitherto followed tradition to be less 
reliable than a required change in the rule. The meaning o f order is less clear, then, for it is not clear 
which order of actions is being preserved or enhanced thereby.
We might think in terms of degrees of'orderliness*. Still, what is the minimum degree o f orderliness 
o f a structure, which would allow us to  characterize it as 'order1? How much orderliness is 
necessary to be able to  characterize as successful, a complex structure? How much disorderliness is 
a society able to bear and still stay alive, persisting and reproducing?
Action displays a practical knowledge o f *what order is about', but, at the same time and by the 
same token theoretical knowledge is forbidden. We might depict order as a spiral movement which 
runs fester in the core than in the boundaries, with decreasing speed as long as we move from its 
heart to its peripheries. Dynamic images seem to be more suggestive.
A spiral-account sets evolution in time:
though social theory constructs social orders from the rules o f conduct assumed to 
be given at any one time, these rules o f conduct have themselves developed as part 
o f a larger whole, and at each stage o f this development the then prevailing overall
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order determined what effect any one chance in the rules o f individual conduct had.
(S, 73)
But it still sounds like a comparative-static analysis rather than dynamic in that we are interested in 
making sense of what happens in between one stage and the next, in understanding the nature of 
change and its impact, the crucial element o f a complex order. Besides we are not so much 
interested in how a prevailing overall order determined the effect o f a change in rules as how this 
latter affects the overall order o f actions itself through its impact on other rules. Thus far, all we 
know is that every action inside the overall order may set in motion conservative as well as 
challenging forces with regard to the existing rules. The circumstances which will make a rule more 
likely to prevail than competing others, and the effect this will generate on other rules cannot be 
anticipated. What a miserable state!
Should we draw any conclusions regarding possible social theories? Beyond the poor predictive 
power of our theories that this picture o f social world entails, we may hope that they may 
contribute to enhance the predictability o f our world by influencing it on a modest basis, as Hayek 
suggests. But what are the means we may count upon in trying to achieve any modifications in the 
social world? Our social theory would scarcely be helpful. For a theory o f social order will remain a 
theory of a number o f ideal types as it cannot overcome the surprise o f circumstances. In fact, it can 
say almost nothing in a deductive manner as to the results of the actions o f the parts, o f which 
particular facts the theoretician knows even less than the individual actors themselves. That is, 
though we are all deductivists we cannot make inferences from our premises, for they are to a large 
extent hidden.
Since ignorance is widespread in the world o f suppositions and imputed knowledge that we live, in 
which, that is, nobody knows who knows best what we would like to know,
the only way by which we can find out is through a social process in which
everybody is allowed to try and see what he can do. (IEO,l 5)
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Ignorance (at the individual level) generates knowledge (at the social level) and makes institutions 
and mies o f conduct applicable, again as essential supplements to our self- and reciprocal­
understanding. Still, individual ignorance is also a source o f testing and potential challenge to these 
rules. But, what rules should we keep, then, in order to test any others?
What about the constructivist pretense that we may articulate our common premises and perfect 
our social order accordingly? Against it, there is the argument that what we more reliably have in 
common is inarticulable, known by acquaintance but not by understanding. Then there is the 
argument that our sense o f justice is one instance of this unarticulated knowledge which may be 
represented in our laws, so even these cannot help relying upon some unarticulated premises. A 
more fundamental argument is provided by the idea that being the premises o f our thinking and 
acting highly inarticulable we can only conjecture, interpret, and in doing so it is quite unlikely that 
we may overcome our position within the whole, with regard to that whole (what we know and do 
not know o f what all the others know) and with regard to that part we are directly playing (our 
perception of what relevant others are doing). Rationality will appear more as an interpersonal and 
evolving capacity, than as a singular and atemporal attribute o f an individual.
So, if constructivism is not convincing and tradition is not reliable, are there any outlets?
6.2 Third W orld
I shall insist on tradition,41 the element Hayek identifies as enabling an overall order to come about 
and persist. We have seen that tradition is something that draws us towards conformity as well as 
encompassing a potential for change. It has been said that rules evolve, by a mechanism o f 
transmission among the individuals and selection, by the whole, o f those mies whose prospects o f 
group success are the greatest. Yet, when we think o f tradition we can think of a  number o f 
different references not thoroughly compatible with one another, nonetheless persisting.
41 Tradition, here, stands for the broad system  o f  largely unarticulated rules. I shall afterw ards, in  a later 
section, justify  our choice o f tradition w ith th e  help o f the Poppeiian contention th a t a com prehensive 
traditionalism , so to  speak, is logically tenable. 1 then  refer to a particular tradition, that o f critical rationalism .
See section 7.
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We may think in particular o f some traditions as disappearing and reappearing at the mercy of 
circumstances, Hayekian circumstances which may render a rule beneficial after being considered 
detrimental. Or we may think, in a Popperian vein, of practices or rules not applicable to the present 
but by merely offering themselves as alternatives to prevailing rules, they end up by producing the 
very circumstances under which they shall be considered applicable. We may also think o f a number 
of different interpretations o f our traditions (like freedom, and equality, and tolerance), as 
authorizing many different and even contradictory mies and constraints.
Without pushing this point too far now, I would like to work out Popper's (1949,1987) suggestion 
that one o f our main traditions is the very idea of reason as a critical capacity. Is Hayek’s selective 
mechanism compatible with critical rationalism? Let us suppose them to be so, on the presumption 
that Lamarckian evolution - Svhat is acquired may be transmitted1 - is congenial with the invention 
of favorable circumstances for a change - and may be made to  work under a newly established 
environment* So, I shall presume, critical rationalism is compatible with a phenotypical account of 
social interaction.
This would entail considering selection not as a thoroughly blind mechanism whereby our 
environment selects us, our practices and institutions, but as also active,42 in that we would also 
have the capacity to select the environment, to influence our circumstances. Are the Hayekian 
actors capable of creating 'ecological niches', in the words of Popper, guided by their imagination, 
and taking advantage of the very mechanism whereby a spontaneous order operates?
Hayek explicitly admits the possibility that we may make the most of the operation of a 
spontaneous order. Yet would he be willing to support the Popperian third world, made up of
42 Espada, op.cit.. m akes a sim ilar point, in his defense of an 'indirect' and 'negative' constructivism , whose 
roots he finds in  Popper's "In Search o f a Better W orld".
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inventors (though without an architect)? Let me try to spell out, in a provisional and quite desultory 
way, some elements o f a possible conciliation.
One first element would be the Hayekian idea that social actors are (unsuccessful) constructivists. 
They act from their theories and opinions, beside the higher level supra-conscious rules which 
nonetheless undergo a non despicable interpretative work on the part of the individuals. The 
question arises, quite naturally it seems to  me, as to the scope o f consciousness in such individual 
undertakings.
The suggestion is that we should think o f consciousness not only as one more complicating element 
behind our actions along with the unarticulated ones but also as a special element with a special 
force as it may take us through a long problem-solving path.
Secondly, we would have to approach 'circumstances’ in a less natural or external way than is 
sometimes suggested in certain vetoes that Hayek utters. That is, at least and with Hayekian 
authorization, if the circumstances that constrain an action are to influence the individual's choice, 
they have to be perceived by the actor through the filters he makes use o£ primarily through his 
perception o f the past and o f the future, the latter referring to the unavoidable anticipations he 
makes. So, the circumstances are to  a large extent non-natural, but 'made', and, I conjecture in 
addition, not only passively made, that is as a side product o f our trying to grasp what is going on 
led by our inarticulate guidelines, but also actively.
In this respect, Hayek discusses at length the significance o f the distinction 'natural versus artificial'. 
He regards this latter as meaningless, for he considers that our world is man made (and in this 
sense non-natural), but also undesigned (and in this sense non-artificial). I am here working out the 
seemingly more suggestive distinction between a passive and an active manufacture. My suggestion 
is that our order is made up of weak-constnrctivists, who passively and actively contribute to its 
make up. But how? To what extent can man actively create his circumstances?
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Hayek concedes that we may derive some help from our social theories, in the sense that they may 
influence the order by taking advantage o f its spontaneous motion. Actually, Hayek contends that 
part of our theoretical efforts should be devoted to discerning what the rules of conduct are which 
might deliberately be improved upon. I feel, however, that this suggestion is not fully coherent with 
the limited place Hayek made abundantly clear we should assign to  social theory. This being due to 
our limited capacity of understanding and more generally to the limited reach of reason.43
I shall conjecture, with Popper, that circumstances may operate as a selective mechanism (as in the 
idea that the environment selects us) but also through criticism (as in the idea that we can also 
select the environment). And the meaning of this criticism should exceed the mere test of 
consistency o f existing rules and encompass an imaginative effort:
we...owe to  the third world...our rationality - that is, our subjective mind, the 
practice o f critical and self-critical ways of thinking, and the corresponding 
dispositions. More important than all this...is the relation between ourselves and our 
work, and what can be gained for us from this relation.
The incredible thing about life...is just this interaction between our actions and their 
results by which we constantly transcend ourselves, our talents, our gifts.
This is how we transcend our local and temporal environment by trying to think o f 
circumstances beyond our experience: by criticizing the universality, or the 
structural necessity, of what may appear...as the 'given' or as a 'habit'; by trying to 
And, construct, invent new situations - that is test situations, critical situations; and 
by trying to locate, detect, and challenge our prejudices and habitual assumptions
This is how we lift ourselves by our own bootstraps out o f the morass of our 
ignorance; how we throw a rope into the air and then swarm up it - if it gets any 
purchase, however precarious, on any little twig. (Popper, 1974:147/148)
Hayek stresses, it seems, the passive productivity of our social world whereas a Popperian 
argument about objective knowledge encourages us to portray this productivity as also active; a
43 See Kukathas'{1989, p.82) point: "The contradiction into which Hayek seem s to  be locked is one in w hich he 
is forced to claim  that there can be no social theory that can guide our evaluation of the entire structure o f our 
institutions, w hile conceding that a  considerable social theory, explaining the purpose served by our 
institutions, is  necessary for us to evaluate and a lte r our rules of conduct."
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more positive role is assigned to consciousness in this latter. The intra-personal aspect o f 'over­
production' has been underemphasized, in Hayek's more substantive view, in favor o f an over 
emphasis on the interpersonal issue. This asymmetry has not caught Hayek's attention, for at the 
intra-personal level consciousness is conceivably to play a quite important role, having no analogue 
at the level o f inter-personal relations. Hayek should have explored the consequences o f it on the 
overall order, instead o f dismissing it on the basis o f its irrelevance at the inter-personal level (or the 
dangers plausibly resulting from the supposition of a collective consciousness). Though we may 
agree that individual consciousness is not able straightforwardly to construct or evaluate the overall 
order, it may, however, complicate the landscape as it may also contribute to change, thus actively 
changing the very parameters o f order itself The extent o f this contribution still requires 
explanation.
Thus far, then, I have found no justification to Hayek's recommendation that we ought to be 
actively ignorant. The Hayelaan overemphasis on a rather passive consciousness reveals Hayek’s 
rejection of what he calls the ‘abuse of reason’, typical o f constructivist thinking. For him, the 
rationality postulate, in taking for granted precisely what we should be more interested in 
understanding, begs the question: what can we know? But he should concede that to draw the full 
consequences of the epistemological conditions o f individual action that he sets out, would amount 
to enlarging a bit the scope o f consciousness as well as enlarging its meaning, that is, as a capacity 
o f both foresight and hindsight, and foresight not as 'guesses' but as invention. Invention should be 
allowed, alas, precisely for the very fact that guesses are not possible under the ignorance condition 
and anyway we need to accommodate consciousness somewhere! At least he might concede that 
his world is populated by constructivists, who may not know their premises but might on purpose 
add some to their provision, for the capacity o f addition is already recognized by Hayek himself 
when he discloses the reasons for which action is to subsist under radical ignorance.
If  this is so, Hayek who fears feelings of ours like feeling the ground withdrawn from under our 
feet' can be made to support an argument which actually hopes that we may be able also on 
purpose, though not fully anticipating the outcome, to raise ourselves up by our own bootstraps.
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7. Praxis and poiesis
V e  are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock o f reason, because we 
suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that die individuals would do better to avail
A A
themselves ofthe general bank and capital o f nations and ofages.
In order to explore in a less desultory way some o f the suggestions I have so far been making other 
voices shall be introduced into the debate. The guests are Michael Oakeshott, Karl Popper and 
Michael Polanyi. They are introduced at this point to pave the way to a more acceptable idea of 
tradition, more in line with Hayek’s evolutionary (and not evolutionist) aspects. Let me begin with 
Oakeshott, who, to my purposes here, will represent a strong case against prescription and 
conscious intervention in the world of practical life.
According to the British historian Michael Oakeshott, politics and scientific activity, along with 
cooking, stumble upon the ineffable: these activities are emblematic of a sort o f impossibility of 
rationality in that they make use o f a practical (concrete and skillful) knowledge that cannot be 
reduced to a technical (abstract and ruled) knowledge, o f which they also make use. However, the 
rationalist in politics, he complains in "Rationalism in Politics", will always try to assimilate politics 
to engineering:
In this activity the character which the Rationalist claims for himself is the character 
of an engineer, whose mind (it is supposed) is controlled throughout by the 
appropriate technique and whose first step is to dismiss from his attention 
everything not directly related to his specific intentions. This assimilation o f politics 
to engineering is, indeed, what may be called the myth o f rationalist politics. 
(Oakeshott, 1974:5)
The Rationalist's misleading doctrine about human knowledge is, in a few words, that 'more and 
more certain knowledge about men and society can be reached through the unencumbered 4
44 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in  France, p.99.
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intellect'.45 The fact o f the matter, says Oakeshott, is that every practical activity requires two sorts 
of knowledge, namely, the technical one which is constituted by rules susceptible o f precise 
formulation, and the practical which only exist in use, is not reflective and cannot be formulated in 
rules This latter being conveyed not through any method o f formulated doctrine but through 
tradition:46
Even in the what, and above all in diagnosis, there lies already this dualism o f 
technique and practice: there is no knowledge which is not know how*, (ibidem: 9)
Closer inspection reveals that Oakeshott also implies a hierarchy between these kinds o f knowledge 
in that some practical knowledge o f anything is always supposed to  be the nourishing element for 
any technical knowledge to flourish. Indeed, to team is to reform something already in existence:
As with every other sort o f knowledge, learning a technique does not consist in 
getting rid o f pure ignorance, but in reforming knowledge which is already there. 
Nothing, not even the most nearly self-contained technique (the rules o f a game), 
can in fact be imparted to an empty mind; and what is imparted is nourished by 
what is already there. A man who knows the rules o f one game will, on this 
account, rapidly learn the rules o f another game; and a man altogether unfamiliar 
with 'rules' o f any kind ...would be a most unpromising pupil, (ibidem: 12)
Oakeshott evokes, for that matter, affiliation to Pascal's theory of knowledge:
the only knowledge that is certain is certain on account o f its partiality; the paradox 
that probable knowledge has more o f the whole truth than certain knowledge.(...) 
The human mind, he asserts, is not wholly dependent for its successful working 
upon a conscious and formulated technique; and even where a technique is 
involved, the mind observes the technique *tacitement, naturdlement et sans art*. 
(ibidem:20)
What is more, the attempt to formulate the rules may even have deleterious consequences:
45 Cf. O akeshott o p cit.
46 Cf. Oakeshott, op cit.
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The precise formulation o f rules o f inquiry endangers the success of the inquiry by 
exaggerating the importance of method. (ibidem:20)
The origin of the Rationalists' confusion is his assimilation of the mind to the faculty of Ueasori, as 
in his 'supposition that a man’s mind can be separated from its contents and its activities (...) the 
mind as a neutral instrument, as a piece o f apparatus/47 Oakeshott, in "Rational Conduct", displays 
a different conception of mind.
Now, this mind I believe to be a fiction; it is nothing more than an hypostatized 
activity. Mind as we know it is the offspring of knowledge and activity; it is 
composed entirely of thoughts. You do not first have a mind, which acquires a 
filling of ideas and then makes distinctions between true and false, right and wrong, 
reasonable and unreasonable, and then, as a third step, causes activity. Properly 
speaking the mind has no existence apart from, or in advance of, these and other 
directions These and other distinctions are not acquisitions; they are constitutive o f 
the mind. (Oakeshott, 1974:90)
As for the precedence of the activity in relation to the 'rational' purposes of its practitioners, the 
following passages are illuminating:
It is an error to call an activity 'rational' on account o f its end having been 
specifically determined in advance and in respect o f its achieving that end to the 
exclusion o f all others, because there is in fact no way o f determining an end for 
activity in advance of the activity itself; (...) A cook is not a man who first has a 
vision of a pie and then tries to make it; he is a man skilled in cookery, and both his 
projects and his achievements spring from that skill. (ibidem:91)
In a even stronger statement, the activity is said to define questions as well as approaches towards 
solutions:
It is the activity itself which defines the questions as well as the manner in which 
they are answered (...) (ibidem:97/98, my emphasis)
47 Cf. Oakeshott, 1974. "Rational Conduct”, p.86.
; l
i ' 
! i
266
Both the problems and the course o f investigation leading up to their solution are 
already hidden in the activity (...) (ibidem:99/100, my emphasis)
A final point shall present Oakeshott's view on what 'rational conduct' (as opposed to a 'rational 
faculty1) should be, namely, 'faithfulness' to tradition:
the only significant way of using the word ’rational' in relation to conduct is when 
we mean to indicate a quality or characteristic (and perhaps a desirable quality or 
characteristic) of the activity itself) then it would appear that the quality concerned 
is not mere 'intelligence', but faithfulness to the knowledge we have of how to 
conduct the specific activity we are engaged in. Rational' conduct is acting in 
such a way that the coherence o f the idiom o f activity to  which the conduct belongs 
is preserved and possibly enhanced, (ibidem: 102)
The agricultural metaphor of the practical knowledge being a nourishing element for the technical 
knowledge to flourish is taken here as an indication o f a fairly concrete limit to conscious ambitions 
to transcend anything, and for the argument we are going to make in this section this metaphor 
shall constitute our model of 'praxis'. By this it is meant the idea that the activity, any activity in 
which we are involved in our practical life, is always bigger than its product, the result o f the 
activity itself being always but an abridgment of its unknown possibilities. An instance o f this is 
provided by Oakeshott's statement that "what we do, and moreover what we want to do, is the 
creature o f how we are accustomed to conduct our affairs."48
From this statement at least two things follow: the first is that no analysis o f the product is able to  
reveal the complexity o f the activity and thereby allow any person to master it, in the same way as 
the rational analysis o f a delicious meal in the form o f its recipe is unable to convey the necessary 
knowledge for it to  be made by an inexpert cook; the second is that any change that might possibly 
happen is deemed to be already inscribed in the activity itself) the individual or group being nothing 
more than its midwife and only insofar as they have been brought up within it.
48 Cf. 1974, "Political Education", p.120.
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The earthly metaphor is suggestively replaced, in "Political Education", by an even less enabling 
liquid one when it comes to politics:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither 
hari)or for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed 
destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend 
and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional 
manner o f behavior in order to make a friend o f every hostile occasion. 
(Oakeshott,1974:127)
We should then rely on the politician's skills and ability to handle the tools provided by tradition on 
his way to 'attending to the general arrangements of a set of people' and not 'making' these 
arrangements. This art cannot be spelled out by any political doctrine. Hence, political philosophy, 
after Oakeshott, must be just a history
of the incoherences philosophers have detected in common ways of thinking and 
the manner of solution they have proposed, rather than a history of doctrines and 
systems, (ibidem. 132)
And, frowning on Hayek's position concerning social theory, Oakeshott concludes that:
neither 'principle' (on account of what it turns out to be: a mere index o f concrete 
behavior) nor any genera] theoiy about the character and direction of social change 
seem to supply an adequate reference for explanation or for practical conduct, 
(ibidem: 136)
In this line we should recall the famous passage, in "Rationalism in Politics", in which Oakeshott 
disagrees with Hayek, accusing Hayek's rationalism:
A plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the 
same style o f politics, (Oakeshott, 1974:21)
It seems that, in this statement, Oakeshott realizes Hayek’s paradox of producing a political 
philosophy of the unpredicted consequences and unarticulated premises, a paradox I want to 
explore in the opposite direction than that proposed by Oakeshott. To this end, I want to introduce 
some of Popper's reflections. For though belonging in the same tradition of criticism of rationalism
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as Hayek and Oakeshott, Popper is still a rationalist, or so he claims. What he is certainly opposed 
to is what he calls the rationalist's 'immodesty'.
In fact, in at least two lectures (1945; 1949) in which he discussed the issue of rationalism, Popper 
took up the anti-rationalist challenge, as remarkably raised by Edmund Burke in his famous w ork 
on the French revolution, and, more recently, by the 'Cambridge historian Michael Oakeshott'.
Though recognizing the force o f the challenge, in his 1945 lecture, Popper makes a distinction 
between Burke and Oakeshott's critiques: while Burke is taken as a thinker who developed an 
"analysis of the importance of that irrational power which we call 'tradition*", Oakeshott deserves a  
less enthusiastic welcome:
Quite a number of outstanding thinkers have developed the problem of tradition 
into a big stick with which to beat rationalism. I may instance Michael Oakeshott, a 
Cambridge historian, a really original thinker, who recently in the Cambridge 
Journal launched an attack on rationalism. I largely disagree with his strictures; but 
I have to admit that the attack is a powerful one. (Popper,1949:121)
Though agreeing with the importance o f tradition, following the Burkeian route, Popper sides with 
rationalism, thus rejecting the seemingly radical anti-rationalism o f  Oakeshott. 1 am a rationalist o f  
sorts, Popper declares in his 1949 paper. In his 1945 article, he states even more sharply that, as far 
as the struggle rationalism versus irrationalism is concerned, 1 am entirely on the side o f  
rationalism*. And he adds further:
This is so much the case that even where I feel that rationalism has gone too far I 
still sympathize with it, holding as I do that an excess in this direction (as long as 
we exclude the intellectual immodesty of Plato's pseudorationalism) is harmless 
indeed as compared with an excess in the other. In my opinion, the only way in 
which excessive rationalism is likely to prove harmful is that it tends to undermine 
its own position and thus to further an irrationalist reaction. It is only this danger 
which induces me to examine the claims of an excessive rationalism more closely 
and to advocate a modest and self-critical rationalism which recognizes certain 
limitations. (Popper,1945:p.34)
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But how to reconcile tradition and rationalism? First, Popper suggests, by accepting that we cannot 
free ourselves from traditions; second, by assuming a critical attitude towards tradition in the sense 
that we should not accept it as unquestionable taboos; third, by inscribing any critical attitude of 
ours in a tradition, the 'second-order* tradition of critical rationalism, of critically inspecting the 
ideas offered to us and offering our own ideas to critical scrutiny.
The only kinds of rationalism that do not pass this test are uncritical and comprehensive rationalism, 
namely, the idea that '1 am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of 
argument or experience' (a logically untenable statement which itself is not grounded either in 
argument or experience), and the disregard of the feet that *no rational argument will have an effect 
on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude* (a rational attitude depends on a pre- 
rational decision).49
Hence, although comprehensive rationalism is logically untenable whereas comprehensive 
irrationalism is, in addressing the pertinent points raised by Burke and later by Oakeshott, Popper 
launches a defense o f rationalism that seemingly renders it logically tenable. He restates rationalism, 
as it were, as comprehensive traditionalism, and the tradition referred to is that of critical 
rationalism, the one invented (sic) by the Greek philosophers.
So, Popper's very peculiar form of rationalism, what he calls critical rationalism, is advanced on the 
grounds that criticism and not any substantive content is the crucial feature of reason, one which is 
deeply inscribed in our tradition. Rationalism is useful as a pair o f spectacles for us to read our 
tradition but is itself just a tradition and therefore cannot be rationally understood. Hence, Popper's 
world contains both this messy thing called tradition, along with its articulable and non-articulable 
elements, and the critical glance which came out of it, which is, however, an attitude we may decide 
(on pre-rational grounds) to take.
49 Cf. Popper, 1945, pp 34 and 35, respectively.
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Popper's views on tradition, thus, seemingly reconcile usual antinomies such as 'tradition versus 
change', and 'tradition versus rationality, when approaching both scientific activity and society. As 
for the antinomy, tradition versus rationality:
It is not possible for you to act rationally in the world if you have no idea how it 
will respond to your actions. Every rational action assumes a certain system of 
reference which responds in a predictable or partly predictable way. Just as the 
invention o f myths or theories in the field of natural science has a function - that of 
helping us to bring order into the events of nature - so has the creation of traditions 
in the field of society. (Popper, 1949:131)
As for tradition and change;
The analogy between the role o f myths or theories in science and the role of 
traditions in society goes further. We must remember that the great significance of 
myths in scientific method was that they could become the objects o f criticism, and 
that they could be changed. Similarly traditions have the important double function 
of not only creating a certain order or something like a social structure, but also 
giving us something upon which we can operate, something that we can criticize 
and change. This point is decisive for us, as rationalists and social reformers. 
(Popper, 1949.131)
We may think o f the interplay between tradition and reason as a reciprocal limitation, where our 
critical capacities impede us from following traditions blindly. That *we cannot start afresh' or 'clean 
the canvas' restrains our constructivist 'immodesty. We may think o f it also in terms o f openness,50 51
as in Popper's suggestion that we can 'invent' traditions. This latter possibility will constitute our 
model of'poiesis*. By this is meant a model o f practical life in which the result o f a practical activity, 
its product, is bigger than the activity itself, it displays a surprising outcome that does not fit well 
into the traditional modes of behaving or understanding within the activity and thereby supports a 
genuine drive for change. The best example here is the already mentioned Popperian third world31
50 Espada (1996) uses the same term 'openness' to state his point in  favor o f a more active role for social actors 
in the political society, in a different interpretation from the one we take up here, where 'openness* gives room 
to piecemeal intervention in a political society.
51 I refer to  Popper (1974).
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of objective knowledge, and the extremist version of it may be seen in the following quotation 
selected from Vernon (1976):
if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find 
ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one, and we can 
at any moment break out of it again, (cited in Vernon, 1976:273, quoted from 
Popper)
This quotation suggests that we might so enlarge the sense of reason as to encompass not only a 
capacity of effecting consistency or coherence tests and checking contradictions, but also an 
imaginative capacity that would let us transcend, at least in an intellectual sphere (Popper talks 
about scientific research), the world as given.
Vernon warns us to take care with the fact that when it comes to politics the sense of openness 
implied in Popper's (1974) poiesis is quite narrowed down when compared to his 'revolutionary1 
attitude towards our modes of thinking within the scientific community. Though acknowledging 
that openness is much more limited in Popper's thinking as far as political society is concerned, we 
shall not give up an examination o f the consequences of some of Poppers premises concerning our 
conjectures, beliefs and expectations as long as these are also inhabitants of a political society.
In short, under the model of praxis the stress is being put on continuity whereas under the model of 
poiesis, the emphasis is clearly on the side o f change. Somewhere in between the self-proclaimed 
'conservative' Oakeshott and the 'revolutionary Popper we should have to make room for an 
alternative perspective. To this end, we introduce Michael Polanyi's contribution. As we will see, 
Polanyi provides a firmer basis to Popper’s poiesis.
I have already referred to Polanyi's The Logic of Liberty (1951), where the distinction between 
monocentric and polycentric orders is proposed and which exercised a most effective influence on 
Hayek's thinking. In the late introduction (1963) of his short book Science. Faith and Society 
(SFS,1946), Polanyi launched an attack against the idea o f the planning of science that was then 
officially sponsored in the Soviet Union and gave rise to the subsequent enforcement of Marxist
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philosophy, and began to spread to England under the form of a 'mental disturbance', where a 
number of British scientists began to defend ideas such as 'science for the citizen' and the like. His 
The Logic of Liberty dealt to a great extent with this issue, and SFS is written in the spirit o f  
addressing this erroneous idea. He wanted to take up the following questions, challenged as he felt 
by Marxism:
What philosophy of science had we in the West to pit against this? How was its 
general acceptance among us to be accounted for? Was this acceptance justified?
On what grounds? (Polanyi,1946,1966:9)
In search for the answers, Polanyi declares:
Like the Marxist theory, my account of the nature and justification of science 
includes the whole life of thought in society. In my later writings it is extended to a 
cosmic picture. But the ultimate justification of my scientific convictions lies always 
in myself At some point I can only answer, Tor I believe so*. (ibidem:9)
Knowledge is dealt with as only 'perceived knowledge*, much in the tradition of phenomenology; 
Polanyi refers to Maurice Merleau-Pontys La Phenomenology de la Perception (1945) as an 
analysis of'perceived knowledge on the lines of Husserl’52 expressing views akin to his own. His 
emphasis is on two elements, namely, the *tacit coefficient of explicit knowledge' and the *tacit 
process by which scientific knowledge is discovered'.32 3 The first overrules the possibility o f 
'scientific control' over scientific knowledge, in the sense that the 'premisses o f science on which all 
scientific teaching and research rest are the beliefs held by scientists on the general nature o f 
things.'54The second, similarly overrules a control over the process of scientific discovery:
there are rules which give valuable guidance to scientific discovery, but they are 
merely rules of art. The application of rules must always rely ultimately on acts not 
determined by rule. (...) The rules o f scientific enquire leave their own application 
wide open, to be decided by the scientist's judgment. (Polanyi, 1946,1963:14/15)
32 Cf. Polanyi, 1946,1963, p.12.
33 Cf. Polanyi. op. c it., p.13.
54 Cf. Polanyi, op.cit., p .ll .
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We shall pursue now, to a certain extent at least, Polanyi's ideas in his Personal Knowledge, where 
an original argument stresses the most important role personal deliberation is to play in a 
traditionalist perspective.
The key words of Polanyi's outlook in this work, for my particular undertaking here, are the notions 
of 'personal knowledge' and 'passive action'. It is certainly a huge task for anyone to sum up 
Polanyi's contribution to the understanding o f human action, and o f scientific practice in particular, 
as displayed in his Personal Knowledge. Fortunately, this is not my aim here. What shall interest me 
most are some of his insights and the possible effects they might generate on our proposed attempt 
to fill missing parts of Hayek's understanding of the social order emergent from interacting 
individuals. One crucial element is the notion of personal knowledge. Let us turn to it now.
Polanyi argues for the existence o f a 'personal knowledge’ on rather philosophical grounds, for it is 
something, he believes, that is able to bridge the gap between subjectivity and objectivity:
We shall find Personal Knowledge manifested in the appreciation of probability and 
of order in the exact sciences, and see it at work even more extensively in the way 
the descriptive sciences rely on skills and connoisseurship. At all these points the 
act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all 
factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by 
striving passionately to fulfil his personal obligations to universal standards. 
(Polanyi, 1958:17)
The synthesis personal knowledge (PK) represents may be felt in its capacity to bring together the 
particular and the universal elements that are present in our attempts at acquiring a knowledge of 
reality: we personally strive for universal standards, or for getting more and more intimations of 
reality. This sort of passion for the universal is the effective capacity we have to come closer to 
reality. And the evidence of any success we might have in this striving is given by the implications 
of our efforts going beyond the original experience our knowledge used to control. So, an index of
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reality is spontaneity which can only be felt through a contrivance, a conscious act. In short, if we 
do not try to know more, we will not know anything, or just know less.
The roots of personal knowledge are two, according to Polanyi: focal awareness and subsidiary 
awareness These are two different and mutually exclusive kinds o f knowledge which are present in 
every practical activity of human life. Focal awareness is knowledge or action that can be reduced 
to rules, or cause-consequence relations; subsidiary awareness is the *tooIs and probes' we 
assimilate when trying to attain focal awareness.
More generally, subsidiary awareness is the set o f our pre-suppositions, the interpretative 
framework that enables us to be focally aware of something. So, a performance cannot be 
accounted for just on the basis of a logical analysis for h contains more than that, and in this sense 
full self-consciousness destroys the sense o f context which alone can evoke the sequence of words, 
gestures, and so on. This refers to the unspecifiable character o f some arts like scientific research 
and politics.
The kind o f clumsiness which is due to the fact that focal attention is directed to the 
subsidiary elements of an action is commonly known as self-consciousness (...) This 
destroys one’s sense of the context which alone can smoothly evoke the proper 
sequence o f  words, notes, or gestures.
(...)
We may describe such a performance as logically unspecifiable, for we can show 
that in a sense the specification o f the particulars would logically contradict what is 
implied in the performance or context in question, (ibidem, 56)
( ...)
All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly 
constitute, (ibidem, 57)
This is not new, it is just another way o f  saying that the order exceeds the sum of its constituent 
parts, and accordingly the understanding o f the order is not tantamount to the analysis of its
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elements. The interesting suggestion by Polanyi refers to the way we acquire this PK and the 
dynamics that takes place between its two different roots.
So, how is PK achieved? For Polanyi, it is achieved by a repeated mental effort at the 
instmmentalization of a thing to some purpose:
Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded... as the act of 
making them form a part of our own body.... We may test the tool for its 
effectiveness or the probe for its suitability, e g., in discovering the hidden details of 
a cavity, but the tool and the probe can never lie in the field o f their operations; they 
remain necessarily on our side o f it, forming part of ourselves, the operating 
persons. We pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as parts of our own 
existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them, (ibidem, 59)
So, in trying to leam/understand/solve something, which is a conscious and purposeful act we end 
up with two different payoffs, so to speak, one being an increase in our subsidiary awareness, the 
unconscious elements we assimilate in the process, and the other being a newly acquired 
consciousness which is tantamount to the thing we learnt or came to understand or solved and may 
even go beyond. So, this is a positive relation between conscious and unconscious acts whereby a 
conscious effort sets in motion a process o f  unconscious trial and error, not fully specifiable, by 
which we grope our way towards success. This is what Polanyi calls a passive action.
Still, the negative relation between articulation and non-articulation to the effect that not every 
thing which is known may be consciously known also gains, with Polanyi, a more fertile meaning 
than the ones suggested by both Hayek and Oakeshott. He seems to imply that this relation should 
be seen not only as the inarticulable parts o f our knowledge constituting the condition of possibility 
of the articulable ones but also and more interestingly as an index of a non-abridgeable and 
indeterminate distance between both elements. This latter point may be made clearer through an 
illustration, as follows
Polanyi takes the relation between speech and thought to give rise to three distinctive domains: the 
ineffable domain (fully inarticulable), the domain of co-extensiveness (as in the case o f a text and its
2 7 6
meaning), and the domain of sophistication (where articulation and non-articulation are thoroughly 
unconnected). This latter domain requires a decision on the part of the recipient o f the message, 
either in the form of a speech or a text: he has to decide whether the lack o f meaning is due to a 
fumbling that might, henceforth, be corrected, or a pioneering, that is a proposed change in some o f  
the elements that constitute meaning.
So, the relation articulation-non-articulation involves an indeterminacy, and, particularly in the case 
of language, that the symbolic operations cannot be fully understood is an insurmountable feature 
of language itself. According to Polanyi, this indeterminacy is double: we cannot say all that we 
know or think; and we cannot know or think all that is implied by what we say. We have then 
backwards and forwards indeterminacy. What does this mean? For Polanyi, indeterminacy may be 
taken as an index of an anticipatory power of language, as a signal of its contact with reality 
(Polanyi's words).
I have already affirmed that these indeterminate anticipatory powers o f an apposite 
vocabulary are due to its contacts with reality. We may extend the conception of 
reality implied here to account for the capacity o f formal speculation to raise new 
problems and lead on to new discoveries. A new mathematical conception may be 
said to have reality if its assumption leads to a wide range of new interesting ideas.
(PK, 116)
In short, the message Polanyi seems to be conveying is not the same as that uttered by Oakeshott, 
for it is not 'don't try to overcome the boundaries of the unarticulated, for you won't succeed 
(Oakeshott) or you will destroy its motto (Hayek)', but something else. What for him is more 
worthwhile is precisely the efforts we make to invade the unknown, to have an anticipation of the 
unexpected, to get an intimation o f reality. And this is done through a passive action, a deliberate 
act that prepares the conditions for the emergence of a novelty. The example he gives of the 
operation o f this passive action is scientific research where the whole activity of problem-solving 
may be seen as a contrived act which enables the emergence of a happy thought': heuristic efforts 
evoke their own consummation.55
55 Cf. Polanyi, 1958.
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So, Polanyi acknowledges a pretty important place for design within the practical world through his 
notion of personal knowledge which is in fact pointing to an non-eliminable coefficient of individual 
initiative in the mechanics of our world. This yields a more detailed basis for the Popperian poiesis
Turning to our provisional typology o f praxis and poiesis I will now try to place Hayek within it 
First of all, we should stress Hayek's concern with knowledge as the crucial element of an 
understanding of the social world. The social world is a world of theories insofar as it is to a large 
extent an unknown world for its members (and conversely it is unknown precisely because of the 
cropping up of theories). So, social actors and theoreticians in general have to understand 
something quite similar as it is constituted by a universe o f socially and culturally generated notions; 
the object to which this knowledge refers lacks the desirable exteriority. Being the objects of 
people's concern external and internal at once, we have then, according to Hayek's picture, forces 
of praxis and poiesis launched simultaneously.
Now, the Hayekian message seems sometimes to be: we have no way to overcome our positional 
differences, and, accordingly we are unable to attain such an external viewpoint. Yet, Hayek 
understates an insight of his to the effect that the only method we have available to find our way in 
this world of uncertainty is to somehow construct such a world in the form of suppositions, 
anticipations and interpretations of the actions or suppositions of our cohabitants. This insight is 
better explored by Polanyi. In fact, Polanyi would argue that we have a drive to try to overcome 
our differences, to transcend our experience. And Popper, even more strongly (and morally?), 
would contend that we have a duty to invent if we are unable to accomplish the traditional ideal of 
objectivity. How can we reconcile these premises of our actions? Should we give up one of them?
Let us attempt to understand the components of this world of theories which our social world 
happens to be. According to the Hayekian view, it is possible to individuate three kinds of theories 
behind social actors' acts. Firstly, there are local theories which guide ordinary action of actors and 
which are tantamount to the concrete knowledge available to each according to his position within
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the social landscape. Secondly come social theories well advised by a good social philosophy that 
should have warned the specialists in the matter that the only possible social theories are but a set of 
ideal types. Thirdly, there are speculative Vulgar" theories which arise from the synoptical illusion of 
social actors, an illusion that would mislead them into building up theories of the functioning of the 
entire social order, but which cannot get rid of their inductive origin and ought to be corrected by 
properly thought-out social theories.
In this picture, any changes ought to arise just from chance (as adaptive solutions that we stumble 
upon, or else as mistakes or misunderstandings eventually produced by our local theories), or may 
be induced by proper social theories on a piecemeal basis. A supplement to this picture, one that 
tries to retrieve the dismissed synoptical illusion of ours, is suggested by our interpretation of 
Popper and Polanyi, for they seem implicitly to indicate two alternative sources of change. Popper 
straightforwardly states the possibility o f invention of new worlds from within the very invented 
tradition of (critical) reason, and Polanyi argues for the possibility of the emergence of a new 
solution from contrived efforts aiming at it even though an important part of the process might be 
unspecifiable.
Turning to our question of how to reconcile two basic premises of our action which are, 
respectively, our particular position within the whole (praxis) and our striving to encompass the 
whole itself (poiesis), we so far have no better answer than to remain within their very terms. One 
accepts the indeterminacy not as a failure but as a sign that we have so far succeeded in what our 
task possibly is.
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CONCLUDING CHAPTER
This thesis has identified and commented on three individualist arguments concerning the 
possibility of social order, three different conceptions o f the way in which the social order may 
result from the interaction of individuals. From the perspective I have taken up here, the 
different ways in which an individualist conception may be achieved differ in terms of degrees 
of reductionism and kinds of idealization. Regarding reductionism, I have assumed that any 
individualistic account o f the social order naturally undertakes, although to a variable extent, 
some reduction of the whole o f social order into its individual pans. Hence, the ‘one’, the 
‘two*, and the ‘many*. As for idealization, I have presumed that there is some sense of 
transcendence involved when we shift from the individuals to the whole, since individuals are 
seen less in their characteristic ‘individuality* and more in their ability to mutually coordinate 
their actions in some order-enabling way. In this way, my taxonomy has called attention to the 
different kinds of idealization where individuals may simply coordinate in some order- 
preserving way, or else adjust their actions in a more stringent equilibrium sense, or coordinate 
cooperatively or efficiently, or still achieve higher ideals such as justice and well-orderliness 
through interaction.
It has also been found here that the more reductionist the approach, the 'more* idealized its 
vision of the social order. So far, so good. Yet, is reductionism convincing? The possibility of 
reduction has seemed to me to depend on the capacities and motivation with which individuals 
are endowed in each approach, in particular their presumed ability to abridge the whole 
community in themselves which turns ultimately on the postulated knowledge possibilities. 
From an examination o f these aspects and relations, I have found reductionism quite 
unconvincing. If so, how about high ideals? Should we give up them? I have also tried to 
argue against this skepticism in the last section of Part ID. Let me retrace my steps in this 
thesis and call attention to the structure o f  the argument I have built up on my way to looking 
for some answers.
* * *
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In the Introductory Chapter, I have tried out a couple of analytical remarks, in an effort to  
demarcate the set of theories in terms of some traits that would fit into my purpose o f  
discussing reductionism, normative aspects, and epistemological elements, as well as their 
mutual relations in the theories. In this regard, I have proposed a two-dimensional taxonomy 
of social action considering different kinds of rationality (parametric, strategic, and 
evolutionary) and ends o f the individuals (public and non-public), corresponding roughly to 
distinct degrees o f  reductionism and normative outlooks, which, I have presumed, have a 
special relation to  epistemological elements in the analysis. The classification undertaken 
should have drawn attention to common characteristics of theories in each cell as well as to  
the diversity between different cells. In matrix 1 ,1 have also initially characterized the different 
theories in terms o f  their belonging to the same perspective o f seeing the social order as the 
result o f peculiar individual rational choices. However, with the inclusion o f the 'evolutionary1 
rationality in the modified matrix 2, our reasoning is forced into realizing how enlarged may 
the conception o f  'individual' be as well as the idea that the social order is the result o f 
individual actions and purposes. To see that the subsets of theories in matrix 2 still have much 
in common and may be seen as distinct interpretations o f largely the same tradition, one has to 
move a long way back into the past.
So, I have tried, in chapter 1, to locate the entire lot o f arguments in a common tradition that 
goes back to the eighteenth century European political thought and that evolves from a 
discussion over the meaning of the public interest. In that context, the notion o f  self-interest 
acquired great significance. Self-interest was proposed as a promising proto-democratic 
political category that could oppose partisanship in the competition for a suitable basis for the 
public interest. It was also seen as potentially helping in its capacity to add to the social 
cement, as in Mandevillian and Smithian arguments for that matter. All this notwithstanding, 
except for the utilitarian branch o f the tradition as denounced by Macaulay, almost every 
argument redeeming self-interest from its pre-modem exile called attention to its merely 
vicarious or imputed character in political arguments. In other words, there was nothing self- 
evident about self-interest nor was it always true that when considered as a natural motivation 
o f a person it necessarily worked for his good, let alone the common good. So, self-interest
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reappeared as a category shaped in political arguments, whose value in terms of promoting 
one's or everybody's good was to be established through acceptable meanings conveyed to it 
by the social environment, and whose primary function was that of being a critical and 
reflective category.
* * *
Having established this standpoint regarding self-interest, I have proceeded by examining some 
contemporary theories that stem from the tradition such as those in Parts I, n , and m . My first 
case, in chapter 2, was a set of theories that typically claims to provide an account o f social 
order in terms of an efficient (and sometimes also just) cooperation among individuals that 
results from a collective action o f self-interested people, or what they call an 'internal solution' 
to the problem of generating the political order. According to these theories, self-interest may 
effect the 'bootstrapping' of promoting the public interest. The self-interest o f people is here 
translated into their maximizing behavior in the context o f Hobbesian strategic interaction. The 
perspectives examined assume either complete information, or incomplete information or still 
endogenous preferences, relying, respectively, on rational choice approaches to individual 
behavior, institutional design and preferences. I have organized my critical analysis o f this 
literature in a way that contrasted it with the opposite perspective of'external' solutions which 
have seemed to me to be more in line with the advice given by the tradition. In the end, 
internal solutions have appeared to call for external aid o f the independent substantive 
assumption o f cooperative behavior or, more generally, to reinforce the impression that 
external elements to the maximizing utility assumption are needed for cooperation among 
individuals to arise.
In this direction, I have identified what I have termed an 'identitarian' collective action 
approach which emphasizes the importance o f considering a person as an enlarged entity 
rather than a bare self, and as possessing constitutive group interests or commitments to 
values and norms that reach beyond their 'selves' and indeed are the condition o f the possibility 
o f any maximizing calculation of theirs. Such an enlarged behavioral assumption would render 
cooperation possible. Two difficulties have stood in the way, according to my analysis. They
2 8 2
refer, on the one hand, to the conceptual confusion between explanans and explananda where 
group-interest achievement assumes group-interest motivation, and on the other hand, to  the 
doubtful desirability o f this achievement in view of the warnings that come from the tradition 
about deleterious effects o f successful group interest on public interest. Is there something 
beyond self-interest that does not belong in the group-interest sphere, or more generally in the 
altruistic- or, to put it in Kantian terms, Tiappiness- sphere? The claim by accounts discussed 
in Part II is that there is such a sphere, the moral domain o f human motivation. (Note the link 
between chapter 2 in Part I, and Part II). Indeed, Part II begins by posing a stylized question 
concerning the narrow limits o f what Kant calls the domain o f  'generahzability1 in contrast to 
the larger ones o f  the domain o f ’universalizability'.
Before coming to this, however, there are other threads worth pursuing in Part I. To begin 
with, I have discussed game-theoretical issues in this Part with the intention of outlining some 
o f the theory of rationality behind the public-good theories which spells out how individuals 
reason in a strategic environment, and, more generally, what is peculiar about a strategic 
interaction. While the 'public' aspect o f  rational choices in the sense o f my matrix 1 was 
explicitly discussed in the chapter on order as a public good and had a natural sequence in Part 
II, their 'strategic' aspect, in turn, was approached in the chapter on game theory. Another 
important motivation for discussing game theoretical aspects is the underlying assumption in 
Part I that the notion o f equilibrium is an important part to the notion o f order (besides its 
efficiency or justice attributes), and game theory is concerned with producing equilibrium 
solutions to strategic situations. Given, however, that the environment is strategic in the sense 
that the individual choosers are aware o f  their interdependence, epistemic aspects acquire 
great importance when choosing. In view o f this, the equilibrium notions in the standard 
approach assume at some point a convergence o f beliefs among the agents. The best 
accomplished justification for this convergence assumption I have found within the game- 
theoretical field has been provided by Bayesianism in its use o f  the Bayes rule as a learning 
mechanism and in its adoption o f  the common priors assumption and the so-called Harsanyi 
doctrine. These assumptions provide the symmetry conditions for at least two distinct 
individual agents to  reason to the equilibrium-profile in an uncertain environment. So, while 
this account puts stress on the problem o f mutual predictability and the medium by which
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intentions are translated into actions, the attempt to build up a formal reasoning to underscore 
equilibrium considerations reduces the question of predictability to the seemingly more 
tractable and less interesting one of'outguessing'. A series of objections may be raised against 
the symmetry postulates, and the Une I have followed in the thesis has stressed the low 
philosophical density thereof. My contention is that they take too much for granted, as in the 
statement that beliefs are coextensive with information where the issue o f knowledge in the 
social interaction is trivialized. In this respect, a better philosophically situated stand is taken 
up by the approach that I have examined in Part m , and the link between chapter 3 in Part I 
and Part III is quite direct for that matter.
* * *
Retrieving the link between Parts I and II, we should note that the adoption o f the assumption 
of cooperative behavior on the part of the individuals finds argumentative support in the 
theories examined in Part II. So, in Part II I have considered a different family o f theories 
stemming from the broad self-interest tradition that produces arguments for the existence o f a 
motivational sphere beyond self-interest, the moral domain; this set o f  theories illustrates the 
parametric-public case. The moral sphere is supposed to provide the basis for a well-ordered 
society, where we would find not only equilibrium and efficiency but also an objective measure 
of better-orderliness in terms of the achievement of certain ideals o f justice.
In the historical chapter 1, 1 have discussed possible ways of reconciling the self- and the 
public- interests that one may find in the tradition, and I have mentioned the two theories o f 
laws as edges, and laws o f justice, by Hobbes and Locke, respectively. Then, I have tackled 
the claim by Locke that the laws should also include some positive high ideals and not only a 
concern about 'bogs and precipices', that is to say, they should also indicate some ends to 
follow, reflecting a portion o f the General Good in each individual. My feeling then was that 
Locke, like many others including Adam Smith, was well aware o f  the limits o f the self- 
interested motivation in promoting the General Good and that something else was needed for 
this to be brought about. Normative theories typically assume the possibility of this 'something 
else', which they call the moral motivation.
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In order to delineate the general traits o f these approaches I have written a chapter on Arrow's 
impossibility theorem which I have interpreted as posing an important question to liberal 
conceptions of the social order, namely, can preference-autonomy lead to an acceptable notion 
of social preferences, where this autonomy may involve people's personal tastes as well as 
values? Or, in other words, can the myriad o f interpersonal comparisons people make when 
forming and expressing their preferences over alternative social states, from their own 
however enlarged personal standpoint, produce acceptable social states? This I have called 
Arrow's inductive question concerning the (¡impossibility o f social order as an aggregate o f 
personal preferences. My attention was drawn to what appeared to me to be the suggestion o f 
a conceptual relation between order and justice, where justice acquired a preeminence, as a 
condition o f possibility o f order itself. It was also drawn to what I have taken as a warning as 
to the difficulty o f establishing the justice viewpoint from a 'generalizability' perspective, that 
is, from a majority o f personal viewpoints regarding the social preferences.
Then, in my interpretation, Harsanyi and Rawls' arguments follow those o f Arrow's as 
proposals o f construction of an impersonal or impartial standpoint, where the social order is 
seen as arising from prior well-founded interpersonal comparisons which stem from an 
agreement on rational principles. Harsanyi finds a support for this standpoint in what he calls 
our moral (in contrast to personal) preferences and he works it out from a sympathy-like 
perspective. Rawls poses our sense of justice as providing such a support. Their arguments, 
although differing in important respects, share the basic common characteristic of approaching 
the objective standard for interpersonal comparisons (which is the condition o f possibility o f a 
well-ordered society) through the thought experiment o f  one rational individual whose ends 
have been properly constrained. In a way, either sympathy or the sense of justice may be seen 
as symmetry devices that enable reason as impersonated in any rational individual to give 
access to the standpoint o f all; in the case o f  Harsanyi, the so-called Harsanyi doctrine plays a 
crucial role in the construction o f the ideal observer's standpoint. These devices are proposed 
as elements in the construction of a ‘universalizability* perspective, in order to fill the blanks of 
the inductive construction of the social preferences. (There is an interesting parallel that may 
be made between the formal argument o f the impossibility theorem and the ethical arguments
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issued by Harsanyi and Rawls and it is that these latter also deal with the problem of 
aggregation o f individual ends from a formal perspective, where even some substantive aspects 
of ethical doctrines such as claims about specific ends that individuals or their social 
arrangements should follow are formally provided. This renders the joint treatment o f these 
theories a much easier and natural task to undertake, where consistency conditions along with 
moral constraints are only different kinds o f  formal restrictions to be imposed on one's rational 
choices over social arrangements.)
A question arises how much objectivity can this new standpoint achieve due to this new set of 
restrictions? The extent to which intrapersonal deliberation may cross the boundaries between 
people towards the achievement o f an impartial outlook depends much, in these approaches, 
on the presence of certain knowledge conditions, as I have remarked on in my analysis. This is, 
in my judgment, where the 'universalizability* argument seems to collapse into the 
'generalizability' one, and what I have called the deductive approach seems not to overcome 
the inductive difficulties in providing conditions for the formation of acceptable social 
preferences. Reductionism and 'high' ideals go together here: reason as it occurs in any 
rational individual renders one able to  design the principles that should regulate the ideal social 
order, where the demands of stability meet those of justice. However, the objective knowledge 
that is needed to  the achievement o f the same set of principles by any rational individual is 
reduced into a less infallible theoretical knowledge.
Certain nuances are worth remarking on in this Part. Generally speaking, the transcendence 
aspect involved in any individualistic account o f  social order is here thought of in terms o f the 
access individual reason conveys to an ideal community o f individuals, through principles o f 
universal validity which it may reach, understand and articulate. In the rule-utilitarian version 
there is but one rational good to  be pursued, and this comes out as the result o f an 
individual's properly constrained hypothetical reasoning. Hence, an ideal social order is that 
which is ordered according to principles which result from a rational individual's understanding 
o f what the one rational good is. This view is unacceptable to Rawls, who launches a very 
important criticism to utilitarianism on the appealing ground o f the incommensurability o f 
the goods, or o f  conceptions thereof, in the society. This is a Tact' which our ideal conception
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of social order should address somehow. However, Rawls' view of social order is still 
aggregative, for he also looks for the one rational standpoint whereby a set o f principles would 
unfold, although with a view that there is no trade between those goods and therefore that we 
should think in terms of a hierarchy or a serial order of common regulative ends which we all 
share, regardless o f our differing conceptions of the good. In the earlier Rawlsian argument of 
A Theory o f Justice, room is given to an incommensurability between goods as pursued by 
rational individuals, the emphasis being placed on the possibility that rational individuals have 
a common regulative interest in abiding by public principles which in turn gains support from 
their sense o f justice. In the later Rawlsian argument one does not attain universal principles 
only by means of ignoring one's particular position in the social arrangement and relying on 
one's sense o f justice. This time, the achievement of public principles is also constrained by 
what the many radically incommensurable views of the good might all share, relying on a 
notion of public reason and the demands o f the Treasonable. and hence getting closer to a 
view of'justice as order' rather than 'order as justice'.
Moving from the rule-utilitarian to the later Rawlsian arguments it becomes increasingly 
difficult to reduce the social order into one individual's rational endeavors, as well as to 
harmonize the different ideals to which the order so conceived should be conducive. 
Nonetheless, it seems to me that there is something strikingly similar in these approaches to 
the effect that the 'representation fact' is conceived unproblematically, or non-philosophically. 
The idealized representation of the social order in terms o f  the interaction o f  rational 
individuals take these latter as only capable, in the processes o f deciding on what principles to 
organize the basis o f their interaction, o f following a proper method o f reasoning and 
obtaining the relevant information to this end (leaving aside the psychological assumptions of 
sympathy and sense o f justice that warrant the ideal agreement).
* * *
A different view o f individual transcendence towards the construction of a social order is 
displayed in the third approach that I have examined in Part m . It derives much of its vision of 
the social world from the eighteenth century tradition that I have discussed in chapter 1,
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indeed it may be argued that this perspective is a legitimate heir o f  that tradition as it has been 
interpreted in the present dissertation. In the chapter on self-interest I have pointed out certain 
quite obvious limitations of this behavioral assumption, in terms o f its restricted use either in 
explanatory or in normative arguments due basically to the fact that, to take a metaphor 
suggested in the title to that chapter, self-interest does not possess an absolute value but only 
a relative one. In other words, its meaning is relative to one's circumstances and to the 
knowledge open to him, relative to more basic and less desirable motivations o f human action, 
relative to political argument and, more generally, relative to opinions. In a nut-shell, self- 
interest is highly sensitive to the restrictions, be they moral, political or epistemic, to an extent 
that renders it almost empty when it is asked to yield an explanation or a normative horizon to 
human interaction in its terms. So then, this basic idea is captured by the third set of thoughts 
that I have analyzed in the thesis under the heading of'interacting individuals'.1
This is an approach that clearly emphasizes the role o f restrictions on social action in the 
construction o f our social world in a way that downplays the importance o f the plain 
behavioral assumption o f self-interest and, in general, o f individual rationality. What is more, it 
also proposes that the motivation o f self-interest itself is something that is given meaning by 
the socially evolving restrictions. However, as it might be supposed, it does not involve the 
thorough rejection o f  individualism as in a holistic approach where the social world is 
explained in terms o f  some prior social entities and individual action is in the same way 
determined by these pre-existing social forms. The vision here is o f a complex relationship 
between the irreducible domains o f  the social and the individual. I have tried to get closer to 
this vision and to offer its anatomy.
W hat comes out is an intermediary position between canonical holist and individualist 
approaches to social order, which I have labeled the 'interacting individuals' variety. In contrast 
to  the individualistic varieties that I have gone through in the present thesis, this outlook offers
1 At the precise time 1 wrote the first version of this chapter and submitted it to  my supervisor in 1995,1 did 
not know  the article by Alan Kinnan, "Economies with Interacting Agents”. After knowing it, I have decided 
to  m aintain my title because the distinction between individuals and agents has seemed to me to be significant 
enough. I have been most interested in understanding interacting individuals as peculiar carriers of knowledge 
rather than agents.
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a view of order not as a rational choice o f  either maximizing agents or (also) moral persons 
but as an emerging unintended effect o f the interaction o f ‘interacting individuals’ over time. 
Before summing up the main steps I have taken towards that end, let me recall that the 
Hayekian vision of society as a complex interactive system is not new as it comes from the 
tradition I have examined in chapter 1, in particular from Mandeville and the Scottish 
enlightenment authors whose ideas Hayek explicitly interpreted and elaborated upon. It is also 
worth remarking that Hayek’s vision bears important similarities to those o f British 
philosopher Edmund Burke and, more recently, British historian Michael Oakeshott and 
Austrian thinkers such as Michael Polanyi and Karl Popper. With the exception o f Oakeshott 
who takes a clearly anti-rationalistic stand, these authors claim with varying intensities a 
limited role for reason (as it is available in each individual) to account for the social world, and 
oppose either reason's 'conceit* or 'immodesty'. I have assumed here that Scottish 
enlightenment can provide an interesting defence o f (a modest form of) rationalism. However, 
before coming to that let me resume my interpretation o f Hayek's concerning his conception of 
the social world.
Chapter 7 on Hayek is divided into 7 sections which pursue the following scheme. The first 
section provides the Hayekian general outlook concerning the social order as an emerging 
effect of individual actions, where the macro-level of the social order appears as a surprising 
effect of the actions and interactions o f individuals otherwise motivated and radically ignorant. 
The micro-level of the individuals is looked into in sections 2, 3, and 4. In section 3, in 
particular, the Hayekian true' individualism is displayed via the image o f interacting 
individuals, that is, individuals that only exist and make sense in society, where reductionism is 
rejected and the importance of an intermediary or intersubjective space is affirmed that takes 
the form o f 'rules'. These are proposed as a truly ontological dimension that does not, 
however, collapse into a collectivistic, let alone, individualistic essentialism. The nature of 
rules is epistemic; they are social forms o f knowledge that have their origin in the interaction 
o f the individuals over time and whose role is to complement the limited reach of individual 
rationality to go about the social intercourse. These rules, in other words, cannot be entirely 
known in the individuals' consciousness.
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What kind o f knowledge is this? In contrast to the views displayed in the previous Parts o f the 
thesis, this knowledge is not understood as unambiguous information and methods of 
reasoning, it is instead a more problematic notion of knowledge that we have to deal with 
here Rules are proposed in a Verstehen sense, as internal-external viewpoints, that is, 
objective norms subjectively or individually consumed and being produced by the same act 
whereby they are consumed. Since the individual does not have an access through reason to 
the rules he follows or should follow as they cannot be entirely known in his consciousness, he 
can only get the rules from his particular position in the social world. Objectivity in this way 
has an irreducible personal coefficient, to borrow Polanyi's expression. However, as the 
individual catches the rule on his way to understanding or acting, he adds to the general stock 
o f knowledge to be mastered by his fellow actors, thus his subjective acts have an objective 
however unintended extension.
From this viewpoint, we have the consequence that any knowledge is only practical 
knowledge, that is, limited to one's particular position in the world and interpretation 
apparatus, although being objective in the sense that it extends far beyond the individual 
sphere. In this sense, the individuals' positions are not interchangeable and the possibility for 
people to coordinate on their reciprocal plans derives from analogy rather than symmetry 
considerations. In section 4, the double aspect of knowledge, the objective and the subjective, 
is discussed in depth, and we see that every aspect that concerns the individual action in the 
social world is rule-laden, comprising his perceptions, experiences, purposes and decisions.
It is also shown in that section that the way the individuals understand and apply the rules, 
which they do in virtue of their ignorance, is witness, in a non-intuitive manner, to their 
additive or creative capacity. Because they cannot have before them a clear-cut idea o f  the 
rules they follow as they cannot articulate them all in their minds, the rules are subjected to  the 
individual's interpretative apparatus: the understanding o f the situation in which they find 
themselves as well as the comprehension o f the rules applicable and use thereof are submitted 
to  the personal coefficient. I believe that this vision permits a fresh interpretation o f  the 
famous dictum by Adam Ferguson, that the social world is the product of human action not o f 
design, though I can only give a partial idea o f what I have in mind at this point. So, the fact
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that not every rule that we follow can be articulated in a conscious manner does not rule out 
our creative capacity and does not make o f  us wholly determined creatures. Further on l will 
reintroduce this dictum in connection with Polanyi and Popper's contribution.
In sections 5 and 6 , 1 have taken the path back from the micro- to the macro-level on the way 
to devising the Hayekian idea o f order, the spontaneous order. A series of elements comes into 
the analysis to yield the image o f an autonomous or complex and changing structure. Then, I 
have captured the tension that dwells in the heart of Hayek's idea o f  order, as this is connected 
with preservation and change, by distinguishing the 'evolutionist' from the 'evolutionary* 
aspects of Hayek's thought. The evolutionary Hayek is at odds with the evolutionist Hayek as 
the epistemic (evolutionary) perspective sets limits to the normative (evolutionist) viewpoint.
In section 7 a way out is proposed that draws on Popper and Polanyi’s ideas. The startling 
thing about this route is that it suggests a possible reconciliation between the epistemological 
aspects of Hayek’s analysis and personal deliberation and intervention, in a way that enables an 
original relationship between ignorance and design, between, that is, our epistemic condition 
and our inclination to actively change our world. This gives a new flavor to Ferguson's dictum 
that order is the product of action not o f will, in that while the constructivist alternative is 
rejected on the grounds o f our precarious private stock o f reason, to put it in Burke's words, 
this action is not completely determined by the blind forces of'natural' selection. Between full­
blown intentional action and 'naturally* determined action there seems to exist a third 
alternative, an intriguing third bank o f the river, as in the image o f  JoSo Guimaries Rosa. This 
possibility seems to come out from Michael Polanyi's discussion o f personal knowledge, 
where, I believe, it is possible to catch a glimpse of a new micro (corresponding to complex 
structures such as society, scientific discovery and language) in the notion of a passive action, 
which has not the full strength o f intentional action nor the weakness o f passivity and which is 
a contrived effort that causes an emergence. This also comes out from Popperian imaginative 
reason, where circumstances are approached in a 'constructivist' way instead o f  in the external 
and rather natural manner often present in so-called evolutionary approaches.
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In relation to previous Parts of the thesis, I have to say that Part m  has a direct link with Part 
I, especially the chapter on game theory, in terms of its epistemological discussion and the 
limits it imposes on symmetry considerations and the role of individual rationality. Moreover, 
its dynamic view o f order does not fit well into standard game-theory's static stand in this 
regard Of course, the form that the discussion has taken is clearly different here, as 1 have 
discussed the epistemological aspects o f Hayek's social philosophy while in the chapter on 
game-theory I have tried to spell out its epistemology from within a more theoretical 
discussion (though I have come to understand that Hayekian social theory can only be a social 
philosophy because it is reflective and suspicious of its own findings!). However, in general 
terms, in both cases the effort has been made to characterize their views of interaction and, 
then, the reduction o f social interaction into smaller parts, namely, strategic rationality of 
maximizing agents in one case, or limited rationality of individual rule-followers in the other.
As for the relation to Part II, a series of aspects may be raised. With respect to utilitarianism, 
Hayek is clearly a critic of its disregarding ignorance and the corollary impossibility of 
calculating the full consequences o f one's acts in an extended society. The Archimedian point 
that might be built up on the basis o f such a rationalistic conceit is therefore dismissed by 
Hayek. Regarding Rawls, what this epistemological Hayekian discussion objects is to the 
impossibility o f fully articulating the rules that we follow while acting, comprising our sense 
of justice, which renders the enterprise o f  justification o f  general principles always partial. 
Reason, with a capital R, is not always fully and equally available to all, notes Hayek. 
Considering either the rule-utilitarian argument or that of R aw ls', Hayek's view o f knowledge 
is quite distinct in that for him the possibility of knowledge in the social world is itself 
interestingly problematic and is not solved by reducing knowledge to  non-disputable data and 
correct methods of reasoning that may be fully and equally available to any individual. 
Knowledge is the moving stuff out of which the social world is made, for although it is 
condensed in these social forms such as the system o f rules, it is always irreducibly 
intersubjective and undergoing change as long as these rules are individually consumed and 
circumstances change. It may be said that the cases that I have examined in Part II also 
postulate a social dimension in each individual action, as Harsanyi postulates the social nature 
o f our preferences and Rawls recalls the compelling demands on our acts of our sense o f
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justice and o f what he calls the 'reasonable'. The presence of this dimension in the individual 
domain opens the possibility for the morality o f our individual actions.
In Hayek, in contrast, although the social dimension is said to be present in every act o f ours 
and even our intuitions to have a social basis, this presence does not constitute a reliable basis 
for the morality o f our acts as the multi-level rules we follow cannot be fully articulated at the 
individual level, and our knowledge o f these can only be partial and relative to our position in 
the social world. Our actions as ordinary actors are always mediated by theories or 
hypotheses, efforts o f  understanding through classification (in the same ways as extraordinary 
actors such as social theoreticians do). The only truly impersonal or impartial standpoint is that 
offered by the evolving structure represented by society, that is, this ontological dynamic 
system that cannot be understood in the sense of the articulable knowledge available to one 
individual. Still, in terms o f the normative consequences o f such a picture, while utilitarianism 
claims the existence o f what Rawls has called the one rational good, and Rawls himself claims 
that there is incommensurability o f goods but not of rights and that, as it were, there can only 
be the common meta-good of toleration, Hayek seems to claim the incommensurability o f 
persons which may be derived from his criticism of essentialistic individualism. Is that all there 
is to say about normative horizons?
In this connection, the integration o f Hayekian epistemology with pieces o f  Popper and 
Polanyi's thinking has been made with the purpose o f experimenting the possibility of 
reconciliation between Hayekian epistemology and design, something Hayek and his more 
conservative colleagues have always rejected quite boldly. The Hayekian warning that design 
would unleash perverse consequences has always sounded a bit odd in view o f  his very 
convincing epistemological arguments that we cannot frilly know the consequences o f  our 
acts. The Hayekian contention that evolution pursues some end has equally sounded awkward 
in view of the same quite illuminating epistemological findings o f  his. So, he cannot as safely 
state that everything tends to the better or the worse for the same very reasons provided by 
the epistemological argument.
zr>
So far so good Still, I keep wondering, is it possible to make more out of this'* Could we 
possibly hope for hope and yet accept our epistemic condition'* I have argued here that 
Popper and Polanyi's ideas provide a basis for such a hope Popper proposes a modest 
rationalism that understands itself as a tradition, having bom from the invention of a tradition, 
namely, the tradition of criticism (a view that bears similarity to the eighteenth century outlook 
regarding self-interest as a reflective category). Polanyi identifies the passive action of an actor 
endowed with personal knowledge whose roots are twofold, conscious and unconscious, and 
where the conscious side pushes him forward in a way he is unable to describe fully He 
locates the intentional action in between its inarticulable backward condition and its 
thoroughly unpredicted consequences, preserving however its sense of deliberation and 
creativity, in what seems to me to be a poietical construction of the social world
* * *
Having said that, I should say a final word about the kind of integration of these theories that 
is possible within the limits of my undertaking here. I want to call attention to the fact that this 
integration as it exists in the thesis is only a meta-theoretical one, where a set of theories 
have been examined in view of their belonging to a common tradition of ideas, which I have 
characterized as such, and their distinct answers to some salient questions that 1 have 
suggested pertain to this tradition. A theoretical integration where better argued propositions 
o f one particular theory would be imported into another in order to overcome the latter's 
difficulties was not my purpose here.
* * *
As an afterword, the following diagram3 may give a synoptic (though perhaps too schematic) 
idea o f  my three ideal types in terms of their idealized views of social order, their assumptions 
concerning the motivation of the individuals, the degrees of reductionism involved, and the 
knowledge possibilities open to the actors: 2
2 Note that the elements in the cells are just the focal (and sot the exclusive) characteristics of each t>pe.
294
IDEAL TYPE ORDER AS INDIVIDUALS AS REDUCTION KNOWLEDGE
POSSIBILITIES
SELF-INTEREST Efficiency/
Equilibrium
Utility-maximizers Otherness (the two) Information and 
method3
AUTONOMY Justice Moral persons Uniformity (the 
one)
Information and 
method4
INTERACTING
INDIVIDUALS
Change Rule- followers Complexity (the 
many)
articulable and 
inarticulable rules
3 This means 'unambiguous* information and ’correct* methods of reasoning.
4 See footnote 3.
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